WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION


BY

A. PIATNITSKY

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CONTENTS

WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION - - - - 5

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY - - - 19

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE - - - 44

CONCLUSIONS AND TASKS CONFRONTING THE SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL - - - 59
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

DURING the period between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Sections of the Communist International, hence also the Comintern itself, have extended and deepened their influence over the broad masses of the workers. This is true likewise of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. During these few years new Communist Parties were founded in the countries of South and Central America and in some colonies.

The Sections of the Communist International have become stronger both in ideology and in organisation. During this period, they adopted and started to carry out the tactics of "class against class." The Comintern Sections started to organise and to lead independently economic battles even in those countries where there are no separate red trade unions. Finally, the period between these two Congresses of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is marked by enormous successes in the construction of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., and by the rising tide of the labour and revolutionary movement almost in all countries of the world. This, in its turn, facilitated the complete liquidation of Trotskyism within the Sections, the carrying out of a successful struggle against the Rights and the conciliators, as well as against the "Left" sectarian distortions, both within the Communist Parties and the Communist Leagues of Youth. It resulted also in the consolidation of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. This struggle, which was accompanied by a discussion on the most important questions of strategy and tactics of the revolutionary and labour movement, strengthened ideologically and unified organisationally the Sections of the Comintern and thus enhanced their fighting capacity.

In this struggle the foremost place among the Comintern Sections in capitalist countries has been, and is, taken by the GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY. It is one of the best organised Communist Parties, the largest numerically, with deep roots in the working class and the leader of the broad masses. In a
relatively short time, by means of an enlightenment campaign and corresponding organisational steps, it defeated Brandlerism in the Party, overcame the conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation (Ewert and others) and is now waging a war both on opportunism in practice—though not as energetically and systematically as is necessary—and against the "Left" sectarianism and the "revolutionary" phrase mongering in the Young Communist League and in the trade union opposition (Merker). Owing to this successful struggle the Communist Party of Germany was able in 1930 to act independently at the elections of the Factory Councils in very many (over 1,000) large and medium scale enterprises and to give independent leadership in the economic struggles of the proletariat (in the Ruhr, Munich, Gladboch, Wasserkante, etc.), meeting in this connection with considerably less opposition in the lower units of the Party than was the case in 1929.

The Communist Party of Germany has become more united, more disciplined. No libellous tricks of the bourgeoisie and Social Democrats will be able to bring about waverings in the ranks of the Party. The present leadership of the Communist Party of Germany has greater prestige in the Party than that which existed prior to the struggle against the renegades (Brandler, etc.) and the application of the tactics of conducting independent battles.

We shall deal further on with the defects of the Party's work in Germany.

As regards the conciliators, some of them have gone over to the Rights, others (Ewert, Eberlein and others), recognised their mistakes and capitulated to the Party.

The renegades, Brandler, Thalheimer and others are carrying on a bitter struggle against the Communist Party of Germany, hampering it in conducting independent battles, are supplying slanderous material against the Party to the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats, are supporting the reformists during strikes, and joining the Social Democrats at elections to the factory-councils and in the trade unions.

In the French Communist Party an energetic and strong leadership has crystallised from among the old cadres as well as from the young cadres, who emerged from the Young Communist League. At the parliamentary elections in 1928 they successfully carried out the "class against class" tactics and also the struggle against the Right. However, they made many
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

mistakes in their work (they did not display enough energy in combating "Left" sectarianism and the "revolutionary" phase, which count many supporters in France), and which will be treated in detail later on.

IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND, prior to the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (in the summer of 1929), there existed in fact two factions with their respective central committees. The Party organisations in the country were divided into partisans of this or that faction. A great deal of the energy of the Party was spent not in fighting the bourgeoisie and the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), but on the factional struggle in its own midst. With the assistance of the E.C.C.I., the Communist Party of Poland has set up a leadership which rallied all the local Party organisations of Poland proper, Western White Russia and Western Ukraine, although it has not yet liquidated everywhere the remnants of factionalism. The Party has revived after freeing itself from the prolonged and at times unprincipled factional struggle. In the last phase of the factional struggle big divergences of opinion arose with regard to the evaluation of the rôle of the P.P.S., and this helped to win over and to rally around the present leadership the former adherents of the groups of Koscheva and Stefanski. The latter have sunk to the level of conduits of the Right deviation in the Communist Party of Poland. The Communist Party of Poland is carrying on great work in extremely complex surroundings, on an important section of the international revolutionary front, working illegally and subjected to incredible terror by the Pilsudskians and the P.P.S. It exercises enormous influence over the proletariat of the whole of Poland, but like the other Sections it does not know how to consolidate in organisation its growing political influence. The consolidation of the leadership of the Communist Party is a guarantee that the Party will cope with the tasks that confront it.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN, as previously constituted, and which led the Party up to the autumn of 1929, mastered its tasks at a time when the work of the Communist Party was mainly of an agitational-propaganda nature, when it was not confronted with the tasks of immediately guiding the political and economic struggle. At that period the Communist Party, criticising in its oral agitation and in print the policy of the trade unions and the "Labour Party" yet supported them at the parliamentary and
municipal elections without putting up its own independent candidates and without setting forth its own policy in distinction to theirs. It resolutely supported the general strike headed by them, also the miners’ union during the miners’ strike in 1926, pushing the movement forward, but not trying to give an independent lead to the strike struggle. After the General Council and the Labour Party had betrayed the strike, after they suffered the passing of the draconian anti-trade union Act, and the lowering of the railway-men’s wages without any struggle, after the trade union bureaucracy pursuing its treacherous policy of “industrial peace,” openly became part of the State apparatus, and the Labour Party cruelly persecuting and expelling from its ranks Communists and the revolutionary workers, became, according to its organisation structure, an ordinary social-democratic party, the necessity of carrying out the “class against class” tactics became the urgent task of the day. This tactic presupposed that the Communist Party acts at elections as an independent party with its own programme and candidates in opposition to the Labour Party and aims at taking the lead in the economic struggle irrespective of and against the trade union bureaucrats.

The question of a change in the tactics of the Communist Party, which emerged in a very acute form at the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, called for the frantic opposition of the majority of the Central Committee of the British Communist Party. Only in the plenary meeting, when the members of the Central Committee of the British Communist Party saw the unanimity of the representatives of all the parties on this question, and after a minority was formed in the Central Committee of the British Communist Party itself, which declared that it would support the new tactics, did they agree to vote for the new tactics. Practice showed that the former Central Committee either did not want or did not know how to carry out the new tactics. It wanted to combine the old and the new tactics; the Party therefore was guided amiss. The central Committee in this connection made many opportunist mistakes, which resulted in the British Communist Party losing more than half of its membership. Its influence among the proletariat, acquired by the excellent work the Communists performed during the general strike and the miners’ lockout was weakened. The Central Committee did not explain to the masses and to the Party itself
the necessity of the new tactics, namely, of the simultaneous struggle both against the Conservatives and against the Labour Party. The workers, afraid that by voting for the independent candidates of the Communists, and thus defeating the candidates of the Labour Party they would only help to maintain the Conservatives in power, gave their votes to the partisans of MacDonald. The Central Committee was subjected to a decisive criticism by the Executive Committee of the Communist International for its opportunist mistakes. Party members and local organisations of the British Communist Party, after considering the letter of the E.C.C.I., demanded the convocation of a special Party Congress. The Congress condemned the political line of the Central Committee and elected a central committee composed mostly of new elements. The present Central Committee is still weak, but on the whole it follows a correct tactic. The central committee started on January 1st, 1930, to issue a daily newspaper; it is conducting a vigorous campaign against the "Labour" government, exposing its policy of treason to the interests of the working-class, and its bloodthirsty policy of throttling the nations of India, Palestine, Egypt and the other colonies. It took an active part in leading the strike of the wool workers.

The number of participants of the demonstrations organised by the Party on March 6th and May 1st, 1930, as well as the number of those frequenting the meetings called by Party organisations show that the Communist Party is spreading its influence over the masses. The Communist Party has made its first steps, to increase its membership and to strengthen its organisational influence.

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia emerged from its struggle with the Right renegades much weaker numerically, but inherently stronger and with enhanced fighting capacity. After the imperialist war and the collapse of the Second International the majority in the Social Democratic Party of Czecho-Slovakia were adherents of the Communist International. After the partisans of the Second International left the Party, the majority of the old Party joined the Communist International. The overwhelming majority of members of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia are former members of the social-democratic party who had no experience of the civil war. They therefore bring social-democratic traditions to all spheres of Party work from which the Party is very slowly
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

freeing itself. The Executive Committee of the Communist International often had to consider the case of that Party, to correct its grave Right errors, which at times were intertwined with ultra-Left tendencies. Party meetings were rarely called, and members were not drawn into the work of the Party. This method of work and the passivity of Party members were transferred to the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia from the Social Democratic Party. These traditions and habits left their strong imprints on the entire work of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.

The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia prior to the Sixth World Congress, estimated the number of its members at 150,000 (it was difficult to check this figure in view of the absence of factory nuclei and of local Party machinery). Under the influence of the Party were the "red" trade unions (headed by the "Communist" Hais) with a membership of about 200,000.

The crisis in the Party started even before the Sixth Congress of the Communist International. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia which regarded itself as "Left" and which obtained a majority in the struggle against the Right renegades (Bubnik and others) turned out to be infected through and through with putrid opportunism. It proclaimed in Prague a "Red Day" of protest against the prohibition of the Spartakiade of revolutionary sportsmen and called on the workers to come from the provinces. At the last moment the "Red Day" was prohibited by the police. In spite of the prohibition, in spite of the utter passivity of the Prague Communists, the workers appeared in the streets of Prague, but the leaders of the Party and of the Prague Party organisation were absent: how is it possible to act against the police? After this day the Party lost some of its former influence over the working class, which was until then firmly established.

Party meetings started to criticise the actions of the Central Committee and the Prague Party Committee. The open letter of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, outlining the tasks of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, was fully and widely discussed among Party members. At the head of the trade unions, co-operative organisations, newspapers and Party enterprises (printing offices, publishing offices, etc.), there were "rabid" Rights who were kept at their posts by the "Left" leadership. The Party Congress (Febru-
ary, 1929) elected a new Central Committee which contained only a few members of the old leadership and whose main body consisted of workers, who made their mark in the struggle against the Rights. Therefore immediately after the Congress the “Right” renegades under the leadership of the “Left” Ilek started to lay their hands on everything they could. They took away the Party newspapers (in Kladno and Reichenberg), printing shops and houses (Reichenberg, Kladno and the Prague), etc. It became necessary to expel from the Party twenty-six deputies of parliament, of the Senate and other persons who refused to recognise and carry out the decisions of the Congress. The active members of the Party rallied round the new Central Committee. The majority of the red trade unions and the majority of their members declared themselves against Hais, who split the red trade unions, but in favour of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. Hais appropriated the funds of the trade unions, the government authorities of course defending Hais. He managed to induce 25,000 chemical and textile workers to leave their union. After purging itself from the Right renegades the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia succeeded in organising demonstrations in spite of police prohibition (August 1st, 1929, March 6th, 1930, and a number of others).

The Red trade unions organised and led a number of strikes, some of them won by the workers. At the last parliamentary election in 1929 the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, in spite of the inner Party crisis which it went through, obtained 752,737 votes (at the preceding parliamentary elections in 1925 it obtained 933,711 votes). In spite of the fact that the right renegades stood as independents at the election in some of the constituencies, none of them were elected to parliament. Many of them appealed to the electors to vote for the Social Democrats (the votes lost by the Communist Party went mainly to the Social Democratic Parties.*)

Our Party lost many members and at present (May, 1930) there are in the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia 35,593 members, regularly paying their dues (the number of registered Party members may be put at twenty-five per cent. higher). In spite of the fact that there are fewer members in the red trade unions, that several newspapers were taken away by the

* In Czecho-Slovakia there are several social-democratic parties (the German, the Czech and other parties).
renegades, that the Party lost votes at the elections, it none the less emerged from the crisis consolidated and full of fight, which formerly was not the case when it differed very little from the Social Democratic Party. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia has already started to reconquer its lost position in the working class. It now has to conduct the struggle against the Right renegades outside the Party, against the Right deviation in practice and against the "Left" sectarianism and "revolutionary" phrase mongering, which grew up as a reaction to the incredible opportunism of the former leadership of the Party. New cadres are being created and some provincial organisations (Moravska, Ostrava and others) are carrying on intensified mass revolutionary work.

The Communist Party of America. The situation in the U.S.A. is peculiar. The most powerful capitalism co-exists with the weakest organisation of the labour movement. There are many reasons for this. One of the causes, a not unimportant one, is the lack of co-ordination amongst the proletariat. The workers of America belong to all the nations of the world. The workers belonging to the Anglo-Saxon nations do not form the majority of the proletariat. Moreover, there is a general division of the working class into whites and blacks, strong chauvinism being prevalent among the white workers of America. This is due to the influence of bourgeois ideology and the press; a chauvinism reflected even in the ranks of the Communist Party of America. The workers of different nationalities who have emigrated to America are not equally amenable to organization in the Pan-American class organisations of the workers. Millions of workers, though they have lived for many years in America, do not know the English language. The leaders of various national organisations, including the Socialist and the Communist ones, create among the workers of different nationalities their separate national organisations, co-operative and friendly societies, separate clubs, papers, etc. Most of the workers of the various nations are not drawn into the political life of the U.S.A., a fact most advantageous for the American bourgeoisie, which supports and cultivates these narrow national tendencies. The American Federation of Labour (a reactionary, largely fascist, trade union organisation, which is not even affiliated to the Amsterdam International, regarding it as too radical) has made wide use of these tendencies of the national sections—it closed the
doors to the trade unions upon the badly paid, i.e., unskilled workers, by introducing very high membership dues. The American Federation of Labour comprises highly-paid skilled workers, principally the labour aristocracy.

The Communist Party has an immense amount of work to do among the many millions of the proletariat of various nationalities who have emigrated at different times to the U.S.A., and also among the negroes, who are not organised at all in trade unions. Until the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, even the American Communist Party was a federation of nineteen national Communist Parties, such as the German, Italian, Finnish, Russian, etc., with their respective congresses and central committees. Above them stood the pan-American Party Congress and central committee, but it depended on the C.C. of the various national parties, whether to carry out the decisions of the general Central Committee or not. The Executive Committee of the Communist International had to conduct a protracted and persistent struggle against these harmful relics of the past. It was also very difficult to induce the Lovestone Central Committee to do work among the negroes. Communist work was not carried on even among the workers of American origin, by no means all of them well-paid, privileged workers. Among them too there is a considerable section of poorly-skilled workers, who are exploited in the same way as the immigrants.

The power of American capitalism weighed so heavily on the political orientation of the Lovestone Central Committee of the Communist Party of America (hence its theory of American exceptionalism) that he and a large section of his party condemned themselves to the rôle of passive spectators in expectation of better times when it will be easier to work among the workers, who, it is alleged, during the period of prosperity of American capitalism, are proof against Communist influence (all the opportunists of the "Left" and Right—Ruth Fischer, Lovestone, Brandlerites—shifted the blame for their unwillingness and inability to work among the proletariat on to the passivity of the latter). Hence the tactics of adaptation to "legalism" and a persistent refusal to give effect to the decisions of the Comintern Congresses and the Plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International concerning the necessity of organising trade unions among those
workers who are not accepted in the American Federation of Labour and in those industries where there are as yet no trade unions (the automobile industry and others) and to carry on energetic work among the negroes, who form a large percentage of the American proletariat in all branches of industry, especially in the Southern States of the U.S.A.

Lovestone remained true to himself even after his expulsion from the Party. At the period when the American crisis was at its height he continued to bow to the power of American capitalism, declaring in his journal, *Revolutionary Age*: "The panic in Wall Street is the result of the strength of the American capitalist system." On the eve of May 1st, at a time when the Communist Party conducted a bitter struggle against the police and the fascist organisations in order to organise the May Day demonstration at the traditional place in Union Square and succeeded in drawing to itself the support of the broad masses, Lovestone published in the press an appeal to Party members and revolutionary workers, inviting them to exercise pressure on the Central Committee of the Party, so that it might obey the demands of the police and "organise the demonstration in some other part of the city." He thus assisted the police. As is known, the demonstration nevertheless took place in Union Square. Lovestone and his friends organised a strong faction within the Party, systematically deceived the Comintern by adapting the decisions of the Party Congresses and of the Central Committee to the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, but in fact sabotaging their realisation. No wonder that after the Communist Party of America got rid of Lovestone and his adherents it started to work energetically among the proletariat, including the Negro proletariat, receiving a mighty response from the working masses.

Under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of America, which, after the expulsion of Lovestone and his followers, enrolled energetic elements from among the workers, the Party and the Trade Union Unity League developed wide activity. The League organised class trade unions at the end of April, 1930—the Sailors' Union (dockers and ships crews). Two hundred delegates, representing 7,000 sailors, took part in the inaugural congress of this union. At the end of May of this year, there took place the inaugural congress of the automobile industry union, at which fifty-five
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

delegates were present, representing several thousand members. Sections of the existing class trade unions of miners, textile workers, tailors in various states and cities were started and new trade unions of jewellers, of underground railway builders in New York and of farm labourers in the south of California were organised. Strikes were carried out at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 by the Communists and the Miners’ League of Trade Union Unity, such as the Illinois strike with 10,000 strikers, the textile workers’ strike in Gastonia, and many others.

The unemployed were organised. In the demonstration on March 6th, 1,250,000 workers took part all over America (especially numerous were the demonstrations in New York and Detroit), mass demonstrations and meetings took place on May 1st, 1930. The recruiting of new members for the Communist Party is being effected more or less successfully. Negro workers are being drawn into the Party and the League—this proves that work has been started among them. Finally, one of the indications of the fact that the Communist Party of America became more active and fit for battle is the intensification of repressions against it (the shooting down of strikers and demonstrators, hard-labour sentences in Communist trials, the imprisonment of the leaders of the Central Committee—Foster, Minor and others—and in particular the appointment of a congress commission to investigate the activity of the Communist Party in America). The American bourgeoisie always tries in one way or another—even by the activities of agents’ provocations to destroy the revolutionary organisations of the proletariat when they assume a mass character. The tasks of the Communist Party of America consist in striking root so deeply among the masses that the bourgeoisie will be powerless to uproot them. The Communist Party of America must do this and it will do it, for it is now on the right path.

We have enumerated above all the positive features of the work performed by the Communist Party of the U.S.A. There are very many shortcomings which the Party organisations of the Communist Party of America are trying to remove.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA had to work in specially complicated and hard conditions. During the Northern expedition of 1926-27 the Communist Party of China which until then worked under a state of terror and deeply underground, for the first time emerged into the
open. It organised trade unions which soon became mass unions in all the cities and provinces which were under the sway of the Kuomintang. The opportunist mistakes of the Party leadership of that period consisted among other things in that it did not know how to combine a support of the northern expedition, correct from the standpoint of the revolution, with independent action among the broadest masses, with the development of the agrarian revolution, with the consolidation of their independent organisations and positions in the working class, the peasantry, the army, with arming of the workers, etc. As a result of this, after the break between the Communists and the Kuomintang, the latter (at first the Kuomintang of Chang Kai-shek and then the "Left" Kuomintang) started to shoot down Communists and destroy all the revolutionary workers' and peasants' organisations. The Kuomintang executioners, with the support of the Imperialists, drove the Party underground and removed the Communist leadership which had not secured for itself a firm foundation in the trade unions. In many localities the Kuomintang succeeded in this after dealing sanguinary "justice" to the Communists and revolutionary workers.

The workers—Party members—were arrested in huge numbers, and most of them killed; those who escaped were deprived of work and then forced to return to their villages. (The return of the workers to the villages partly explains the new revival of the revolutionary peasants' movement and the creation of the Red Army in the villages and districts of many Chinese provinces.) The Communist Party of China was threatened, in 1928-29, with the danger of becoming a peasant party as regards its composition (out of 133,655 members there were only 3,435 industrial workers scattered in thirty big cities), and in the cities it almost lost touch with the broad masses of the workers. It confined its work to Red trade unions which under the conditions of unparalleled terror lost an overwhelming majority of their members. At the same time the "right" (Chang Kai-shek) and "left" (Wang Tin-Wei) Kuomintangists, after capturing the trade unions turned them into yellow organisations, and also started new Kuomintang trade unions, which embraced relatively large masses. The part played by these "trade unions" consisted in putting down the strikes which broke out spontaneously in spite of the ghastly terror introduced by Chang Kai-shek and other Chinese generals, by repression or Kuomintang courts of arbitration, whose decisions always
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

went in favour of the employers. In the whole of China there were, according to official data, 400,000 strikers in 1928 and in 1929 the number of strikers almost doubled and reached 750,000.

Party organisations and Red trade union functionaries discussed for a whole year whether it is possible and necessary to work in the yellow mass trade unions. In the meanwhile the Chinese labour movement recovered from counter-revolutionary blows as is evident from the official statistical data of the Kuomingtang quoted above and started a counter-offensive. With the aid of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the Communist Party of China recognised the necessity of wresting the trade union movement from the hands of the Kuomingtangists and started to work in the yellow mass trade unions. The Red trade unions recovered also and established connections with the factories and works. They started to take part in and lead the strikes (as stated in the report of the Central Council of the All-Chinese Federation of Trade Unions to the Profintern of January 7th, 1930, a Congress of Red trade unions took place on November 7th to 12th, 1929, with a membership of 40,000, more than half of them being artisans). Simultaneously with the revival of the labour movement, there arose a strong movement against the imperialists and the Kuomingtangists. The local Party organisations revived too. The Party publishes illegal and semi-illegal newspapers and a theoretical organ, the Bolshevik. It issues a great number of leaflets and placards. In Shanghai and in other centres it organises big demonstrations against unemployment, against the Kuomingtangists and against the Imperialists. Immediately after its defeat in 1927, the Communist Party of China had to conduct a struggle inside the Party, against the inevitable companions of defeat—the Putschists, the liquidators and the Rights (Tan-Pin-Syan, Chen-Du-Su—the Chinese Trotskyists and their adherents). It stood the test during the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Without a moment’s hesitation it took the measure of the imperialist manœuvre of the Chinese general and stood up in defence of the U.S.S.R. At the present time the Communist Party of China conducts an intensified campaign in the industrial centres and in the Soviet districts. The leadership of the Communist Party of China, in spite of its many mistakes and omissions emerged from the period of reaction stronger, endowed with plenty of experience and with
the help of the Executive Committee of the Communist International it will be able to solve the big problems which are confronting it in its capacity of organiser and leader of the new revolutionary tide that is already rising in China.

There is no necessity to enlarge upon the position in other sections of the C.I. Our task here is not to refute the lying assertions of the "Rights" that the Comintern is "passing through a crisis," as they describe the two years of struggle against the Rights and the Conciliators, but to try to elucidate those causes which prevent the Sections of the Communist International from consolidating organisationally their great and growing influence over the proletariat. The examination of the work and shortcomings of the two best, biggest, more or less legal Sections of the Communist International—the German and the French—will enable us to fulfil the task which we have set ourselves.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

Until 1928 the Communist Party of Germany did not put up its own lists at the general meetings of the workers in the various factories at the election of the Factory Councils. In spite of the pressure brought to bear on it by the Trade Union apparatus it was fighting, not without success, at the meetings of the Trade Union members of the factories, against the Social Democrats and the bureaucrats of the reformist Trade Unions for its candidates to be included in the lists of the Trade Unions.

In 1929 the Communist Party of Germany and the Trade Union opposition put up independent lists at workers' meetings in more than a hundred factories. The workers enthusiastically supported these lists and the Trade Union opposition received majorities on Factory Councils in many of these works. The figures available for 101 factories, employing a number of working men and women ranging from 226 to 25,000 at which, in 1929, two parallel lists were put up, show that the Trade Union opposition received 113,522 votes and the reformists 118,596 votes.

At meetings of Trade Union members and meetings of workers in the factories during the last year's elections of Factory Councils, there was an obvious turn of the working class in favour of the C.P.G.

This year the Communist Party and the Trade Union opposition put up independent lists of candidates at the elections of Factory Councils in more than 1,000 factories (in spite of the fact that the C.C. of the C.P.G. and the Trade Union opposition were resolutely fighting against the presentation of joint lists in alliance with the reformists, such joint lists were none the less put up in many factories and works where Communists or the partisans of the Trade Union opposition are employed).

The independent lists of the Trade Union opposition were undoubtedly successful at the recent elections—taking Germany as a whole—which proves of course that the C.P.G. exercises
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

a great influence over the workers, especially among the non-unionists, in spite of the fact that the Social Democrats, acting under the banner of the reformist Trade Unions, still managed to retain a majority of votes at many factories, and where the C.P.G. obtained the majority the Social Democrats still retained a considerable minority of workers. At the 101 factories at which the Trade Union opposition acted independently in the elections of 1929, it obtained this year 107,455 votes (6,067 votes fewer than in 1929) and the reformists 104,266 (14,330 votes fewer than in 1929). Both suffered losses, but both held their positions, although the number of votes cast for both parties changed considerably in many factories. On the other hand, the C.P.G. dealt a powerful blow at the reformists in those factories where it acted independently this year for the first time. At fifteen factories in Upper Silesia, in Middle and Lower Rhine and the Ruhr, the lists of the Trade Union opposition secured 12,667, and those of the reformists 13,403 votes, while in 1929 the reformists received in these fifteen factories 23,390 votes.

The fact that although the Trade Union opposition for the first time put up its independent lists in 1929, it secured almost as many votes as the reformists, proves that the Trade Union opposition not only correctly started to use independent tactics in the elections of factory councils but that it was rather late in starting on this course.

During the last election of the factory shop committees in Germany, incidents happened which throw a glaring light on the causes preventing the sections of the Communist International in capitalist countries from consolidating in an organisational way their enormous relative influence over the broad mass of the workers. Therefore it is necessary to deal with them in detail.

Passing on to the concrete analysis of the elections of Factory Councils at big factories in the most important industrial regions (Berlin, Halle-Merseburg and others) we must put on record that the C.P.G. suffered a heavy defeat at this year’s elections in a whole series of the biggest works, apart from the Ruhr district and Upper Silesia (Leuna Werke, Blom und Voss, Bochumer Verin, Oppel and others) and in a majority of the big enterprises in Berlin (The Berlin Transport Association, A.E.G., Turbine, Kabelwerke, Brunnerstrasse, Ackerstrasse, Transformator-Werke, Siemens Werner and others), in which the Trade Union opposition gained consider-
able successes in 1929, and in some of which the Trade Union opposition under the guidance of the Communists in last year's elections secured a majority of votes (and mandates) and consequently the guidance in the factory shop committees was centred in the hands of the Trade Union officials. What then are the causes of the defeat of the Trade Union officials in these factories?

The working men and women all over Germany voted enthusiastically at the Factory Council elections in 1930 when the Trade Union Opposition for the first time put up its independent lists. In these factories the Trade Union opposition in most cases managed to secure a large number, and in some places an absolute majority of votes. On the other hand, in many big works where the Trade Union opposition possessed a majority on Factory Councils, but in which it worked badly, did not carry out the correct line of the Party, but followed opportunist practices, the number of votes cast for it this year decreased very considerably. The Trade Union opposition lost about fifty per cent. of the votes it received at the last year's elections in Leuna Werke (15,000 workers), Oppel Werke (7,000 workers), Siemens Werner (15,000 workers), the Berlin Transport Association (24,922 workers and employees), and A.E.G.-Turbine (2,112 workers), etc.

What other organisations competed at the Factory Councils elections against the lists of the Trade Union opposition? The Social Democratic "Free" Trade Unions, the Catholic Trade Unions and the Fascists. The Catholic Trade Unions are carrying out the same treacherous policy but under the guise of religious demagogy more simplified than that used by the reformists. In spite of this, though they have increased the number of their votes, their rôle in the factories here referred to is small, and I shall therefore confine myself to the comparison of the results of the elections as between the Trade Union opposition and the reformist trade unions.

During the period when the Social Democrats stood at the head of the Coalition which ran the German Government, more laws were passed in favour of the employers and landlords at the expense of the broad masses of the people, especially directed against the workers (the inroads in laws concerning unemployment insurance) than were passed within a similar space of time by any other bourgeoise German government since the revolution of 1919. The financial plan worked
out at the end of 1929 by Hilferding, the Social Democratic Minister of Finance, decreased the taxes raised from the property-tied classes by 1,698,000,000 marks and increased the taxes, which mainly fall on the broad masses, by 800,000,000 marks. This still did not satisfy the bourgeoisie, and the Social Democrats hastened to meet the additional demands presented by the financial oligarchy. As a result they increased, in comparison with the previous year, the taxes which fall on the broad masses by 650,000,000 marks (150,000,000 marks on wages, 255,000,000 marks on tobacco, etc.). They increased custom duties on foodstuffs (rice, sugar, meat, butter, rye, wheat, flour, potatoes, etc.), which will greatly increase the prices for these staple articles. They increased the war budget by 50,000,000 marks (the war budget of this year was 713,000,000 marks, although the whole army is only 100,000 men strong!).

They (the Social Democrats) cut down pensions for invalids which were already very small. They made the law concerning unemployment relief more stringent for the workers (the German workers pay six to seven per cent. out of their wages on all forms of insurance, including one and three-quarter per cent. unemployment insurance); it was formerly necessary to pay insurance premiums for twenty-six weeks in order to obtain unemployment relief, now the Social Democrats have increased that period to fifty-two weeks. Formerly, single workers obtained relief a week after they became unemployed, now this period has been increased to three weeks. This has particularly affected seasonal workers (builders, tailors, etc.). The builders in Germany are not connected with the village, and when there is no building available they become actually unemployed. Relief will be given to them now only during six weeks, after which evidence will have to be produced to show that the seasonal workers need further assistance. Some categories of workers have been deprived of the right to receive relief altogether during unemployment (individual home workers).

We have enumerated here only the main points which worsen the position of the unemployed. Finally the Social Democrats have passed the Young Plan which imposes on the toilers the burden of 113,000,000,000 marks, and on which is based the subsequent ruthless offensive against the standard of living of the working class. 'No other bourgeois government in Germany dissolved so many workers' revolutionary organisations
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

(the league of Red Front Fighters, the League of Young Guards, etc.), broke up so many meetings of workers and revolutionary demonstrations, suppressed so many Communist newspapers and shot so many workers (on May 1st, 1929, the shooting down of many of the demonstrations of the unemployed) as the government headed by the Leaders of the Social-Democracy, the Ministers of the Coalition Government. Their last act just before they resigned was the passing of the law against the Communist Party of Germany, the law that was introduced by the Social Democrat, Severing, which fully enables them to drive the Party underground and to confiscate all its property.

The reformist Trade Unions were equally active in the interests of the bourgeoisie, and at the head of them are also the leaders of the Social-democratic party. They actively assisted in bringing about capitalist rationalisation at the expense of the workers. With their aid the eight-hour law was practically repealed for many enterprises; with their assistance all the anti-labour laws were enacted, which worsened the position of the working class. Almost all the leaders of the reformist trade unions being deputies of the Reichstag and members of the Social Democratic fraction. They supplied the capitalists with strike breakers at a time when the revolutionary workers were on strike (the pipe-fitters in Berlin last year, and during many others). Finally there was not a single strike, not a single lock-out, not a single conflict between labour and capital in which the Trade Unions did not take the side of capital. The reformist Trade Unions actively participated in the enormous wholesale dismissals of workers by the capitalists, in the introduction of new rationalising measures, in the lowering of the wages and the increase of the working hours.

The elections of the Factory Councils took place subsequently just at the very height of the above-described activity of the Social Democrats and reformist Trade Unions. It could be expected that the Social Democrats would suffer a crushing defeat at the big factories, and first and foremost, in revolutionary Berlin, where the Trade Union opposition controlled the Factory Councils or where at any rate it was represented on them by a compact big minority. The elections of the Factory Councils at the big factories gave an unexpected result; the Social Democrats not only held their last year's positions in many of the big works, but in some of them received more votes than in 1929.
Comparing the results of the elections of 1929 and 1930 in 101 factories in which the Trade Union opposition and the reformists put up independent lists, we arrive at the following result: the reformists lost 14,330 and the Trade Union opposition 6,067 votes. These 101 enterprises are distributed in the following way among five respective groups:

In fifty-six enterprises the gains and the losses were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Trade Union Opposition received votes in</th>
<th>The Reformist received votes in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1930 Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 43 Ruhr Mines with 90,552 workers .. 26,501</td>
<td>33,571 7,070 .. 25,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 13 Mines of the Wurms region (Aachen) .. 2,364</td>
<td>6,513 4,149 .. 6,425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No data is available as to how the votes were distributed between the Trade Union opposition and the reformists at each of these fifty-six mines. Such data is available only in regard to forty-five out of 101 enterprises for which the details are as follows:

In 1930 compared with 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Union Opposition</th>
<th>Reformists.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gained</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 5 enterprises ..</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 17 ..</td>
<td>4,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 13 ..</td>
<td>9,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 10 .. (mainly big ones)</td>
<td>12,986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is an incomplete table of Factory Councils elections in 1930 in the big factories in which the Trade Union opposition was defeated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Trade Union Opposition</th>
<th>Reformists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*1. The Berlin Transport Association (Berlin)</td>
<td>6,317 (10,747)</td>
<td>10,147 (5,934)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*2. Siemens-Werner (Berlin)</td>
<td>3,866 (7,143)</td>
<td>6,550 (8,153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*3. A.E.G. Kabelwerke (Berlin)</td>
<td>1,467 (2,477)</td>
<td>1,642 (1,774)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4. Turbine (Berlin)</td>
<td>637 (1,237)</td>
<td>1,226 (1,097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5. Brunnenstrasse (Berlin)</td>
<td>2,933 (4,023)</td>
<td>1,928 (1,815)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*6. Transformator Werke (Berlin)</td>
<td>751 (1,080)</td>
<td>697 (600)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Enterprises marked with an asterisk had Red Factory Councils in 1929.
As can be seen from the above table of the results of the elections in twenty factories and works in 1930 as compared with those of 1929, the Social Democrats and the reformists gained 1,991 votes, whereas the Trade Union opposition lost 22,379 votes.

The elections of the Factory Councils of nine biggest Berlin works give us results which are still less satisfactory for the Trade Union opposition.

The Trade Union opposition received, in 1929, 30,066 votes; in 1930, 18,467 votes, i.e., lost 11,599 votes.

The reformists received in 1929, 22,043 votes, and in 1930 24,762 votes, i.e., gained 2,719 votes.

How can it be explained that instead of the expected defeat of the Social Democrats, a defeat of the Communist Party of

* Enterprises marked with an asterisk had Red Factory Councils in 1929.
Germany in a number of big factories actually took place? Some comrades give many reasons in the press and in reports explaining the result of the elections of the factory shop committees in Germany, and the defeat of Trade Union opposition in these big factories. Here are the most important of them:

(1) At some of these works there were great reductions of the staff of the workers (5,000 workers were dismissed in Leuna Werke) and the dismissal mainly affected revolutionary workers. In the Berlin Transport Association the partisans of Trade Union opposition were dismissed (several thousand men) and replaced by the partisans of Social Democrats—therefore the Trade Union opposition suffered defeat in these two works. It lost 8,923 votes: in the Leuna Werks 4,493 votes, and in the Berlin Transport Association 4,430 votes. Of course reduction of workers and dismissals of adherents of the Trade Union opposition did take place, but the losses cannot be explained only by these reasons, for dismissals of workers occurred all over Germany, not only where the Trade Union opposition lost so many votes (how otherwise could there be such enormous unemployment if there had not been such great dismissals of workers?), but also in the Ruhr, Middle Rhine, Upper Silesia and in many other factories all over Germany, both in control of the Factory Councils and where the latter were in the hands of the reformists. However, the Trade Union opposition carried a brilliant victory in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia and in other localities of Germany.

(2) The workers were afraid that by voting for the trade union opposition they might lose their jobs. In the first place the voting at elections of the Factory Councils takes place by secret ballot, which renders it very difficult to ascertain exactly which of the workers voted for which list, especially in big factories. In such case the workers would have simply abstained from voting, but they would not have voted for the traitorous reformists. Secondly, why should they be afraid to vote for the trade union opposition precisely at these big works and not afraid to vote for it at very many other factories?

(3) The trade union members saw in the trade union opposition putting up almost everywhere independent lists against the trade union lists, a slight upon the trade unions; therefore they gave their votes in favour of the trade union lists. This argument contains a certain amount of truth, but it proves at the same time that the workers of these biggest factories are not
properly informed of the everyday betrayal of the interests of the working class perpetrated by the reformist trade unions and the social democrats!

What then did the Red Factory Councils and their members do at these factories during a whole year? Here we come to the explanation of the causes of defeat of the trade union opposition in these places:

(1) It is obvious that the Berlin-Brandenburg and other Party organisations have not brought home the struggle against the social democrats and reformist trade unions to the factory workers. Surely there was an enormous amount of convincing material for this struggle.

The broad masses of the workers do not read Communist newspapers, mass gatherings and meetings are rarely arranged and what is more they are mainly attended by elements in sympathy with the Communist Party of Germany; it was therefore necessary to shift the centre of gravity of the work and struggle against the social-democratic reformists in the factories, conducting it by means of organising frequently short meetings at, and in the vicinity of, these works, issuing factory newspapers and leaflets, insisting on the red factory councils and revolutionary trade union delegates; conducting proper and minute spade-work under the sound, active and correct leadership of Party nuclei and of the factory councils. This has either not been done at all or else done very inadequately.

(2) The red Factory Councils and the Communist members in the above-mentioned factories differed little in their work from the reformist Factory Councils and the reformist members of the latter. They organised hardly any struggle against the lowering of wages, against increased hours of work or against the wholesale dismissals. More than that, some red Factory Councils and red councillors even voted for the dismissals. The workers, of course, did not observe that the Party nuclei of these factories, the Party organisations, the Party press and the trade union opposition criticised or disavowed these factory councils. How could they give their votes to the trade union opposition? Here are a few examples, for which let us take a few factories and works, where the trade union opposition secured a majority on the Factory Councils last year.

Until 1923 the general Factory Council of the Berlin Transport Association, embracing all the concerns, was controlled by
the reformists. The management of this municipal transport enterprise (street cars, buses, underground and aboveground railways and electric railways) consisted of Social Democrats. At the time of the elections of the Factory Councils in 1929 there was such dissatisfaction with the social democratic leadership, that the workers inflicted a crushing defeat on the reformists, securing an important victory for the Communists. (The trade union opposition obtained 10,777 and the Social Democrats 5,954 votes.)

A few months after the election the revolutionary workers were dismissed by the management, and the Factory Council failed to put up a fight against their dismissal and the substitution for revolutionary workers of elements acceptable to the Social Democrats. It also failed to defend the everyday interests of the numerous categories of workers; therefore no wonder that when the president of the Factory Council was dismissed no serious protest came from the workers. After this the social democratic management could do anything it liked without being afraid of encountering any protests from the “red” Factory Councils. The result of this “revolutionary” tactic was not long in coming; at the elections of the Factory Councils in 1930 the trade union opposition received 4,430 votes fewer than the year before. On the other hand at the factories of Sirotti (chocolate factory with 1,800 men and women workers) and Mannoli and Osetti (tobacco factory with 1,000 men and women workers) in Berlin, where in the 1929 election the trade union opposition obtained a majority and where the Factory Councils worked satisfactorily ever since (following the appeal of the factory councils, the workers—men and women—came out after the shootings on May 1st) the trade union opposition obtained an absolute majority at the elections of the Factory Councils in 1930. Do not the results of elections at the factories of Sirotti and of Mannoli and Osetti prove the statement that the causes of losses are opportunism actually practised by the red members of the Factory Councils and poor work performed by the trade union opposition and the Party organisations?

Some comrades console themselves by explaining the defeat of the trade union opposition at the chemical combine—Leuna Werke—by the fact that nearly 5,000 workers, adherents of the trade union opposition, were dismissed. This combine was a stronghold of the Communists. From the very beginning of the German revolution, almost from 1919, the Communists were
leading all the economic and political battles of the workers of Leuna. It is in Leuna that the Central German Red Army originated and grew up in 1921. In Leuna Werke the Communists and the trade union opposition possessed a majority in almost all the elected organs of the works. At the preceding election the trade union opposition obtained an absolute majority of votes. At the election in 1930, however, the trade union opposition lost 4,493 votes, whereas the Social Democratic party lost only 821 votes, and the Catholics, the yellows and the fascists (the Steel Helmet) increased their vote in comparison with the preceding year; the Catholics by 179, the fascists by 484. It is characteristic that 958 votes (408 more than last year) were declared void, which is obviously explained by the fact that a section of the workers was dissatisfied with the lists that were put up.* And this defeat is to be explained only by the dismissal of the adherents of the trade union opposition! No, the cause is obviously the bad work of the Factory Councils during the last year (apparently instead of following the correct line of the Party, it evinced opportunism in practice, which expressed itself in not conducting a sufficiently energetic struggle against the dismissal of the workers and the worsening of the conditions of work), as well as, of course, of the work of the factory nucleus and the corresponding organisation of the Party.

(3) Could the Berlin Party organisation, did it possess enough strength, bring home to the workers its agitation against the Social Democrats and the reformists? If there had been understanding, a change in the methods of work, a better and more systematic organisation of the campaign of exposure of the Social Democrats adapted to their manœuvres, the Berlin-Brandenburg party organisation could certainly have carried it out successfully. The Berlin Party organisation received in the parliamentary and municipal elections over 600,000 votes. It brought out to the demonstrations as many as 200,000 men, but it is weak in the factories, for in Berlin and also in other German cities, as well as in other capitalist countries, the centre of gravity of Party work is still not on the factories, where the

* Almost at all enterprises, where the trade union opposition lost this year, the fascists increased their vote in comparison with last year; in the Leuna Werke in 1929—1736, in 1930—2,217, in the Berlin Transport Association they did not even put up any candidates in the elections of 1929, this year they received 1,344 votes.
workers are engaged, but it is shifted to the place of residence of the workers and employees. Did not the sad experience of the revolutionary Factory Councils in Germany in 1923 prove clearly that it is impossible to lean on the Factory Councils, to carry out Party instructions, to make the councils work well, unless the Communists who constitute them, are organised in fractions working under the direction of Party nuclei, which in their turn are connected with the corresponding Party organisations? It is obvious that this lesson (which was intended to play the rôle of Soviets according to the strategy of the Brandlerist Central Committee, but with which the Party organisations were not even connected, since there were no party nuclei in the factories and works), was not mastered by many of the local organisations of the Communist Party of Germany. Comrades explain our defeats in a large number of big works by the passivity and opportunism displayed in practice by the Red Factory Councils, and this is undoubtedly true. But how can we explain their passivity, except by the fact that the respective Party organisations concerned themselves little with their work? Surely the Red Factory Councils existed for a whole year. Only just before the elections, when many of the members of the Factory Councils opposed the realisation of independent tactics by the Party at the election of the Factory Councils in 1930, they were expelled from the Party. And it was too difficult and too late to explain to the workers why the Party organisations were so late in deciding. Had the Party organisations taken a permanent interest in the work of the red factory councils, it would have been easy to correct the mistake, to render active, overcome the passivity of, and disassociate oneself from the other members of the Factory Councils. Then the workers of these big factories would not have blamed the Communist Party for the bad work of the Communist factory councils and their members. The connection between the Party and the factories is very weak. Things are better in Germany, of course, than in other capitalist countries, but even there the ties with the factory workers are far from being adequate and strong.

Therefore, the first task after the elections of Factory Councils in 1929, when the C.P.G. gained considerable success in very many new, big and medium size works, was to strengthen the Party nuclei, wherever it existed and organise new ones out of Party members and sympathisers, who worked in the respective
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

enterprises (for otherwise the C.P.G. and the trade union opposition could not take part in elections and elect its own candidates) in order to guide through them the members of the Factory Councils and the revolutionary and trade union delegates. After all, that is the only sure method of keeping in contact with the factories and of exerting there Communist influence. Obviously this has either not been done at all or else done very inadequately.

Yet the acute class struggle, the participation of social democracy in the coalition government and the open betrayal on their part of the interests of the working class, the offensive of capital along the whole front on hours of work and wages, under conditions of an economic crisis and enormous unemployment and at the same time the rising revolutionary tide in the labour movement confronted the Communist Party of Germany with tasks of exceptional importance and complexity. The central and local Party organisations should have worked out a detailed plan of campaign against the Social Democrats, reformists and capitalists, brought it home to the whole Party and the working class by means of the Party press, factory papers, leaflets, speeches by parliamentary, Landtag, and municipal deputies and councillors, by arranging reports of an instructive nature for the active Party members, Party secretaries, for the members of the bureau of nuclei and for the Communist members of the Factory Councils, and finally by calling general workers' gatherings and meetings. The nuclei and the members of Factory Councils would then know what should be done and how to work. Has this been done? The Red Factory Councils and their Communist membership were left in the cold in many cases, at such an important period.

The results of these omissions are clear: the Communists not only failed to deal a crushing blow at the Social Democrats and the reformists in a great number of the biggest factories, but suffered defeat in a number of them. We must draw the necessary conclusions from this fact and correct the omission as soon as possible.

(4) In reading this booklet, comrades will ask, what then was the Party organisation doing if it failed to do the elementary things referred to above? It is easy to answer this question. In all countries, where before the war, the Social Democrats were predominant in the working class, there was a deeply-rooted practice: the social democratic party concerned itself with
politics, and the trade unions with the economic struggle of the working class. These old social democratic traditions were inherited by the Communist Parties which emerged from the social democratic parties. It is very difficult to cast off old traditions. If the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany has definitely renounced these traditions it does not yet follow that all the local organisations of the Communist Party of Germany have followed likewise. The work of the Factory Councils in the factories is analogous to that of the trade unions—therefore, in many Party organisations they were turned over to the care of the trade union opposition—even the lists for the Red factory councils were put up in their name—consequently they were supposed to know best. As to the trade union opposition, it did not master, and in fact was not in a position to master, such a complicated question, such difficult a time, too—without a proper guidance on the part of the Party organisation, and this guidance was not present everywhere; not only was there an absence of proper guidance but sometimes there was not even proper contact established between the trade union opposition and the Party organisation. How else could we explain such phenomena, that many Party committees are informed of dismissals of workers, of strikes, of reductions in wages only several weeks after the events? This is one of the important causes of defeat in a large number of the biggest enterprises during the latest period.

(5) The trade union opposition should serve as a most powerful transmission belt, connecting the C.P.G. both unionists and non-unionists.

Until 1928 the trade union opposition consisted of Party members, who were trade unionists and a small number of trade union members in sympathy with the Party—in fact they were Communist fractions functioning mainly within the so-called "free" Amsterdam trade unions. Since 1928 the functions and the composition of the trade union opposition have undergone a great change in consequence of unheard of impudent actions against the revolutionary trade union opposition on the one hand, and the rising tide of the labour movement on the other. The reformists used to expel and still expel from the unions members of the trade union opposition who speak or act against the reformists; they have dissolved and dissolve local sections of the unions, when the trade union opposition gains a majority in them. The local boards of
trade unions, which continued to exist in spite of the dissolution, joined the trade union opposition. The reformists either prevent strikes from taking place, or if they take place contrary to their will, take energetic steps to stop them for the benefit of the employers, either by means of arbitration-courts or by means of direct strike breaking. This made it necessary to take the strike leadership out of the hands of the reformists and conduct the strikes independently. Who could take this over except the trade union opposition? Therefore these functions were turned over to it. The percentage of unionist workers is relatively small, even in Germany. The reformists bring pressure to bear on the unionists by means of their bureaucratic apparatus during strikes, but at the same time they entirely neglect the non-unionists. On the other hand the trade union opposition, when there is a strike in progress, organises non-unionists and combines them with the revolutionary elements of the reformist trade unions. It is thereby enabled to effect the election of strike committees, and through them to guide independently the economic battles of the proletariat. In order to prepare strikes contrary to the will of the reformists, the trade union opposition must have a stronghold at the factory, by means of which it could reach, not only the unionists, but also the non-unionists.

Provided there is proper guidance on the part of the Party nuclei and the Communist fractions in the factory councils the part of such strongholds must and can be successfully acted by Party members and workers of the trade union opposition, the trade union adherents and the revolutionary delegates elected by all the workers of the factories and works, as distinguished from the trade union delegates, who are elected by unionists only, and the red Factory Councils. In view of the change in the objects of the trade union opposition as compared with the functions of the Communist fractions in the trade unions, in view of the broadening of its composition, of the extension of its work among the non-unionists, it had to reconstruct correspondingly its organisation, which it partly achieved; it called a Pan-German Congress of trade union opposition at which there were delegates present both from unionists and non-unionists. This Congress elected a central bureau for furthering trade union opposition. Similar congresses were held in almost every province and in many industrial districts of Germany. In many localities committees of the trade union
opposition were set up according to industrial groups parallel to the existing reformist trade unions.

The trade union opposition issues several periodical organs with a considerable circulation. For a better Party guidance of the trade union work (formerly through the Communist fractions in the trade unions, now through the trade union opposition) trade union sections have been established within the Central Committees, the provincial committees and the district committees. How did the trade union opposition cope with its new tasks?

In October, 1928, a strike of the textile workers broke out in Munich-Gladbach, which involved 45,000 men and women workers. They demanded an increase of wages by fifteen per cent., and the extension of the yearly holidays from four to six days. The employers retaliated by a lock-out. The trade union opposition did not prepare this strike; it came as a surprise to it. Still the trade union opposition took an energetic part in this conflict and thereby was of considerable help to the workers. It was only owing to the energetic work of the trade union opposition that the workers declined the arbitration award. It did not organise strike committees. The conflict resulted in a compromise.

From November 1st to December 8th, 1928, there took place a lock-out of 213,000 metal workers in the Ruhr. The trade union opposition performed excellent work which laid the beginnings of a great change in the attitude of the Ruhr workers in favour of the Communist Party and the trade union opposition. The Communist Party of Germany and the trade union opposition were not only able to hold the gains secured in the preceding year in the elections to the factory councils, but gained in addition important new positions in the metallurgical works and in the coal mines. (In 1929 the trade union opposition could put up fifty independent lists in the factories, in 1930 163 such lists were put up.) During the lock-out of the metal workers the trade union opposition organised thirty-three committees of action which covered 70,000 unionists and non-unionists. At the same time the strike of 50,000 shipbuilders of Wasserkante (Hamburg, Kiel, etc) occurred, lasting from October 10th, 1928, to January 6th, 1929. The workers demanded an increase in wages; again the strike was not prepared by the trade union opposition, and only during the course of the struggle did it exercise a great influence on it.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

The trade union opposition carried out the election of the committees of action, it organised a conference of representatives of the committees of action of Hamburg, Stettin, Kiel and other cities, and again it was only due to the influence of the trade union opposition that the workers rejected the arbitration awards. However, the reformists succeeded in betraying this strike.

During the same period there were other strikes and lock-outs of about 35,000 textile workers in Saxony and Thuringia. The trade union opposition took part in this movement and had to fight not only against the capitalists and the reformists but also against the Rights and the conciliators, who were opposed to the new tactics of the Communist Party of Germany in the economic struggle. The trade union opposition organised and held Pan-German and provincial congresses and finally successfully conducted the elections to the factory shop committees in 1929. It also took part in 1930 with varying success, the elections held in more than 1,000 factories.

We have quoted above facts which tend to prove that the transmission belt of the Party to the masses through the trade union opposition functioned more or less normally. Unfortunately, however, there are far more facts which show that this transmission belt either did not function at all or functioned badly. The following are the facts:

(a) The trade union opposition had to conduct its work in two directions, both outside, and, of course, inside the existing trade unions. The work outside the trade unions consisted in organising and strengthening its leading organs both central and local; in publishing its papers and circulating them; in working among the non-unionists and the unemployed, inducing both to take part at its congresses and conferences; drawing the unemployed into the councils and committees of the unemployed, which should have been set up by it. Preparing and carrying out elections to the Factory Councils elections, in which the non-unionists play the principal rôle owing to their numerical strength; in guiding the work of the former and in preparing the struggle and leading the independent economic struggle of the proletariat.

The second and important task of the trade union opposition should have consisted in ceaselessly working inside the trade unions; working energetically and competently in ousting the reformists from the everyday work to which they still cling, and
simultaneously exposing to the trade union members and the working masses, the treacherous and strike-breaking part played by the reformists. The trade union opposition should, through its members inside the corresponding trade unions, not only have come forward with its merciless criticism of the reformists, but should have offered its definite proposals on all questions of trade union life at all the meetings of the members of unions and at the meetings of delegates and congresses. The trade union opposition should have fought for each elective office of the trade union, if such unionists take part in these elections among whom the opposition could make propaganda for its programme, irrespective of whether there are any chances of capturing that elective office or not.

In order to carry out successfully the first task—the work of the trade union opposition outside the trade unions—it is absolutely necessary to know what the trade unions are doing and how they are faring, because even now, the reformists, who are backed by the entire apparatus of the bourgeois state, are still so strong—this partly through the fault of the trade union opposition—that they can frustrate the successful issue of any economic fight. How then did the trade union opposition cope with these tasks? If the trade union opposition mastered the first task somewhat, it not only failed to consolidate and strengthen its influence over the existing German trade unions, but in many unions even lost its former influence (where the trade union opposition worked in the trade unions there were also some successes).

The trade union opposition will hardly be represented in 1930 at the coming congresses on a Pan-German scale and yet in former years at the congresses of metal workers, miners, etc., it already counted up to forty per cent. of the mandates (in 1923). No doubt the absence of the representatives at the most important trade union congresses does not yet give a clear and precise picture of the influence of the trade union opposition in the lowest organisations of the reformist trade unions, for the trade union bureaucrats use fascist methods of struggle in order to prevent the admittance of the elected representatives of the trade union opposition to these congresses. This is, however, still an indication of the decline in the influence of the trade union opposition in the most important trade unions of Germany.

In the union of timber workers, metal workers, etc., in
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

Berlin, the trade union opposition used formerly to hold fifty per cent. and even more of all the mandates at the meetings of delegates. Now in Berlin, according to the incomplete data which is at our disposal, the trade union opposition will have at the delegates' meeting of the timber workers not more than one-fifth of last year's mandates, amongst the factory workers—not more than one-half—and among the metal workers, where the trade union opposition previously held strong positions, there will be an insignificant proportion compared with last year. How can the slackening of the work in the trade union opposition in the existing trade unions be explained?

In the first place it is hard to work in the trade unions. The reformists are very experienced politicians, they very easily side-track our inexperienced comrades from the revolutionary path. And if they don't succeed in this, they act by means of repressions, expelling from the union, which often spells dismissal from the factory. Instead of replying to such actions of the reformists with more energetic work by the trade union opposition, directed against the former from without and from within the trade unions, the central and local functionaries of the trade union opposition and the responsible functionaries of the trade union sections of the Communist Party of Germany—Com, Merker and others—have taken hold of the most pernicious "Left" sectarian ideas, which justify and even encourage the inactivity of the Communists in the trade unions and which were not combated by the Comintern with sufficient vigour in practice, although these ideas were rejected both by the Profintern and by the Comintern.

The essence of these "ideas" consists in that the members of the reformist trade unions are the most reactionary section of the proletariat; that it is impossible to conquer any part of the apparatus of the reformist trade unions, consequently also the lowest units, including even the trade union delegates at the factories; that the trade union organs at the factories consist in an overwhelming majority of strike-breakers; that only the non-unionists and unskilled workers are capable of assimilating revolutionary ideas and carry them out in actual life.*

* The authors of these "Left" theories do not, of course, say or write that they are against work in the reformist trade unions, for there are clear decisions of the Profintern and Comintern on that score. They hide under "Left" phrases such as that it is possible to work in reformist trade unions "only" at factories, for there, so they say, both unionist and non-unionist men and women workers are engaged. The authors, however, are well aware
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

We must record that these "ideas" of passivity unfortunately found a response in the ranks of the trade union opposition. The policy of the reformists is truly abominable. But instead of this policy inspiring them with new energy for a struggle against the Social Democrats and the reformists, these pseudo-revolutionaries leave huge masses of workers and employees without business influence affiliated to the Allgemein Deutschen Gesellser Bund. In 1930, there were 4,800,000 workers, and adding to this figure the number of office-employees affiliated to A.F.A., and the members of Catholic trade unions, we arrive at a figure of no less than seven million. Apparently, owing to "Left" sectarianism, the tactics of a united front from below was not followed in the factories, not only as to social democratic workers, under the pretext that they all of them, are "little" Zorgiebels, but also with regard to the members of reformist trade unions, under the pretext that they are "the most reactionary section of the proletariat." These comrades with sectarian proclivities do not grasp that even in order to set up independent trade unions, of which they talk so much, it is also necessary to win over from the reformists a more or less considerable proportion of members of their trade unions and that it is necessary for this purpose to work inside all the trade unions.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany started, in due time, a resolute struggle against this "Left" sectarianism. This must be welcomed and we may hope that this struggle will prove fruitful in the nearest future.

(b) The last nine months of 1929 and the first five months of 1930 have passed in Germany without any big economic strikes and lock-outs. However, in those strikes which took place during that period the participation of the Trade Union opposition came very little to the fore. (The recent strike of 10,000 tailors took place under the guidance of the reformists. This strike was of an aggressive kind—for an increase in wages, for the shortening of working hours—the reformists declared the strike under the pressure of the masses, and it was they who killed it without any resistance from the Trade Union opposition.)

This year collective agreements affecting some 5,000,000
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

working men and women expire in most important industries. One would imagine that the Trade Union opposition would be fully armed for it, for even last year it was common knowledge, corresponding instructions having been given by the leading organs, that it was necessary to prepare oneself well for this campaign.

The conditions of the struggle of the German proletariat at the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 have become extraordinarily complicated. The acceptance of the Young Plan and the system of financial and budget measures connected with it, which shifts the whole burden of reparation payments on to the toilers of Germany; the preparations of capitalist and reformist organisations, under the pretext of raising the competitive ability of Germany in the world market for a general offensive against the standard of living of the proletariat in all its forms including directly longer hours and a reduction of nominal wages; the use made by the bourgeoisie of the combination of the economic crisis and further rationalisation and the exceptionally grave unemployment connected with it, for the purpose of conducting this offensive, counting on the decreased power of resistance of the broad masses of the workers in the economic struggle—all this demanded from the Trade Union opposition carefully-thought-out tactics widely prepared, founded both on a firm, consistent leadership and on the activity of the masses, resolute and yet flexible; in a word, Bolshevik tactics.

In particular, it was necessary not to confine oneself to the evaluation of the general economic situation, but to study the position of each industry in detail in order to determine which demands to make in particular branches of industry, in accordance with the concrete conditions of the struggle and the inter-relation of forces. Five months of 1930 have now passed; the collective agreements campaign is in full swing. The employers are attacking along the whole front, all the conquests of the working class obtained in the sanguinary revolutionary fights of 1919-1921 (they have already passed and are about to pass, amendments to the unemployment and sickness insurance laws, prejudicial to the interests of the working class, reducing the relief fund by 700,000,000 marks a year). The Social Democrats and the reformists did all in their power to pave the way for the prompt execution of the orders of the bourgeoisie.

How did the trade union opposition prepare itself for the
collective agreements campaign? The first attempt of the Trade Union opposition to take part in the conclusion of the collective agreement of the builders (to call forth a strike) resulted in a failure. Now a revision of collective agreements has started affecting 525,000 metal workers of several important regions of Germany (Berlin, Ruhr, Saxony, Wasserkante). The basic tariff agreement of the metal workers ends in autumn. The appendix to this agreement—"Mantel Tariff"—expires in June of this year. The reformists of the Metal Union are in a very "radical" mood. They worked out the demand of reducing hours to forty-five and forty-seven a week, and increasing wages twenty-five to thirty per cent. Of course, their purpose in professing to be such radicals, is to lull the watchful metal workers, whose dissatisfaction is growing, and to prevent them rallying to the Trade Union opposition. This is only one of the methods of fooling the workers.

The leaders of the German reformist trade unions, are at the present moment carrying out this "left" strike-breaking manœuvre on a wide front, thus covering up a treacherous underhand agreement of the Social Democratic and the reformist leaders with the capitalist organisations. Tarnow, Gusemann and others are making hypocritical speeches about the seven-hours day, etc., in Parliament and at meetings before the workers, and simultaneously are coming to terms with the representatives of the trusts about introducing longer hours and cutting down the miserly nominal wages. Unfortunately the Trade Union opposition happened to be unprepared, it did not find its way through the situation formed at the moment when the tariff agreements expired. Therefore voices were heard from amongst the Trade Union opposition declaring that it is necessary to postpone the struggle until the Autumn, when the fundamental tariff agreement on wages was to be revised, so as to organise themselves better.

The corresponding leading organs, on the one hand, the strikes and demonstrations of the metal workers of Ruhr, Mansfeld, Saxony, against the announced reduction of wages and the arbitration award on the other hand, forced these comrades of the Trade Union opposition to renounce their intention of postponing the struggle until the Autumn. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany will undoubtedly take all steps, and will mobilise the party to organise and assume the leadership in the struggle of the metal
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

workers, and of the workers in other branches of industry in Germany. However, it is necessary to state that the trade union opposition feebly and badly prepared itself for the conclusion of new collective agreements.

Evidently the Communists—members of the reformist Factory Councils, the revolutionary and trade union delegates, the red Factory Councils and factory nuclei were not any better prepared and instructed by the trade union opposition to whom in accordance with the old tradition, was entrusted by some Party organisation the task of conducting the campaign against the dismissal of workers and reduction of wages, against the Social Democrats and the reformists, and also of preparing the campaign for the conclusion of new collective agreements.

How could we otherwise explain that helplessness which was displayed by the red Factory Councils, Party nuclei, the revolutionary and trade union delegates, the adherents of the trade union opposition in these big factories during the attack made by capitalism? At many of these works the Red factory shop committees gave their consent to dismissals of workers. What stunning effect this had on the workers is seen from the results of the elections of the factory shop committees this year at the twenty big factories referred to above.

The result of this most pernicious carelessness and passivity, disguised as a "Left" "revolutionary" phraseology, of bad control and incompetent leadership on the part of many Party organisations was not only that social-fascism still succeeded—we hope not for long—to hold its position in a number of big factories but that the fascists became even stronger in these same places (the fascists conducted great demagogical work in the factories and grew strong where insufficient resistance was offered to them by the Communist organisations and the trade union opposition).

The trade union opposition can thus show the following results for the years 1929-1930:

**SUCCESSES:**

(a) It created both in the centre and locally an organisation which in a relatively short period managed to establish contact with the broad working masses, both unionists and non-unionists, and what is most important, succeeded in conducting independent battles of the proletariat in Munich, Gladbach,
WORLD COMMUNISTS IN ACTION

Ruhr, Wasserkante, etc., and is now conducting the heroic struggle of the Mansfeld workers.

(b) By its frank revolutionary work it became known to the broad working masses and was able therefore to put up its lists at the elections to the factory councils in 1930 in a large number (over one thousand) of big and middle-sized factories in Germany.*

(c) In factories where the trade union opposition worked in the least satisfactory manner (Ruhr, Upper Silesia), and also where it put up independent lists and was not discredited by its part opportunist work, it dealt a hard blow at the reformists and doubled the number of its votes, which it gained from the social democrats.

LOSSES.

(a) In those big factories where the trade union opposition controlled the Factory Councils and where it displayed opportunism in practice and utter passivity (and unfortunately there were many such cases), it suffered a serious defeat. As a result of this the position of the Communist Party of Germany was rendered considerably weaker in many big factories and works.

(b) The trade union opposition (and consequently the Party, too) lost ground in almost all the big trade unions, barring a few exceptions, as was shown by the results of the new elections of the lowest reformist trade union organs. At the coming Pan-German Congresses of the big trade unions the trade union opposition will either not be represented at all or will be represented by an insignificant number of delegates.

(c) These local sections of individual trade unions, which after they were dissolved by the reformists for refusing to follow the opportunist policy, continued to exist independently having joined the trade union opposition (the Berlin pipe-layers, etc.) lost a certain proportion of their members. The decline in the influence of the trade union opposition in the trade unions could not fail to weaken the position of the Party in the factories. We get a strange disproportion: the Party and the trade union

* According to the official German statistics for 1925, Germany had 37,000 factories (with over 50 workers) with a total number of workers and employees of 8,851,585. There are about 1,000 big factories each engaging over 1,000 persons.
opposition are able to bring out hundreds of thousands of men to demonstrations, millions of toilers vote for the Communist Party of Germany at elections to Parliament, to the Landtags and to the municipalities, and yet the positions of the Party in a number of mass organisations of the proletariat, in many big factories and works, not only shrank in size and strength but have become even weaker.
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE

The causes which prevent the Communist Party of Germany from consolidating organisationally its great ideological influence over the broad working masses, are not peculiar to Germany. With certain variations in this or that respect these causes operate in all the sections of the Communist International, especially in France, where Party construction and work at the industrial enterprises is entirely neglected (although much is being talked and written about it and there is no lack of resolutions, these resolutions mostly remain on paper only). Therefore, there is no need to repeat and enumerate all the defects in the work of the Communist Party of France and point out the causes of these defects, which were considered when the results of the Factory Council elections at the big enterprises of Germany were analysed.

The C.P.F. exercises a great influence over the proletariat. At the parliamentary elections in 1928 the C.P.F. received 1,063,943 votes out of a total of 9,547,776 who actually polled, the total number of electors being 11,395,330. (Women in France do not enjoy the right to vote, and soldiers, though their names are contained in the electoral lists, are not allowed to vote either.) The Social Democratic Party obtained 1,698,084 votes. Moreover, there are several million foreign workers in France who do not possess the suffrage and over whom the C.P.F. exercises great influence, in spite of the fact that work among them is being carried on in a most unsatisfactory way.

As far as the conditions of its work go, the C.P.F. enjoys many advantages. Social democracy is not so strong in France, the reformist trade unions are not so numerous or so powerful, the proletariat is less organised by the Social Democrats and the reformists. Consequently it is easier to work among it in France than it is in Germany. Finally the C.P.F. exercises a great influence over the Red Trade Unions of France, which numerically are little inferior to the French Amsterdam trade unions. This circumstance certainly must make it more
possible to consolidate organisationally the great ideological influence of the Communist Party over the masses of the workers. How then does the C.P.F. consolidate this influence?

Before we pass on to this question we must pause to enumerate its principal achievements. The C.P.F. has performed an enormous amount of work in the last two years. In 1928 at the parliamentary elections it followed the tactics "Class against Class," which is a great achievement for a country like France, where all the parties are permeated by parliamentary cretinism and where all the parties revive and become active only at the time of the ballots. For the first ballot all the parties—there is a multitude of them in France—put up their candidates. In those constituencies where no candidate secures a clear majority at the first ballot, a second ballot takes place. Then a real bargaining takes place between all the parties—where, in which constituencies, and whom to help at the elections. Until recently the C.P.F. also took part in such bargaining, though to a limited extent (with the Social Democrats and some other parties, such as the radical Socialists, etc.).

In the election of 1928 it obtained 1,063,943, at the first ballot, without any of its candidates being elected at that stage. In the Party itself, especially in the distant provinces, where local Party organisations existed very peacefully with the social democratic organisations (the C.P.F. was formed out of the majority of the Socialist Party, which became the Communist Party, a section of the Communist International, the minority however seceded, preserving the old name) a campaign was set on foot to come to terms with the socialists at the second ballot. The C.P.F. fought these opportunist tendencies and carried on the second stage elections against all parties, especially against the Social Democrats. (At these elections the Communist Party of France managed for the first time to oust the Social Democrats out of a considerable number of the most important industrial areas.)

This brought about a single front of all the parties acting against the Communist Party of France. The latter succeeded in electing eleven deputies by its own efforts. The "class against class" tactics produced great vacillations within the Party itself, but it was energetically supported by the proletariat. The Party obtained 177,943 votes above those it obtained at the preceding parliamentary election. Now it would hardly be possible to find a party member who would
venture to propose to pass on to the old electoral combinations—this is a past stage.

The party waged a resolute struggle against opportunism in practice in the municipalities, where formerly in most instances the Communists in their practical work were almost undistinguishable from the representatives of the Social Democratic party. (In Alsace-Lorraine a formal bloc was formed between the Communists and the nationalists for the purpose of mutual support in the Strasbourg Municipality.) In order to combat such opportunists the C.P.F. did not stop short of appealing to the masses by causing new elections. It invited the municipal fraction, the majority of which was faithful to the Party, to resign (in Saint Denis), thus rendering new election inevitable. The C.P.F. successfully celebrated August 1st (the international red anti-war day) and May 1st, in 1930 (on this day not fewer than 300,000 workers came out on strike in Paris alone, though we must point out that the organisation of the demonstration was unsuccessful).

The Party leadership carried out and is carrying out a firm and resolute campaign against the Right and the conciliators within the Party and against Anarcho-syndicalism and opportunism within the red trade unions. Here this tendency prevented the carrying out of the "class against class" tactics (how can the Party do the work of the red trade unions?). The Party called on the members of the trade union to come out on strike on August 1st—the international red day. (On the other hand the secretary of the red trade union of printers and paper workers in Roubaix-Tourcoing threatened: "All those who strike on August 1st will be expelled from the union.") It took action against some of the editors of L'Humanité, who prevented the carrying out of this work—by removing sixteen of them and stating in the press the causes of their dismissal.

Finally, in spite of the fact that the French Government arrested the majority of the leading Party centres, and of the red trade unions, accusing them of organising a plot against the state on August 1st, 1929, the Central Committee of the C.P.F. has set up a Political Bureau (it was forced to work secretly so as to avoid police persecutions), which on the whole in spite of many serious acts of omission managed to fulfil its tasks. The National Council of red trade unions set up a provisional Centre which more or less successfully led a very large number of strikes.
Though the Central Committee of the C.P.F. adopted a perfectly correct and firm line of policy, there were a whole series of omissions, which prejudiced the prestige of the Central Committee and consequently that of the party. All the correct and necessary organisational measures which were carried out by the Central Committee against opportunism of every kind were not accompanied by an adequate and simultaneous ideological campaign either inside the party or in the press or at workers' meetings. The opportunists and the renegades undertook a frantic attack on the Communist Party, the latter in its turn instead of attacking, of opening fire on the renegades, at first only defended itself. This caused an unnecessary loss in membership. In Alsace-Lorraine, where there is great hatred of the French, where there is a tendency among the toilers to establish a single front of all parties of Alsace-Lorraine against the French, the Communist Party of France should have precisely and clearly formulated the Bolshevist, national policy, and had it adopted by the Party organisations of Alsace Lorraine. The reverse took place. When the leaders of the Party organisations of Alsace-Lorraine formed a bloc with the bourgeois parties, the leaders of these organisations were properly expelled from the Party by the Central Committee of the C.P.F., but unfortunately they were followed by the majority of members of the Party organisations of Strasbourg. The explanatory campaign was insufficiently developed both before and immediately after the expulsion of the six Paris municipal councillors and renegades from the Saint Denis municipality. The result was that at the new election to the Saint Denis municipality the C.P.F. obtained fewer votes than at the former election and did not secure a majority at the first ballot.

It was difficult for the leadership, which was unable to act openly, to guide a legal party. At the general Party and provincial party conferences reports were read by comrades in the name of the Central Committee, comrades who did not express the opinion of the Central Committee. This compelled the Political Bureau, through the press or by means of letters, to explain to the delegates of the conference and to the Party membership its policy on a number of the most important questions. This method of correcting the actions of the representatives of the Central Committee by means of letters, etc., did not enhance the authority of the Party leadership.

The Party leadership paid little attention to Party machinery
and organisational questions and in this it was followed by the whole Party, did not pay sufficient attention to the struggle against Social Democracy. The Communist Party of France at the time of the parliamentary election of 1928, succeeded in dealing a powerful blow at Social Democracy in many constituencies. The whole campaign was at that time mainly directed against the social democrats, which gave good results.

But the C.P.F. did not know how to make use of these results, it did not follow them up by continuing the campaign. Yet the defeat suffered by the Social Democrats stimulated them to start a counter-campaign. They improved and extended the central organ of their Party, which daily throws a lot of mud at our Party. They improved their Party organisations and made them more active, whereas the C.P.F. and L'Humanité slackened their attack on the Social Democrats at the moment when the growing world economic crisis reached France and the struggle of workers is certain to become very bitter.

Signs of unemployment have just now appeared, and since there are over three million foreign workers in France, who take active part in the ever-growing number of strikes and swell the ranks of the strikers (in January of this year there were 150 strikes and 79,581 men on strike), the bourgeoisie will start a campaign under the leadership of the Social Democrats to dismiss and deport foreigners. This will be done under the pretext of combating unemployment, but in reality for the purpose of causing a split among the workers. Yet foreign workers are engaged in the basic branches of economy—in the metal, mining and chemical industries and in agriculture. The Party and the red trade unions conduct almost no work among these masses of foreign workers. Hence it follows that the struggle against the Social Democrats must be intensified hundredfold. It is necessary that L'Humanité and the other press organs of the Communist Party of France, including the factory newspapers, should conduct systematically a campaign against the French and international Social Democracy, explaining the part played by the MacDonalds in England and the Müllers in Germany, and wage, at the same time, also, a struggle against the renegade "Workers' and Peasants'" Party; they should also see to it that not a single slanderous utterance of the Social Democratic and the Workers' and Peasants' parties be left unanswered by our press, for they—

48
the Social Democrats and the Workers' and Peasants' Party—"only live by it."†

It is necessary immediately before unemployment has spread, to start serious work among the foreign workers. It is necessary to work out and to popularise a whole series of demands concerning social insurance, especially unemployment insurance, which is to apply to foreign workers as well. The red trade unions and the C.P.F. must take under their protection the foreign workers, against whom persecution will be started the moment unemployment assumes widespread dimensions, and if unemployment increases, foreign workers, unless they are drawn into the red trade unions and the Communist Party, may become a factor obstructing the struggle of the French proletariat.

Matters stand infinitely worse in the organisational sphere of Party work. The Party is still founded on the mostly lifeless groups based on the residence of Party members. As passive appendages at some works and factories there are Party nuclei, which are little cared for (it is simply amazing that under such conditions some factory and works nuclei work magnificently—they issue factory papers and exercise great influence over the workers). The district committees in big cities and the regional party organisations and committees which should carry on the entire Party work locally, guide the Party groups and nuclei, instruct and control their work—are themselves very helpless organisations. They, with a few exceptions, have neither an apparatus nor paid functionaries, through whom they could guide the work. The Provincial Committees are also working badly. They are like parliaments, and are rarely called together (there were instances, when the plenums of the Provincial Committees did not meet between two provincial party conferences). The bureaux of the provincial committees as a rule do not conduct their work collectively. It is usually the secretariat that is doing the work, and in most cases the secretary alone is doing all the work, and he very frequently settles the most important questions in the name of the Provincial Committee.

A similar phenomenon is observed in the district and regional committees. The plenums of the Provincial committees even when they meet are badly prepared, the questions and motions

†The renegades expelled from the C.P.F. and the municipal councillors formed their own party under the name of Workers' and Peasants' Party. It is one of the purveyors of this calumny.
on the agenda are inadequately worked out. They possess a weak apparatus and an insignificant number of paid workers, who give all their time to Party work. They are not properly connected with the regional committees and are therefore unable to guide them properly. For instance, the other day one of the secretaries of the provincial committees of one of the most important and biggest provinces of France read a report before the French commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He dealt very minutely with the conditions in the Social Democratic party in his arrondissement, but said nothing definite about the conditions of the Communist Party organisation in his province. When asked about the number of nuclei, the number of members, the social composition of the provincial Communist Party organisation he answered that he was unable to reply to these questions, because the provincial committee does not receive the necessary data from the arrondissement committees. On the other hand, he could report with laudable accuracy and competency on the number of members, social composition, etc., of the Social Democratic organisation of his arrondissement!

In most instances there is no permanent party life in the lowest party organisations, there is no constant plodding, agitational, propagandist and organisational work either at the place of residence or at the place of work of the members of the C.P.F. Most Party organisations display lively activity in special cases —before elections to parliament, to municipalities and before important demonstrations. And then we must give them their due—they are working well.

Hence it becomes intelligible why L'Humanité more than the central organ of any other Communist Party in capitalist countries plays the part of organiser and leader of the masses of the workers, for the workers of the Communist Party look at things mainly through L'Humanité. L'Humanité is the most widely-read Communist newspaper in capitalist countries. Its circulation in 1928 reached on some days 225,000 copies. Therefore, nearly all the dailies of the C.P.F. were called L'Humanité; L'Humanité—Nimes, L'Humanité—Strasbourg, etc.

It is precisely this position of L'Humanité in the French working class that explains the response among the broadest masses of the French toilers evoked last year by the call: "DEFEND L'Humanité!" The workers not only saved
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE

L'Humanité by collecting the necessary funds, but on their own initiative they rallied round the paper and formed committees for the defence of L'Humanité. The movement developed round L'Humanité not round the Party. For the workers do not know or see the Communist Party organisations. In order not to be accused of making unsupported statements, I shall adduce a few facts.

(1) At the last parliamentary election in 1928 not fewer than 300,000 non-Party workers were actively conducting the election campaign of the Party, but the Party did not get in touch with them nor draw them either into the Party or into the red trade unions.

(2) In 1929 the bourgeoisie, in order to seize the central organ of the Communist Party of France, L'Humanité, presented to the newspaper a demand of immediately paying up all its debts to the Workers' and Peasants' Bank (over 2,000,000 francs) which L'Humanité, of course, was unable to do without an immediate assistance of the proletariat. The workers actively responded to L'Humanité's appeal for help. The workers on their own initiative (the Party organisations in most cases learned only from L'Humanité from which factories the workers contributed to the funds of the newspaper) organised committees for the defence of L'Humanité in their place of residence and of work. They collected and paid up 2,200,000 francs to cover the debts of L'Humanité! The French workers are not accustomed to pay any membership contributions or dues—and if they managed to collect such a huge sum in a few months, this proves—first what an enormous influence L'Humanité has over the broad sections of the proletariat, and, second, what an excitement, what an upgrade movement was caused among the working class of France by the attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to take away L'Humanité. And, indeed, if we were to assume that every worker, who contributed to L'Humanité paid on an average five francs—which is impossible—we get 440,000 workers who took part in financing L'Humanité. The best elements of this half-million of workers were not only not enlisted into the Party or the red trade unions, but the Party on the whole (with few exceptions) did not even get into touch with or guide the committees of defence of L'Humanité, it did not make use of them to associate itself with them organisationally and form nuclei among the best elements at factories, where the committees of defence of L'Humanité sprang up spontaneously.
but which did not possess Communist nuclei, though at many of them Party members were working.

The Central and local Party leadership not only failed to make use of this enormous achievement in order to consolidate its position at the enterprises, by guiding the Defence of L'Humanité Committees, but even impeded them in those activities, for the sake of which they spontaneously sprang into life: a discussion started in Party organisations and the leading organs of the Party of how to utilise these committees. Some proposed to extend the functions and the tasks of L'Humanité Defence Committees by transforming them into committees of action, strike committees, committees to combat reaction and fascism, U.S.S.R. Defence Committees, etc. Others proposed to impose on them the duty of defending "all the slogans of the Communist Party." The leadership of the Communist Party of France failed to gauge the enormous political importance of this mass movement and issued incorrect organisational slogans. In the leading article of the January issue of the Cahiers du Bolchevisme, an instruction was issued to transform the L'Humanité Defence Committees into "real committees of struggle." In the February issue of the same organ of the Party an instruction is issued in the name of the organisational department of the Central Committee of the Party, which reads as follows: "Our general slogan must be: the transformation of the L'Humanité Defence Committees into committees of struggle or factory committees." In the Paris Party organisation and among the Party leaders, the opinion prevailed, and was carried out in practice, amounting to a policy of opposing the tendency and attempts of the L'Humanité Defence Committees to become permanent organisations for defending L'Humanité. That the defence committees without ceasing to collect funds for the central organ of the Party started to raise permanent fees from their members in aid of L'Humanité was considered harmful. And this policy in regard to the mass organisation created by the workers themselves continues until now.

L'Humanité of May 10th, 1930 (in the section "Party Life and Construction," edited by the organisational department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of France) comes down on the Eastern Provincial Committee of the Party for recommending in its circular to its local party organisations to follow the example set by the L'Humanité Defence Committees and set up permanent defence committees of the
provincial party paper, *Sèmeur*, with entrance membership fees of two francs (fourpence) a year. The newspaper writes: "The *Sèmeur* Defence Committees must be committees of action which are organs of a united front, and exist only temporarily, therefore, they may not raise fees for their newspaper from their members." The Party leadership instead of furthering this movement, getting hold of it organisationally, and giving it the opportunity of developing itself, instead of popularising the organisational-creative initiative of the *L'Humanité* Defence Committees and appealing to follow the example of the pioneers of the movement, of helping transforming these committees of defence, aid and assistance into permanent informants and workers correspondents of *L'Humanité* from the works and factories, instead of connecting itself with them and win over to the Party, to the red trade unions the best members of the committees, instead of influencing the workers through the revolutionary elements in these committees, in the direction of setting up committees for struggle, etc.—instead of all this, the party organisations started to trumpet about deviations, treat them with contempt and foist on them functions which belong to the party itself and the red trade unions. The result of such tactics was the fettering of the initiative of the masses. And since this widespread movement did not obtain proper support, good leadership, it is decreasing with every day as spontaneously as it arose, and unless the Central Committee of the C.P.F. takes heroic measures to give it the right direction the movement will be reduced to naught.

The results of these faulty tactics of the Party organisation in respect of the *L'Humanité* Defence Committees were not slow in coming. The circulation of *L'Humanité* instead of increasing, which was quite possible in view of such a mass movement in its favour, decreased by not less than twenty thousand copies per day.

Is not the case with the *L'Humanité* Defence Committees the clearest instance of how clumsily the Party organisations approach the problem of strengthening organisationally their growing political influence? Is it surprising, in view of such a state of things in the Party organisation, that the fluctuation of membership in the C.P.F. is a standing feature? And what is more, far more people are leaving the Party than joining it, for the Communist Party of France is numerically decreasing with every year. What other causes would there be for this?
After all, the political line of the Party is on the whole quite correct. It cannot also be explained by the terror on the part of the government authorities and employers, for until recently there was not enough labour in factories and works, and those who were dismissed immediately obtained work elsewhere. Following the call of the red trade unions and the party (through *L'Humanité*), the workers attend meetings, demonstrations, take part in strikes, and after all these actions are everywhere attended by encounters with the police. The case of *L'Humanité* proved that the French workers are not stingy. What else is there that keeps them from joining the Party unless it is the circumstance that the Party organisations are not a permanent Communist headquarters, which works both in peace time and in times of action.

Many comrades are surprised that new, competent cadres are only slowly growing in the Communist Parties. But, surely they can grow mainly where practical work is going on. It is the work that promotes and raises men. When work goes by leaps from one election or demonstration to another, it cannot promote such people and as many of them as are required in the period we are living through.

How do the Red trade unions work? In France not more than seven to eight per cent. of workers and employees are members of trade unions. (In Paris not more than 3,000 out of 300,000 metal workers are union members. The CONFEDERATION GENERALE DU TRAVAIL (reformist) embraces over half a million workers and employees, and the CONFEDERATION GENERALE DU TRAVAIL UNITAIRE (Red trade unions), 409,000. The forms of organisation in the trade unions are almost the same. Both labour federations are set up on the territorial principle (according to the residence of members), not on the principle of the place of work of their members. The reformists neither advocate nor want the reconstruction of trade unions on the basis of factories and workers, while the leaders of the Red trade unions wrote about it, spoke about it still more, but did very little to advance that cause. The methods of work and the tactics were different, to be sure. But until recently there were many cases when the methods of work differed in few particulars only—the reformists spoke little about the strikes; they did not want them, and when strikes began all the same, they betrayed them; the Red trade unions spoke a lot about the strikes, but in most cases they did not prepare them, and
when strikes started spontaneously there were not a few cases when the representatives of the Red trade unions hampered the strikes and even tried to persuade the workers to stop the strike (the miners' movement in Loire, the behaviour of the delegates of the miners' union in the North, the action of the miners' union in Moselle, etc.), and when the workers did not agree to this the Red trade unions lead them unwillingly and inefficiently. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Red trade unions did not increase their membership, did not in fact expose the reformists and did not enjoy proper authority in the eyes of these workers and employees, who are not members of any of the existing trade unions of either tendency. More than that, the Red trade unions even declined numerically (they lost many members of the metal workers' union).

Yet, for the economic struggle, the situation in France was more favourable than in other countries. There were no unemployed there and prices for necessaries were always rising. The Red trade unions instead of organising the workers and calling on them to fight, mostly dragged in the tail of the movement, confining themselves to applying defensive tactics. For the last few years a whole wave of strikes swept all over the country. They arose chiefly spontaneously. (In 1927, 443 strikes with 120,500 strikers; in 1928, 943 strikes with 222,600 strikers; in 1929 there were as many as 1,139 strikes with 470,100 strikers, and the first months of 1930 gave another increase, as compared with 1929.) The Red trade unions and the Communist Party of France did not prepare these strikes. The strikes caught the Red unions and the Party unawares.

At the last year's National Council of the CONSEIL GENERAL DU TRAVAIL UNITAIRE, the leader of the Red trade unions, Com. Mon-Mausseau, declared: "The (strike) movement is going above our heads" and in its report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International in March, 1929, the Central Committee of the C.P.F. stated: "We have displayed remarkable weakness in the strikes that took place or should have taken place. These great movements caught us unprepared to lead them."

The self-criticism contained in both these declarations is rather severe, but still it is inadequate. The Red trade unions apart from the inability of preparing and guiding strikes have in many instances displayed the tendency to drag at the tail; they were suffering from legalist cretinism, they under-valued
the fighting preparedness of the masses (the miners’ movement in the Loire) and failed to grasp the rôle of the non-union workers, who in France number ninety-two to ninety-three per cent. The preparedness of the broad masses to fight was so great (strikes occurred in places like Belfort, the Briey region, Nancy, where no strike took place for a very long time past) that strikes were spreading from one district to another, and enterprises were involving each other in the struggle (in Belfort 8,000 metal workers started the strike and were joined by the textile workers). These masses of the workers were egging on the Red trade unions and forcing them to take over the leadership in the battles. Cases frequently occurred when the workers appeared in Party committees and demanded the removal of this or that “red” saboteur of struggle. There were many militants from among non-Party members who became prominent in the campaign of strikes.

It goes without saying that these lessons had their effect both on the Party organisation and on the Red trade unions. Lately the Red trade unions have become more active and the Party organisations at last started to take interest in trade union affairs. Very successful strikes were carried out, which gave good results. Here are two of them. In Guise in December, 1929, 1,100 metal workers declared a strike. They were mostly non-unionists. The secretary of the Party committee was elected chairman of the strike committee. The municipality where the Communists were in a majority entirely sided with the strikers, and lent them its energetic assistance. The strike resulted in a partial victory. After the strike was over about 1,000 men, i.e., ninety per cent., joined the Red union of metal workers. In Belfort, where 13,000 metal and textile workers went on strike (the whole city was on strike), there were daily demonstrations and meetings. The most militant participants of the strikes were women and the youth. Arrests were effected and there were wounded in the encounters with the police. The strike assumed a sharp political character, for the sappers who were intended to be used as strike-breakers sent in a letter through their committee, in which they stated that they would not work in place of the strikers, and asked the workers to assume patronage over their sapper regiment. The soldiers of the thirty-fifth artillery regiment also sent a letter expressing solidarity, stating that they would not shoot on the workers. In spite of the fact that the leadership of this strike committed
many blunders and mistakes, in spite of the strike resulting in only a partial success, 2,400 men joined the Red trade unions of metal and textile workers after the strike.

Do not these two instances prove that provided there is the least active work, the workers are willingly joining the revolutionary organisations? Do not these facts refute the "theory," that French workers are averse from being members of organisations or that they abstain from joining revolutionary organisations, being afraid of the police and capitalist terror? How could it occur that the Red trade unions of France, which seceded from the reformist trade unions precisely because they disagreed with the line of policy, methods of work and organisational forms of the Amsterdamers, did not in fact become revolutionary mass trade unions, capable, by making use of the suitable situation, of preparing, organising and conducting the economic battles of the proletariat? There were enough correct decisions, clear instructions by the Red International of Labour Unions, even by the Central Committee of the C.P.F. and the leadership of the Red trade unions as to how to organise the Red trade unions, how to conduct and prepare strikes, to recruit members. Their realisation was hampered by the old anarcho-syndicalist and reformist traditions and habits, the unwillingness of some, the inability of others—of the old cadres, and the inexperience of the new cadres. The causes were the same as in Germany and in many other Communist Parties, although in France they could either be altogether avoided or obviated in an easier way, than in the other sections of the Communist International, for the "Left" sectarian theories about members of the reformist trade unions being the most backward section of the proletariat, etc. (a reason the C.P.F. of France does not conduct any work in the reformist trade unions, although they embrace about half a million workers and employees), are inappropriate to France, because there are Red trade unions, at the head of which both in the centre and locally there are almost exclusively Communists. The C.P.F. could not yet induce the Party organisations to discuss and decide the questions of the trade union movements and bring the party members to take part in the practical activity of the Red trade unions. The Central Committee thought that if a couple of leading members of Red trade unions be introduced into the Political Bureau, this in itself would secure the influence of the Party.
Questions connected with the trade union movements were not discussed by the whole Party, Communist fractions were not organised in all the trade unions. And wherever they have been organised they are either passive or work very badly. So far this situation has not altered. Some comrades of the National Council of the Red trade unions passed decisions about the creation of Communist fractions in the trade unions and of shifting the centre of gravity of the work to the enterprises in words only, but in fact in most Red trade unions the Communist fractions have not yet been set up and the factory has not yet become a base for the Red trade unions. This is obviously explained by the fact that many active elements of the Red trade unions and local trade union organisations imagine even now that if the boards of the trade unions contain almost ninety-five per cent. of Communists, Communist fractions would be superfluous and that we could manage without them. Since there were no Communist fractions and the trade union questions were not discussed by the Party, there was no constant guidance or vigilant control over the performance of tasks, that confronted the Red trade unions. Thus the principal, the most important transmission belt which should have connected the Party with the masses, worked badly and with many hitches.

The working masses of France, as well as of Germany and of other capitalist countries, are looking towards our Party to support it, and as soon as any work is carried out which catches the attention of the masses, the masses respond to it at once, combine and join the Communist Party and the revolutionary organisations which are led by our Communist Party. But owing to the bad non-Bolshevik work of these organisations, these very same revolutionary workers are abandoning their ranks.
CONCLUSIONS AND TASKS CONFRONTING THE
SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

By means of Communist ideas, a correct policy and tactics, a bold struggle against the bourgeoisie, the social-democrats, reformists, fascists and renegades, the Communist Party attracts to its side the great masses in capitalist countries and colonies. This shows the wide ideological influence which the Communist Party of all countries exercises over the broad masses. But even the best of the Sections of the Communist International in capitalist countries such as the Communist Party of Germany and the Communist Party of France, have not yet learned how to consolidate that influence. The causes for this, as was pointed above, are the following: the muddle in Party construction, bad functioning of Party organisations, inexact work, lack of leadership, instructions and control over the work of Communists and Communist fractions in mass proletarian organisations; the inability to organise and conduct mass campaigns simultaneously by the whole Party, setting going all the transmission belts among the masses and to consolidate the results of these campaigns organisationally in those mass organisations, where there are Communists and sympathisers; finally, the inability, the unwillingness, the incapacity to put an end to all those obstacles, to replace all those comrades who hamper the reconstruction of the organisation on the basis of factory nuclei. How otherwise can we explain the causes of fluctuation of Party membership, which becomes a constant feature in all Communist Parties of capitalist countries. What is most alarming is that frequently there are more members leaving the Party than joining it. Revolutionary workers are attracted by the Communist Parties hoping to find in them a well-functioning organisation, which could satisfy all their requirements and make use of the whole of their revolutionary energy. Failing to find this, the workers, that are in a revolutionary mood but as yet insufficiently class-conscious, are abandoning the ranks of the Party.
Can the Communist Parties tolerate such state of affairs? Certainly not.

The latest Plenum of the Young Communist International, the enlarged Presidium of the Comintern and the March Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, adopted a resolute policy tending, without slackening the struggle against the principal danger from the Right, towards resolutely doing away with sectarianism and the "Left" phrase in the Young Communist League and the Party organisations, towards the carrying out of the pains-taking, unobtrusive, everyday work among the masses and the mass organisations; at the same time waging in practice a ruthless struggle against opportunism. It is necessary to carry out not in words, but in deeds systematically and resolutely the following measures, without which it is impossible organisationally to get hold of the masses, so as to consolidate the enormous ideological influence enjoyed by the Sections of the Communist International.

(1) To investigate the causes of loss of ground at the big factories and in the reformist trade unions of Germany, the causes of the weak growth of Red trade unions, of the decline of the Party membership, of the negligent attitude on the part of Party organisations towards the L'Humanité defence committees in France; by making wide use of the method of self-criticism—to investigate these phenomena, to work out measures for their failures and to make the results of the investigations of these measures known to the whole Party.

(2) To wage a ruthless struggle against "Left" sectarianism and "revolutionary" phrasemongering, at the same time not slackening but rather intensifying the struggle against the representatives of the "Right" danger, which still is the main danger, both theoretically and in practice, within the parties themselves. Without this resolute struggle it is impossible to extend and improve the work among the masses and the carrying out of the "class against class" tactics.

(3) To organise carefully the carrying out of a systematic campaign by the whole Party through all the transmission belts, connecting it with the masses, against the social democrats and the reformists. Unless we wage a successful struggle against the social democrats and the reformists, it is impossible to carry out successfully the "class against class" tactics.

(4) In the struggle against the attacks of capital and its
CONCLUSIONS AND TASKS

armour-bearers—the Social Democrats and reformists—it is necessary energetically to realise the correct slogan and the tried measure for the successful mobilisation of the masses: a united proletarian front among the lower classes, including the workers, who still follow the Social Democrats.

(5) To cease treating contemptuously Party construction and separating the political from the organisational questions. The muddle in Party construction, bad functioning of Party organisations, etc., takes place on account of separating policy from organisation and of that contempt with which Party construction has been treated in all the Party organs of all parties of capitalist countries. The experience of the C.P.S.U. had proved in general that only the co-ordination of politics with a good organisation and with energetic work can vanquish the enemy and build up Socialism.

(6) Under present surroundings it is of special importance to build the foundation of the Party in the factories and to renounce the social democratic organisational form of constructing Party organisations locally on the principle of residence of Party members. Only if we reconstruct the organisational forms of party organisation and create factory nuclei will we be able successfully to shift the centre of gravity of the Party work to the factories. So far the Party reorganisation on the basis of factory nuclei has not been carried out in any of the sections of the Communist International. Not all the Communists working in factories are members of the nuclei existing there, and in many factories and works Communists are not even organised in nuclei at all. Many of the existing factory Party nuclei display little activity. Even in the best sections of the Communist International the factory nuclei hardly contain, on an average, more than twenty per cent. of all the Party members working in the factories. The Communist Party of Germany should without delay make use of its connection with the factories, where independent lists of the trade union opposition were put up at the Factory Councils elections and which do not as yet possess Party nuclei, in order to create them. The same should be done by the Communist Party of France. It should have done all in its power to connect itself with the L'Humanité defence Factory Committees, which have not yet dissolved as spontaneously, as they were founded—in order to create through them factory nuclei.

(7) It is necessary resolutely to put an end to those social
democratic, out-of-date traditions which subdivide the problems of the labour movement into spheres of influence—the Party concerns itself with politics, and the trade unions (the trade union opposition or the Communist fraction in trade unions) with the economic struggle. This most harmful division exists still in many parties and in some local organisations of the best sections of the Communist International (the German, the French, etc.). The big fundamental trade union questions—the questions of tariff (wages), the tactics and the work of the Factory Councils, strike tactics, the organisation of committees of action, the working out of demands in regard to the revision of the tariff previous to the strikes, etc., must be considered by the respective Party organisations in accordance with the importance of the question, the size of the enterprise, the number of the workers, who are affected by the question that is to be decided. The decisions of the Party organisations on the questions of trade union movement (as well as on other important questions) should not only be made known to those comrades who must carry them out, but it is moreover necessary to instruct the latter how these decisions should be explained to the masses so as to make them most comprehensible. In order to carry out the decisions adopted, the factory, Party and trade union press, organisers, propagandists and agitators must be mobilised. Everything must be concentrated on one point.

It is not enough to pass decisions and issue instructions how they are to be carried out; it is moreover necessary to see to it that Party organisations control the carrying out of decisions by means of a special local revision or by means of reports read by responsible comrades or fractions, after the decisions passed have been carried out. Only in this way will it be possible to mobilise Party organisations and all the revolutionary workers to carry out the most important campaigns. And only in this way will it be possible to revive both the Party and the mass proletarian organisations, in which Communists and revolutionary workers are working.

(8) There is no question that it is necessary to widen the composition and improve the work of the Red trade unions, wherever they exist (the Red trade unions of France have not perceptibly increased their membership, although for the last two years they took part in and conducted, according to incomplete data, about 1,500 strikes with several hundred thousand participants, over half of which in some measure or
CONCLUSIONS AND TASKS

other resulted in favour of the workers). It is necessary to strengthen the trade union opposition, to improve its work both numerically and organisationally, as well as the work of Communist fractions in Red and reformist trade unions. Then they will be able to cope with the most urgent task confronting them and the Communist Parties of all the capitalist countries, colonies and semi-colonies—the preparation and independent guidance of the economic struggle of the proletariat. In order to carry out this task it is necessary to improve and intensify the work in reformist and Catholic trade unions in those countries, where there are independent Red trade unions and especially in those countries where there are only reformist and Catholic trade unions. It is necessary to wage a struggle in reformist and in other than Red trade unions for each elective office, if the masses are taking part in the elections, especially in factories and works.

It is necessary to put an end to the unmeaning phrases of "Left" sectarianism and wage a relentless uncompromising struggle against opportunism, the Right deviation in practice, against Communists and adherents of the trade union opposition adapting themselves to the bureaucrats within the trade unions. Only in this way will it be possible to intensify the work in reformist trade unions, to organise successfully and conduct independently the economic battles of the proletariat even in those countries where as yet there are no Red trade unions.

The purpose of this pamphlet was not to dwell in detail on the achievements and successes of the Communist Parties in capitalist countries, which undoubtedly did take place during the last few years. The broad masses of the workers see in the Communist Parties their revolutionary leaders, otherwise they would not cast their votes for the Communist Parties or come out into the streets in response to their appeal. For the present moment the most decisive feature is that the Communist Parties have not yet learned how to render the Party members more active, how to distribute work amongst them, how to unite them in factories and works into nuclei and in the mass labour organisations into fractions, how to instruct them properly, how to follow in their work among the masses the correct Party line, how to render our tactics flexible, adapting ourselves to those masses among whom Party members have to work, to
supply Party members with the necessary material, which they could make use of in their agitation speeches among the non-unionist masses, among those who are members of reformist and Catholic trade unions—and how it is necessary to conduct work among the workers who are members of social democratic, Catholic and national fascist organisations, in a word, how to consolidate organisationally this ever-growing influence in a Bolshevik fashion. This pamphlet examines the causes of this phenomenon and an attempt is made to indicate how it is to be obviated. The Communist Parties must become and will become the real organisers of the broadest masses of the workers.