Soviet Russia and the Post-War World

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THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT to final victory over Hitler and Hirohito and to an enduring international peace is distrust and disunity among the United Nations. It is imperative that we in the United States make every effort to understand our associates in the Second World War, whether our British, our Chinese, our Soviet or our South American allies are concerned. We have the moral and intellectual obligation of trying our best to iron out whatever fundamental causes of friction may stand between us and them. Only in this spirit can we Americans do our full part in seeing to it that the United Nations maintain unity for victory and unity after victory.

There is no more vital problem affecting the success of the United Nations both in war and in peace than that of American-Soviet relations. Fortunately during the course of the war relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have steadily grown closer and better, the culmination of this development having taken place with the Moscow Conference in October, 1943, and the Teheran Conference in December. At the Moscow Conference America's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and Soviet Russia's Foreign Secretary, V. M. Molotov, were joined by the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in signing an epoch-making Four-Nation Declaration promising action after the war to preserve international peace and security and to bring about the regulation of armaments. In the Declaration they also pledged their respective countries "to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender."
The Teheran Declaration climaxed a four-day meeting of President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill at the capital of Iran. They agreed that “our nations shall work together in the war and in the peace that will follow”; while the military staffs of the three powers joined in round-table discussions for the final destruction of the German forces in “operations which will be undertaken from the east, west and south.” Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill promised that, “We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.” “We came here,” the three great leaders concluded, “with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.”

**Moscow and Teheran Mark Turning Point**

These Moscow and Teheran accords signified a real turning point in Anglo-Soviet-American relations and will affect mightily the shape of things to come. They pointed the way to winning both the war and the peace for all the United Nations, arousing immense enthusiasm among the peoples throughout the earth fighting the Axis and bringing to a new height friendly feeling and cooperation between the U. S. A. and the U.S.S.R. Yet despite overwhelming popular support of the official American policies embodied in these agreements, recurring waves of anti-Soviet propaganda have continued to appear in the United States, centering around Soviet Russia’s alleged goals, territorial and otherwise, in the post-war world.

In the newspaper field the Hearst press, the Scripps-Howard press, the Chicago Tribune and the Social-Democratic New Leader have seized upon every pretext to attack the Soviet Government. Every time that Government takes definite action in domestic or foreign affairs, such as increasing the autonomy of the sixteen Union Republics or giving support to the real anti-Nazi elements in Yugoslavia or Poland, these newspapers somehow manage to interpret the new move so as to arouse
hostility against the U.S.S.R. Even the New York Times, which should know better, frequently indulges in this belaboring of Soviet Russia.

Apparently the immediate stimulus for this renewed campaign against the Soviet Union has lain in the magnificent triumphs over the Nazi invaders won by the Red Army beginning with the epic Battle of Stalingrad in the fall of 1942 and continuing throughout 1943 and, as I write these words, into the spring of 1944. It is a tragic commentary on the divisive factors still existent between the U.S.S.R. and its allies that the very power of the great Russian offensives against our common enemy should enable certain reactionary elements to stir up the old anti-Soviet prejudices based on the fear of Communism's spread and the remarkable strength of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And there can be no doubt that one of the prime motives of these Russophobes is to disrupt the United Nations coalition and set the stage for a separate, negotiated peace with Nazi Germany.

**Soviet Strength an Asset for Peace**

Few, of course, would now deny the fact that Soviet Russia has proved itself exceptionally strong in military affairs, in army and civilian morale, and in economic organization. The American people as a whole are thankful indeed that Soviet might has been able to withstand Hitler's concentrated onslaught for three years in succession and thus serve as mankind's most effective bulwark up till now against Nazi aggression. Soviet strength in the present conflict is an asset of infinite value to the United States and the United Nations. The point I want to stress is that after the war, too, Soviet strength will be a tremendous asset to the United States and every other nation that seeks to build a secure and peaceful world. In that great task Soviet power will be on our side (unless we are foolish enough to refuse its aid), working with America and the rest for peace, collective security, the self-determination of peoples, disarmament and normal international trade.

In order to make clear the true and enduring bases of
American-Soviet cooperation, I am assuming the task in this pamphlet of restating what in my opinion are the chief aims of Soviet Russia in the realm of international relations. These aims are simple, understandable and permanent. While they are interpreted flexibly to meet changing situations, they are not policies of the moment; they are of long standing and have been applied consistently by the Soviet Union, except when foreign governments made this impossible, during the entire twenty-five years of its existence and in relation to its foreign affairs in both Europe and Asia. They are policies that have been actualized in deeds as well as expressed in words.

**World Peace Is Soviet Aim**

First and foremost, let me say categorically that in the sphere of international affairs the Soviet Union desires world peace above all else. Since its founding in 1917 the Soviet Republic has twice gone through the terrible ordeal of foreign aggression. The first time was during the civil war and intervention period of 1918-22 when, with Russia already prostrate from its long, losing battle against Kaiser Wilhelm’s forces, the armies of no less than fourteen different nations, including expeditionary units from the United States, invaded the U.S.S.R. During these five years of desperate struggle against foes striking from every quarter, the Soviet Union suffered millions in dead and billions in economic destruction, lost all of the rich provinces along its western border and received altogether a staggering setback from which it did not recover for a decade or more.

The second occasion was at dawn on June 22, 1941, when Reichsfuehrer Hitler threw the full weight of his army against Soviet Russia in a perfidious surprise attack. During the ensuing three years of fierce and bloody warfare the Soviet Republic endured untold losses in human life and economic devastation. Upwards of 15,000,000 Russians have died either in military combat or as civilian prisoners under the savage Nazi occupation. Almost the entire western part of the country has been laid waste through the ravages of the invader or
through the scorched earth policy of the Russians themselves. Big cities like Stalingrad and Rostov have been utterly destroyed, with hardly a building standing intact. The whole Ukraine, with a population in 1941 as large as that of France, has been turned into a shambles, with its villages and towns, agricultural and industrial centers bombed, looted and burned with true German efficiency.

**Peace Essential to Soviet Reconstruction**

Yes, Soviet Russia during the past twenty-five years has had more than enough of war, has suffered far beyond any other power in both of our two world conflicts, has a supreme need and longing for peace. When Hitler is beaten the U.S.S.R. will want peace more than ever, so that it can devote itself to the prodigious internal tasks of reconstruction, especially in the immense devastated areas of western Russia. It will want to continue with the great Five-Year Plans and the building of Socialism, unhampered by the constant threat of military attack and the necessity of putting into defense industries and armaments a major portion of its resources and productivity. The Russians envision an economic program, to be embodied in a Fifteen-Year Plan, that will bring abundance in material and cultural goods to all of their 193,000,000 people and that will absorb the energies of the country indefinitely.

The Soviet view is that international war is ultimately—and usually sooner rather than later—ruinous to the economic security and stability of the participants, no matter what sort of social-economic system is involved. America and Great Britain have surely learned by this time that world wars in this mechanized, streamlined twentieth century do not exactly strengthen the capitalist system. The Soviet Government has always taken the position that both war and peace are indivisible under modern conditions and that aggression against one nation, capitalist or otherwise, constitutes an eventual menace to every nation. How sound this position is both Russia and America learned anew through the rapid spread of the Second World War.
Though the Soviets consider wars of national liberation justified—such wars ordinarily being caused by prior imperialist aggression—they hold that the wars in general that have plagued humanity in the twentieth century have been against the freedom of peoples and counter-revolutionary in the sense of holding back peaceful and democratic progress. Today the Fascists represent the most reactionary elements in society and have resorted to internal violence and then to external violence in a desperate, last-ditch effort to prevent mankind from evolving naturally toward a more cooperative economic system. And in their attempt to turn back the clock of history, they aimed to conquer, plunder and dominate the entire world.

**Historical Review of Soviet Foreign Policy**

Since its founding in 1917 the Soviet Union has proved by its whole conduct that its policy is one of peace and amity. From the start it upheld the view that a socialist republic could peacefully co-exist and cooperate on basic international ends with capitalist states. As Mr. Maxim Litvinoff, former Ambassador to the United States, once expressed it, the relative merits of Socialism and Capitalism are not going to be decided by various kinds of non-cooperation and mutual annoyance in the international sphere, but by the ultimate stability, strength and living standards of the two economic systems concerned. Hence the U.S.S.R. early attempted to establish normal diplomatic and economic relations with the capitalist countries, but found that most of these countries were not receptive. The United States itself refused even diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union for sixteen years, until the late date of 1933.

The Soviet Government also renounced the imperialist aims of the Tsarist regimes. Instead of continuing to cherish the romantic Tsarist vision of annexing Constantinople and the Dardanelles, the Soviets instituted cordial relations with Turkey and ceded it the region of Kars near Armenia. In Iran the U.S.S.R. abrogated the unequal treaties forced upon that country by the Tsars; in China it gave up all its extra-

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territorial privileges, being the first foreign power to do so. It initiated and signed non-aggression pacts with eleven of the twelve states bordering upon it; with the twelfth, Japan, it signed a special neutrality pact in 1941. Under Mr. Litvinoff’s leadership as Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Soviet Russia also signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact for outlawing war in 1928 and entered the League of Nations in 1934. Through the League it tried strenuously to bring about a dependable system of collective security and thus to stop the Fascist aggression that eventually culminated, as Soviet statesmen repeatedly warned it would, in a Second World War.

Finally, in its international aspirations the Soviet Republic has always emphasized, from Lenin’s time to the present, the urgent need and desirability of permanent peace among the various countries of the earth. It has constantly called attention to the fact that those in every land who suffer most from war are the masses of the people, the workers and peasants (or farmers). And it has uncompromisingly stood for full equality among the different races and nations of the earth, establishing this principle successfully in relation to the many different minority groups of the U.S.S.R. So in summary we can say that the self-interest of the Soviet Union as a nation, the hope of the Soviet people for economic and social progress throughout the world, the 25-year record of the Soviet state in international relations, and the Marxist ideals dominant within the U.S.S.R., all point to the seriousness and sincerity of Soviet Russia’s wish for international peace, in the future as in the past.

*The Principle of Collective Security*

Second, Soviet Russia remains firm in its insistence that peace cannot be achieved without the principle of collective security being established on a firm basis. This principle means simply that the peace-loving peoples of the world should band themselves together for the unflinching purpose of imposing economic and, if necessary, military sanctions against a potential or actual aggressor state. The U.S.S.R. supported collective
security unequivocally during the entire pre-war period of Fascist aggression, starting with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. It stood ready and willing to participate in sanctions when Fascist force was used against Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czechoslovakia. And not only was it foremost in exposing and opposing these acts of aggression; it also was the one major power that sent substantial aid to the invaded Spanish and Chinese peoples, in conformance with its pledges as a member of the League of Nations to render assistance to the victims of aggression.

Time and again during the pre-war decade Maxim Litvinoff rose at the meetings of the League of Nations and called for action against the Nazi and Fascist aggressors; and on each and every one of these occasions Soviet Russia was unable to obtain sufficient response from the Western democracies—Britain, France and America—to make possible in any measurable degree the establishment of collective security in the world at large. The democratic powers, together with the states that depended primarily on their leadership, signally failed to implement their own invention of collective security, the principle of which was written into the League Covenant by America’s President, Woodrow Wilson, after the First World War. This failure prevented the building of a genuine peace bloc with Russia and gave Hitler his big opportunity for a one-front war in 1939.

**U.S.S.R. Backs League Covenant**

It is well for Americans to remember that it was Soviet Russia that finally became the outstanding champion of those ideals and methods of world cooperation that President Wilson, President Taft and others among our leaders had been so instrumental in bringing to the fore and that later America repudiated. No Soviet statesman has ever had to acknowledge a like repudiation, as did former Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in his speech on Memorial Day, 1942. The United States, said Mr. Welles, “were offered the opportunity of sharing in the assumption of responsibility for the mainte-
nance of peace in the world by participating in an international organization designed to prevent and quell the outbreak of war. That opportunity they rejected. . . . We are reaping the bitter fruit of our own folly and of our own lack of vision.” Of course President Roosevelt himself was in favor of collective security through the “quarantine” of the aggressor, but could not muster sufficient support to make this the official American policy.

Few people realize that right up to the very end the Soviet Union stood by the League Covenant and acted in accordance with its principles. For example, Article XVI of the Covenant states in part: “The Members of the League agree . . . that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League.” Now it was precisely the refusal of the Baltic States and Poland to permit passage of Soviet troops in case of a Nazi attack, a refusal backed by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, that in the summer of 1939 led to the breakdown of British-Soviet negotiations, which in its turn led to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Had Winston Churchill, now Prime Minister, and Anthony Eden, now Foreign Secretary, both of whom opposed Chamberlain’s foreign policy, been at that time sufficiently influential, it is probable that a solid peace front with the Soviet Union would have been formed.

The Meaning of Appeasement

The fact is, of course, that the appeasement governments of Chamberlain in England and Daladier in France never really wanted a full and effective mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia. These two governments, ably assisted by reactionary circles in the United States, sabotaged collective security year after year and abruptly declined the repeated calls on the part of the Soviet Union for a conference on measures to halt Hitler. The appeasers were motivated by the hope and expectation that the Nazis, in return for the choice territories handed them on a silver platter in Central Europe, would leave the West
alone and hurl their military might against Soviet Socialism, smashing its hated economic system and taking from it all the Lebensraum that could be desired. This was the meaning of the ignominious surrender to Hitler at Munich in the fall of 1938, on which occasion the Soviet Government was not even consulted. This was why collective security collapsed and the architects of appeasement finally found themselves confronted with the frightful fiasco against which Stalin himself had warned them.

The split between Soviet Russia and the Western democracies had roots deep in the prejudices and suspicions of the past. Early in 1918 the Soviet Government, with Lenin as Premier, tried hard to obtain Allied military cooperation against the German imperialists, who were then over-running large portions of European Russia. Colonel William B. Thompson, Chairman of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia, and Thomas W. Lamont, a partner in the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., both did their best to bring the British and American governments into an understanding with the Russians. But the anti-Soviet forces of that day prevented an agreement and so left Russia no alternative but to accept the onerous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As Lenin put the matter just before the Supreme Congress of the Soviets ratified that treaty in March of 1918: "Neither the American Government nor any of the Allied Governments will cooperate, even against the Germans, with the workmen's and peasant's revolutionary government of Russia. I shall now speak for the peace."

**Russia Prepares for Nazi Attack**

The Soviet Union faced much the same sort of situation again in 1939 and saw no reasonable alternative, from the viewpoint of self-protection, except to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany. This was in no sense an alliance and was in the same category as the present pact with Japan. For almost two years after the European war began the Soviet Union maintained its neutrality and followed a foreign policy that was both independent and dynamic. Since collective se-
curity had completely broken down, the Soviet Government had to meet the realities of the situation and prepare for the worst, as the United States itself did during the same period. Especially did the U.S.S.R. attempt to strengthen its defensive positions in the West, pushing back the Finnish frontier to 75 miles away from Leningrad instead of a mere 20 and taking back Bessarabia from Rumania. The White Russian and Ukrainian sections of Eastern Poland and the three Baltic States voted to become part of the Soviet Union and were legally incorporated within it.

This extension of the Soviet boundaries constituted a real strategic defeat for the Nazis and forestalled any coup on their part, just as did the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in the summer of 1941. Furthermore, the Russian moves in Eastern Europe reacted favorably on the British defense effort, as Adolf Hitler later admitted, by keeping the German General Staff nervous and causing it to maintain well over a million troops, together with vast quantities of military equipment, along the eastern frontier. Of course when the Nazis attacked in 1941, the new Soviet territories functioned as very necessary and helpful buffers.

There is nothing, then, in the Soviet record from 1939 to 1941 that indicates disloyalty to the principles of world peace and collective security. And since Hitler's assault on the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government has repeatedly made clear that it still regards the establishment of collective security as a foundation stone in any system of enduring peace. The Polish-Soviet Agreement of December, 1941, read in part that "a durable and just peace . . . can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law, backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied states, must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization." The same thought was specifically included in the Twenty-Year British-Soviet Pact of May, 1942, guaranteeing the peace of Europe through the collective might of Britain and Russia. Finally, the signatories
of the Four-Nation Moscow Declaration, including of course Soviet Russia, stated in point four "That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The Self-Determination of Peoples

Third, the Soviet Union stands for the self-determination of peoples and in fact has always supported this principle. The Soviet Government, therefore, having subscribed to the Atlantic Charter along with the other United Nations, completely endorses the Charter's pledge that its signatories "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Premier Joseph Stalin considers this whole matter so important that on several occasions since his country became involved in the war he has explicitly reaffirmed the traditional policy of the Soviet Union.

On November 6, 1941, Mr. Stalin asserted that: "We have not nor can we have such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories or the conquest of other peoples, irrespective of whether European peoples and territories or Asiatic peoples and territories, including Iran, are concerned. Our first aim is to liberate our peoples and our territories from the German Nazi yoke. We have not nor can we have such war aims as the imposition of our will and regime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are waiting for our help. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then to accord them the possibility of arranging their own lives on their own land as they see fit, with absolute freedom. No interference of any kind with the domestic affairs of other nations!"

A year later, on November 6, 1942, Premier Stalin stated
that “the program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition” for winning the war must include “abolition of racial exclusiveness; equality of nations and integrity of their territories; liberation of enslaved nations and the restoration of their sovereign rights; the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare; restoration of democratic liberties; destruction of the Hitlerite regime.” While insisting on the sternest possible attitude toward Hitler and all the Nazi criminals who “have turned Europe into a prison of nations,” Stalin makes clear that the Russians support the principle of self-determination even in relation to Germany. “It is not our aim to destroy Germany,” he goes on to say, “for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia, but the Hitlerite State can and should be destroyed.” And in a previous speech he had declared: “It would be ridiculous to identify Hitler’s clique with the German people and the German State. History teaches that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German State remain.”

**International Democracy within U.S.S.R.**

Important in showing the Soviet attitude toward the right of self-determination, has been its own success over the past twenty-five years in establishing full racial and international democracy in relation to the more than 50 national and racial minorities living within the U.S.S.R. During my visits to Soviet Russia in 1932 and 1938, which included trips through the Caucasus and Ukraine, I was struck by the complete absence of racial discrimination wherever I went. The expression of anti-Semitism or any other kind of racial prejudice in the Soviet Union “is punishable by law,” to quote the Constitution. As Vice-President Henry A. Wallace said in his address at the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship in November, 1942: “Russia has probably gone further than any other nation in the world in practicing ethnic democracy. From the Russians we can learn much, for unfortunately the Anglo-Saxons
have had an attitude toward other races which has made them exceedingly unpopular in many parts of the world."

In February, 1944, the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body of the Soviet Union, voted to increase considerably the autonomy of the sixteen constituent Republics of the U.S.S.R., officially known as Union Republics, by giving them the constitutional right to have their own diplomatic representatives abroad and to organize their own army formations as part of the Red Army. This important move toward greater democracy and de-centralization in Soviet Russia was widely misinterpreted in the United States as some sort of sinister plot against the United Nations and bitterly attacked by those very groups who had always criticized the U.S.S.R. for too much dictatorship and centralization. Actually this new step in the evolution of Soviet democracy is an altogether logical development of the great Constitution of 1936 and shows how successfully the Soviet minorities policy has functioned under the stress of war. In my opinion that policy is the greatest non-military contribution that the Soviet Union has made to the conflict against the Axis.

In view, then, of Russia's policy toward nations and races both within and without its own borders, I think we can definitely affirm that no member of the United Nations supports more stoutly and sincerely the right of self-determination than does the Soviet Union. The Russians want to see this principle extended to the whole world, including the colonial areas. Looking at the matter historically, our conclusion must be that violation of the principle of self-determination through foreign intervention has in general been a tool of reaction and imperialism, since the Metternich period. And of course the continual military intervention that was initiated in foreign countries between the First World War and the Second was on behalf of old-time imperialist or outright Fascist interests.

**The Baltic States and Eastern Poland**

Unfortunately there are a number of Americans who favor the principle of self-determination only so long as it is applied
in a way that is unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Such Americans approved the widespread foreign intervention against the U.S.S.R. in the early years of its existence. Today these same people, together with their more recent recruits, are trying to build up into a big anti-Soviet issue the right of the peoples of the Baltic States and what was formerly Eastern Poland to carry out the principle of self-determination and reaffirm their national, historical and economic ties with the U.S.S.R. But if this principle means anything, it certainly means not only Soviet Russia’s recognition of the right of other peoples to live under capitalist or non-socialist systems. It also means a reciprocal recognition by the rest of the world, particularly the United States and Great Britain, of the right of those peoples who may so desire to follow a socialist way of life.

We should recall that the Baltic provinces and Eastern Poland were torn from Russia after the First World War through force and power politics, which had as their purpose the weakening of the Soviet Republic and the creation of a “cordon sanitaire” (sanitary cordon), both to hem it in from a military standpoint and to protect Europe from its influence. The American Government quite rightly protested against such a dismemberment of Russia, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby officially stating in 1920 that this Government “would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and associated powers that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian state.”

The “independent” governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were first set up in 1918 with the aid of the Kaiser’s armies, in line with the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk formalizing Germany’s conquests and spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. They were later recognized by the Allies, which, for their own obvious reasons, wished to see these anti-Soviet outposts made permanent. The American Government finally granted recognition in 1922, but through Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes made this significant reservation: "The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania." Thus we see that the American Government was extremely reluctant to acknowledge the independence of the Baltic States and that Mr. Hughes qualified his recognition statement so as to leave the door open for a future return of these nations to Russia.

**U. S. Government Changes Colby Policy**

The matter of Armenia quickly became an academic issue, but why did our Government later change its policy toward the Baltic States and Eastern Poland? The reason is perfectly clear. When Secretary of State Colby first made his statement, the American Government thought that the Soviet Republic would soon collapse; and even Mr. Hughes two years later nursed a similar hope. It was all right in the opinion of our State Department for a non-socialist Russian regime to have its legitimate western frontiers. But when Lenin and his Communist colleagues actually stayed in power, the American State Department shifted its attitude, not because of the fundamental rights or wrongs of the question, but because it wanted Soviet Socialism to remain as weak as possible. In short, the motives were predominantly anti-Soviet in character.

There can be no question that economically speaking the Baltic States, which were conquered by the Tsars back in the eighteenth century, belong naturally with Russia and Russia with them. Peter the Great acquired Estonia and Latvia in 1721 and Alexander I Lithuania in 1795. The only year-round, ice-free ports that Russia had in the West directly accessible to the Atlantic Ocean, were in these territories. Before the First World War almost a third of Russia’s exports and imports went through these outlets to the sea. The artificial separation of the Baltic States from the U.S.S.R. in 1918 proved an immense handicap to the Soviet Union and disrupted the econ-
omies of those three countries themselves. It was entirely logical, then, from both an economic and political (fear of the Nazi octopus) viewpoint that the Baltic peoples should have voted, in the summer of 1940, to become Soviet Republics and join the U.S.S.R.

**Rights of Baltic States within U.S.S.R.**

Thus the Baltic States entered into both the duties and privileges of being among the sixteen Union Republics that make up the Soviet Commonwealth of Nations. As such they are able to maintain and develop their own particular characteristics and institutions under the Soviet principle that the cultures of all the various peoples composing the federation should be "national in form and socialist in content." The Baltic peoples, therefore, will continue to have their own languages, their own theatres, their own schools and so on. They will have their own diplomatic representatives in foreign countries and their own armies. They will have full control, furthermore, over industry and agriculture of a local nature, over justice, education, public health and other such matters. And they will presumably evolve toward the complete democracy that is the aim of the Soviet Union and expressed in its Constitution. Moreover, under the Constitution the Baltic Republics, like the other Union Republics, have the right to withdraw from the U.S.S.R. if and when they see fit.

It has been widely believed in America that the Baltic countries from 1918 to 1940 were beautiful little "democracies" functioning along the lines of our own. This was not true. As Mr. Walter Lippman wrote in his column in the *New York Herald Tribune* on April 6, 1943, these three states "some years before the war fell into the hands of Fascist rulers, and became the focal points of intrigue against Russia. Thus the last Lithuanian parliament had been dissolved in 1927 by a conspiracy of army officers; the Latvian Republic became Fascist in 1934; and Estonia, though it never went quite that far, fell under strong Fascist influence between 1933 and 1937."

The clearest case of all for recent territorial changes under
the principle of self-determination concerns Eastern Poland, with its population of around 13,000,000, made up of approximately 7,000,000 Ukrainians, 3,000,000 White Russians (not to be confused with the anti-Soviet political exiles) 1,500,000 Jews and 1,500,000 Poles. The lands comprising Eastern Poland, except the small southern portion known as East Galicia that in 1914 belonged to Austria-Hungary, were taken away from a weakened and exhausted Soviet Union under the Treaty of Riga in 1921 by the Polish imperialists after their unprovoked war of aggression against the socialist Republic. Even the anti-Soviet Allies protested against Poland (which had also seized the Lithuanian capital, Vilna) grabbing so much territory that was obviously non-Polish. In the fall of 1939 the population of these regions (except Vilna, which was returned to Lithuania by the Soviet Government) voted overwhelmingly to join the White Russian and Ukrainian Republics and thus to become part of the U.S.S.R.

*The Soviet Position on Poland*

The new frontier of 1939, along most of its 400-odd miles, was fairly close to the Curzon Line recommended as a just one by the Supreme Council of Allied Powers in 1919 before the Polish-Soviet war. Early in 1944 the Soviet Government proposed that the 1939 boundary be altered so that "the Soviet-Polish border could approximately follow the so-called Curzon Line." Thus Poland would receive back the few predominantly Polish districts that Russia had annexed in 1939; and in addition, according to the Soviet declaration, "Poland's western borders must be extended through the joining to Poland of age-old Polish lands taken away from Poland by Germany." At the same time the Soviet Government reiterated its support of "the just striving of the Polish people for complete unity in a strong and independent state." But it also made clear that it did not consider the reactionary Polish Government-in-Exile, with which it severed relations in April, 1943, truly representative of the Polish people or a fit body with which to negotiate.
Numerous critics in the United States have accused the Soviet Government of insisting on a "unilateral settlement" of the Polish problem. Yet Prime Minister Churchill told Parliament in February, 1944, that at Teheran: "I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin the question of the future of Poland . . . . We have never in the past guaranteed on behalf of this Government any particular frontier line to Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920. The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon Line, which deals at any rate partially with the problem . . . . Russia has the right of reassurance against future attacks from the West, and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms, but by the approval and assent of the United Nations . . . . I cannot feel that the Russian demand for reassurance about her western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable and just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the north and in the west." This presumably would include most of East Prussia, the traditional breeding ground of the German Junkers who have provided so much of the dynamics for Prussian militarism.

No Unilateral Action by Soviet Union

We see, then, that far from acting alone and without consulting its allies on the Polish issue, the Soviet Government through its Premier has explicitly discussed the matter with the head of the British Government and that the British Government backs the Soviet position. While the silence of the American Government on this question may well indicate tacit approval of the British-Soviet stand, a forthright declaration by our State Department in support of this stand would serve to clear away a great deal of confusion. Both our Government officially and the American people as a whole should return to the policy enunciated by Secretary of State Colby in 1920. The Curzon Line conforms to that policy, as does Soviet possession of the Baltic States and Bessarabia.
As for Bessarabia, it was stolen, as is well known, from Russia in 1918 by Rumania. Its annexation was never recognized by the Soviet Government nor even by the United States. There would seem to be no sound reason why Rumania, Hitler's satellite in aggression, should receive back Bessarabia and the small portion of Bukovina, predominantly Ukrainian in population, that the U.S.S.R. incorporated at the same time. This part of Bukovina became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1940, while most of Bessarabia became part of the new Soviet Republic of Moldavia, one of the sixteen Union Republics. No self-determination plebiscite was held in Bessarabia, since the Soviet Union never in any sense acquiesced in its incorporation by Rumania. During the spring of 1944 the Red Army drove the Nazi and Rumanian troops out of the major portion of Bessarabia, the Prut River boundary with Rumania being the first of the Soviet Union's 1941 frontiers that Soviet forces reached.

Again, if we view objectively Finland's role as a full-fledged ally of the Nazis, there would appear to be no particular point in redrawing after the war the boundaries agreed upon in the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 1940; and in re-establishing, for example, the Finnish frontier less than twenty miles from Leningrad: Russia's second city, the cradle of the Revolution, and an industrial, munitions, shipping and naval center of paramount importance. Apart from any other arguments, transcendent considerations of self-defense justify the Soviet attitude here. To imagine a quite comparable situation, what would the United States do if Long Island, up to within twenty miles of New York City, belonged to a small, hostile foreign nation that was continually intriguing with large powers against the security and welfare of the U. S. A.?

**Finland and the Soviet Armistice Terms**

One of the chief points in the original armistice terms offered by the Soviet Government to Finland in February, 1944, was the wholly reasonable stipulation that Finnish troops should retire to the 1940 boundaries. The Finnish Government sub-
sequently refused the moderate Soviet peace proposals, which had the approval of the British Government and were recommended by both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull as Finland's big opportunity "to withdraw from this hateful partnership" with Hitler, as Mr. Roosevelt put it. This action by the Fascist-orientated Finnish Government constituted one more proof of the extent to which it was tied to the Nazi chariot.

In recapitulating on the whole question of the Soviet attitude toward Finland and the Baltic States, an issue frequently twisted and puffed up beyond all reason in order to prejudice public opinion against our Soviet ally, I can do no better than to quote from the United States Army's latest manual for its information officers and orientation course teachers. Referring to the Soviet Union's attack on Finland in 1939 and its acquisition of the Baltic provinces, this manual says: "Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U.S.S.R. not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker today."

In general it seems to me that we in America, following Mr. Winston Churchill's cue, ought to make a special effort to understand the imperative necessity the Russians feel about having strategic boundaries in the West that will provide relative security against aggression. After all, even though the United States is protected by vast oceans to both east and west, it insists on defensive bases hundreds and thousands of miles into the Atlantic and Pacific. Britain has the effective water barrier of the English Channel. But the Soviet Union has all along faced potential and actual enemies just over its borders east, west and south. No country has been so vulnerable to attack from so many directions on the part of powerful, militaristic states. And after Soviet Russia's experience over the last decade with countries that refused to live up to their obligations under the League of Nations Covenant and other treaties, it will legitimately desire in the future naturally defensible frontiers and ones farther removed than in the past from its great urban and industrial centers. This holds
true even if, as seems likely after Moscow and Teheran, a general world agreement on collective security is worked out.

American Foreign Policy after the War

It is somewhat paradoxical for Americans to argue that the Soviet Union should be willing to rely entirely on post-war organization for peace when we can by no means be sure what attitude on international affairs the United States itself will take after the war. Though the Roosevelt administration and Congress are both on record as favoring American participation in a system of collective security, and though a number of leading Republicans are inclined in the same direction, everyone knows that the political kaleidoscope can shift so rapidly and violently in this country that there is at least a possibility that the United States will retire into isolationism as it did following the First World War.

To quote former Under-Secretary of State Welles again: "I am revealing no state secret when I say to you that one of the gravest doubts which exists in the minds of our partners of the United Nations today is the doubt as to what the policy of the United States will be when the victory is won." In the light of these considerations and of the widespread hostility that still exists here toward the U.S.S.R., no one can be surprised if the Russians should retain some misgivings about American post-war policy. Naturally it is the hope of all intelligent Americans that the presidential and congressional elections of 1944 will result in overwhelming popular support for a U.S. policy of far-reaching international collaboration.

The appeasers, the anti-Soviet die-hards and a few innocents among the United Nations still make a practice of conjuring up the dreadful nightmare that at the close of this conflict the Soviet Union will march its armies all over Europe placing in power Communist regimes. This fanciful notion comes straight from the maliciously purposeful brains of Goebbels, Hitler & Co., doing their best to disrupt the United Nations coalition. Dr. Goebbels himself, subsequent to the big Russian victories in the latter part of 1942, came out with this blast: "The danger
of Bolshevism, which was believed to have been definitely checked by German armed forces, lifts its head once more. . . . Should ever the tragic possibility arise that the German forces could not cope with this storm from the East, our continent would lie at the foot of Bolshevism." The shocking thing about this statement was not the vicious idea expressed, but the fact that certain circles in England and America, desperately trying to resurrect Munich from the grave, have echoed and re-echoed this old familiar Goebbels refrain.

Aggression abroad in order to establish socialist systems would be contrary to all Soviet policy and principle. Moreover, as a practical matter it is hardly conceivable that Soviet Russia, with its enormous totals of army and civilian casualties and its incalculable economic losses, would wish to embark on doubtful military adventures throughout the continent of Europe after finishing the Herculean task of defeating the Nazis and their allies. Far from wishing to win military control of Europe, the Russians for three long years have been urging Britain and America to open up a Second Front in the West. Most decidedly they desire to have other large anti-Hitler armies operating on the continent besides their own. Above all, the Soviet Union does not want to become embroiled with England and the United States, from whom it will greatly need post-war collaboration, especially in the economic sphere.

**Soviet Russia's Influence Abroad**

The Soviet people and their leaders continue to believe firmly that a planned socialist system is superior to Capitalism and that the rest of the world would do well to adopt it; but this emphatically does not mean that the Soviet people and their government are in favor of spreading Socialism through military aggression. Spreading a certain form of government through military aggression is the Fascist method. When in April of 1944 the Red Army offensive pushed across the Prut River into Rumania, Foreign Secretary Molotov declared on behalf of the Soviet Government that "it does not pursue the aim of acquiring Rumanian territory or of altering the existing
social structure of Rumania. The entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Rumania is dictated exclusively by military necessities and the continuing resistance of enemy troops."

This statement represents faithfully the general pattern that Soviet Russia will follow when its armed forces press forward across other state frontiers in pursuit of the Nazis and their satellites. And it effectively supplements point six of the Four-Nation Moscow Declaration pledging "that after the termination of hostilities" the signatories "will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation."

Under the leadership of Joseph Stalin and the group associated with him, it has long been the policy of the Soviet Union to make Socialism a visible and outstanding success within the extensive borders of the U.S.S.R., thus letting it serve as an example to the other peoples of the earth, who might thereby be stimulated to set up similar systems. The founders of our own American Republic had exactly the same hopes regarding the effect of our great experiment on the rest of the world. As for the Third International or Comintern, its influence and activities were always much overplayed and it finally dissolved itself in May, 1943. It is significant to note, too, that the Communist Party of the United States officially disaffiliated itself from the Third International in 1940 and decided to cease functioning as a regular political party in 1944.

The U.S.S.R., which is nearly three times as large as the U. S. A. and which possesses abundant natural resources of almost every variety, has no economic need for extending its domains. Its huge population has plenty of room in which to expand and enough work to do in post-war reconstruction and the development of Socialism to keep it busy indefinitely. Of course new governments will arise throughout Europe when Hitler is finally smashed. They may be republics; they may be monarchies. They may be radical; they may be conservative. We hope they will be democratic and certainly they will not be Fascist. If some of them turn out to be genuinely
socialist, certainly the Soviet people will be glad, just as most Americans will be glad if they turn out to be capitalist. So long as these new regimes renounce war-making, the Soviet Union will try to work out with them arrangements that will ensure peace and prosperity for Europe.

There is no valid ground for believing that the more general agreements toward this end, which will naturally include both England and the United States, will in any sense conflict with pacts that the U.S.S.R. makes with individual states. Thus in December, 1943, there was signed in Moscow a twenty-year Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-war Collaboration. The comment of President Edward Benes of Czechoslovakia on this treaty is most pertinent. "The Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement," he said, "is to be regarded not only as a Soviet-Czechoslovak affair, but as a part of a great political entity and of a great conception, as one of the links in a post-war security system of which the Anglo-Soviet Agreement is another particularly important part. The Treaty means for us a permanent assurance against a recrudescence of Pan-Germanism. It is a guarantee of our frontiers and of the independence of our Republic."

Re-establishment of International Trade

The fourth main peace aim of the Soviet Union is the re-establishment of normal, flourishing international trade. Naturally the U.S.S.R. was never in favor of the economic and financial boycott that was imposed upon it by the capitalist powers after the First World War. When the present conflict is concluded Soviet Russia will be in tremendous need of goods from other countries, especially from the United States and Great Britain. And our own America will have much to gain economically from maintaining good trade relations with Russia, since orders from that nation may well soften the shock of readjustment to a peace economy here. There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union is and will continue to be most insistent on the complete, world-wide extension of the economic provisions of the Atlantic Charter.
Those pledges are that the United Nations “will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.” The Soviet Union is also signatory to a Master Lease-Lend Agreement with the United States, which commits both parties “to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples, to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.”

**U.S.S.R. Supports Drastic Disarmament**

Fifth, Soviet Russia supports the principle of universal disarmament. Though that goal looks exceedingly distant and downright Utopian at the moment, I am convinced that the Russians will return to their former proposals on behalf of drastic disarmament as soon as post-war security is established on a reliable foundation. The Soviet Union upholds disarmament both in order to eliminate international fears and frictions and in order that the billions that go into armaments can be used, in Russia and everywhere else, to raise the living standards of the people in general. The Soviet Government has recently put itself on record in favor of disarmament by subscribing to the Atlantic Charter and signing the Four-Nation Moscow Declaration, both of which documents devote special points to the question of armaments.

In my discussion of Soviet post-war aims I have concentrated on the European situation. However, the foundations of Soviet foreign policy that I have outlined also apply fully to Asia and the Far East, to Soviet relations with China, Japan and
the United States in the Pacific region. It is at the northern end of this region, in Bering Strait, that only two miles of water separate islands belonging to the U.S.S.R. and islands belonging to the U.S.A. as part of the Territory of Alaska. Had there been full American-Soviet cooperation and consultation over the past decade regarding their mutual problems in the East, our country today would not be having such far-reaching troubles in that quarter of the globe.

The Soviet Attitude towards Japan

The question of Japan has all along been of grave concern to the Soviet Union. We should not forget that on two recent occasions, in 1938 and again in 1939, the Japanese militarists made experimental attacks on the Soviet army in Siberia. In both of these miniature wars the Japs were completely routed after fierce and prolonged fighting involving large armed forces and considerable quantities of military equipment. Since 1939 the Soviet Union has had to maintain increased vigilance along its Far Eastern borders and has kept a large army in Siberia, thus immobilizing hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops. The neutrality agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan has enabled the very busy Russians to concentrate on the defeat of Nazi Germany, which is the agreed-upon priority in the United Nations' program, and to receive important lend-lease supplies from our Pacific coast.

The strength of Soviet Russia's position in relation to Japan was underscored in March, 1944, when the Japanese Government, as a condition for the renewal of restricted Japanese fishing privileges in Pacific waters adjoining Soviet territories, was required to liquidate all its oil and coal concessions in the Soviet-owned northern half of Sakhalin Island. These considerable concessions were originally due to run until 1970 and were obtained by Japan in 1925 when the U.S.S.R. was too weak to resist its demands. The Japanese promised to give up the concessions in connection with the 1941 neutrality pact, but for three years refused to carry out this understanding. The new 1944 agreement constituted a significant diplomatic
triumph for the Soviet Union, demonstrated Japanese awareness of Hitler's deteriorating position and was of definite help to United Nations power in the Far East through depriving the Japanese war machine of important sources of fuel.

This development also brings to mind that from 1875 to 1905 Russia owned the whole of Sakhalin Island, an area about as large as the state of West Virginia. The Russians were compelled to cede the southern half to Japan after being defeated in the war of 1904-05. It seems possible that after the downfall of the Axis the Soviet Union will acquire southern Sakhalin, since the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, agreed that Japan would be expelled from all “territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”

Common Aims of Russia and United States

I hope that I have made plain the fundamental, deep-reaching issues upon which the Soviet Union, America and the other United Nations can collaborate in the field of international relations. The system of permanent peace and collective security to which mankind aspires, the promise of Teheran, cannot possibly come to pass if the unhappy split of former years again takes place between Russia and the western democracies. And a foundation stone in that system will necessarily be close cooperation between the U. S. A. and the U.S.S.R. in both Europe and Asia. Such cooperation can be supported wholeheartedly by any American, regardless of his position on domestic issues in the United States or Soviet Russia. Internal problems of economics, politics, philosophy and whatnot are either secondary or irrelevant to working with the Soviet Union for the great ends of world peace, collective security, the self-determination of peoples, flourishing international trade and disarmament.

There are practically no grounds for a collision of American and Soviet interests in the international sphere. On the other hand, these two powers basically agree on the five chief goals I have stressed in this pamphlet and can look back upon a long tradition of mutual friendship, starting with the time of
Thomas Jefferson, coming down through our Civil War and the First World War, and culminating in the present global conflict. Both of our peoples are realistic in understanding that no country, be it socialist or capitalist, can show its ultimate worth and develop its finest potentialities unless it lives in a decent international environment free from war and the rumors of war.

The Americans and Russians, too, are similar in their passion for freedom, in being warm, friendly, big-hearted peoples who want to build a society in which all individuals and groups can enjoy an abundant life. We both are melting pots of many different nationalities. We both are pioneers, experimenters on the grand scale in social and economic affairs. We both believe in the possibility of unending human progress and in the use of scientific and machine techniques to effect it. And, last, we both hold to the supreme ethical concept, as expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, that all men, the whole of mankind, have an inalienable right to “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” That ideal the United States and the Soviet Union can fulfil only through mutual cooperation for a world of peace, democracy and economic security.
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