RESULTS OF
THE BERLIN CONFERENCE

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Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
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The conference of Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union which met in Berlin from January 25 to February 18 examined a number of major international problems.

The preceding conference of Foreign Ministers of the four Powers was held in the spring of 1949, and there had been no such conferences in the intervening five years. The Berlin Conference, for its part, was unanimous concerning the necessity of holding another conference, with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic, and this is of definite international importance.

I

In the past five years the post-war trend of development in the camp of the capitalist countries has become distinctly apparent. It is now clear to all that the ruling circles of the United States lay claim to the role of leader of that camp. They lay claim to more than that. They unceremoniously declare that they have taken upon themselves the "burden of world leadership," that the United States is the "leader of the world," though, it goes without saying, there is no foundation whatever for these claims.

These ambitions have found practical expression in the North Atlantic bloc, founded in 1949 on the initiative of the U.S. government and with the active support of British ruling circles. The North Atlantic pact was signed by the following countries: the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Some of these countries signed the pact under direct outside pressure. Actually, the pact is an instrument of the Anglo-American bloc; in effect the United States is endeavouring to use it for the establishment of its world supremacy. The North Atlantic pact resembles the "Anti-Comintern Pact" which was concluded in 1937 by Hitler Germany, militarist Japan and fascist Italy, and which was at first directed against the U.S.S.R. There is no reason to doubt that the fate of the North Atlantic pact will be no better than that of the "Anti-Comintern Pact."

Besides laying frank claim to world supremacy, the ruling circles of the United States, and of Great Britain, began increasingly to stress that they intended to conduct their foreign policy "from positions of strength." There is nothing surprising in this. From an urge for world supremacy to a "positions-of-strength" policy, or a "peace based on strength" policy, is only one step.

Now we all know perfectly well what the extolling of that policy has led to, not only in the United States and Great Britain, but also in the other North Atlantic bloc countries.

A direct reflection of that policy is the arms drive which has developed in recent years. Armament piling has attained unprecedented dimensions in the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Norway and other member countries of the bloc. The capitalist monopolies of America and Europe have already made big fortunes out of rearmament. But it has laid a heavy burden of unbearable taxation and inflated prices on the backs of the people, of the working folk.
Particular importance was attached to all manner of atom-bomb intimidation. But that was not effective for very long either. Everyone can now see that the calculations based upon the futile hope that the United States would retain a monopoly in this field have proved absolutely unfounded.

Together with the arms drive, the United States, as well as Great Britain, began to build a network of military bases in Europe and adjacent territories. The fact that these military bases are frankly directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies only serves to emphasize that the establishment of American military bases has nothing to do with purposes of defence.

Devotion to the "positions-of-strength" policy led to the signing, two years ago, of the Paris treaty providing for the formation of a so-called "European Defence Community," which envisages the rebuilding of the armed strength of Western Germany. Plans are now on foot for the revival of German militarism, which until very recently was opposed not only by France and other European countries, but also by the United States and Great Britain. This has given rise to new, and extremely serious, difficulties in the settlement of the German problem.

The "positions-of-strength" policy is reflected in many other actions of the United States in the sphere of international relations.

One cannot, for instance, close one's eyes to the discrimination in international trade which the United States, in conjunction with Britain and other countries of that camp, have been practising in recent years against the U.S.S.R., the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Democracies. In spite of the fact that that policy has already caused great damage to the United States and Great Britain themselves, pressure is still being exercised by various means and under various pretexts with the object of further hampering normal international trade and of restricting and impeding commercial intercourse with the countries of the democratic camp. That policy, however, is having a contrary effect, inasmuch as economic relations between the U.S.S.R., China and the People's Democracies have in this period become much stronger, and their economic progress has gained momentum from year to year.

Everyone can now see that the "positions-of-strength" policy conducted by the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain has not been productive of positive results either in the political or the economic sphere. And it is meeting with failure in the military sphere too.

In the first place, that policy failed to stand the test in Korea. It did not bring the United States military victory. Having involved itself in armed intervention in Korea, the United States began to suffer a loss of military prestige and moral authority. That policy was bound to end in failure when levelled against a people which was staunchly fighting for its national rights, its independence and liberty.

Despite all the assistance the United States is giving France in Indo-China, the "positions-of-strength" policy has not led to anything good there either. French colonial policy, and, with it, the United States policy of supporting "colonialism," is sustaining defeat after defeat in Indo-China. The protracted war against the people of Indo-China, who are fighting for their liberty, has not glorified the "positions-of-strength" policy, but only discredited it completely.

To all this should be added the fact that the past five years have witnessed not only the establishment, but also the consolidation of the Chinese People's Republic, which has delivered the Chinese people from foreign imperialist domination. That fact has radically altered the situation throughout Asia and is of cardinal importance for the whole future trend of international developments.

It is against China that the "positions-of-strength" policy is being applied with particular obstinacy and with many absurd excesses. But it is precisely here that the failure of that policy is being most convincingly demonstrated.

In the past few years the entire camp of socialism and people's democracy has grown much firmer and stronger. During this period there was formed a second world market, embracing both the highly-industrialized and the agrarian-industrial countries of the democratic camp. The trend of political relations between these countries is towards ever closer co-operation and firmer friendship.

What does the "positions-of-strength" policy of the ruling circles of the United States and the other countries of the Anglo-American bloc imply? In the final analysis, it implies the conduct of a foreign and domestic policy which facilitates the engineering of another war. It can have no other implication. Such a policy cannot enjoy the firm support of the peoples.

Unlike the policy of the United States, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union aims at promoting peace and international co-operation. The fundamental principle of the Soviet government's policy is that there are no international issues which cannot be settled by peaceful means. It is a policy of promoting peace. It conduces to friendly co-operation among nations.
and helps to unite the peace-loving forces of all the nations of the world.

Until very recently, the foreign policy of the United States and Great Britain referred to above set a definite tone for the majority of the countries of the capitalist camp. The "positions-of-strength" policy inevitably made for greater international tension. That was to be felt both in Europe and in Asia. It was, and is, to be felt in every part of the world.

The international situation was materially changed by the initiative of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic which led last year to the termination of the war in Korea.

The conclusion of the Korean armistice helped to lessen international tension. This enabled the Soviet Union to raise the question of a further reduction of international tension. The convening of the Berlin Conference was in itself proof that there is a possibility of achieving that under present conditions.

The Berlin Conference was preceded by a long diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet government and the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France. The exchange of notes was of value. It improved the conditions for the holding of the Berlin Conference.

What the three Western governments in effect proposed was that the conference should confine itself to the discussion of certain questions relating to the German problem, and of the question of the Austrian treaty. They were anxious to avoid discussion of other issues and the general question of lessening international tension.

The Soviet government, however, believed that termination of the war in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice had created favourable conditions for the examination of measures that would conduce to a general relaxation of international tension, including reduction of armaments and prohibition of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries.

The Soviet government proposed a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the five Great Powers—France, Great Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic—to discuss measures for lessening international tension, and a conference of Ministers of the four Powers to discuss the German question, including the problem of restoring Germany's unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The diplomatic correspondence conducted up to the close of last year failed to produce full agreement, inasmuch as the United States, Great Britain and France objected to the proposed conference of the five Great Powers, with the Chinese People's Republic participating. The Soviet government then declared that it would raise this question at the conference of representatives of France, Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in Berlin, concerning which agreement had already been reached.

At the Berlin Conference, we proposed the following agenda:

1. Measures for lessening international tension, and the convening of a conference of Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain, the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic.

2. The German question and the safeguarding of European security.

3. The Austrian state treaty.

This agenda was accepted by the conference, albeit with certain reservations.

We must not forget what was being done before the Berlin Conference to mould public opinion in the Western countries. There, too, we saw the influence of the basic line of Anglo-American foreign policy to which I have referred.

Measures of every kind were employed by the ruling circles of the United States, as well as of Great Britain, to increase pressure on the U.S.S.R. It was asserted not only by their press, but by leading statesmen as well, that it was useless to negotiate with the Soviet Union and that the Berlin Conference was doomed to inevitable failure. But while resorting to various means of pressure, up to and including the direct threat of torpedoing the conference, the reactionary press was unable to conceal that the U.S.A., Great Britain and France were interested in the Berlin Conference.

The governments of these countries could not but reckon with the increasing pressure of democratic opinion, which demanded that the conference of representatives of the four Powers take into account the popular desire for relaxation of international tension. The growth of the people's national-liberation movements, especially in Asia, operates in the same direction. Developments have confirmed that France, Britain and the United States were deeply interested in having the Berlin Conference take place.

Before speaking of the areas of agreement reached at the Berlin Conference, it is necessary to dwell on the differences which the conference revealed in the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the three Western Powers.

II

The greatest attention was given at the conference to the German problem. That, as everyone knows, is the chief of the problems which have remained unsettled since the end of the war. Yet the four countries
which were represented at the Berlin Conference bear an especial responsibility for the proper solution of that problem. That means that the German question must be settled in a way which will guarantee peace and security in Europe, and which will also accord with the national interests of a democratic Germany.

The discussion brought out very fully the nature of the differences on this question between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the United States, Great Britain and France on the other. That, however, does not mean that the attitude to the German problem in France fully coincides with that of the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain.

The Soviet Union held, and holds, that the safeguarding of European peace and security requires, above all, that a resurgence of German militarism shall not be permitted.

From this it follows that the measures necessary for the restoration of Germany's unity on a democratic and peaceful basis must not be postponed. That attitude fully accords with the agreements concluded by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition—the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., with the subsequent adhesion of France—both during and immediately after the war.

However, the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France have retreated from this position, are dishonouring cardinal international agreements to which they put their signatures, and have adopted the course of assisting the revival of German militarism. Since this cannot be done today with respect to all Germany, they are persistently paving the way for the remilitarization of the western part of Germany. In this they are relying also on the Adenauer government in Bonn.

If the governments of France, Great Britain and the United States agreed with the government of the Soviet Union that there must be no revival of German militarism, settlement of the remaining controversial issues would be much easier. That implies that the governments of the four Powers must rely in this matter not on the German militarists and revanchists, but on Germany's democratic and peaceful elements, who express the real will of the German people.

The Berlin Conference confirmed that the German problem, too, is affected by the foreign policy of the Anglo-American bloc, as expressed in the "positions-of-strength," or the "peace based on strength," policy.

This is attested by such facts as the signing of the Paris and Bonn treaties in May 1952. These treaties have made the danger of a revival of German militarism especially acute.

Under the Paris treaty, a so-called European Defence Community is to be set up for a period of fifty years, and, under its auspices, a European army is to be formed, consisting of the armed forces of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as of West Germany. It will thus be seen that out of a total of approximately thirty European states, six, including West Germany, have made it their aim to form a narrow and restricted military alignment on which they have unlawfully slapped a "European" label, despite the fact that four-fifths of the European states do not belong to it. That treaty legalizes the creation of a West-German army (Wehrmacht) and its integration in the aforesaid military alignment. It is proposed to form twelve West-German divisions as an initial force, but there are already plans to increase that number. And that there is talk of forming 25 and even 60 West-German divisions is not without its significance. In this connection the fact cannot be ignored that the other day the West-German parliament (Bundestag), in defiance of the existing Constitution, passed decisions which permit the introduction of military conscription in West Germany for males of 18 years and over. This is an attempt to give the Adenauer government a free hand to form an army.

Besides the Paris treaty, signed by six countries, the Bonn treaty was concluded at the same time and signed by the United States, Great Britain and France, as well as by West Germany. The Bonn and Paris treaties complement one another.

According to the Bonn treaty, U.S., French and British armed forces are to be stationed in West-German territory for several decades to come, thus turning West Germany into a semi-occupied country. That treaty also bears the signature of the Adenauer government, which is now the chief bulwark of the West-German revanchists, who want to clear the way for the re-emergence of German militarism. Today the West-German revanchists have affixed their signature to the Bonn treaty, which is humiliating to the German people. But there can be no doubt that when, in accordance with the Paris treaty, an army headed by Nazi generals will have been created in West Germany, they will cease to honour their signature. Then their real aims, their aggressive revanchist designs, will be revealed—and the neighbouring countries will be the first to feel it.

Simultaneously with the signing of the Paris and Bonn treaties, the United States, Great Britain and France issued a tripartite declaration, the express purpose of which was to support and accelerate the creation of the "European Defence Community" and, hence, of the European army.
All this throws light on the far-reaching plans of the ruling circles of the United States, Great Britain and France, for the furtherance of which the Paris and Bonn treaties were concluded. The United States and Great Britain do not propose to include their own armed forces in the European army, but they want to be its actual masters all the same. The organization of a European army, of which an army of the West-German militarists would be an integral part, can be explained only by plans for the engineering of another war in Europe. And it is becoming obvious that the ruling circles of the United States want to wage that war by the hand of “Europeans.”

When the European army is formed, France alone of the five Great Powers will be deprived of the possibility of having her own national army, since her armed forces will be incorporated in the European army. That the armed forces of West Germany will occupy the dominating position in the European army is beyond all doubt. At the same time, France is grossly trampling upon the very principles of the Franco-Soviet treaty of 1944, the object of which is to prevent fresh acts of aggression on the part of German militarism. There are French Ministers who, assent to all this, though it is incomprehensible how such an attitude can be reconciled with France’s national dignity and interests.

The Paris treaty has still not been approved by the parliaments of France, Belgium and Italy, and has therefore not yet entered into force. But increasing pressure is lately being exerted by the United States and Great Britain—especially on France—to have the treaty ratified and its implementation started.

At the Berlin Conference, not only Dulles and Eden, but also the French Foreign Minister, Bidault, adduced every species of argument in defence of the Paris treaty and the “European Defence Community.” They went so far as to assert that, formally, the treaties concluded with West Germany will not be binding upon the future united Germany. There will come a time when these statements of the French, British and American Ministers will be remembered by the German militarists and revanchists, should they ever succeed in giving practical effect to the opportunity presented by the Paris treaty for a revival of militarism in West Germany.

However, it is already clear that the U.S., British and French governments, and the Adenauer government, too, rule out the very possibility of uniting West and East Germany into an integral German state. In conformity with the Paris treaty, they explicitly declare that, unless that treaty is extended to the united Germany, they will not even permit the union of the two parts of Germany and, consequently, will not permit the creation of a united and independent German state. This glaringly reveals how little importance they attach to all their other proposals on the German question.

It might be presumed that, at the Berlin Conference, the U.S., British and French Ministers were not interested in a real solution of the German problem, or even in the settlement of any practical issue of major importance to the German people. They were preoccupied with only one aim, namely, to clear the way for the creation of the European army in accordance with the Paris treaty, which would open the floodgates for the revival of militarism in West Germany.

Even the Soviet government’s proposal that the Germans should be given a hearing, so as to learn what the German people themselves think of the urgent tasks of unifying Germany and the participation of the German people in guaranteeing peace and security in Europe—even that proposal was not accepted at the Berlin Conference. The West-German government did not want that either, because, you see, it is not disposed to sit down at one table with the government of East Germany—the government of the German Democratic Republic—which resists all plans to revive German militarism. Yet, as things are now, it is the German Democratic Republic which voices the real will of all peace-loving Germans, the real desire of the German people for peace and friendly relations with other nations. The refusal of the U.S., British and French representatives to give a hearing to representatives of Germany shows how remote they were from any serious intention of examining the German question.

The U.S., British and French Ministers did not want to examine the Soviet draft peace treaty with Germany. Nor did they submit any draft peace treaty of their own. They even refused to examine ways and means of accelerating the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany, although a detailed examination of this question had already been undertaken at a conference of the Ministers of the four Powers several years ago.

The three Western Ministers declined to examine the question of forming a provisional all-German government comprising representatives of the parliaments of East and West Germany, though this would have been an effective step towards the reunification of Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis. They likewise rejected the Soviet proposal to set up two all-German committees: one to improve economic and administrative relations between East and West Germany, and the other to promote better conditions
for the development of German national culture. They avoided all practical steps to bring East and West Germany closer together, though such steps would be the surest road to German reunification.

The U.S., British and French Ministers declined to examine the proposals made by the Soviet Union for easing the financial and economic obligations of East and West Germany arising out of the war. They knew, of course, that in East Germany these measures have already been carried out, and that occupation expenditure, for instance, has already been reduced to 4.5 per cent of East Germany's national revenue. In West Germany, on the other hand, taxes are mounting and occupation expenses steadily increasing. This year occupation expenditure will amount to nearly 35 per cent of West Germany's total national revenue.

The U.S., British and French Ministers made, in effect, only one proposal on the German question, and that was the holding of so-called "free elections" in East and West Germany. But even that proposal was in no way designed to promote a settlement of the German problem in the interests of European peace and security, or the holding of really free elections. What is more, it was imbued through and through with distrust of the German people and their democratic forces.

It was proposed that even this, purely internal affair of Germany should be taken out of the hands of the Germans and entrusted to the occupation authorities. The Soviet Union's proposal that the four Powers help the Germans form a provisional all-German government consisting of representatives of the parliaments and democratic organizations of East and West Germany, and that that government should itself conduct free all-German elections, was rejected.

Rejected, too, was another of our proposals, namely, that all occupation forces, with the exception of strictly limited contingents, should be withdrawn from both East and West Germany prior to the all-German elections. The object of this Soviet proposal was to eliminate the possibility of the occupation authorities exerting pressure on the elections. But the advocates of so-called "free elections" also rejected this proposal, which is in the highest degree calculated to promote real freedom at the polls.

To this day Dulles is delivering speeches on the Berlin Conference in which he professes to be an ardent believer in "freedom" of nations and in "free elections." But we know that not all talk of "freedom" is a defence of real freedom for the people, for the working folk. Certain "defenders" of freedom have a fancy for the kind of "freedom" under which the exploiters and militarists have a free hand and live in piping prosperity, while the working folk are constantly menaced with war and annihilation. It goes without saying that this is not the kind of "freedom" we stand for. We stand for real freedom, freedom under which the militarists are deprived of the possibility of plunging the people into new holocausts.

We know that Hitler and his clique, in 1932-33, also came to power by means of so-called "free elections." Hitler did not become Chancellor of Germany all at once. The road was cleared for him by the Adenauers of the time, men like von Papen, who belonged to the same party as the present Bonn Prime Minister, Adenauer. It is well known that behind Hitler and his lieutenants, men like von Papen, stood the German monopoly magnates, who were making huge fortunes by expanding the war industries. And now, too, behind the back of the Adenauer clique, who are dreaming of accelerating the remilitarization of West Germany, stand similar German monopoly magnates, who are basing their hopes of additional fat profits and super-profits on another armaments drive, and who associate their interests primarily with the plans for reviving German militarism.

The U.S., British and French governments profess to stand for free elections, but actually they refuse to have anything to do with the democratic and peaceful forces of the German people. They calculate that the kind of "freedom" they want to confer on Germany can best be assured through the occupation authorities, backed by the forces of occupation. Far from promoting Germany's development on democratic and peaceful lines, such distrust of the German democratic and peaceful forces amounts to direct support of the German militarists and revanchists, who are already utilizing that support for the furtherance of their aims in West Germany.

In the present German policy of the U.S., British and French governments everything is subordinated to the plan for a "European Defence Community," that is, a European army, and this is leading to the revival of militarism in West Germany. That course cannot promote peace in Europe. It would also close the path to German reunification, inasmuch as West Germany would cease to be a peaceful state and it would become impossible to re-establish Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis.

The Soviet Union stands for a different policy, for a different course with regard to Germany.

This found expression in its proposals for accelerating the conclusion of the peace treaty, for the reunion of Germany, the formation of a provisional all-German government and the holding of free all-German
elections. The purpose of these proposals is to ensure the speediest possible unification of the German nation and Germany's subsequent development on democratic and peaceful lines. Quite obviously, the U.S.S.R.'s proposals rule out the possibility of a situation arising in which Germany might again become a dangerous seat of aggression in Europe. These proposals are based on the principle that there must be no revival of German militarism.

Thus the settlement of the German question now hinges on one fundamental problem: is German militarism to be revived or not?

It must be said that the policy of creating a European army and of reviving militarism in West Germany is meeting with active resistance, outside of government circles, in such countries as France and Britain, and even in West Germany.

In France, for instance, opposition to this policy is mounting not only among the workers and other sections of the working population, but also in bourgeois circles. That opposition is increasing in the French Parliament. Dissatisfaction with this policy is widespread among the British people. It is not without significance that nearly half the Labour M.P.s have come out in opposition to this policy, which the Right-wing Labour leaders defend. And in West Germany, the Social-Democrats, mindful of the sentiment of the masses, continue to oppose Adenauer's policy of speeding up the revival of German militarism even at the price of renouncing the unification of Germany.

And that is understandable. A policy which leads to the revival of German militarism arouses legitimate alarm in all European countries.

That policy raises the question foursquare: where are matters tending—to the consolidation of peace, or to another war?

Where is the present German policy of the United States, Great Britain and France tending?

That policy is tending towards the creation of a military alignment of certain European states against other European states. To follow that course is to abandon the task of promoting peace and security in Europe. To follow that course is to head for another war in Europe, and that would lead to a third world war.

Is it true that France, Italy, Belgium and the European countries associated with them are compelled, in the interests of their security, to follow that course? Is it really necessary to create a "European Defence Community" and, along with it, to remilitarize West Germany, in order to safeguard their security and peace in Europe?

It has been asked again and again lately, especially in France, whether there is no alternative to the "European Defence Community," whether that notorious "Community" cannot be replaced by something else, and whether European peace and security cannot be guaranteed without building a European army based on the revival of militarism in West Germany. These questions have been raised again and again, but usually in order indirectly to vindicate the plans embodied in the Paris and Bonn treaties.

In opposition to the plans for military alignments in Europe, the Soviet Union put forward at the Berlin Conference a concrete plan which would place the safeguarding of the peace and security of all the European countries on a firm footing. That plan was embodied in the Soviet draft of a General European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe.

The General European Treaty provides appropriate guarantees against aggression and violation of the peace in Europe. The treaty would be open to all European countries, no matter what their social systems. Both the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic could be parties to it pending the reunification of Germany and the united Germany after reunification had been achieved. The treaty provides that if any of the parties is subjected to armed attack, the other parties shall assist it by all the means at their disposal, including the use of armed force, in order to re-establish and maintain international peace and security in Europe.

In addition, the Soviet proposals envisage an immediate substantial easing of Germany's position, including the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the four Powers, with the exception of strictly limited contingents, from all German territory.

The object of the Soviet proposals is to create, instead of mutually opposed military alignments of European states, an effective system of collective security in Europe.

A regional inter-American treaty of mutual assistance, to which the United States and all the Latin-American republics are party, has been in existence since 1947. Such regional arrangements, provided they are of a strictly defensive character, may be of positive value, although, of course, the attempts of U.S. ruling circles to use the before-mentioned treaty, under the pretext of combating communism, for the furtherance of their own selfish interests cannot be regarded as legitimate. Rebuffing the objections raised to the General European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe, the Soviet delegation made it clear how untenable such objections were when directed against a European regional treaty. Such a
treaty, being of a genuinely defensive character, is fully compatible with the United Nations Charter.

It was said time and again at the Berlin Conference that the present-day world is divided, that there are now countries with different social systems. That, of course, is a fact, and must be reckoned with. It is impossible to disregard the fact that not only the Soviet Union, but a whole number of other countries have embarked upon the road of socialism and people's democracy and are successfully advancing along that road.

We regard this as one of the greatest achievements of the twentieth century. We do not propose to deny that the camp of peace, democracy and socialism now embraces countries with an aggregate population of 800 million. The growing strength of the democratic camp is obvious, and, indeed, very instructive.

However, we are consistent believers in the Lenin principle of co-existence of countries with different social systems.

We believe that notwithstanding the different social systems in Europe, for instance, all the European nations are interested in the preservation and consolidation of peace. Our endeavour is that, in the matter of protecting peace, there shall be no two camps either in Europe or in the world generally. We appeal to all the European states to refrain from creating military alignments directed against one another, since such alignments cannot but lead to war. Instead of that, we propose the formation of a united camp of all European states which are anxious to safeguard their security and to promote peace in Europe. In such a system of European security, no state, however strong, must enjoy a dominating position. The sovereignty of each and every party to this collective security system must be guaranteed and protected from outside encroachment. It is on these principles that our draft of a General European Treaty of Collective Security in Europe is based.

That draft did not meet with the support of the French, British and U.S. Foreign Ministers. But no ministers can repudiate the idea of collective security of the European nations. It is an idea which the peoples understand. It wins the sympathy of all peace-loving men and women.

The idea of a general European treaty of collective security in Europe will find its way to the hearts of the millions through many different channels, and that will contribute in the surest way to the cause of peace and security in Europe and, with it, throughout the world generally. The Soviet Union, furthermore, urges that, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the creation of German armed forces shall not be permitted, which would mean that during this period Germany would be neutralized.

Certain ministers may, of course, continue to build all manner of plans for the creation of a "European Defence Community" and the remilitarization of West Germany. But nothing will come of this except another unreliable military alignment bereft of the support of the peoples. The idea of collective security of the European nations, embodied in a general European treaty or in some other form, is another matter. That idea is winning increasing sympathy among the European nations, because it is expressive of a deep desire to promote universal peace and security.

The Soviet government has never concealed its disapproval of the North Atlantic pact, which is an expression of the urge of the Anglo-American bloc for world supremacy. The attempts to create a "European Defence Community" which would be directly instrumental in reviving German militarism greatly multiply existing differences. The Soviet government is against multiplying these differences. It is our desire to settle disputed issues in the interest of peace. In this instance, it is becoming very clear that the Soviet Union expresses the thoughts and sentiments of all the peace-loving nations of Europe, and not only Europe.

The discussion of the German question at the Berlin Conference showed that in this case the differences between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers hinge primarily on the question of German militarism, inasmuch as there are plans for its revival. The Soviet Union, having borne the main brunt of the struggle against Nazi aggression, cannot underestimate the danger of fresh aggression if German militarism is allowed to re-emerge.

The growing menace of West-German remilitarization could not but affect the Austrian question too.

It was learned at the Berlin Conference that the United States, Great Britain and France were prepared to withdraw their objections to those articles of the draft treaty with Austria to which they had been objecting for the past five years. That made it sufficiently clear how baseless those objections had been.

The Soviet side declared at the Berlin Conference that it was prepared to sign the Austrian treaty forthwith, given the acceptance of two proposals which were rendered necessary by the signing of the Paris agreement for a "European Defence Community."

Here are these two proposals.

First, we proposed that Austria shall undertake not to enter into any military alignment directed against any country which took part in the war against Hitlerism and in the liberation of Austria, and that she
shall not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on her territory.

Second, we insisted that a reservation be inserted in the Austrian treaty stipulating that, in view of the delay in concluding a peace treaty with Germany, the military units of the four Powers now stationed in Austria shall be allowed to remain there, and that the question of their withdrawal from Austria shall be reconsidered not later than 1955. If there were no plans for a European army, this reservation would be unnecessary. It has become necessary because the United States and Great Britain are exerting every manner of pressure on France and other countries to secure their consent to a revival of militarism in West Germany, which, of course, increases the danger of a new Anschluss (annexation of Austria).

The U.S., British and French governments refused to accept these two addenda to the Austrian treaty proposed by the Soviet Union. They thereby prevented the Austrian government from treating these proposals with the understanding they deserve. The result is that the Austrian treaty has not been signed.

The facts I have cited show that responsibility for the failure to sign the Austrian treaty lies with the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, inasmuch as they are unwilling to renounce their plans for reviving German militarism, which increases the danger of a new Anschluss.

The attempts now being made by official spokesmen in the United States, Great Britain, France, and also Austria, to lay the blame on the Soviet Union for non-conclusion of the Austrian treaty are totally unwarranted. Conditions being what they are at present, the Soviet government cannot close its eyes to the danger of a revival of German militarism or to the threat of a new Anschluss, the prevention of which is expressly provided for in the Austrian treaty. The Soviet Union expresses its readiness to sign the treaty with Austria as soon as consent is received to the afore-mentioned proposals, which are in the interest of the Austrians themselves, as well as of the peace and security of all the European nations.

III

In addition to the German and Austrian questions, the Berlin Conference discussed measures for lessening international tension, as provided for in the first item on the agenda. The examination of this question was undoubtedly of value.

In all, the Berlin Conference held 27 sessions. These included six closed sessions, with restricted participa-


tion, where the discussion was devoted mainly to questions relating to the first item on the agenda.

As a result of these discussions, two decisions were agreed upon by the Ministers.

It was agreed that the governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., France and Great Britain would assist in promoting a successful solution of the problem of disarmament, or at least of a substantial reduction of armaments. That agreement did not fully satisfy the Soviet delegation. It did not reflect our proposal to convene a World Conference on General Reduction of Armaments this year. Nevertheless, the agreement imposes certain obligations on the four governments. It is directed against the armaments race. It imposes the obligation to promote at least a substantial reduction of armaments, upon which the Soviet Union has always insisted.

Agreement was also reached to convene a conference in Geneva on April 26, 1954. It will be a conference of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., France, Great Britain and the Chinese People's Republic with the purpose of reaching—with the participation of the Republic of Korea, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend—a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; also for the purpose—again with the participation of the interested states—of restoring peace in Indo-China.

Thus a conference in which the five Great Powers will take part will meet in Geneva on April 26 to examine two of the most pressing Asian issues: the Korean question and the situation in Indo-China. And the Chinese People's Republic will at this conference occupy its lawful place side by side with the other Great Powers.

The importance of this agreement reached at the Berlin Conference cannot yet be fully assessed. But this agreement may make for the settlement of two important Asian problems, and that would contribute to a further lessening of international tension.

The United Nations General Assembly proved powerless to settle the Korean question; here too it acted under United States pressure. That pressure led the General Assembly to adopt incorrect decisions which frustrated the convening of the Political Conference on Korea. The U.S. representatives at the Panmunjon talks worked for this same end.

The Berlin Conference helped to untie this knot. Now representatives of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, the United States, Great Britain and France, together with representatives of both parts of Korea, will be able to explore a final settle-
ment of the Korean question. The task is to assist the national reunification of Korea on a democratic basis and the transition of Korea from truce to stable peace.

The French representative at the Berlin Conference displayed particular interest in the question of Indo-China. Here French colonial policy is at an impasse, having encountered the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people, who are defending their right to peace and national liberty. That policy has moreover laid an intolerable burden upon the French people and is continuously demanding of them new, and futile, sacrifices.

The Geneva conference will be faced with the intricate problem of restoring peace in Indo-China and safeguarding the national rights of its peoples. Much will depend on the attitude of the French government, but much also on the attitude of the United States, which is intervening more and more in Indo-China affairs. But most of all will depend on whether all the parties to the conference recognize the necessity of restoring peace in Indo-China not by continuing a hopeless war, but by agreement based upon the principles of the liberty and independence of nations.

* * *

The results of the Berlin Conference are now being widely discussed. Opinions on the subject are being expressed in many countries by official spokesmen and by the press of various trends.

The other day the French Foreign Minister spoke of the significance of the Berlin Conference, and especially of the importance of the agreement to convene a conference in Geneva at which the restoration of peace in Indo-China will be discussed. Developments are showing how urgent a settlement of that problem has become.

The British Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons last week, made a number of critical remarks about the Berlin Conference, but admitted at the same time that the conference had been "well worth while." He added that "the conference certainly has not heightened international tension." His statements betrayed dissatisfaction at the fact that certain hopes of exercising pressure on the U.S.S.R. had not been justified.

We also know that in the United States Dulles has been attacked by several Senators, especially for having, supposedly, been too yielding in relation to China. Those Senators are eager to return to the past and would like to have the great Chinese people remain in the old status of a semi-colonial nation unscrupulously exploited by foreign capital. But those times have passed forever. Let us hope that the Senators in question will come to realize it.

Certain definite conclusions may be drawn from what has been said.

The results of the Berlin Conference should not, of course, be overrated. The more so that it will be possible to form a proper judgment of them only from the outcome of the Geneva conference, which it was agreed in Berlin to hold.

However, the fact cannot be overlooked that the long interruption in the Great-Power conferences, which lasted five years, has now ended. The Berlin Conference has been held. It has helped to elucidate a number of international problems and has paved the way to a conference of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, together with other countries.

The measures being taken by the Soviet Union are designed to lessen international tension and, hence, to promote peace. The facts show that these measures do not remain without result.

Everything goes to show that the policy of the Soviet government helps to strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union and of the entire democratic camp.

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