For Closer Unity of The Forces of Socialism On The Basis of Marxist-Leninist Principles

PRAVDA Editorial

November 23, 1956
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PRESS OFFICE OF THE U.S.S.R. EMBASSY
354 Stewart Street
Ottawa — Canada
Friday, Nov. 23.

The events in Hungary where the counter-revolution succeeded in growing active and in launching an attack upon the socialist gains, upon the people's democratic system, have evoked a profound response in the minds and hearts of all people to whom the interests of socialism are dear.

In all countries of the socialist camp, the machinations of reaction have been unanimously condemned. The press of the Communist Party of China published articles, imbued with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which have attracted universal attention by the depth of their Marxist-Leninist analysis of the Hungarian events. Statements by the leaders of the Communist Parties of France, Italy, and other countries, have shown that there is a unity of views in the ranks of the world communist movement on the events in Hungary. The Communist Parties in the capitalist countries are courageously fighting against the rampage of reaction.

The course of the events in Hungary shows that for its anti-popular ends, reaction attempted to utilize the accumulated dissatisfaction of the working masses who justly demanded an improvement in the leadership of the country and higher living standards for the population.

There is no doubt that the former Government and Party leadership of Hungary headed by Rakosi and Gero, which in pursuing the tasks of socialist construction committed grave mistakes both in general political matters and in the realm of economic policy and cultural construction, is to blame for the Hungarian events.
The leadership of the Party, headed by M. Rakosi and E. Gero, had divorced itself from the Party masses, from the people; it did not know the moods of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. There were gross violations of legality (the Rajk case and a number of other cases in which many honest Party and government workers had innocently suffered). Grave miscalculations were made in the economic sphere; a substantial part of the funds were directed for the construction of new large enterprises which were beyond the means of such a small country as Hungary. The slogan of accelerated industrialization, which is correct in the conditions of the USSR, was mechanically transferred to Hungary; the construction of large industrial enterprises not provided with raw materials was pursued, following a standard pattern, without due economic substantiation.

The former Party and government leadership of Hungary mechanically copied the experience of the Soviet Union in the realm of industrialization, despite the fact that comradely advice not to do so was time and again given to the leaders of the Hungarian Working People's Party. In drawing up plans of economic construction it was necessary to proceed from the concrete conditions of Hungary and reckon with the fact that each country need not, within the framework of its own state, build up all branches of industry, for it has the opportunity to rely on the entire commonwealth of the socialist countries. More funds should have been spent on the development of agriculture and on expanding the production of consumer goods, which would have made it possible to steadily raise the living standards of the population. Here, however, the proportions were violated.
The road followed by the Soviet Union in building up its mighty industry in a brief span of time was conditioned by the fact that the USSR in that period was the only country of socialism in a capitalist encirclement. Our people had to deny themselves much and to mobilize funds for the development of heavy industry as an all-important guarantee of the country's independence and the foundation for its economic development. The correctness of this road has been confirmed by the entire course of history. If this had not been done the Soviet land could not have withstood the war against Hitler Germany and could not have routed fascism.

In Hungary, mistakes were also committed in the sphere of Party construction, which have weakened the Party. The Hungarian Working People's Party had a membership of more than 900,000 out of the country's population of 9,000,000. The doors to the Party were open to all who wished to enter, and therefore the most diverse people joined it. Workers joined it because it was their Party, because only by building up that Party, by strengthening it, can the working class safeguard, consolidate, and develop their gains. However, petty bourgeois nationalist elements also flocked into the Party ranks, as well as people alien to it, careerists who wanted to utilize the Party for their own purposes.

The Party leadership did not devote due attention to selecting for Party membership the really best and foremost forces of the people; they worked inadequately to educate the cadres and all members of the Party in the Marxist-Leninist spirit, in the spirit of international solidarity of the working people. Therefore, when difficulties arose, the Party was unable to cope with the complex situa-
tion in the country; they failed to rouse the advanced forces of the people to struggle against reaction; more than that, the Party itself became disorganized.

The leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party did not take due account of the country's national peculiarities. It was doubtlessly possible in the course of the ten years' development of the people's democratic system to rear and to advance to the leadership of the Party and the Government more people from the basic national cadres of the Hungarian Republic, than was done. Such actions were taken which hurt the national pride of the Hungarian people. For example, a military uniform began to be introduced similar to that used in the Soviet Union. Each people has such traditions and national customs which must be respected. Everybody must not be made to follow the same pattern. Are similar haircuts in the army or a similar system of assessing student progress in the schools, a sign of unity and international solidarity of the socialist countries? These, naturally, are needless and harmful schemes which in some measure offended national sentiments.

After the XXth CPSU Congress, Rakosi was unable and did not want to head the reconstruction of the entire work and, on the contrary, against the opinion of the majority of the Party's aktiv, declared that the policy of the leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party was wholly correct and there was nothing in it to rectify. This aroused serious dissatisfaction in the Party. The Party leadership, not having a clear-cut political line, did nothing to vigorously, and in a short time, rectify past mistakes. It should be added that in the course of many months open propaganda against the Party and the government was
waged in the Hungarian press, among a section of the writers, students, etc. In addition to correct criticism of the leadership there increasingly appeared in this propaganda nationalistic, chauvinistic trends, slogans to return to bourgeois democracy, anti-socialist moods, which infrequently were covered up by counterposing the “Yugoslav way to socialism” to the experience of the entire socialist camp, including the experience of the USSR.

The Rakosi-Gero leadership made no rebuff to these negative moods; they failed to rely upon the workers’ Party organizations in which, at that period, healthy, international sentiments still prevailed. The Party leadership, the organs of state power, displayed a lack of vigilance and failed to see both the growing just dissatisfaction in the people and the expanding subversive conspiratory activity of the counter-revolutionary elements.

In such an atmosphere, dissatisfaction grew increasingly and led to the street demonstrations of October 23 in Budapest.

A section of the workers, who came there with good intentions, participated in these demonstrations, striving to express their just dissatisfaction caused by the mistakes of the former leadership. But this spontaneous dissatisfaction was utilized by the counter-revolutionary forces. Now it has already been definitely established that the counter-revolutionary elements were organized in advance. They had their own military directing centre; they prepared and deployed their forces for a coup d’etat; they assigned people for the seizure of arms dumps; they designated objects for attack; they mobilized transport facilities for bringing up arms; and they appointed places for handing
out arms. That is just why the bloody events caused by the provocative actions of the Horthy fascist gangs occurred in Budapest.

The Western bourgeois papers are rather outspoken in saying that reaction had made rather lengthy and careful preparations, both inside and outside the country, for the Hungarian developments, and that the skilful hand of master-plotters was felt everywhere from the very outset. U.S. intelligence chief Allen Dulles flatly declared that "we knew" beforehand of the Hungarian developments. A correspondent of the West-German Welt am Sonntag, says of one of the mutineers: "The first thing I saw on him was the ribbon of a German Iron Cross". France Soir says that the American radio stations, in transmitting "calls to revolt, did much evil" in Hungary. The self-same paper admits that "ultra-reactionary and patently fascist elements" played the leading role in the Hungarian developments.

With the aim of cutting short the activities of these anti-popular elements and of restoring order in Budapest as early as possible, the Hungarian Government asked the Government of the USSR to order Soviet military troops, quartered in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty, to help.

The introduction of Soviet troops and their hand in restoring order crippled reaction and forced it to beat a retreat.

However, as soon as the Soviet Government, at the request of the Imre Nagy Government, ordered its troops to withdraw from Budapest, the counter-revolutionary forces began to cruelly dispatch Communists, public and political personalities, and supporters of the people’s democratic system.
There are a host of facts which show that Imre Nagy conducted a double-crossing policy; on the one hand he declared the introduction of Soviet troops was imperative to crush counter-revolutionary forces, while, on the other, he encouraged the active resistance afforded by counter-revolutionary elements and maintained contact with them.

Failing to meet any determined rebuff from the Imre Nagy Government, the counter-revolutionary forces seized weapons, formed armed bands that were helped by the imperialist states, and dictated their terms to the Imre Nagy Government. This Government actually had no power at all in the country; it was closeted in the Parliament building and the only contact it had with the population was by radio. At this time the fascist-Horthy bands made short shrift of whomsoever they pleased; they snatched progressives on the streets, and hanged them and chopped off their heads.

Within seven or eight days the composition of the Imre Nagy Government underwent several reshuffles, slithering more and more to the right every day. The Imre Nagy Government became a screen behind which counter-revolutionary forces carried on their doings. The conspiratorial military centre began to bring more and more pressure to bear upon it.

In this situation the best people, such as Comrades Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich, and Imre Horvath, who were members of the Imre Nagy Government, broke with this Government.

The newly organized Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Janos Kadar decided to stop the
bloodshed and to repulse the reactionary fascist forces, and called upon the Soviet Union to give help.

In these conditions the Soviet Government's decision to come to the aid of the revolutionary forces in Hungary was the only right decision that could be taken. The socialist state could not hold aloof as an indifferent observer of the carnage let loose by fascist reaction in People's Democratic Hungary. When everything in Hungary calms down and life returns to its normal tenor, the Hungarian working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia will unquestionably understand better and correctly assess our actions. We view our assistance to the Hungarian working class in its fight against the machinations of counter-revolution as a fulfilment of our international duty. In this struggle we have made a sacrifice only to bar the road to fascism in Hungary, only to preserve the socialist gains of the Hungarian working class and toiling folk, only to enable them to progress further, to live their own life and to build their own independent and sovereign socialist state.

We shall continue as hitherto to be friends with the working people of Hungary in the struggle for our common cause, to make socialism win, to build a new society along a new pattern and to consolidate the cause of peace. Our Party considers it its duty to support the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in the realisation of the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism. When normal order is restored in Hungary and its Government deems the further presence of Soviet troops unnecessary, the Soviet Union for its part will in no case insist upon its troops remaining there.

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Among the foreign comments on the events in Hungary the recent speech of Comrade Tito at Pula attracts attention. It devotes a large place to the events in Hungary, and correctly points out that in these events counter-revolutionary elements played a provocative role. "These reactionary forces", Tito said, "very soon, in two or three days, showed their true face. In conditions of the country-wide indignation against everything that was done in the past, the leadership of that time did not display a desire to remove the elements that caused the indignation of the Hungarian people, did not display a desire to follow a really Hungarian path of the development of socialism, with all its internal specific peculiarities. In view of this, the events soon took a different turn, and reaction began to gain increasing dominance."

Comrade Tito gave a severe characterization of the Imre Nagy Government: "The Nagy Government did nothing to prevent this. It continually shed tears over the radio and called for help instead of fighting against this, and to somehow display will to prevent the destruction of Communists and progressive people... If the Nagy Government had been more energetic, if it had not been vacillating, if it had vigorously stood up against anarchy and the murder of Communists by reactionary elements, if it had resolutely rebuffed reaction, etc., matters would, possibly, have followed a proper course and things would probably not have come to the intervention of Soviet troops. But what had Nagy done? He urged the people to take up arms against the Soviet Army and appealed to the Western countries to intervene."

The events in Hungary, as Tito pointed out, had assumed such a scope that it became clear that a frightful
carnage would take place there, a fearful civil war, as a result of which socialism could have been completely eliminated and matters could have ended in a third world war. Though we are against intervention, Tito said, Soviet intervention was necessary. This, it goes without saying, is a correct evaluation of the Hungarian events. However, in that same speech Tito calls the assistance of Soviet troops to the Hungarian Government a "mistake" and declares: "We never advised them to resort to the aid of the army". Such a position cannot be called consistent and conforming to reality. It is now perfectly clear to everybody that without that aid the counter-revolution would have gained the upper hand in Hungary, a Horthy-fascist regime would have been established. Consequently, the assistance of Soviet troops was a necessary and inevitable step.

It is known that the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the working people of Hungary in their struggle against the counter-revolution has met with the approval of the fraternal Communist Parties and the working people of the socialist countries. Expressing the viewpoint of the Communist Party of China Jenminjihpao wrote: "The position of the Soviet Union with regard to the Hungarian events is an absolutely correct position of proletarian internationalism... The Soviet Government and the Soviet people have no grounds to look upon everything with folded arms when the Hungarian Government, which represents the will and the national interests of the people, appeals to the Soviet Union for assistance, and when the Hungarian people would have been enslaved by fascism if the Soviet Union had not in reply extended to them a friendly hand".

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The destiny of socialism in Hungary was being decided in the past weeks. If a fascist Hungary had appeared in the heart of Europe, the political situation of a number of countries in Eastern and Central Europe would have substantially altered, and the international situation as a whole on the European continent would have doubtlessly deteriorated.

The events in Hungary were the first large-scale sally of fascism during the entire post-war period; a sally which has demonstrated that the threat of fascism has still not passed. In these circumstances all adherents of socialism must rally ideologically, must display keen vigilance and profound principledness in posing questions relating to the Hungarian events.

The more amazing therefore are certain propositions in Tito's speech, which are by no means conducive either to the consolidation of all the adherents of socialism or to a correct understanding of a number of important questions of the international situation and the urgent tasks of the world communist movement.

To begin with, along with correct appreciations, there are to be found in Tito's speech also assessments of the Hungarian developments that cannot but provoke legitimate objections. "Here, look," says Tito to his audience, "barehanded and poorly armed, the people put up the strongest resistance when they had before them but one goal, to be free and independent. They are no longer interested in what this independence will be like, whether there would be the restoration of the bourgeoisie and the reactionary system, all they want is to be independent, nationally. This in the main was uppermost in their minds."
Firstly, Comrade Tito is plainly exaggerating by speaking in the present case of the "people," and, secondly, Marxism-Leninism teaches us to examine such developments in another light. If it matters not a whit to part of the working folk whether, under guise of lying catchwords as to "freedom and independence," the yoke of exploitation will again be put on their heads, whether their country will be made a cat's-paw in the hands of the big imperialist powers, or whether they would be plunged into another war as the fascist Hitlerite clique of Horthy did with the Hungarian people in 1941-44, this means that this section of the working people have been ensnared in a mouse-trap set by reaction. This, consequently, would imply that the masses would be not going forwards towards emancipation and independence, but would be heading in a diametrically opposite direction, towards enslavement and the loss of independence. Marxism-Leninism demands that, in approaching social phenomena, there always be furnished the answer to the straightforward question: which classes are interested in one or another development and the interests of which class are served by one or another pattern of man's social activity? It is quite true that large sections of the working people in Hungary were involved in the vortex of developments. History knows no few cases when the national sentiments of the masses are instigated, fanned, and utilized by reactionary forces against the people's fundamental interests.

In his speech Comrade Tito dwelt on another key international issue, that of the aggression of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt.

"This is most typical aggression," Tito said, "in no way differing from former classical aggressions of the
colonialist powers’. Israel, Tito proceeded, proved this
time to be an instrument in the hands of the great powers,
and, as such, is a menace to peace. "The greatest tragedy
here, in my point of view,” he noted, “is that the French
Socialists made a disgrace of themselves and again showed
themselves to be the most devoted servants of circles which
are striving at all costs to preserve the old classical forms
of colonialism . . . This, comrades, compels us to be watch­
ful, as the fact is that the carriers of so-called Western
democracy, viz., France and Britain, only pay lip service to
peace, justice, and democracy. Actually, they are hotbeds
that may flare up into extreme reactionary and aggressive
actions, conditions allowing.”

There is one conclusion to be drawn from this correct
evaluation, namely, the need to heighten the vigilance and
tighten the unity of all peace-loving nations.

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Speaking of the Hungarian events, Comrade Tito
also made a number of critical remarks with regard to the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These remarks re­
quire special attention. We are, of course, not against
criticism. The Moscow declaration expressing the common
opinion of the CPSU and the Yugoslav Communist League
says that our co-operation will be based on friendly criti­
cism, on a comradely exchange of views on disputed ques­
tions between our Parties. And we have no ground to re­
tract from that decision. Comrade Tito’s remarks, however,
attract our attention because they have been made in such
a tone which in recent times has been eliminated almost
entirely.
Take, for example, the fundamental proposition put forward by Tito with regard to the Soviet system. He insistently alleges that the "personality cult was essentially a product of a certain system". He declares that it is necessary to speak of a "system which ensured the creation of the personality cult". In reality, however, the personality cult was a glaring contradiction to our entire Soviet socialist system. And proceeding from our political and economic system, we have been able to wage a struggle against the personality cult and, in the shortest possible time, to score great successes in eliminating its consequences.

The Soviet socialist system, created by our working class in alliance with the peasantry and all the working people of the Soviet Union, by its Communist Party, has been verified by the experience of history. The foundation of the invincible might of the Soviet socialist system lies in the fact that it rests on socialist forms of ownership of the means and implements of production. The Soviet socialist system is, genuinely, a people's system. In our country, the exploiting classes have been fully eliminated: the moral and political unity of society has been built up and consolidated, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry has grown still stronger, the inviolable friendship of all the peoples of the USSR has been steeled in the struggle for socialism.

The result of life's verification of this system is the creation in a brief historical period of a mighty industrial socialist power, a country of advanced socialist agriculture in conditions of hostile capitalist encirclement when far from getting any material assistance from outside a per-
sistent overt and covert economic, political, and ideological struggle went on against the first land of socialism.

Now, after a number of object lessons, even the enemies of the Soviet Union have no ground to doubt the reality of this result. The enemies of socialism tried to test the strength of our system in the crucible of the fiercest of wars. Created by the peoples of our country under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet political and economic system creditably withstood this most difficult trial. The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War is of world-historic significance. It saved the peoples from the menace of fascist enslavement; it opened up the way and created favourable conditions for the construction of socialism in a number of countries.

The Soviet system has demonstrated its might in the restoration of its war-ravaged economy when we, far from being able to calculate on foreign aid, ourselves rendered assistance to the young people's democratic states. The strength of our system lies in collectivism, in profound socialist democracy.

The Soviet system is an amalgamation of millions upon millions of working people of town and country for the great ideas of building a new society. The glorious accomplishments of the Soviet people are there for everybody to see. Only recently, in the great crusade upon the virgin land, hundreds of thousands of people united at the call of the Party and, in difficult conditions, achieved tremendous results.

All this, of course, does not mean that we have no shortcomings. We have. We severely and straightforwardly criticise them; we systematically work to eliminate them.
Our shortcomings were laid bare by the XXth Party Congress which has also shown the correct way of eliminating them. No one can deny the fact that today the Party and the Soviet Government are perseveringly and consistently pursuing immense measures for raising the living standards of the working people, for strict observance of revolutionary legality, for the further development of socialist democracy.

Such is the Soviet system which neither war nor economic blockade, nor the diverse machinations of the enemies of socialism could destroy. Also the personality cult, naturally, could not destroy it. For underlying this system, the socialist system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is the alliance of the working class and the collective-farm peasantry. This system has come into being by the laws of the historical development of society. It is the embodiment of the creative energy of the millions of working people.

How should one, therefore, interpret Tito's remarks about our system but as an attempt to cast aspersions on the system of the social life of the Soviet people? How can one fail to ask the question: is this not a repetition of the former attacks upon the Soviet Union which were in vogue in the past when the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia had deteriorated? It is up to the Yugoslav people and the Yugoslav Communist League to apply any forms and methods in the construction of socialism. But is it right at the same time to disparage the socialist system of other countries, to extol one's own experience, to publicize it as universal and the best. One cannot fail to see that in the Yugoslav press the idea is more and more frequently propounded that the "Yugoslav path to
socialism" is allegedly the most correct one, or even the only possible path for almost all countries of the world. At the same time nothing is said about the positive aspects and achievements of the socialist countries. Such a position brings to mind the ancient saying "Without us even the sun won't rise!"

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Creative diversity on a single road of socialist development is conditioned in different countries by concrete and objective factors.

The great Republic of People's China has amassed a splendid experience of socialist construction. Working as it does in complex historical conditions, the Communist Party of China is making a tremendous contribution to the theory and practice of building socialist society. The world communist movement may rightly be proud of the ability of the Chinese comrades to evolve and to successfully implement new methods of solving most complicated vital issues related to the life of hundreds of millions of people. However the Chinese comrades constantly point out that they by no means claim universality for their methods of socialist construction, though in their country these methods have fully justified themselves. The wisdom of the leadership of the Communist Party of China is also reflected in the fact that it does not oppose the experience of socialist construction in its own country to that of other countries, and skilfully applies the experience of all the socialist countries to successfully accomplish the tasks of building a new society in China.

There is much that is also unique, in solving various problems of socialist construction, in the European
People's Democracies. The experience of economic and cultural advancement in Poland, Rumania and Albania, the experience of the co-operation of agriculture in Bulgaria, the signal progress in industrial and agricultural development in Czechoslovakia — all this and much else enriches the treasure chamber of the experience amassed in erecting a new social system.

Yugoslavia also has its own peculiar forms of socialist construction, and new methods of administration and economic management are being tried out in practice there. The Workers' Councils in Yugoslavia appeared but comparatively recently, with each new year of their existence introducing alterations in their functions. Anyhow, some of the good aspects of this form of management are already clear now. This, however, cannot be said of another novelty which is having an adverse effect, namely, certain undertakings in the fields of planning, which have tended to weaken the planned basis of the Yugoslav economy and to strengthen the influence of market relationships, a fact of which the Yugoslav press has written.

It is impossible to dispute the fact that good experience will always find supporters and followers, provided it has withstood the acid test of time and yielded beneficial results. And conversely, it is ridiculous to take affront at other countries if one or another method used in one country is found unsuitable for another country.

What then are the advantages of the "Yugoslav path to socialism" mentioned by the Yugoslav authors? In replying to this question, the authors of the articles published by the Yugoslav press usually refer to some or other novelties of a political nature. But socialism — the new social system — envisages the reconstruction of the
economy, the basis of the entire social life. This reconstruc-
tion has been started in Yugoslavia, but as the Yugo-
slav comrades know very well themselves, much still re-
 mains to be done to complete this reconstruction. It is well
known that agriculture holds an important place in the
economy of Yugoslavia, nevertheless, the output of grain
has not yet reached the pre-war level, and, it is to be re-
gretted, the triumph of socialist relationships in the village
is far from being attained. It is also known, that the yearly
deficit in wheat in Yugoslavia amounts to approximately
600,000 to 650,000 tons.

It is perfectly evident of what great significance to
the economy of Yugoslavia is the aid received from the
capitalist countries, from the United States primarily.
Owing to the situation that had been created, Yugoslavia,
in the course of a number of years, was in a position to
utilize the sharpened contradictions between imperialism
and the socialist countries. But if a great part of her econ-
omy is comprised of aid rendered by capitalist countries, it
is impossible to admit that such a path has any special
advantages. All the countries of the socialist camp cannot
reckon on such aid; they cannot build their policy by cal-
culating on the aid of the imperialists. Consequently, such
a path is not, by any means, a universal one. It is well
known that the imperialist circles rendered aid to Yugo-
slavia not because they sympathize with socialism, or with
the building of socialism in Yugoslavia. Politicians from
the camp of imperialism have admitted that their plans
are calculated on sowing and spreading discord between
the socialist countries by fair means or foul. One must not
for a moment forget that the foes of socialism would like,
even now, by any means, to sow discord in the community
of socialist countries, to weaken contacts between them.
In his speech Comrade Tito raised the slogan of the "independence" of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties from the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, everybody knows that the Soviet Union does not demand of anyone, any kind of dependence or obedience. This has been forcefully stated in the decisions of the XXth Congress of the CPSU. These premises have again been confirmed in the Declaration of the USSR Government of October 30, 1956, "On the Basis of Development and the Further Consolidation of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Other Socialist States". Our Party and our Government are resolutely correcting the mistakes that occurred to this end, in the past. The experience of our relations with Yugoslavia in recent years testifies to this. We have boldly set out to root out all the errors of the past in our relations with Yugoslavia, and disregarding all considerations of prestige, we were the first to reach out a hand to the Yugoslav Government and the Union of Communists. No one can deny the fact that on the part of the CPSU, everything has been done and is being done to adjust relations on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism in the interests of consolidating friendship and co-operation with the fraternal people of Yugoslavia, in the interests of fighting for peace and socialism.

Favourably appraising as a whole the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and agreements, concluded between the USSR and Yugoslavia, Tito reproaches the Soviet leaders with allegedly not wanting to spread the principles fixed in these agreements, to other socialist countries. This strange and wholly fabricated assertion was needed by Tito in order to ascribe to the Soviet Union "insufficient confidence" in the socialist forces of the People's Democracies.
These assertions have been refuted by facts.

There is the Belgrade Declaration and the Joint Statement issued by the Governments of the USSR and the FPRY on Soviet-Yugoslav relations, as well as the Declaration on the relations between the Yugoslav Union of Communists and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There is the Declaration of the USSR Government on the basis of development and further consolidation of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. There is the Joint Statement in connection with negotiations between the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Government of the Soviet Union and the delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and the Government of the People's Republic of Poland. These documents reflect the Leninist principles of relations between socialist countries, but Comrade Tito still continues to speak of some kind of "Stalinist course" in relationships with the People's Democracies.

Yet before the XXth Congress, precisely in connection with the discussion of the question of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a decision in July 1955 which reads:

"In all our relations with the countries of the people's democracy, as well as with the fraternal Communist and Workers' parties, Government and Party organs, and all our workers abroad, should guide themselves strictly by the Leninist principles of: socialist internationalism, full equality, respect for national sovereignty, and consideration of the national peculiarities of the respective countries. Soviet Communists must serve as an example of adherence
to the principles of proletarian internationalism, as becomes the representatives of a multi-national socialist country where the national question has been settled consistently on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory.

"The historic experience of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies shows that, with unity in the main, different forms and methods of solving concrete problems of socialist construction in ensuring the victory of socialism in different countries may be applied, depending on historic and national peculiarities."

It is a matter of record that the XXth Congress devoted much attention to the problems of proper relations between our party and all other fraternal Communist and Workers' parties, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. To speak now, after the XXth Congress, about some "Stalinists" in the CPSU who allegedly strive to subjugate fraternal parties means simply to shut one's eyes to the policy the CPSU actually pursues with respect to socialist countries. This policy is based on the principles of full equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and is permeated with the spirit of strengthening friendship between all peoples, the spirit of proletarian socialist internationalism. This policy is permeated with the concern for strengthening the friendship, fraternal co-operation and unity of all countries of the socialist camp, for strengthening peace throughout the world.

Now, what does Comrade Tito call for in his speech? To march singly? But, one may ask, what does this road promise, what advantages does it hold forth for socialist countries? There are no such advantages. No good can be done the cause of building a socialist society by the call
for breaking away from other socialist states, from the entire friendly family of socialist countries. Loyalty to the great banner of socialist internationalism, the alliance and unity of all fighters for socialism, is the primary condition for the success of our great cause.

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In the light of the demands of socialist internationalism the tone in which Comrade Tito deemed it possible to speak about the Communist Parties and their leaders cannot but arouse surprise. All the leaders of the fraternal parties of the West and the East who do not agree with his views he calls "Stalinists" without any foundation for it, ascribing the most negative features to them. He speaks in no other way about them but as "inveterate Stalinite elements", as "irresponsible elements in different Communist Parties", etc. His entire speech made in Pula is full of such attacks against Communist leaders. Having chosen as the subject for his speech the question of relations between Communist Parties, Tito, in essence, did not conduct comradely polemics, did not argue, but instructed, or, to be more exact, scolded some leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties. The speech was made not in a tone of conversation or argument on an equal basis with proper respect for different opinions. Furthermore, there are no grounds whatsoever to talk about "Stalinists" and "Stalinism" insofar as our Party, like the other Communist Parties, defended and is defending the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Particularly impermissible is the contemptuous attitude expressed in the speech towards such a country as Albania and its leaders. Speaking about the Albanian comrades, Tito used rude and insulting expressions. It is known at
the same time that the Yugoslav leaders frequently defend the thesis of equality between great and small peoples, the right of each to hold his opinion and defend it. They usually demand that no one should claim the monopoly in defining the truth. But no sooner had Comrade Enver Hoxha written an article not to the liking of the Yugoslav comrades than they showered him with abuse. The article may possibly have been written differently. But why cannot Comrade Hoxha hold his own opinion, and have the right to criticize, which the Yugoslav comrades claim?

In his speech Comrade Tito obviously interferes not only in the affairs of the Albanian Party of Labour. He interfered just as unceremoniously in the affairs of the French Communist Party and in the affairs of other Communist Parties, including also our Party, trying to give categorical evaluations of the internal position in these parties and of the activities of their leaders. "The choice of leaders", wrote l'Humanite, organ of the French Communist Party, in this connection, "is the internal affair of each party and interference from outside in such affairs, as was proved in the past, can only harm the labour movement as a whole". One cannot but agree with this just remark.

After the above-said it is not surprising that Comrade Tito's speech has been met with exultation in the bourgeois circles in foreign countries. How can one help recalling here the words of August Bebel, the old leader of the labour movement, who recommended that one ponder over the offence you have committed if you are praised by enemies. Our enemies now hasten to draw conclusions to the effect that this speech will be the cause for serious disagreements between the Soviet and Yugoslav Commu-
nists and will lead to a worsening of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Is it not clear that for the common cause of the Communist Parties it is impermissible to develop quarrels, to go over to mutual attacks, to return to the atmosphere of differences that have receded into the past thanks to the mutual efforts? The highest interests of the working class, the interests of socialism, urgently demand the attainment of mutual understanding and the elimination of everything that is fraught with negative consequences for the further unification of the forces of socialism on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.

The co-operation between the CPSU and the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, as is pointed out in the "Declaration On Relations Between the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" must be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, the comradely nature of exchanging opinions on disputed questions between our Parties. It is well known that in the past among a certain section of the leaders of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia incorrect views were widespread that did not conform to the Marxist-Leninist theory on certain important questions of socialist construction, and departures were made from the principles of proletarian internationalism. By establishing closer ties with the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia our Party had in mind that the attainment of unity of views on important ideological questions would require considerable time because differences existed and still exist between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia on a number of problems of an ideological character.
The CPSU on its part will continue to pursue a policy of co-operation between our Parties on a principled Marxist-Leninist basis in the interests of the fraternal peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia, in the interests of defending the cause of peace, democracy, and socialism. We are convinced that today as well disputed questions must be discussed and elucidated in a calm and friendly atmosphere by a comradely exchange of opinions.

The Communists of the Soviet Union, like the Communists of all the countries of the world, realize that in conditions when reaction has launched a bitter campaign against the forces of socialism and democracy, when the imperialists and fascist elements in many countries are undertaking vicious attacks against the Communists, trying to split the international communist movement, it is essential to further unite all the forces of socialism on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism.

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