LIGHT ON KOREA

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The stars mark the sites of some of the American bases, which continue along the east coast of Japan.
One of the biggest confidence tricks of recent times has been put over on the public in 'Western' countries in connection with the incidents in Korea. The story that has been purveyed is:—

(1) That the 'Communists' in North Korea are waging war against the free people of South Korea;

(2) that this war was started by a deliberate aggression of 'the Communists' in North Korea, on the orders or with the acquiescence of Moscow; and

(3) that the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation has rightly and soberly considered the evidence, adjudicated on the matter, and decided that the North Korean 'Communists' started the war.

THE TRUTH

This pamphlet is written to marshal the very strong evidence that in truth

(1) there is not and has not been a war between anyone in North Korea and the people of Southern Korea; only a war—which in substance ended in a week—by the armed forces of the hated and oppressive government of Southern Korea, headed by Syngman Rhee, against the people of North Korea—or, to be more accurate, against the whole Korean people—followed by war of the United States against the whole Korean people;

(2) that this war was started by Syngman Rhee, with American encouragement if not on American orders; and

(3) that the Security Council has done nothing, since what it pretended to do was invalid under vital provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation; and that what it did try or pretend to do was done without evidence, without proper consideration, and, naturally enough, quite wrongly.

The matter can be dealt with under three heads:—

(a) The events of the last few years in Korea;
(b) American control and encouragement of Syngman Rhee and his armed forces;
(c) The events following on the outbreak of hostilities.
In August, 1945, the Soviet forces entered Korea from the North, and began to drive the Japanese out. As fast as they did so, the Koreans, rid at last of their Japanese oppressors, set up local people’s committees everywhere, as the beginnings of their own free government. As early as September 6, a Congress of these people’s committees was held in Seoul, and the prospects of an independent democratic Korean state looked bright. Two days later, however, American troops landed in Southern Korea, and established themselves as rulers of the country up to the line of the 38th parallel. There is a long and tangled history, from then on, of efforts to secure a united Korea, but it was unfortunately clear by 1947 that the Americans had no intention of leaving, and that the country was to remain divided along the parallel for an indefinite time.

In spite of this division, North Korea has prospered. The people are governing themselves; they have given the land to the peasants and vested the essential industries in the State; and standards are steadily improving.

In the South, the Americans dispersed the people’s committees, protected the landlords, money-lenders, and factory owners, and set up as the ruler of the country one Syngman Rhee, who had spent 30 years of his life in the U.S.A.

While the North prospered, the people of the South suffered misery and unemployment; the peasants longed for the land and the workers for control of the industries; inflation was rampant, and the Americans had to pour in hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the truncated country going at all; as The Observer of July 2, 1950, wrote:

South Korea has been living on American charity, and their use of it has been so inefficient that Mr. Hoffmann threatened to reduce it; once, last January, Congress actually refused to appropriate the sum requested for Korea until Mr. Acheson appealed in person.

The Syngman Rhee government was, as even the right-wing Press in Britain admits, corrupt, inefficient, oppressive, and unpopular. (In August, 1949, for example, the United Nations Commission on Korea, set up—illegally, it is true—by the United Nations ‘Little Assembly’ and composed of delegates from six countries, all of which were anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, reported of South Korea that Press freedom was virtually non-existent, and that in the course of eight months seven newspapers and one Press agency had been suppressed—one of them for the crime of ‘failing to follow
Government directives and to print Government releases in sufficient numbers.

The people of South Korea were so anxious for unity with the North that, when the latter held a general election in August, 1948, the voting took place—in spite of the Syngman Rhee government and the Americans—throughout Southern Korea, and 77 per cent. of the people in the South recorded their votes.

Meanwhile, early in 1948, the U.S.S.R. had suggested a simultaneous withdrawal of occupation troops in the North and the South. The Americans refused, and finally, in December, 1948, the Soviet troops were withdrawn, leaving the Americans in the South. At last, in June, 1949, the Americans withdrew their forces (with important exceptions, as will be seen below). According to The Observer of July 2, 1950, their motive for withdrawing was only that, in the view of U.S. Defence Department, Korea would be indefensible in a general war.

SOUTHERN JINGOS AND U.S.A. ENCOURAGEMENT

The story of Syngman Rhee’s eagerness to embark on aggressive war, and U.S. government encouragement and assistance in this adventure is a striking one. I can best tell the story by drawing quotations almost entirely from American Press sources. The first is as long ago as August 24, 1948, at about the time when the people of the South were voting in the General Election mentioned above. On that date, Syngman Rhee, who was in Washington, issued as his slogan the cry ‘The march on the North is the most important task’. He would hardly have talked like that in public, in Washington, without the approval of his masters, the U.S. Government.

A year or so later, on October 31, 1949, Syngman Rhee made a speech on U.S.S. ‘St. Paul’, the flagship of the Seventh Task Fleet, in a South Korean port. Once again, under conditions where he would not be likely to say anything of which the Americans disapproved, he spoke of the ‘unification of Korea with the help of armed force’. ‘If’, he said, ‘we have to settle this thing by war, we will do all the fighting that is needed’. He added: ‘I would wage war—but for this American help is needed’. (He would surely not even have been allowed to beg publicly for military aid if it had not been intended to give it to him when a good moment should arrive.)

On the same occasion, the South Korean Defence Minister made a speech, in which he said that his army was ready and waiting to invade North Korea, but had been restrained by American officials;
and at a Press conference he added: ‘If we had our own way, we would, I'm sure, have started up already. But we had to wait until they (American government leaders) are ready. They keep telling us: “No, No, No, wait. You are not ready”.’

At about the same time as these speeches were being made, General Roberts, the head of a group of American ‘military advisers’—part of the American troops not withdrawn from Korea, and stated by The Times of June 26, 1950, to be 500 strong—told an American correspondent in Tokyo that ‘100,000 officers and men in South Korea are ready to go out in the line’. On January 26, 1950, an ‘agreement for joint defence and mutual assistance’ was signed between the U.S.A. and South Korea, expressly including the territory of South Korea in the American line of ‘defence’.

A little later, on March 1, 1950, as reported in the New York Times, Syngman Rhee made another speech, in the presence of the chairman of the United Nations Commission in Korea, already mentioned. In this speech, he hinted unmistakably at the use of force against North Korea to bring about the unification of the country (which North Korea was doing everything it could to bring about by peaceful negotiation).

**GAOL FOR WANTING PEACE**

On March 14, 1950, Mr. Sullivan, the correspondent of the New York Times, reported from Seoul to his newspaper that 13 deputies of the National Assembly of South Korea had been sentenced to imprisonment for periods of from 1½ to 10 years for violations of the Security Act, under five heads of charge, of which the fourth in particular deserves italics:

1. presenting a petition to the United Nations Commission;
2. undermining confidence in the Cabinet by revealing cases of misfeasance by its members;
3. seeking out points to oppose in the budget;
4. opposing the invasion of North Korea by the South Korean forces;
5. proposing changes in the Constitution.

Another American correspondent, Mr. Richard Johnson, also of the New York Times, who had been some years in South Korea, told a Press Club audience in New York on April 27, 1950, that ‘there is a very real desire on the part of South Koreans to attack North Korea, restrained only by the fact that the U.S. authorities allow them only enough ammunition at a time for three days’ fighting’.
Then, on May 19, 1950, five weeks before hostilities started, Mr. Johnson, the administrator of Marshall Aid in South Korea, told the Appropriations Commission of the House of Representatives in Washington that '100,000 officers and men of the South Korean army, equipped with American arms and trained by an American military mission, have completed their preparations and can start a war at any moment' (my italics).

In May, too, according to statements by South Korean officers captured in the recent fighting, a meeting of Divisional regimental officers was held to discuss three plans for the invasion of North Korea.

Let me add to what American correspondents thus tell us just one quotation from China: on May 29, 1950, ten days after Mr. Johnson's statement to the Appropriations Commission and less than four weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, the correspondent of the Peking People's Daily in the North Korean capital reported that divisions of the South Korean army were concentrated on the frontier line, trying to stage provocations, whilst an American fleet was demonstrating in South Korean ports, and U.S. aeroplanes were flying over 'the people's guerrilla areas'—i.e., those areas in Southern Korea where discontent with the Syngman Rhee government had reached the point of regular guerrilla warfare.

Turn again to the American Press. Mr. Sullivan, mentioned above, wrote from Hong-kong at about this time, as follows:

'Of all the foreign troops trained by American officers the South Korean troops are the most Americanised. They have American style uniforms, ride in American-made vehicles, carry American-made weapons. After intensive training, which has gone on for several years, they even march and in many respects behave like Americans, so much so that a visitor is startled into thinking that American forces are still in occupation'.

Time of June 5, boasting that this army is 'the best of its size in Asia', adds the information that the best officers of this army are Japanese, which can scarcely endear the army to the Koreans, either South or North.

Mr. Sullivan added that 'five hundred American military advisers have desks throughout the Ministry of National Defence; they are also assigned to the South Korean units in the field, down to regimental and sometimes battalion level'.

THEY WILL SHOOT FOR U.S.A.

On June 5 General Roberts, whom I have quoted above, also told Miss Higgins, of the New York Herald-Tribune: 'In Korea the
American taxpayer has an army which is a fine watchdog over investments placed in this country—my italics—and a force that represents maximum results at minimum cost. He added that his group was ‘a living demonstration of how an intelligent and intensive investment of five hundred combat-hardened American officers and men can train 100,000 men who will do the shooting for you. . . .

I have at least 13-14 Americans with each division. They work with the Korean officers, they live right there with them at the front—the 38th parallel—and stay with them in battles and in rest periods’—this, if you please, 21 days before ‘the front’ changed from a line on which South Korean troops were trying to stage provocations to one where somebody ‘who will do the shooting for you’ started definite battles.

Then on June 26, we learn further from Mr. Sullivan that ‘nearly all the talk about war emanates from South Korean leaders’; and ‘on a number of occasions Syngman Rhee indicated that his army would have taken the offensive if Washington had given its consent’.

For a change, let us turn from American news to the reports of the Far East correspondent of a serious and moderate Swiss paper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which has always had a reputation for knowledge of the Far East. Writing in the middle of June, he said:

South Korea lacks big industrial enterprises and therefore it is impossible to provide work for even a small part of the four million army of unemployed. . . .

In Southern Korea there is no shortage of people who see a solution for the serious economic problem in an armed attack on the North. The well-trained, American-equipped army, numbering 100,000 men, to which should be added police detachments numbering 50,000 men, will most likely be considerably superior to the North Korean army.

WASHINGTON TAKES THE BRAKE OFF

We come now to a time when Syngman Rhee could no longer complain that the Americans were restraining him, when indeed they were obviously egging him on to start fighting. In mid-June, a matter of days before the start of hostilities, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Republican ‘adviser’ to the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, visited Korea. He went up to what General Roberts called ‘the front’—arriving there six days before what we are told was the unprovoked and wholly unexpected attack by North Korean troops. Photographs of his visit were widely published. In one, he is seen standing by an armoured train, within a mile or two of the front; the train, one must suppose, was waiting to be the victim of a sur-
prise attack. Another photograph showed him in a front-line trench, studying a map spread on the parapet.

A day or two later, on June 19, 1950, Mr. Dulles addressed Syngman Rhee's National Assembly, saying:

'The eyes of the free world are upon you. Compromise with Communism'—i.e., the peaceful reunion of the whole of Korea under one Korean government, which was then under discussion—'would be a road leading to disaster'. And Mr. Dulles assured his audience of the 'readiness of the U.S.A. to give all necessary moral and material support to South Korea, which is fighting against Communism'.

Mr. Syngman Rhee also spoke, saying: 'Should we not be able to protect democracy in the cold war, we will achieve victory in a hot war'.

What did all this amount to? America, the financier, was saying to Syngman Rhee and the rest of his reactionary government: 'Don't hold back any longer. Don't have peace, or unity, with the Koreans of the North. Go ahead and fight them, and we will back you up, with all the practical help that you need in and for the battle'. To make the position even clearer, Mr. Dulles, as he was leaving Korea two days later, on June 21 (four days before the shooting started), said: 'Korea does not stand alone... my talks with General MacArthur will be followed by positive action'.

In the course of June, moreover, according to the statements of South Korean officers captured in the fighting, no less than seven American military advisers visited the troops, telling them that they must occupy North Korea—and later on Manchuria as well!

THE ONE-WEEK 'WAR'

It is a significant symptom of the inefficiency of the Syngman Rhee régime that in a week—as the British Press scarcely even tried to conceal—Syngman Rhee's army ceased to exist as a fighting force. This could not have happened so quickly if the South Korean people were in any way hostile to the North Koreans, and it is plain that the 'war' was in the beginning merely an attempt by foreign-armed, foreign-trained, and foreign-equipped forces to fight the Korean people. The argument sometimes used that the collapse of the Southern forces shows that they cannot have been the aggressors is of course destroyed by everything I have quoted above; Syngman Rhee is not the first aggressor to find that popular forces which he thought he could crush were too strong for him.

At a bitter cost, the people of Korea are now achieving their
unity, and are fighting a foreign enemy, America. The pretence that America is defending or protecting anybody or anything in Korea except her own anti-Soviet and anti-Communist interests cannot last long. She is in reality simply invading Korea because she wants to hold it as a war base against the Soviet Union.

WHO BEGAN IT?

In the light of the facts given above, what is the answer to the important question: ‘Who started this war?’ Each side, of course, accuses the other; and the bulk of the American and British Press and radio, having the field almost to themselves, find it easy to answer ‘The North’. The reader may conclude that the true answer is ‘Syngman Rhee and Co.’ Indeed, if the North had started it, it would have seemed almost like robbing Syngman Rhee of his most cherished scheme.

One or two items of news as to events on and around the ‘front’—the 38th parallel—in the few days before hostilities began throw some light on the matter. One is a report said to have been made on Saturday, June 24, 1950, a few hours before hostilities began, by ‘field observers of the United Nations’. (For some unexplained reason, this report apparently took six days to reach U.N.O., which issued it on Friday, June 30.) It is a somewhat vague report, using phrases such as ‘there is no evidence’, ‘it is said’, ‘it is reported’; but it does say definitely that ‘No reports have been received of any unusual activity by North Korean forces that would indicate any impending change in the general situation along the frontier’.

Officers of the South Korean forces captured in the brief fighting, however, stated that on that very day, June 24, the usual Saturday leave for officers was cancelled; and that on the Sunday they were ordered to begin ‘the full phase of the attack North of the parallel’.

WOULD THEY BE SO FOOLISH?

It would, of course, have been the grossest folly for the North to have started hostilities, either from the purely Korean point of view, or from the wider aspect of possible outside influence. There was everything to lose and nothing to gain by such a course.

North Korea wanted unity, and wanted to be rid of the Americans and of Syngman Rhee; but those aims were best achieved through unity of the country; and the way to unity was through peace. Negotiations, in spite of Syngman Rhee arresting Northern delegates and carrying on various other forms of opposition, showed good prospects of early success.
In the wider field, the U.S.S.R. has by now convinced nearly everybody, even its enemies, that it does not want war; even Mr. John Foster Dulles has publicly acknowledged this, and Mr. Gromyko’s declaration of July 4 makes it very clear. To the suggestion that the North Koreans would not have started hostilities without Russian orders or at least approval, the answer is clear: ‘No they wouldn’t have; that is one reason to feel sure that they didn’t; for it is plain that Moscow would not have given such approval’.

For the U.S.S.R. herself, there was equally everything to gain and nothing to lose from the absence of armed conflict. Even in respect of South Korea itself, where they certainly did not want the Americans to have a jumping-off ground for war, all that was necessary to do was to wait. To quote the Observer of July 2 once again: ‘Had she (the U.S.S.R.) shown patience, South Korea would almost certainly have fallen into her lap. Elections held only four weeks ago showed that Syngman Rhee’s government was weakening, and that the stranglehold of the North on the South was creating chaos’. The same comment applies, of course; the impatience came from elsewhere.

In the rest of the world, the widespread peace campaign, centred in the Petition to ban the use of atomic weapons and to brand their first users as war criminals, was gathering weight; already there were 100,000,000 signatures in all, and 200,000 were collected in New York City in one day. Active demands for the swift ending of the Cold War were being made, drowning the cries of Mr. Acheson that it would last for many years. In short, the tide was turning in favour of peace and against war. Those who wanted peace had merely to sit quiet, avoid armed conflict, if possible, and watch the situation improve. The Russians are not fools, and the one thing that they could not have wanted was warfare in Korea.

On the other hand, those who were clamouring for war—i.e., some people in America—had a direct interest in starting armed conflict, in the hope of upsetting the Peace Campaign and stampeding people into war hysteria. They have succeeded, here and there, for a little while; but not, if we are active, for long; and Mr. Gromyko’s statement of July 4 has probably saved the peace of the world.

STAMPEDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL

When we examine the steps taken in the U.S.A. immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, we see how the war for which Syngman Rhee and the Americans had been clamouring in Korea fitted into the pattern of Washington’s desires.
Within 20 hours of the first news reaching Washington, and within 12 hours of the members of the Security Council being called—at 3 a.m.—from their sleep, there was passed what appeared to be a resolution of the Security Council; and even before that, according to The Times of June 26, Washington had decided to give military help to South Korea (which was not called for by the Security Council, of course, until the 27th).

Let us first see how the Security Council appeared to move—I will show why it could not validly act at all—with a speed contrasting tragically with its many fumblings of the past over such aggressions as the Arab war against Israel in 1948, and the fighting in Greece, Indonesia, and Kashmir.

After a brief discussion in those few hours, it (apparently) passed a resolution which condemned "the invasion of the Republic of Korea by armed forces from North Korea", called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of the armed forces of North Korea to the 38th Parallel, and called upon all members of U.N.O. to render assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution.

I say 'apparently passed a resolution', as the resolution was in truth wholly void; Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations makes it quite clear that the Security Council cannot validly act in such matters as this unless all five permanent members of the Council concur. (This is the famous unanimity rule, inserted in the Charter at the instance of the Americans, and warmly supported by the British; and it cannot be ignored just because it suits the Americans now to ignore it!) The U.S.S.R., objecting in principle—surely rightly—to China being represented in the Council by the nominees of Chiang Kai-shek, whose government has ceased to have any real existence, was not present. Had it been present, it would not have concurred, so that its absence made no difference in the result. It was known from the start it would not be present, and accordingly no resolution of the kind proposed could have any validity; but that deterred nobody. Nevertheless, the resolution was invalid, and no State has any right to act on it.

NOT A JOT OF EVIDENCE

It is also important, and quite shameless, that those members who were present—every one who represented a State that was either a debtor or a satellite of America—arrived at a conclusion without any evidence at all.

Let us see what was actually before them. Their resolution shows
that the 'evidence' was a 'report of the United Nations Commission on Korea' which, the resolution asserted, expressed 'grave concern for the invasion of the Republic of Korea by armed forces from North Korea'. (Mr. Dean Acheson, speaking in Washington on June 29, described the report as: 'labelling the Communist action as an unprovoked act of aggression'.)

Such a report should surely be both reliable, and definite, if action which may precipitate—or perhaps avert—a third World War is to be taken upon it. So we turn to the official version of the Commission's report.

And what do we find? The Commission makes it quite plain in its report that it had seen nothing, investigated nothing, and indeed knew nothing except what Syngman Rhee had told it. It didn't even pretend to knowledge; and as a matter of verbal accuracy it did not use the words 'grave concern', nor label anything as an 'unprovoked act of aggression'.

The report begins with the words: 'Government of Republic of Korea states', and goes on to give—without actually confirming them—Syngman Rhee's version of the outbreak of hostilities, and his denial of the North Korean assertion that it was he who was the aggressor. Syngman Rhee would, of course, have said this whatever the true facts were, and his statement was thus of no value; nor, to do it justice, did the Commission say it was. The Commission indeed said nothing, beyond merely 'passing on' Syngman Rhee's statements, except in this final paragraph:

Commission wishes to draw attention of Secretary-General to serious situation developing, which is assuming character of full-scale war and may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It suggests that he consider possibility of bringing matter to notice of Security Council, Commission will communicate more fully considered recommendation later.

It is really horrifying that this scrap of hearsay evidence, from one vitally-interested party—and a thoroughly discredited one, at that—should be thought good enough for the Security Council to act on, without waiting for the 'more fully considered recommendation' promised by the Commission. Here, in this very grave matter, the Security Council, not even thinking of attempts at reconciliation, rejects the idea of asking the North Koreans for their version before condemning them, convicts them out of hand, apparently ignoring the mass of evidence in their favour which I have quoted above, as well as all the probabilities of the situation. One hopes for the sake of their consciences, if not for their reputation for honesty, intelli-
gence, or balance, that they were ignorant of the facts I have related, although they had mostly been reported in the American Press.

**BRITISH CAUTION**

Some twinges of doubt seem to have affected the British delegate, who stated that 'it was essentially in the Council's interest not at this moment to take action which might go beyond the bounds of the evidence available'. But he did not draw the logical conclusion that as there was no evidence available no action should be taken. Indeed, he agreed that the resolution 'met the case'!

A further resolution of the same Security Council was passed on the Tuesday (June 27) recommending the members of the United Nations to give military aid to South Korea. The representative of Great Britain announced then and there that his government would act as desired. The Americans had of course anticipated the recommendation over two days before it was made.

The ready acquiescence of our government in this irresponsible, baseless, illegal decision, reminding one of nothing so vividly as the sudden revival of the moribund League of Nations in December, 1939, for the purpose of expelling the U.S.S.R., does not make pleasant reading. The suspicion that helped to kill the League of Nations—that it was no more than an executive committee of the anti-Soviet world—was thus revived. Indeed, in the *Observer* of July 2, it was made the subject of a boast:

The Security Council—overnight—was transformed from an impotent debating society into the executive authority of non-Communist world opinion, adding that it had 'suddenly begun to work as it was intended to work'!

This is frank, at any rate. Not merely is the Security Council to lead, not the United Nations, but that part of the world (already little more than half) which the U.S.A. seeks to enlist on its side of the not-so-cold-war, but that is, we are told, what it was intended to do when it was established!

It is not surprising that, in the statement made on behalf of the Soviet Government on July 4, 1950, Mr. Gromyko should say:

The crude pressure of the U.S. Government on the Security Council members turned the United Nations into a kind of a branch of the U.S. State Department, into an obedient instrument of the policy of the U.S. ruling class...

The Security Council is acting not as a body invested with the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace, but as an instrument employed by the U.S. ruling circles with the object of unleashing war.
TRUMAN THREATENS WORLD WAR

Much more of course happened on that Tuesday, June 27. President Truman, without even waiting for the Security Council to pass its resolution of that very day, issued his statement. He said that, the Security Council having called upon all members of the United Nations to give help, he had ordered ‘United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support’. He went on, without any sign of understanding that he was going far beyond apparent ‘United Nations’ action in Korea, to proclaim unprovoked unilateral interference in the lives and actions of other sovereign states and peoples, and in effect to announce a military crusade against ‘Communism’. He said:

‘The attack upon Korea’ (i.e., the hostilities, the true origin of which I have just been examining) ‘makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces’—his description of the proposed occupation by the forces of the only government in China, recognised as such by Great Britain, of part of its own territories—‘would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area’. (Some may ask what lawful or necessary functions the United States could have anywhere near Formosa!) The President went on to say that he had ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any ‘attack’ upon Formosa, adding a broad hint that the U.S.A. might annex Formosa in due course.

But even Formosa wasn’t enough for this fire-eater. He announced that he had also decided to strengthen U.S. forces in the (nominally independent) Philippines, to accelerate military assistance to the Philippine government (for the repression, in truth, of the popular forces in the Islands), and to do the same for the French in Indo-China and send a military mission there.

Thus, in effect, America, on the pretext of an alleged aggression by North Korea—of which there is no evidence at all—and of an invalid resolution of the U.N. Security Council, declares war directly on China, threatens war on much of the rest of Asia, and preaches a crusade against every Socialist country in the world. And no one asks the Security Council to deal with this threat of aggression.

What has happened to bring America, on such a pretext, to preach world war? As recently as last January, it will be remembered, the
President had officially declared that the U.S.A. would not interest itself in the ‘defence’ of Formosa. The explanation may be found in a report in The Times of Monday, June 26, announcing the arrival in Washington on the previous Saturday afternoon—just before hostilities broke out—of the U.S. Secretary of Defence, Mr. Johnson, and of General Bradley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their return from the Far East. The Times quoted a report from Tokyo that they were in agreement with General MacArthur—the American dictator in Japan—that the United States must take positive action (the words used by Mr. Dulles, as noted above) to prevent ‘the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communists’. But, added The Times, Mr. Dulles was expected back a few days later, and these gentlemen would not comment on this report until he arrived!

### RULE BRITANNIA

This crusade has many effects, of course, on Britain. What does it mean, to begin with, for the British Navy? On June 28, changing the phrase ‘Rule Britannia’ from a British boast to an exhortation to the Americans, Mr. Attlee, with the full approval of the main political parties, handed the Navy over unconditionally to the Americans. They can now send British sailors to die, and British ships to be bombed, wherever they like, in the place of Americans, presumably at the expense of the British taxpayer; they may even send our Navy to Formosa, there to ‘defend’ Chinese territory—and incidentally Chiang Kai-shek, who has recently been bombing our merchant vessels—against the Chinese people and their government, which the British government has recognised. Where is our pride? Or our independence? Or our love of peace? Or even our consideration for our own interests?

### AND THE U.S.S.R.?

The U.S.S.R. alone is breathing no fire, uttering no threats or bombast, forming thus a strong contrast to the President’s hysteria, by which it appears entirely unmoved. It made no official announcement until July 4, nine days after the start of hostilities; and it then made a most important statement, well designed to serve the cause of peace. And it is continuing to rally its people in their millions to sign the World Petition for the abolition of the atom bomb and for the declaration that the first to use it shall be branded as a war criminal. Nobody can plausibly assert that this campaign is not
genuine; for a moment's consideration will show that to conduct a peace campaign of this kind would be impossible for any government intending war, since it must gravely weaken the will of the general public to accept a war. We can therefore feel confident that the U.S.S.R. has no intention of making war unless it is actually attacked. The conviction has been gaining ground for many months, even among those most reluctant to believe it, that the U.S.S.R. just won't start a war. It means peace; and it is just as well for our hopes of life that it does.

CONCLUSION

In the face of the evidence marshalled above, and of the absence of any evidence of aggression or threats of aggression from North Korea, what must one conclude? The only possible conclusion, I suggest, is that the war was plainly started by Syngman Rhee, who was powerless to move without American sanction and assistance; that he was held back until a suitable moment, and then let go; that the North Korean intelligence was excellent; that the Security Council was acting not only invalidly but wrongly and without material; and that the war in Korea is now a war of the U.S.A., using forces provided by Britain and Australia as well as their own, against the Korean people. That is an intolerable situation, in face of which the British people cannot sit idle.

We must begin by not letting ourselves be fooled by false stories. We must see the facts, and judge for ourselves; estimate things and people by their actions, not by labels. We face a real risk of war, diminished but not eliminated by the attitude of the U.S.S.R. If war is allowed to come, it will be the end of most of us physically. If the Cold War continues indefinitely, even if it somehow remains cold for a part of the world, it will still be the end of most of us economically. And if the British Government continues on its present course, Britain will become more and more an impotent satellite of America.

We must revolt against such a fate. We must work for peace. We must bring every ounce of pressure we can on our Members of Parliament and our political parties to change the government's policy, to think healthily, to keep out of war. And not merely must we keep out of war; we must insist that every foreign soldier evacuate Korea, leaving the Korean people to settle their own future. At home, one of the most useful steps we can take is to sign and work for the Peace Petition of the British Peace Committee, as part of the world-wide
Peace Petition I have mentioned. The force of millions and scores of millions signing such Petitions all over the world and demanding the outlawry of atomic weapons and those who use them, will be enough to make even the most hysterical governments hesitate before imperilling the peace of the world out of their hatred and fear of Socialism.
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(Written a few weeks before she died and before events in Korea,
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