HISTORY OF THE PARTICIPATION BY NEWFOUNDLAND IN WORLD WAR II

Edited and with an Introduction by Peter Neary and Melvin Baker ©2010
CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................................................

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 

DOCUMENT: ALLAN M. FRASER, HISTORY OF THE PARTICIPATION BY NEWFOUNDLAND IN WORLD WAR II

I RECRUITING...................................................................................................................................... 

Special Naval Service.......................................................................................................................... 

Office Organized................................................................................................................................. 

Officers............................................................................................................................................. 

Men.................................................................................................................................................... 

Appointment of Director of Recruiting and Formation of Recruitment Committee..................... 

Women’s Patriotic Association Club Rooms....................................................................................... 

First Naval Draft................................................................................................................................. 

General Naval Services..................................................................................................................... 

Royal Artillery.................................................................................................................................... 

Royal Air Force................................................................................................................................. 

Ground Staff..................................................................................................................................... 

Air Crew........................................................................................................................................... 

Royal Merchant Navy....................................................................................................................... 

Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit.............................................................................................. 

II DEFENCE....................................................................................................................................... 

The Newfoundland Militia.................................................................................................................. 

Seizure and Prize................................................................................................................................. 

Christoph V. Doornum......................................................................................................................
Izarra .................................................................................................................................
Cancalais ................................................................................................................................
Madiana ....................................................................................................................................
Bassilour .....................................................................................................................................
Oddvar II ....................................................................................................................................
Requisitioning of Ships ...........................................................................................................
Treatment of Enemy Aliens ......................................................................................................
St. John’s Harbour Net ..............................................................................................................
Control of Shipping ...................................................................................................................
Censorship ...............................................................................................................................}
Control of Navigational Aids in Wartime ..................................................................................
Civil Defence ...........................................................................................................................
Air Craft Detection Corps ..........................................................................................................

III BASES ..............................................................................................................................
The Newfoundland Airport, Gander ..........................................................................................
Use of Gander in connection with Transatlantic Ferry Service ..................................................
Torbay Airport ............................................................................................................................
Goose Bay Airport .....................................................................................................................
Chronology of Goose Bay Negotiations ....................................................................................
United States Bases in Newfoundland .......................................................................................}

IV FINANCIAL MEASURES ....................................................................................................
Finance: 1942-1943 ....................................................................................................................
Finance: 1943-1944 .....................................................................................................................
Finance: 1944-1945 .....................................................................................................................
Finance: 1945-1946 .....................................................................................................................
Foreign Exchange Control ..........................................................................................................

V ECONOMIC MEASURES
Price and Rent Control

Import Control and Priorities

Settlement of Trade Disputes

National Registration

VI ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

VII NEWFOUNDLAND’S FIGHTING FORCES

The 166th (Newfoundland) Army Field Regiment, Royal Artillery

The 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment, Royal Artillery

Service Statistics

VIII NEWFOUNDLAND’S STRATEGIC VALUE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOC in C</td>
<td>air officer commanding-in-chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Air Raid Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>acting sergeant major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCATP</td>
<td>British Commonwealth Air Training Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEM</td>
<td>British Empire Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Commander of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRA</td>
<td>Commander Corps Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMG</td>
<td>Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>commanding officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Companion of the Order of the Star of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVO</td>
<td>Commander of the Royal Victorian Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
<td>Durham Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENSO</td>
<td>Entertainments National Service Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOO</td>
<td>field ordnance officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCB</td>
<td>Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMF</td>
<td>ground mobile force(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>His Excellency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMC</td>
<td>His Majesty’s Canadian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Justice of the Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC</td>
<td>King’s Counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Bombardier</td>
<td>lance bombardier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI</td>
<td>landing craft, infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBE</td>
<td>Member of the Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Military Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>officer commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBY</td>
<td>patrol bomber (Y was a US navy designation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASC</td>
<td>Royal Army Service Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REME</td>
<td>Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHQ</td>
<td>regimental headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>regimental sergeant major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Schutzstaffel or Steamship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 i/c</td>
<td>second in command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>Union Defence Forces (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE Day</td>
<td>Victory in Europe Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/Sergeant</td>
<td>warrant sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOEL</td>
<td>warrant officer, class EL (electrical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPA</td>
<td>Women’s Patriotic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WT</td>
<td>wireless telegraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I
INTRODUCTION
The Second World War lifted Newfoundland and Labrador out of the Great Depression of the 1930s and fostered impressive social change in what was then still a separate country.¹ When the war started, Newfoundland (the present-day province only became Newfoundland and Labrador in 2001), was being governed by a British-appointed Commission of Government. This system had been in effect since 16 February 1934 and had been forced on the then Dominion of Newfoundland by a deep financial crisis brought on by world economic events following the Wall Street crash of 29 October 1929. Instead of an elected legislature and cabinet, Newfoundland had a governor and six commissioners, three from Newfoundland and three from the United Kingdom—but all appointed by London, which provided an annual grant-in-aid to allow hard-pressed Newfoundland to balance its books. The commission had both legislative and executive authority: it could both make laws and carry them out. But it was accountable not to the Newfoundland electorate but to the British parliament. After 1934 the commission tried various means to revive the economy, but in the spring of 1939 there were as many people on relief in the country (roughly one-third of the entire population) as there had been in the spring of 1934. Thanks to wartime developments, however, all this soon changed.

Because of its constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom through the Commission of Government, Newfoundland went to war on 3 September 1939 when the British went to war (King George VI declared war on behalf of Canada a week later). The commission responded to the emergency by passing, on 1 September, An Act for the Defence of Newfoundland, the Newfoundland equivalent of the Canadian War Measures Act. A defence plan had been adopted in 1936 and, in keeping with this, legislation was passed in October 1939 to create the Newfoundland Militia, later renamed the Newfoundland Regiment and augmented by an Auxiliary Militia or Home Guard. In the First World War Newfoundland had recruited a regiment and sent it overseas—at great human and financial cost. Eventually, the divisive policy of conscription had to be introduced to maintain the war effort. In 1939 the commission set out in a very different direction. This time Newfoundland would contribute by acting to defend its own territory and by directing volunteers into the British forces.

The largest group of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians to serve in uniform with the British went into the Royal Navy, but many others found their way into service in units identified with Newfoundland in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Air Force. When the atomic bomb was exploded above Nagasaki, Japan, on 9 August 1945, one survivor was John Ford, a Newfoundlander who had volunteered with the RAF and was now a prisoner of war labouring at the Mitsubishi naval dockyard. Eventually, Canada was also
allowed to recruit in Newfoundland and found many enlistees, both male and female, for its fighting forces. Interestingly, the largest single group of Newfoundlanders to go overseas during the Second World War did not go in uniform, but as members of the Newfoundland Forestry Unit, recruitment for which was started by the Commission of Government, at British request, in October 1939. Members of this unit worked mainly in Scotland and their experience paralleled that of Canadian foresters, who did serve in uniform. Altogether, more than 12,000 Newfoundlanders served abroad in one form or another during the war (the 1945 population of Newfoundland and Labrador was 321,819).

At the same time thousands of Allied servicemen and women were stationed in Newfoundland and Labrador. Early in the war the Commission of Government concluded that it could not from its own resources defend the vital military installations in the country, especially the Newfoundland Airport at what is now Gander and the seaplane base at Botwood. These facilities had been built in the late 1930s by Newfoundland and the United Kingdom in connection with experimental flights aimed at the introduction of transatlantic air service. From 1940 the British, now fighting for their own survival, were likewise compromised in relation to the defence of Newfoundland. Accordingly, Canada was invited to send forces to Newfoundland to meet an urgent need. Understanding that her own defence was closely tied to that of her eastern neighbour, Canada readily agreed and Canadian forces arrived at the Newfoundland Airport on 16 June 1940. Canada then ran this strategically located facility, which, from November 1940 onwards, was a key base for ferrying aircraft produced in North America to the United Kingdom. Subsequently, Canada built airbases at Torbay (site of the present-day St. John’s airport) and, to assist in the ferrying operation, at Goose Bay, Labrador. From 1941 Canada operated a naval base at St. John’s on behalf of the Royal Navy. Included among the Canadian forces who went to Newfoundland and Labrador during the war were six war artists—Thomas Harold Beament, Frank Leonard Brooks, Albert Edouard Cloutier, Paul Alexander Goranson, George Campbell Tinning, and Thomas Charles Wood—who left behind them a stunning visual record (now part of the art collection of the Canadian War Museum) of their country’s diverse, extensive, and costly military effort there, on land, sea, and in the air.

Canadians were soon followed to Newfoundland by even larger numbers of American forces. In September 1940, the United Kingdom promised the United States base sites for 99 years in a number of its transatlantic territories in exchange for 50 used destroyers. This arrangement is known to history as the “destroyers for bases” agreement, but in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda the Americans were permitted to establish themselves “freely and without consideration.” A visiting American party led by Admiral J.L. Devers eventually chose sites at St. John’s, Argentia, and Stephenville. The full details of the American occupation of the properties thus
acquired were spelled out in the Anglo-American leased bases agreement of 27 March 1941. Newfoundland was represented in London in the talks leading to this agreement by Commissioner for Justice and Defence L.E. Emerson, a Newfoundlander; and Commissioner for Finance John N. Penson, a Scot. The Americans bargained hard and obtained sweeping jurisdictional rights. By contrast, Canada had undertaken expensive wartime commitments in Newfoundland without any such general long-term agreement. The difference was striking, though in 1944, following protracted negotiations, Ottawa was able to extract a 99-year lease to the Goose Bay site.

In an age of air and submarine warfare, Newfoundland and Labrador were strategically located and the presence of so many Canadian and American forces in the country acknowledged this reality. In truth, Newfoundlanders and Labradorians had front-row seats for the war and in particular witnessed first-hand the battle for control of the North Atlantic. 1942 brought an especially grim toll to the region—the USS Truxtun and the USS Pollux were lost near St. Lawrence; there were two submarine raids near Bell Island, Conception Bay, with the loss of four merchant ships and many lives; the passenger ferry Caribou was torpedoed in the Cabot Strait with many more casualties; and 99 servicemen lost their lives in a fire at the Knights of Columbus hostel in St. John’s. These were sombre developments that transfixed the country. Many years later, long after the war was over, it became known that Germans had landed on the coast of Labrador and established an automatic weather station. If the war brought prosperity to Newfoundland, it also brought anxiety, death, and destruction.

Initially, the Commission of Government believed that wartime expenditures would necessitate retrenchment in its development plans, but in practice recruitment for service abroad and Canadian and American base construction at home touched off the biggest economic boom Newfoundland had ever known. By 1942 Newfoundland was enjoying full employment and in the process making interest-free loans to the British, on whom it had previously relied for financial assistance. In becoming “a garrison country,” Newfoundland had left behind the hard times of the 1930s and entered a new phase in its history. Writing from booming St. John’s through the war years, United States Consul General George Hopper provided his Washington superiors with ripe commentary on the transformation of Newfoundland, while Governor Sir Humphrey Walwyn observed in 1943 that Newfoundlanders were “dazzled by American dollars, hygiene and efficiency.” In 1944 Walwyn reported that the Americans were contributing “much towards the modernization of Newfoundland building, architecture, communications systems, and the art of better and more comfortable living generally.”

The rising economic tide in Newfoundland heralded the end of British rule there. Understanding that wartime prosperity in Newfoundland would make political adjustment unavoidable, the British acted decisively to direct
the process of change. In 1942 Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee of the United Kingdom made a brief visit to St. John’s and in 1943 the British sent a parliamentary mission to Newfoundland. The mission toured the country and helped keep the political temperature down. In December 1943 the British promised that at the end of the war in Europe they would provide the Newfoundland people with machinery whereby they could decide their own constitutional future. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians would decide—but the British would decide how they would decide. This development set the stage for the 1949 union of Newfoundland with Canada, an outcome facilitated by the wartime interaction of the two countries. Constitutionally, as in so much else, the changes brought on by the Second World War were lasting and fundamental.

Anticipating events, on 18 October 1939 the Secretary of State for the Dominions instructed governments under his authority to take immediate steps “to ensure that the essential material required for a history of the war” was “collected and preserved in a convenient form.” Specifically, the governments circularized, including that of Newfoundland, were asked to submit quarterly reports “summarizing the more important events, decisions, etc., taken…during the period under review.” These reports were to cover not only “actual warlike events…but any measures taken as regards internal security (e.g., the internment or release of enemy aliens) and any important war economic measures introduced.” So rapid was the pace of change in Newfoundland that the Commission of Government found it impossible to comply with this request in the manner specified, but in November 1942 it appointed Allan M. Fraser, professor of history and political science at Memorial University College, to write a history of the country’s war effort. His job would be “to compile a digest suitable for transmission to the Secretary of State, and, later, a more expanded account with a view to publication in book form, after the close of hostilities, of a complete History of our War effort.” Fraser was given access to government records, paid $2 per hour for his efforts, and had as his first task the writing of an account of events to 31 December 1942. In connection with this work he visited the Newfoundland Airport at Gander (where he met with Squadron Leader Harold A.L. Pattison, the Commission of Government’s agent there), and interviewed “representatives of unofficial bodies such as the Women’s and Men’s Patriotic Associations, the Red Cross, etc.”

In February 1944 Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education H.A. Winter reported that Fraser was preparing his final draft on the period September 1939-December 1942 and would thereafter move on to an account of what had happened in 1943. His pending report, Winter noted, was required by London and would “also form the basis for a History of Newfoundland’s War Effort” towards which the Great War Veterans’ Association was preparing and which public opinion would “ultimately demand.” To the end of 1943, Fraser’s billing totaled $2,376. The ultimate result of his research and
writing for the Commission of Government was a manuscript entitled “History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II.” Handwritten drafts by Fraser are now in the collection of his papers at The Rooms Provincial Archives Division (MG286), St. John’s, along with a typescript of the entire work. There is also a typewritten copy in the records of the Department of National Defence in Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (RG 24, vol. 10995, file 290-NFD-013-(D1)). With the agreement of the Commonwealth Relations Office, London, the latter copy was forwarded to Assistant Under Secretary of State W.P. J. O’Meara by Newfoundland Lieutenant-Governor Sir Leonard Outerbridge on 7 May 1951. This action followed a June 1950 inquiry to Government House, St. John’s, and a separate request to Fraser himself by Colonel C.P. Stacey, director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Department of National Defence, for information about the status of his project. The typescript sent to Ottawa that eventually found its way into the holdings of Library and Archives Canada runs to 480 pages (double spaced), is organized topically, and includes capsule histories of the Royal Artillery’s 166th (Newfoundland) Field Regiment, the 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment, and the 125th (Newfoundland) Squadron of the Royal Air Force.

Fraser’s work is mainly a chronology of events, does not include documentary references, and is written in “stiff ‘official’ prose (with the occasional rhetorical flourish, as when he calls Newfoundland “one of the sally-ports of freedom” and the bombers ferried through Gander “an avenging host from out of the West”). It is very much a “work in progress” but is nevertheless a useful introduction and guide to a period of rapid and sweeping change and a reference source of considerable value. It is certainly a good place to start research on a range of topics relating to the history of Newfoundland, 1939-45. As such, it deserves to be readily available to scholars of the period, and this edition has been prepared with that purpose in mind. Fraser’s wartime study is presented here as a document—a compendium rather than a monograph.

Allan MacPherson Fraser, the author of the wartime narrative that follows, was born on 9 July 1906 in Inverness, Scotland, the son of Allan and Teresa Fraser. His father was a haberdasher, and the family eventually moved from Inverness to Nairn, farther out the Moray Firth. Allan went to school at Inverness Academy and then Nairn Academy. In 1928 he completed the MA (Honours) degree in history at the University of Edinburgh. The same year he answered an advertisement from Memorial University College, St. John’s, and was duly appointed, at age twenty-two, as lecturer in history, economics and political science and given charge of the department encompassing those subjects (he also apparently sometimes taught English literature). Satisfying denominational interests was a political reality at Memorial, and the fact that Fraser was Roman Catholic seems to have influenced his appointment, though
he was well qualified academically. His passage to St. John’s was paid by his new employer, and he was advised by Memorial principal J.L. Paton to bring with him “a good supply of clothes & underclothing.” In 1933 Fraser was made associate professor of history and economics and in 1937 achieved the rank of professor. During his first years at Memorial, in addition to his regular teaching duties, he offered a weekly evening class for members of the general public and in 1935-36 “conducted two evening classes per week for selected members of the Civil Service.” In this period Fraser also made himself available as a speaker to various St. John’s literary and social service clubs, and prepared two reports for the Newfoundland Board of Trade. In 1937 he was published in the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.

As a classroom performer, Fraser was known for his prodigious memory but also had the reputation for being shy and aloof. He was rigid in approach and on occasion would have students read in turn from the course textbook. In an account of the origins of the Memorial history department, archivist/historian William Whiteley, who knew Fraser in the 1950s and 1960s, offered this account of him as a young instructor:

Allan Fraser’s teaching was in ancient history, modern history, British history and political science, economics, and later Newfoundland history… Fraser was in his prime in teaching in the 1930s and 40s. He used to go to the lecture room and have a smoke before class outside. He was well groomed, an old fashioned lecturer rather than a teacher. He was formal, clear, elegant, and authoritative, and his history courses were not necessarily original. In his ancient history and modern history he had texts. He kept up with the literature and dictated the relevant sections to the class from the textbooks. He had three-piece suits for every day of the week. He was collected, friendly, but apart, [and] was a thorough man of the world. He came into the classroom with no notes, didn’t look at the students and dictated the lectures. He didn’t want any questions in class but sometimes the students would go to his office and see him. He was happy, unperturbed, and self-reserved…His amazing memory of his subjects stuck in the memory of many of his students. He went to student dances and…danced with the girls and faculty wives.

The eligible bachelor and bon vivant was also well known as a tennis player. He was the first president of the Newfoundland Tennis Association (1930-33), was the North of Scotland men’s single’s champion in 1930, 1931, and 1933, and the Newfoundland tennis champion in 1935 and 1936. Fraser also liked to play bridge (the City Club on Water Street became a favourite venue) and chess. Another considerable interest in this phase of his life was the work of the Newfoundland branch of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (RIIA). In 1938 he represented the Newfoundland organization at a Commonwealth relations conference the Institute sponsored in Sydney, Australia. On this occasion he went to Vancouver and then travelled by boat to Hawaii, Fiji, and New Zealand, returning from Australia via India, the Suez Canal, and the United Kingdom. In 1939 his interest in international affairs took a different tack when he began broadcasting commentaries on radio station VONF of the Broadcasting Corporation of Newfoundland. Eventually, he gave a weekly paid fifteen-minute radio talk on world affairs, and in the 1950s brought his expertise on geopolitics to television. He was also active in the 1940s and 1950s in Newfoundland’s extensive program of school broadcasts.

In 1939 Fraser married Memorial biology instructor Kathleen Kennedy, a Harbour Grace native whose father, Ronald Kennedy (1881-1942), was a prominent educational administrator and one of the founding trustees of Memorial University College. Under Memorial’s rules, she forfeited her job with their nuptials. The couple honeymooned in Scotland, were overseas when the Second World War started, and returned to Newfoundland aboard the SS Newfoundland in the first Atlantic convoy. In 1939 and 1940 the Frasers lived in the Newfoundland Hotel and thereafter, successively, on Forest Road, Rennies Mill Road, and Waterford Bridge Road, where they occupied an apartment owned by Justice Brian Dunfield. In August 1941 Fraser was named to a trade dispute tribunal, appointed by the Commission of Government under recently promulgated regulations for the avoidance of strikes and lockouts, to settle a strike by miners at Buchans. He accepted this appointment without the promise of remuneration other than expenses but the government agreed to “make good to him the amount which he would lose through not being able to give his broadcasts on International Affairs over V.O.N.F.” Ultimately, because the work of the tribunal took more than a month, Fraser requested and received an honorarium of $250.

In December 1941 he was named chairman of a trade dispute board appointed to settle another complex labour dispute, this one in the fluorspar mining community of St. Lawrence. Another foray into wartime labour relations came in May 1942 when he was appointed to a board to settle a dispute between the Newfoundland Protective Association of Shop and Office Employees and various employers in the St. John’s wholesale and retail trades. Following the completion of this work, he was paid $750 for his services. In 1944 he was paid the same amount for his work on the Grand Falls Shop and Office Trade Dispute Board. Fraser was also co-opted during the war period to the formative Commission of Enquiry into Housing and Town Planning in St. John’s. He helped write the commission’s reports, and in a 15 October 1943 byelection was elected to the St. John’s City Council, serving on that body until 1945 (he did not contest that year’s civic election) and promoting the cause of urban renewal in the capital.

In 1941 his academic career entered a new phase when the RIIA formed a committee to supervise a venture in Newfoundland studies. The
supervisory group was chaired by Sir Campbell Stuart, and included representatives of the Institute’s Newfoundland branch and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In addition to Stuart, who was chairman of the RIIA’s Imperial Committee, those involved were Memorial Board of Regents chairman V.P. Burke; Memorial English, French and German instructor Captain Rudolph (Paddy) Duder; Princeton Institute for Advanced Study professor E.M. Earle; University of Toronto political economy professor H.A. Innis (author of the influential 1940 *The Cod Fisheries: the history of an international economy*); University of British Columbia president N.A.M. MacKenzie; RIIA research director Sir John Hope Simpson (he had been one of the original members of the Commission of Government, 1934-36); British Press Service notable John W. Wheeler-Bennett; and R.A. MacKay, Eric Dennis Memorial Professor of Government and Political Science at Dalhousie University. Alternates for Innis and MacKenzie were, respectively, University of Toronto political science professor Alexander Brady and Dalhousie law professor George Curtis. Innis was treasurer of the group and MacKay the secretary and director of research.

In connection with this initiative, Fraser was granted sabbatical leave at half-pay by Memorial to undertake historical research on Newfoundland. He was away from his regular duties for sixteen months in 1941-42, and his efforts eventually bore fruit in his contributions to the 1946 *Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*, a work that remains in use and that highlighted Newfoundland’s emergence militarily in the 1940s. Edited by MacKay, who became a key player on the Canadian side in the subsequent events whereby Newfoundland became a province of Canada, the volume was published by Oxford University Press, Toronto, under the auspices of the RIIA. It encompassed 577 pages, had a preface by the editor and a foreword by Stuart, and, following an introduction (“The Problem of Newfoundland”) by the editor (3-38), was divided into Part I, “The Economy of Newfoundland” (41-242), and II, “From Fishing Station to Atlantic Bastion: Diplomatic and Strategic Studies” (243-508). There were also five appendices, four maps, and an index. In addition to Stuart, MacKay and Fraser, the other contributors to the volume were Dalhousie economist S.A. Saunders (he and MacKay wrote Part I); Queen’s University historian Gerald S. Graham; United College (Winnipeg) professor A.R.M. Lower; and G.S. Watts of the research division of the Bank of Canada. Fraser was responsible for the entire sections on the French Shore (275-332), fishery negotiations with the United States (333-410), and relations with Canada (411-483). These totaled approximately 60,000 words (the lengthiest offering by any author in the collection), and constitute the scholarly work for which Fraser is perhaps now best remembered.

In the intense political round in Newfoundland that followed the war and culminated in Confederation with Canada, Fraser supported the Responsible Government League, which wanted Newfoundland to return to independent self-government. This cause failed in the decisive constitutional
referendum of 22 July 1948, and union with Canada followed on 31 March 1949. During the summer of 1949 Fraser was seconded to the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, a posting that suited both his temperament and research interests. But union with Canada also brought an unexpected and disconcerting consequence for him academically. One of the early acts of the first provincial government, led by J.R. Smallwood, who had spearheaded the campaign for Confederation (Fraser first knew him as a fellow broadcaster), was to secure legislation raising Memorial University College to the status of a degree-granting institution. This, in turn, triggered at Memorial an effort to raise faculty qualifications. Unless he obtained a doctorate by 1 September 1956, Fraser found himself in the position of facing financial disadvantage and downgrading in rank to “Acting Professor.” In the circumstances, he obtained leave from the university in 1952 to begin study for the PhD at Columbia University, New York. While registered there, he and Kay lived in the comfortable 3½ room apartment 2B, 552 Riverside Drive, a fifteen-minute walk from the university. They also enjoyed the cultural amenities of the city and got to see four games (at Yankee Stadium and Ebbets Field) in the 1952 subway World Series between the New York Yankees and the Brooklyn Dodgers.

Under Memorial rules, Fraser had to report every three months on his work, which progressed smoothly. He chose “the history of Great Britain and the British Empire” as his major field of study and “the history of Western Europe” as his minor field. He was especially appreciative of efforts on his behalf by Professor John Bartlet Brebner (author of the 1945 North Atlantic Triangle: the interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain), and told Memorial president Raymond Gushue soon after his arrival that “in many ways” he was being “treated more as a colleague than as a student.” Fraser had hoped that Columbia would accept his “published work in lieu of a doctoral dissertation” but in the event university rules did not permit this. Eventually, working with Brebner, he was approved to write a dissertation on “The History of Newfoundland from the Suspension of Dominion Status to Federal Union with Canada.” Thanks to a generous credit for his MA work at Edinburgh, he was able to jump the last of the preliminary PhD hurdles in May 1953, whereupon he headed back to St. John’s to research and write his dissertation. He travelled home via London, Ontario, where he attended meetings of the Canadian Historical Association, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and the Social Science Research Council, another national organization in which he had been active for some time. On 19 May, Brebner told Raymond Gushue that Fraser had both “the ability and the opportunity to produce a more than ordinarily distinguished piece of work” and that “he might well give Canadian scholars a new level to emulate.” “He has a rare opportunity,” the distinguished Columbia academic ventured, “…and both Newfoundland and Canada as a whole might benefit considerably if he were able to exploit it thoroughly at leisure. I cannot, of course, speak for my Faculty, which will judge his dissertation, but it is inconceivable to me that his
essay would fail to commend itself even if it merely kept up to the level he has already attained. If there were ways by which he could be encouraged to take the time necessary to capitalize more highly on his unique opportunity, I hope that they might be indicated to him. It has been a pleasure to me and a benefit to my seminar to have him with us.” In reply, Gushue thanked Brebner for his interest both in the man and the proposed work, and promised to discuss matters thoroughly with Fraser on his return.

This was all very hopeful, but in practice nothing came of Fraser’s plan, for in June 1953 he accepted the Liberal nomination in the federal riding of St. John’s East for the national election held on 10 August of that year. On the grounds that the university “would not wish any member of its Staff to be identified with any political party,” he resigned from the Memorial faculty in a letter to Gushue dated 25 June.38 On the same day, in accordance with rule 36 of the university, he gave Paul Winter, the secretary of the Board of Regents, a cheque for $2,868.75 in repayment of the salary he had been paid during his sabbatical leave, September 1952-May 1953.39 His successor at Memorial was Gordon Oliver Rothney, a King’s College, London University PhD, a native of Richmond, Quebec, and the unsuccessful candidate in Brome for the Bloc Populaire Canadien in the Quebec provincial election of 1944.

The part of the province covered by the federal constituency of St. John’s East had voted strongly in 1948 in favour of a return to self-government, and the Progressive Conservative Party, the political heir of the Newfoundland proponents of independence and responsible government, had easily carried the seat in the federal election of 1949. The Tory incumbent was St. John’s lawyer Gordon F. Higgins, and in normal circumstances he could look forward to easy re-election. In 1953, however, Peter J. Cashin, an anti-Confederate stalwart, ran as an independent, thereby splitting the Tory vote. This allowed Fraser to carry the seat. On election day, he won 8,310 votes, to 6,691 for Higgins and 4,459 for Cashin (who soon after was made director of civil defence by the provincial Liberal government).40 Through adept party management—the hands of Premier Smallwood were all over this—Fraser had prevailed and was thus launched into a new career. He made his maiden speech in the House of Commons on 24 November 1953 (he drew upon his unpublished wartime history),41 and as an MP took a special interest in foreign affairs. In 1957 he was a member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Unfortunately for him, however, he faced a united Tory vote in the general election of 1957 and lost his seat to Progressive Conservative candidate James A. McGrath, who then held the constituency for many years. The Tories, moreover, formed the government after this election and John Diefenbaker became prime minister of Canada.

This reversal left Fraser, who was fifty at the time, in need of employment. He sought reinstatement at Memorial but the university declined this on the grounds that the post he had held had been filled and no other
suitable position was available. Fortunately for Fraser, he was well established as a contributor to the Encyclopedia Americana and since 1951 had been a member of its Canadian advisory committee. Building on this connection, he spent time after his political defeat working for the publication in New York. Then, in 1958, he was appointed by the Smallwood government as Provincial Archivist in the Department of Provincial Affairs, effective 1 April and at a salary of $8,000 per annum (provision was also made for him to carry into his new position the pension rights he had accrued at Memorial). The archives had been launched by Memorial University but in 1960 the holdings were transferred to the provincial government. They were then housed at the Colonial Building on Military Road, which was vacated by the House of Assembly in 1960 for new quarters in the recently constructed Confederation Building. With this change, Fraser came to occupy a charming office in an historic setting, along the hallway from the old Assembly chamber. As archivist, he continued his association with the Encyclopedia Americana and assisted in the preparation of the Newfoundland Book of Remembrance for the Peace Tower on Parliament Hill, Ottawa. In the quiet, late afternoon of life, he also continued to enjoy the delights of polite St. John’s—Bally Haly and Murray’s Pond clubs (golf and fishing, respectively), the St. Andrew’s Society, etc.—which he had cultivated over many years. He looked forward to retirement but, alas, longevity was not to be his. After a brief illness, he died at St. Clare’s Mercy Hospital on 16 November 1969 at age 63. His funeral mass was said at Corpus Christi Church, Kilbride, on 19 November, and he was buried at Holy Sepulchre Cemetery on Topsail Road.

By the time of Fraser’s death, the events of the Second World War had become a distant memory in Newfoundland, and his history of the period was rarely acknowledged. He made no attempt to publish it. Nor, after his exit from politics, did he attempt to write the thesis he had been inspired to undertake at Columbia. Yet his wartime account has much to offer the student of a pivotal time in the history of Newfoundland and Labrador. Though not continuous and systematic, Fraser’s narrative has an encyclopedic quality that gives it lasting value and justifies the present edition. In preparing the work for publication, we have used the typescript in the Department of National Defence records at Library and Archives Canada. We have pruned and adjusted Fraser’s table of contents, added page numbers and italics, and introduced two new section headings (“III Bases” and “VII Newfoundland’s Fighting Forces”). We have also relocated in section III his chronology of events relating to the Goose Bay airbase (447-65 in manuscript), included his summary of financial affairs, 1943-46 (446-75 in manuscript) under “IV Financial Measures,” and introduced the heading “Service Statistics” in section VII. In the case of the first of these changes, there is some easily navigated overlap. In the main text, we have corrected typographical errors and spelling as required, adjusted some quotations, added explanatory information in square brackets, used italics here and there, updated some usage (dates in particular), silently and lightly modified punctuation and upper- and lower-case lettering, and made other
small changes, all in the interest of consistency and readability. In the accounts of the Royal Artillery regiments with Newfoundland designations, we have adjusted person and place names to accord with the usage in G.W.L. Nicholson, More Fighting Newfoundlanders: A History of Newfoundland’s Fighting Forces in the Second World War (Government of Newfoundland, 1969), the definitive published source. Nothing we have done changes Fraser’s meaning and intent. Given the unfinished nature of Fraser’s work, readers are cautioned to check facts and quotations against original sources. Our object in all this has been to make widely available an extensive and useful account by a purposeful historian of times that were exceptional both for his adopted country and for himself.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 183.
3 Ibid., 174.
4 Ibid., 213.
5 United Kingdom, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, Dominions Office (DO) 35/744/N231/1, Macdonald circular letter, 18 October 1939.
6 PRO, DO 35/744/N231/1, Carew to Pugh, 7 July 1942; The Rooms, Provincial Archives Division (RPA), St. John’s, GN 1/3/A, 1951, box 297, file 3/51, H.A.E. 11-‘44, “Report on Newfoundland’s War Effort.” 21 February 1944.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa, RG 24 (Records of the Department of National Defence), 1983-84/167, box 4567, file 1453-1, pt.3, Outerbridge to O’Meara, 7 May 1951.
12 Ibid., Stacey to Fraser, 6 February 1951.
14 The account of his life that follows draws on various Newfoundland and Canadian Who’s Who entries; relevant correspondence in the institutional files of Memorial University; two unpublished sources—William H. Whiteley, “Contrast in the Headship of the History
Department in the Memorial University; Allan Fraser and Gordon Rothney, 1928-1963,” (in the possession of Peter Neary), and Malcolm MacLeod’s account of Allan and Kathleen Fraser in “The Human Face of Higher Education” (Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University, Centre for Newfoundland Studies, LE 3 M422 M3); and MacLeod’s A Bridge Built Halfway: a history of Memorial University College, 1925-1950 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990) and his Crossroads Country: memories of Pre-Confederation Newfoundland, at the intersection of American, British and Canadian connections (St. John’s: Breakwater, 1999). The authors thank the late Leslie Harris, President of Memorial University, 1981-90, for granting access to the University’s files, and the late Professor Whiteley and Professor MacLeod for making their unpublished work available.

Memorial University Records Archives (MURA), President’s office files, box PO-9, file “Staff Applications to 1933,” Paton to Fraser, 18 May 1928.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-2, file “Board of Governors 1937,” Mews to Hatcher, 6 December 1937.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-5, file “Memorial University Faculty Promotions 1935-49,” Fraser to Hatcher, 6 April 1936.


MURA, President’s office files, box PO-2, file “Board of Governors 1938,” Fraser to Hatcher, 21 April 1938. The conference was held 3-17 September.

He discusses the Buchans strike in detail in his history but does not refer to his own involvement. The other members of the tribunal were Justice Brian Dunfield and George P. Bradney. For the report of the tribunal see Evening Telegram, 12 September 1941, 5, 12.

RPA, GN 1/8/5, box 4, PU 82-'41, memorandum by Commissioner for Public Utilities, 20 October 1941.

RPA, GN 38/S1-1, 848-'41.

The other members of the board were W.J. Walsh and Thomas LeFeuvre. For the report of the board see Newfoundland Government, Settlement of Trade Dispute Board appointed under the Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941, for the settlement of a dispute between the St. Lawrence Corporation of Nfld. Ltd. and the St. Lawrence Workers’ Protective Union (St. John’s: King’s Printer, 1942). Again, while he discusses the work of the board in his history, Fraser does not mention his own role.

Fraser’s colleagues on this board were his Buchans associates, Justice Brian Dunfield (who was named chairman), and George P. Bradney. For the findings of the board see Settlement of Trade Dispute Board appointed under the Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941 for the settlement of a dispute between the Newfoundland Protective Association of Shop and Office Employees and Employers in the Wholesale and retail Trades at St. John’s (Newfoundland Government, 1942). The board was eventually reconstituted and submitted a supplementary report (see Evening Telegram, 8 February 1943, 3). As elsewhere, Fraser is silent in the manuscript about his own role.
This board was chaired by Magistrate Nehemiah Short of Corner Brook and had H.G. R. Mews as its third member. The report of the board was signed on 22 April 1944. See RPA, GN 158, box 6, file 42, A.J. Walsh memorandum “Re remuneration of members of the Grand Falls Shop and Office Trade Dispute Board,” 29 April 1944.

For the work of the Commission see Jane Lewis and Mark Shrimpton, “Policymaking in Newfoundland during the 1940s: The Case of the St. John’s Housing Corporation,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 65, no. 2 (June 1984), 209-39.

H.G.R. Mews, later mayor of St. John’s, was elected the same day (Daily News, 18 October 1943, p. 3).

This account is based on the prefatory information in R.A. MacKay (ed.), Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946).

In 1943 MacKay (1894-1979) joined the Department of External Affairs as a special assistant. In 1947 he became Chief of the Defence Liaison Division and from 1952 to 1955 was first Assistant and then Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. He was a key member of the interdepartmental committee formed within the Government of Canada in 1946 to advise on matters relating to Newfoundland.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-5, file “Salaries 1951-52,” Fraser to Hatcher, 2 January 1952. In June 1952 R.A. MacKay told Memorial President Hatcher that Fraser’s contribution to Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies was “first-rate” and “quite equal” to a Ph.D. thesis” (MURA, President’s office files, box PO-23, file “Board of Governors 1952,” memo by president to secretary, Board of Regents, 18 August 1952). The board, however, was not swayed by this argument.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-4, file “A.M. Fraser,” Fraser to Gushue, 29 November 1952.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-4, file “A.M. Fraser,” Fraser to Gushue (personal), 29 November 1952.

Ibid.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-4, file “A.M. Fraser,” Fraser to Gushue, 25 May 1953.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-5, file “History prior to 1952,” Fraser to Hatcher, 22 May 1951.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-4, file “A.M. Fraser,” Brebner to Gushue, 19 May 1953.

MURA, President’s office files, box PO-4, file “A.M. Fraser,” Fraser to Gushue, 25 June 1953.

Ibid.

Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1953 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1954), 554. For Cashin’s appointment, effective 1 January 1954, see Archives and Special Collections Division (ASCD), Queen Elizabeth II Library, Memorial University, J.R. Smallwood Papers (Coll-75), file 2.02.005, minute of cabinet 1158-75.

42 MURA, President’s office files, PO-44, file “Government Provincial – Various Departments,” Phelan to Spencer, 11 October 1957.

43 ASCD, J.R. Smallwood Papers (Coll-75), file 3.02.012, Fraser to Smallwood, 9 January 1958, and file 2.02.010, minute of cabinet 707’-58.


45 *Evening Telegram*, St. John’s, 18 November 1969, 2.
Allan M. Fraser

History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II
I
RECRUITING
Training and Recruiting for Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force (RAF)

On 7 September, 1939, a telegram was sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from His Excellency the Governor of Newfoundland, stating that a large number of young men were eager to offer their services in the armed forces for the duration of the war and that the Newfoundland government was therefore anxious to announce as soon as possible a definite scheme of enlistment both for the navy and the army.

Special Naval Service

On 14 September, approval was given by the Admiralty to call up 625 volunteers for the Royal Navy from Newfoundland fishermen for special service in boats and in ships of the Northern Patrol. These men after one month’s service at sea and if 18½ years of age were to be eligible for promotion to able-seamen if recommended by their commanding officer. Single men were given priority.

Office Organized

The nucleus of the recruiting office was at once organized (by Captain C.M. R. Schwerdt, CVO, RN) [private secretary to the Governor] and the various necessary details arranged between (him and) the government departments concerned, e.g., recruiting by district magistrates, medical examinations, method of application, application forms and the various documents required, etc., etc.

This preliminary work also involved obtaining essential details from the Admiralty. During this period, Captain Schwerdt received valuable assistance from the chief of police in sending out application forms and receiving applications, etc.

The Department of Public Health and Welfare co-operated by preparing medical history sheets, by arranging for preliminary medical examination by the resident doctors in the various settlements of the magisterial districts, and by forming final medical boards at Harbour Grace, Grand Falls, Corner Brook, and Twillingate. In addition, a Services Medical Board was established at St.
John’s to deal with the larger questions and to carry out medical examinations in the St. John’s district.

On 3 October 1939, His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation requiring the following to report full name, address, and any other available information concerning status under particular category, either to the naval security officer, St. John’s, or to the nearest stipendiary magistrate:

**Officers**

(a) Naval officers on the emergency list;

(b) Retired officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines;

(c) Special reserve of engineer officers, Royal Navy, and special reserve of officers of the Royal Marines;

(d) Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve on the active list;

(e) Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve on the retired list;

(f) Officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve;

(g) Officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve.

**Men**

(h) Royal Navy and Royal Marine long service pensioners;

(i) Royal Fleet Reserve ratings, Class A, e.g., long service pensioners who joined the Royal Fleet Reserve and undergo periodical training;

(j) Royal Fleet Reserve Ratings, Class B, i.e., men who, not being pensioners, have had service in the Royal Navy or Royal Marines, and have joined this reserve;

(k) Royal Fleet Reserve, Class C;

(l) Royal Fleet Reserve ratings, Class D;

(m) Royal Naval Reserve ratings;

(n) Royal Navy and Royal Marine disability pensioners, i.e., men who have been invalided from the Royal Navy or Royal Marines with a pension.
In the middle of October 1939 a large room was obtained at the YMCA in St. John’s and the recruiting staff began work (under the direction of Captain Schwerdt).

On 24 October, 1939, a proclamation was issued by His Excellency the Governor inviting volunteers to answer Great Britain’s call for 625 men “used to the sea and able to handle boats, to serve in His Majesty’s Navy for the duration of the War.” This proclamation also set forth the general requirements and conditions of the special naval service.

Appointment of Director of Recruiting and Formation of Recruitment Committee

On 1 November 1939, Captain G.G. Byrne, MC, was appointed to be director of recruiting. Early in November he organized a recruiting committee in St. John’s and several sub-committees were formed to arrange for publicity for the recruiting campaign. Recruiting meetings were held at Pouch Cove, Bay Bulls, Western Bay, and Winterton in November and December 1939. Moreover, a weekly recruiting programme was broadcast over Radio Station VONG during 1939 and 1940.

Women’s Patriotic Association Club Rooms

The Women’s Patriotic Association (WPA) formed a club in St. John’s for the use of all recruits called up and awaiting draft. The club proved most successful and gave volunteers from the outports a place where they could go for refreshments, recreation, reading and writing facilities, etc. It stimulated recruiting, and broadcasts were arranged to give these volunteers an opportunity to speak to their homes. The club continued their excellent work from 23 December 1939 until the end of 1940, when its functions were assumed by [the] Caribou Hut.

First Naval Draft

The first draft of 100 men was ready to sail on 17 November 1939, but unfortunately, owing to an outbreak of diphtheria, their sailing orders had to be countermanded at the last moment and inoculation administered. However, a further 100 men were called up and the first draft of 198 men sailed in SS Newfoundland on 27 November 1939.

General Naval Service

In November 1939 the Admiralty expressed the wish that as soon as the 625 special service men had been dispatched to the United Kingdom, a further 1,000 men should be sent for general naval service. These men were as far as
possible to be experienced in boat work and were to be enlisted, trained, and treated in all respects in the same manner as men enlisted in the United Kingdom.

On 26 January 1940, His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation announcing the completion of the enlistment of the 625 special naval recruits and calling for 1,000 volunteers for general service in His Majesty’s Navy for the duration of the war. The Admiralty requested that drafts should be sent to Great Britain at a rate of two hundred men a month and that a month’s interval should elapse between drafts. These requirements were met as far as available transport facilities permitted.

On 16 April, the Admiralty informed the Newfoundland government that an additional 1,000 men would be accepted for general naval service after the completion of the enlistment of the first 1,000. On 4 December, a further 1,000 were asked, making 3,000 in all, exclusive of 625 men recruited for special naval service. Up to the end of 1942, approximately 5,000 Newfoundlanders had volunteered for service in the Royal Navy. Of these, roughly 2,000 were rejected as medically unfit. 2,889 actually embarked for the United Kingdom. Of these 227 were officially listed as killed or missing, 11 were prisoners of war, and 145 were discharged on various grounds, leaving a total of 2,506 in service in the Royal Navy at the close of 1942.

Royal Artillery

During November and December 1939, the question of recruiting for the army was discussed with the War Office and it was decided that 1,375 volunteers should be enrolled in two heavy regiments of the Royal Artillery.

On 6 February 1940, His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation calling for volunteers for service in the Royal Artillery for the duration of the war, and explaining the general requirements and conditions of service. The proclamation pointed out that the Newfoundland recruits would “form one complete Heavy Royal Artillery Regiment, and, as far as possible, other complete Heavy Royal Artillery Regiments.”

Three days later, reserve officers and reservists of the United Kingdom military forces resident in Newfoundland were given notice to report to recruiting headquarters.

Towards the end of March 1940, a recruiting party consisting of five commissioned officers, two warrant officers, and twenty noncommissioned officers under the command of Major Meredith, MC, RA, arrived at St. John’s from Great Britain for the purpose of attesting recruits and taking charge of drafts during passage to the United Kingdom.
A first draft of 403 volunteers was recruited from St. John’s District, Carbonear, Holyrood, and Bell Island; on 14 April 1940, they left for Canada to embark from there for the United Kingdom. On 12 May 1940, a second draft of 212 volunteers, recruited from Grand Falls, Corner Brook, and neighbouring districts, left for Great Britain by the same route. By 27 September 1940, 1,373 men had been attested for the Royal Artillery and had gone overseas, and the Royal Artillery recruiting staff had returned to Great Britain with the exception of a staff sergeant major of the Royal Army Pay Corps. All recruits subsequently enrolled were attested locally and dispatched to the United Kingdom by the director of recruiting.

On 1 October 1940, the War Office asked for a further 100 recruits to replace promoted men. The War Office also enquired whether Newfoundland could provide about 570 men to form an anti-tank corps. Recruiting of the additional 100 men was undertaken but did not meet with a very encouraging response. Nevertheless, on 28 November 1940, 54 men were attested and went overseas. However, in view of the falling-off in the recruiting for the Royal Artillery the Newfoundland government informed the War Office that it would not be feasible to attempt the formation of an anti-tank corps. On 29 November 1940, the War Office requested the dispatch of a further 100 men in January 1941, and an additional 100 men in February 1941. Up to the end of 1942, over 3,000 Newfoundlanders had volunteered for service in the Royal Artillery. Of these, approximately 1,500 had been rejected as being below the standard of physical or educational requirements. 1,608 volunteers for the Royal Artillery had actually embarked. Of these, 14 had been killed or had died, one was a prisoner of war, and 151 had been discharged on various grounds, leaving 1,442 actually in service with the Royal Artillery at the close of 1942.

These volunteers were formed into the 57th and 59th Heavy Regiments of Royal Artillery, both of which were engaged in coastal defence in Great Britain from 1940 to 1942. Both regiments were visited early in 1941 by Hon. L.E. Emerson, KC, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, who found all the men keen and cheerful and eager “to learn the most minute detail of their duties.” On his return to Newfoundland, the Commissioner, in a broadcast address on 29 April 1941, informed his fellow countrymen that “taking it all in all there are no men training in England today in any better condition than ours, and there are a great many others much worse off.”

Many tributes were paid to the excellent progress of the Newfoundland artillerymen by competent observers in the United Kingdom.

The highest tribute that could have been paid to the members of both regiments was officially recorded in November 1940, when the following announcement was published in the London Gazette: “His Majesty the King has been pleased to assume the Honorary Colonelcy of the Newfoundland
Regiments, Royal Artillery.” It is understood that the King’s appointment covers both the 57th and 59th Heavy Regiments and is also to apply to any other Newfoundland Heavy Regiment that may subsequently be formed.

During the course of an official visit to the coastal and harbour defences, His Majesty inspected units of the Newfoundland Heavy Regiments who had taken their places in the front line of defence of the mother country.

The first contingent of Royal Artillery recruits from Newfoundland to arrive in England were welcomed on 25 April 1940 by the Right Honourable Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, who addressed them, in the following stirring words: “Newfoundland, whose sons have fought side by side with Englishmen since the days of the Tudors, responded at once to the call that echoed round the world last September. It was a call to your own hearts, a call for voluntary service in a noble cause, and your answer has been clear and firm. You may be sure that the spirit of Newfoundland, both as represented by those who have come across the Atlantic and by those who have remained at home, is not forgotten.”

On 1 May 1940, the first contingent were inspected by the Master Gunner, Field Marshall Lord Milne, at the Woolwich training base. Lord Milne, in welcoming the Newfoundland volunteers to the ranks of the Royal Artillery, expressed his confidence that they would uphold the traditions of that famous regiment. He congratulated the recruits on their soldierly bearing and reminded them that they were standing on scared ground, which had been the home of the Royal Artillery for more than 200 years.

The commanding officer of the Newfoundland unit stated that he was especially impressed by the bearing of the men. He referred to their action on their arrival in England when they hurled their hats into the water to emphasize their realization of the fact that they were beginning a new career and had set their hands to a task which they were determined to accomplish. He had been a little nervous as to what their bearing on parade might be in view of the brief period of training which they had undergone, but he was more than pleasantly surprised. He stressed the diversity of professions and trades represented in their ranks and explained that the men had been classified for various special training courses. He added that there would be plenty of hard work for them to do, but he was confident in the ability of the Newfoundland Gunners to “take it” willingly and well.

Mr. D. James Davies, CBE, Trade Commissioner for Newfoundland in England, who spent two days, accompanied by a liaison officer, visiting batteries guarding many miles of the English coastline, in which Newfoundlanders were serving, reported that the men were working hard in the front line defences and that their officers spoke very highly of them. Their colonel stated that he felt highly honoured to be their commanding officer. All
the men appeared fighting fit and were handling the big guns with the skill, aptness, and precisions of seasoned soldiers.

On 15 January 1941, the Right Honourable Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, visited the Newfoundland regiment serving with the Royal Artillery. He inspected them carrying out their operational duties and declared himself pleased with the appearance of the men and particularly impressed by the progress they had made since volunteering.

Royal Air Force

For recruiting purposes the Royal Air Force was divided into two groups: (1) Ground Staff; (2) Air Craft Crews.

Ground Staff

On 13 November 1939, the Air Ministry instituted enquiries in Newfoundland as to the possibility of recruiting suitable ground staff. Shortly afterwards the ministry supplied information as to the requirements and qualifications necessary. In January 1940, they intimated that the method of recruitment should be similar to that employed for the Royal Artillery. By the end of March, detailed information had been received in Newfoundland as to conditions of entry into and service in the Royal Air Force, but there was still insufficient information applicable to Newfoundland. Consequently, it was impossible to begin recruiting at that time. On 11 May, however, the necessary information was received from the Air Ministry, and on 16 May His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation calling for skilled tradesmen to volunteer for the Royal Air Force ground staff. Recruiting began immediately.

Recruits had to be skilled workmen trained in special trades. Suitable volunteers were required to pass Grade I in the medical examination and were sent to the United Kingdom where they were examined as to suitability and proficiency at Royal Air Force depots and were graded accordingly. They were attested and also enrolled in the Royal Artillery before leaving Newfoundland and were required to sign an agreement to continue to serve in the artillery, if, upon arrival in England, it was found they did not meet the Royal Air Force standards. For this reason all volunteers had to comply with the physical requirements of the Royal Artillery. Up to the end of 1942 all such volunteers had been accepted by the Royal Air Force. As Newfoundland is not highly industrialised, the number of suitable volunteers had been unavoidably small, but up to the end of 1942, 71 had been attested and sent to the United Kingdom with the various Royal Artillery drafts. Of these, one had died and one had been discharged, leaving 69 on service with the Royal Air Force ground staff at the close of 1942.
Air Crew

Royal Air Force air crews comprise pilots, observers, and wireless operator-air gunners.

In December 1939, negotiations were proceeding between Great Britain, Canada, and the other Dominions for the training in Canada of personnel for the Royal Air Force, and for the inclusion of Newfoundland in this Empire Air Training Scheme, but no date had then been set for the commencement of training.

In February and March 1940, the question as to the best method of selecting Newfoundland volunteers was discussed.

At the end of March, general information as to the conditions of entry into and service in the Royal Air Force had been made available to the Newfoundland authorities, but certain details affecting Newfoundland as well as the method of selection and the date of commencement of training were still unsettled. However, on 17 June the necessary information was received.

On 21 June, His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation calling for volunteers for the Royal Air Force craft crews, and recruiting commenced under the Empire Air Training Scheme. Application forms together with information as to educational and medical standards were sent to the district magistrates who sent in such volunteers as they considered suitable for selection, interview, and special medical examination. Each candidate was required to produce two letters of recommendation as to his character.

After some discussions it was agreed that the best method of selecting Newfoundland recruits would be for a small selection committee composed of Royal Canadian Air Force flying officers and a Royal Air Force medical officer, with clerical staff, to visit St. John’s and select the first quota of volunteers for training in Canada. (As a result of the experience gained by officers of the recruiting office and Medical Services Board during this preliminary stage, it was decided that, in future, volunteers should be selected, medically examined, and attested by them in St. John’s and then sent direct to Canada.)

On 10 August 1940, the selection committee arrived at St. John’s and remained ten days during which period fifty-two trainees were selected, attested, and proceeded to Canada with the selection committee on its return.

Up to the end of 1942, 276 volunteers had embarked for Canada. Of these, 46 were missing or had been killed, 11 were prisoners of war, and 16 had been discharged, leaving 202 in service or in training at the close of 1942.
In addition to the numbers of Royal Air Force recruits enrolled in Newfoundland, possibly five hundred or six hundred Newfoundlanders had proceeded direct to Canada and had joined the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Rejection Badges

In December 1940, the distribution of rejection badges was commenced. It was decided that these badges be given only to those volunteers who had been sent by the recruiting officer or the magistrate of their district for preliminary or final medical examination and who had been rejected as a consequence of this examination.

Any volunteers who were unsuitable for other reasons, e.g., being below the physical requirements of the service, illiteracy, etc., are given a written certificate of rejection by the recruiting officer or by the magistrate, acting for the director of recruiting.

Royal Merchant Navy

On 8 March 1940, a telegram was received at St. John’s from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, stating that the United Kingdom government would welcome Newfoundland seamen to man British merchant ships. On 13 March, a public notice was issued by the Honourable Commissioner for Public Utilities outlining the terms and conditions of service in the British merchant marine.

The recruiting of volunteers for this service was undertaken by the Marine Superintendent’s department of the Newfoundland Railway, and men with the requisite qualifications to serve as able seamen, firemen, or bosuns were registered.

From the outset, the response was excellent. Hundreds of applications were received from many different parts of the island, but a number of the volunteers had to be rejected owing to lack of experience.

On 19 March 1940, six days after the public notice appeared in the press, the first order was received from the Ministry of Shipping in London to dispatch 24 men to Halifax, NS, to form the crews of SS Waterloo and SS Oxford. The recruits were assembled and went forward on 25 and 28 March, respectively. Subsequently, men were sent to New York, Baltimore, San Francisco, Mobile, Montreal, and Liverpool to join the ships to which they had been assigned.

When recruiting first began, only men with the necessary seamen’s discharge papers were accepted, but as the supply of these experienced men
was quickly exhausted, favourable consideration was given to men who had
served a minimum of twelve months on fishing schooners and who had a fair
knowledge of the mariner’s compass, so that they could quickly adapt
themselves to work on steamships. Reports received by the Marine
Superintendent’s department show that almost all the men who were sent
forward have proved their quality as seamen.

Owing to heavy merchant shipping losses in the Battle of the Atlantic,
the need for seamen decreased temporarily after December 1940. However,
new shipping acquired by the British government from the United States
increased the demand for seamen a few months later, and on 13 May 1941 a
further telegram was received from the United Kingdom inviting
Newfoundland seamen to serve in the British merchant marine. Volunteers
were now required to sign on for the duration, and the terms offered them were
a considerable improvement on those offered in March 1940, e.g., the men’s
wages were to commence from the date of their departure from Newfoundland
and they were to be granted leave at the rate of two days per month. A public
notice outlining the terms of the new agreement was issued on 16 May, and
approximately 100 applications were received.

The following is a record of men enlisted in the Royal Merchant Navy
by the selecting officer of the Marine Superintendent’s department,
Newfoundland Railway, up to the end of 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enlisted and embarked</th>
<th>477</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lost as a result of enemy action</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Accidentally killed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Accidentally drowned</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Died from natural causes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Repatriated (physically unfit)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Prisoners of war (one released)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Returned home after serving from 6 to 15 months</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Transferred to Forestry Unit</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Transferred to Royal Navy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Transferred to Royal Canadian Navy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 2 – 11</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 minus 2 – 11</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It is estimated that an additional 300 Newfoundlanders were enlisted by
the Furness Withy Company, Limited, and other shipping companies in St.
John’s and embarked for service with the merchant marine.
Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit

The Overseas Forestry Unit was constituted under authority of Act. No. 47 of 1939, passed by the Governor-in-Commission on 18 November, 1939.

The unit is under the control of the Commissioner for Natural Resources. The Chief Overseas Forestry Officer and the other officers of the unit are appointed by the Newfoundland government. Each member of the unit is required upon enlistment to sign an engagement contract with the Chief Overseas Forestry Officer.

The unit is financed by the government of the United Kingdom. Members of the unit who wish to allocate certain portions of their earnings to their families are encouraged to do so. Provision for these allocations is made in the contract forms. Payment of these allocations is made monthly by the Department of Natural Resources in Newfoundland from funds made available for the purpose by the United Kingdom government. The balance of the man’s wages is paid in the United Kingdom.

Up to the end of December 1942, the total number of loggers recruited in Newfoundland amounted to 3,364. In addition 33 Newfoundland loggers were enlisted in the United Kingdom, making an aggregate recruitment for the unit of 3,597. Of these, 2,151 enrolled for six months [and] the remainder for the duration of the war. 21 died in the United Kingdom and 30 were discharged there. 1,495 returned to, and were discharged in, Newfoundland. 554 joined His Majesty’s forces after arrival in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the strength of the unit as of December 1942 was 1,497.

Lt. Col John Turner, MC, OBE, is the officer-in-charge of the unit and is assisted by five superintendents. The work of the unit is carried on in the Highlands of Scotland. The headquarters of the unit is situated at Carr Bridge, and there are three other divisional centers with camps spread over wide areas. These divisional centers are at Beauly, Ballater, and Newtonmore.

Hon. J.H. Penson, MC, the Commissioner for Finance in the Newfoundland government, visited ten of these camps in March 1941. He reported the health of the men as excellent and stated that their camps compared favourably with the best of the Newfoundland lumber woods. In his talks with the members of the unit and in his broadcast address to their relatives in Newfoundland, he emphasized the initial importance of their work and appealed to them not to return to Newfoundland until after the war and not to transfer to the armed forces. “The need of the country and the Empire is for loggers who can do a big day’s work, and our men are wanted for that task.”
(Once again the forests of the Scottish Highlands are resounding with the note of axe and saw wielded by the skilled hands of Newfoundlanders whose fathers felled the trees of Scotland in the Great War.)
II
DEFENCE
Introduction

The geographical position of Newfoundland makes the island of vital strategic importance in wartime. Newfoundland commands the sea lanes of the St. Lawrence river, North Atlantic shipping passes within sight of its shores, and an enemy, once in control of Newfoundland, would be able to make submarine and air attacks on the bridge of ships which links the arsenal of democracy in the United States with the sally ports of freedom in the United Kingdom. Moreover, in hostile hands, Newfoundland could be converted into a springboard for the invasion of Canada, and enemy aircraft based in Gander could be within bombing-range of the great cities of eastern Canada and the north-eastern United States.

Furthermore, Newfoundland, even at the outbreak of the war, possessed equipment of considerable potential military value. Sixteen cables land on its shores. Seven wireless stations and four wireless beacons were operated within its territory and that of its vast dependency, Newfoundland Labrador. St. John’s, the capital and the principal city, lies on the island’s eastern seaboard. Its harbour is an important seaport, possesses a modern dry dock and oil storage facilities, and is a most useful refuge for ships in an emergency. Most important of all, one of the world’s largest airports had been built at Gander with subsidiary seaplane bases at Gleneagles on the shore of Gander Lake, and at Botwood, a shipping port in Notre Dame Bay.

Its economic resources, too, are of substantial military importance. For example, the Wabana iron ore mines, on Bell Island in Conception Bay, form a virtually inexhaustible deposit of this essential war material. Considerable quantities of lead-zinc-copper concentrates are mined and milled at Buchans on Red Indian Lake. The development of extensive fluorspar deposits had recently been begun at St. Lawrence on the south coast. Large paper, pulp, and sulphite manufacturing plants are in operation at Grand Falls and Corner Brook. Most of this industrial activity is linked together with a single-track railway whose branches tap the principal bays and the larger centres of population. This railroad connects St. John’s with Port aux Basques on the south-western extremity of the island, and a regular steamship serviced is maintained between this rail terminal and Canada across the vulnerable Cabot Strait. This is indeed a slender link, and the capture of any section of the railway by a hostile landing party would dislocate the island’s entire economy.

At the outbreak of hostilities, Newfoundland possessed neither the means of offence nor of defence. The only armed forces consisted of small units of police and [Newfoundland] Rangers. Consequently, the most urgent problem that confronted the government was the provision of effective measures for protection against attack. The island was, of course, assured of the protection of the Royal Navy, but it was strongly felt that local precautions
must be taken to ensure that vital strategic points and valuable economic resources should not fall into the hands of enemy raiders.

**The Newfoundland Militia**

Early in 1939, the Newfoundland government felt that, in view of the rapidly deteriorating diplomatic situation in Europe, some form of military organization had become necessary. Accordingly, the Newfoundland government approached the War Office through the Dominions Office with the object of obtaining expert advice and assistance in the organization and training of a small force for home defence. The plan originally formulated was to recruit the volunteers on “territorial” lines. The declaration of war caused this plan to be abandoned in favour of the recruitment of a volunteer force for full-time service. Recruiting began immediately (under the chief of police) but no men were actually called up until the middle of September, when Captain C. Fanning-Evans, DLI, and two NCO’s arrived from the United Kingdom to organize and train the unit.

Because of the absence of barracks and other accommodations, it was at first found impossible to call up more than 30 men, all of whom were residents of St. John’s and were therefore able to live at home and report daily for parades. On 31 October 1939, W.F. Rendell, CBE, was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel and Commanding Officer of the Newfoundland Militia. On 21 November, Captain Fanning-Evans was appointed Staff-Officer and Harold A. Walsh and Norman Squires were appointed 2nd Lieutenants. By the end of the year temporary quarters had been secured and 56 men were in training.

On 22 July 1940, the militia acquired permanent headquarters at Shamrock Field in St. John’s. A considerable expansion of the unit was now practicable and the recruiting of 200 additional volunteers was begun. This necessitated the appointment of additional officers and on 31 August four more commissions were gazetted, two of them being conferred on members of the former Royal Newfoundland Regiment and the other two on young recruits who had been trained in the ranks of the militia.

During the next two years the strength of the militia showed a steady increase, until at the end of 1942 it consisted of 25 officers and 500 other ranks.

The arms and equipment of the militia consist of Short Lee Enfield and Ross rifles, Lewis guns, and two coastal defence guns and two searchlights. The uniforms have been manufactured locally and the equipment either purchased or held on loan from the Canadian government.

It was realized from the outset that this small militia force could not effectively defend the island against any large-scale attacks, but that it could be
used successfully to guard important strategic points and economic resources against sabotage and to repulse small hostile raiding parties. Accordingly, as soon as a sufficient number of men were adequately trained, they assumed guard duties which until then had been performed by the civil police. Thus in the fall of 1939, the militia undertook guard duties at Cuckhold’s Cove cable post, the St. John’s water supply at Windsor Lake, the government radio station at Mount Pearl, and the storage tanks of the Imperial Oil Co., Ltd., at St. John’s. On 28 February 1940, the unit mounted guard over the internment camp at Pleasantville.

In April 1940, it was decided that a coastal defence battery be established on Bell Island and that it should form an integral part of the militia. The Canadian government offered to train a number of the militia personnel in coastal defence work and the first party of two officers and nine other ranks proceeded to Halifax in May 1940, to take a three months’ course. By the middle of August the two 4.7 guns and two searchlights supplied and placed in position on Bell Island by the Canadian government were ready, and the first party, which had meanwhile returned from Halifax, proceeded to Bell Island accompanied by a Canadian artillery officer who had been lent for six months as a gunnery instructor. By the end of 1942, the Bell Island coastal defence battery was manned by 100 officers and men, and, in addition, a force of 80 infantry was stationed on the “iron isle.” The militia also maintains guards at the main dam at Deer Lake, at the cable stations in Harbour Grace and Bay Roberts, and at the dry dock in St. John’s.

In 1942, the decision was taken to utilize the militia as a training depot for volunteers for the Royal Artillery regiments stationed in the United Kingdom. Grade I recruits offered themselves in sufficient numbers to replace many militia men, with the result that in the fall of 1942 one hundred trained soldiers who had served in the militia were able to join their fellow Newfoundlanders in the Royal Artillery. These men had been waiting two and three years for the chance to go overseas. At the close of 1942, another 200 eager young men were in training with the militia preparatory to enlistment in the Royal Artillery as soon as opportunity afforded.

In addition to the active service unit of the militia, certain auxiliary units have been formed. They are known as Home Guards, and their function is to supplement the defence of Newfoundland by providing protection for certain localities and key points and by giving timely notice of any enemy involvement to superior military organizations. The Home Guard units have been raised under authority of the Auxiliary Militia Act, 22 June 1940. They are voluntary, unpaid part-time forces, having their origin in the desire of patriotic citizens engaged in ordinary civil occupations to make some active voluntary contribution to defence, especially the protection of their own localities. The officer commanding Newfoundland Militia, is in command of all Home Guard forces.
The first Home Guard company to be formed was at Grand Falls on 5 May 1941. The following officers were appointed with effect from 1 May 1941: Major H. G. Hicks; MC, Captains H. Kenneth Goodyear, Lewis B. Cooper, Lorenzo Moore, and Josiah R. Goodyear; Lieutenants Allan G. Noseworthy, Harry Bird, Reg. George Eldridge, William J. Short, and John P. Molloy. In May 1942, Philip Gruchy was appointed lieutenant. The strength of the Grand Falls Home Guard at the close of 1942 was 160, and they are now an efficient military body. On parade they wear battle dress and are equipped with army rifles. They have been fortunate in obtaining the services of Canadian army instructors and have taken part in field exercises with Canadian army units stationed in the vicinity.

In January 1943, authority was granted for the formation of a Home Guard unit at Corner Brook. Its official title is the Bay of Islands Home Guard, and its strength at the end of 1942 was about 200. In April 1942 Major W.M. Balfour, DSO, was gazetted as commanding officer, and in May the following officers were appointed: Captains B. Butler, DSO, MC and Bar, and W.W.D. Warren; Lieutenants Albert Noseworthy, William Herdman, MM, G.G. Duncan, W.L. Smith, MM, Gerard Penney, and C.H. Ballam.

In September 1942, a Home Guard platoon was organized at Deer Lake and Cecil Bradbury was appointed in command.

(On 28 October 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Rendell, CBE, relinquished command of the Newfoundland Militia, following his appointment as Secretary of Defence. He was succeeded as commanding officer by Major A.T. Howell, MC, Royal Montreal Regiment. On 12 October 1942, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel Rendell was promoted to be Colonel, in the Newfoundland Militia.)

The Newfoundland Militia has acted in close cooperation with the Canadian forces after the arrival of the latter in Newfoundland during the fall of 1940. Under the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of 22 November 1940, the military forces of the Dominion of Canada, while stationed in Newfoundland, were declared to be acting in combination with the Newfoundland Militia and the Canadian officer commanding has since that date been in command of the combined Newfoundland and Canadian forces.

Seizure and Prize

Almost immediately upon the declaration of war, the Newfoundland government set up machinery to deal with all cases of prize arising out of the seizure of enemy ships in the island’s ports or territorial waters. Thus, on 12 September 1939, His Excellency the Governor issued a proclamation
authorizing the Supreme Court of Newfoundland to take cognizance of, and
judicial procedure in, matters of prize. On the same day, a second proclamation
was issued laying down the rules of procedure to be observed. The rules made
by order of His Majesty the King in Council dated 17 September 1914, 28
November 1914, 3 February, 1915, 29 April 1915, and 21 December 1917,
“shall apply to Prize procedure in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and
shall be in operation and effect in this Colony, subject nevertheless to the
provisions of the Prize Courts Act, 1894, Section 3, sub-section (4) in so far as
the same may apply.”

Christoph V. Doornum

On 25 August 1939, the Christoph V. Doornum, a ship of German
registry, arrived at the port of Botwood to load zinc concentrates for
Avonmouth. On the following day, the ship was arrested under warrant issued
out of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty at the instance of a
company registered in Great Britain, claiming £42,000, being principal and
interest due under a mortgage. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities with
Germany, the customs officials at the port of Botwood, assisted by the police,
seized the ship on behalf of His Majesty as prize.

A writ claiming condemnation of the ship was issued out of the
Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty in Prize, and an appearance and
claim were in due course entered on behalf of the British mortgagee. On 30
October 1939, the ship was ordered to be released and delivered to the Crown
on the undertaking of His Majesty’s Procurator General to pay into court the
assessed value at such time as the court might order. The ship was delivered to
the Ministry of Shipping and was registered in the United Kingdom as the
Empire Commerce. Messrs. Bowater’s Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Mills,
Limited, chartered the ship. While employed as a paper transport, she became a
total loss as a result of enemy action.

The prize case came on for hearing before the Supreme Court of
Newfoundland sitting as a prize court on 4 and 5 September 1940. On 14
September 1940, the court delivered judgment disallowing the claim of the
mortgagee and declaring that the ship be condemned as a prize. Against this
decree, the mortgagee petitioned for leave to appeal to His Majesty in His
Privy Council and final leave to appeal was granted on 25 January 1941.

This was the first occasion on which the Supreme Court of
Newfoundland sat as a prize court.

Izarra

On 17 May 1941, the Izarra, a ship of French registry, was seized by
HMS Registan, on the high seas, approximately twelve hundred miles east of
St. John’s, Newfoundland. An armed guard from the Registan was placed on board the Izarra, and the seized ship arrived at St. John’s on 29 May 1941.

At the time of her seizure, the Izarra was flying the French flag, and an examination of her papers showed that she was registered at St. Malo in German-occupied France and that she was the property of Société Anonyme Les Armements Français Coloniaux, of Bayonne, also in German-occupied France. She had on board 430,000 kilos of salt and a quantity of fishing gear. Apparently she had been bound for the Grand Banks to fish.

On 30 May 1941, a writ claiming condemnation of the Izarra was issued out of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty in Prize.

On 22 July 1941, a decree was issued by a judge of this court, condemning the Izarra as good and lawful prize, and ordering that the ship and her cargo be appraised and sold by the marshall after an inventory of the ship and cargo had been taken. This decree was subsequently varied to allow the sale of the ship, equipment, and cargo by tender and not by public auction. She was sold by the marshall accordingly, and the money was paid into court.

Cancalais

On 3 June, 1941, the Cancalais, a ship of French registry, was seized on the Grand Banks by one of His Majesty’s Canadian ships. An armed guard was placed aboard the Cancalais and she was ordered to proceed to St. John’s, where she arrived on 8 June 1941. An examination of her papers disclosed that she was registered at St. Malo in German-occupied France and that she was the property of Louis Girard. She had been engaged in fishing and she had on board approximately two hundred and thirty tons of fish.

On 18 July 1941, she was formally seized as a prize by the Newfoundland Department of Customs, and on 23 July a writ was issued for her condemnation as prize. On 9 October 1941, a decree was issued by a judge of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty in Prize, condemning the Cancalais and her cargo as good and lawful prize, and ordering that the ship and her cargo be appraised and sold by the marshall, with the exception of some small items of equipment (dories and cars) which were ordered delivered to the Crown.

The ship was subsequently sold, and the money was paid into court.

Madiana

On 5 June 1941, the Madiana, a ship of French registry, was seized on the Grand Banks, and an armed guard was placed aboard her. She arrived in St. John’s on 9 June 1941, and on 18 June she was formally seized as prize by the
Newfoundland customs. Her papers revealed that she was registered at St. Malo in German-occupied France, and that she was the property of Leon Chappedelaine, residing at Cancalais, also in German-occupied France. When seized, she had on board approximately 1,500 quintals of fish.

On 22 July 1941, a writ was issued claiming her condemnation as prize. On 9 October 1941, a decree was issued by a judge of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty in Prize, condemning the Madiana and her cargo as good and lawful prize, and ordering that the ship and cargo be appraised and sold by the marshall with the exception of certain small items of equipment (dories and cars) which were ordered delivered to the Crown.

Subsequently, the ship was sold, and the money paid into court.

**Bassilour**

On 13 August 1941, the Bassilour, a French trawler, was seized on the Grand Banks by one of His Majesty’s ships of war. A guard was placed on board the Bassilour, and she was taken to St. John’s for examination.

She arrived in St. John’s on 16 August 1941, on which date [she] was formally seized by the Newfoundland customs. Her papers showed that she was registered at the port of St. Malo in German-occupied France, and that her owner was Jean Le Grasse of Bayonne, also in German-occupied France. At the time of her seizure she had on board a cargo of fish.

On 23 September 1941, a writ was issued claiming her condemnation as prize. On 8 November 1941, a decree was issued by a judge of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland in Admiralty in Prize, ordering that the Bassilour and her cargo be condemned as good and lawful prize, and that the ship and her cargo be appraised and sold by tender by the marshall.

She was subsequently sold, and the money paid into court.

**Oddvar II**

On 8 December 1941, the Oddvar II was seized as prize by the Newfoundland customs near Argentia, Newfoundland. She was owned by A.B. Oddvar, of Kotka, Finland, and, when seized, she was carrying a cargo of coal from Newport News, Virginia, USA, to Botwood, Newfoundland.

The chairman of the Newfoundland Board of Customs signed an affidavit declaring that the Oddvar II was required for the service of His Majesty, and that the Crown accordingly desired that the ship be requisitioned. Accordingly, on 23 December 1941, an order was made that the ship be appraised, and that, upon His Majesty’s Procurator-General filing an
undertaking in writing on behalf of the Crown, for payment into court of the appraised value of the ship, then she would be released and delivered to the Crown. Appraisers were appointed, and the *Oddvar II* was appraised at $142,275, exclusive of cargo.

The required undertaking was given by His Majesty’s Procurator-General, and the marshall of the Supreme Court was instructed to release the *Oddvar II*, and to release her to the Crown for the use of the Crown.

(One member of the crew, a cabin boy, was subsequently, because of his youth (16 years of age), sent to the United Kingdom with a view to his repatriation to Germany.)

### Requisitioning of ships

At the request of the Ministry of Shipping, London, a number of ships has been requisitioned by the Newfoundland government for the Admiralty.

On 19 February 1940, four whaling ships of 190 gross tonnage each were requisitioned. The whaling gear was landed and the vessels were dry-docked, surveyed, and reconditioned. Manned by a Newfoundland master and crew, they were delivered to the Admiralty at a port in the United Kingdom.

On 10 June 1940, a motor-vessel of 113 gross tons was requisitioned. Extensive repairs and alterations were carried out, and the vessel, manned by a Newfoundland master and crew, was delivered at Kingston, Jamaica.

On 16 September 1940, a French motor-vessel of 1,344 gross tonnage and a French-owned trawler of 616 gross tonnage lying at St. John’s were requisitioned. The cargoes were discharged and, after extensive repairs and alterations had been effected, the vessels were ordered to be delivered at a United Kingdom port. The vessels were manned by a Newfoundland master with a crew consisting of Newfoundland, English, and French seamen. They sailed on the 6 January 1941. The motor-vessel arrived safely, but the trawler unfortunately was sunk by enemy action.

On 8 November 1940, a motor-vessel of 149 gross tonnage, lying at Halifax, Nova Scotia, but registered in Newfoundland, was requisitioned and handed over to HMC Dockyard at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

On 12 November 1940, two Norwegian motor-vessels of 214 and 172 gross tonnage, respectively, lying at Burin were requisitioned. The vessels were manned by a Norwegian master and crew and were sent to Bermuda.
Treatment of Enemy Aliens

At the outbreak of hostilities, the policy of the Newfoundland government was to intern only those enemy aliens who could be regarded as dangerous or suspicious.

The first enemy aliens to be interned were twenty-five officers and crew of the Christoph V. Doornum, which was seized as prize at Botwood, Newfoundland, soon after the declaration of war against Germany. To begin with, these men were interned at the YMCA building at St. John’s. This building was, however, far from suitable for the purpose, and the construction of a regulation internment camp was begun at Pleasantville on the north-eastern outskirts of St. John’s. By the end of October 1939, the construction of the camp was completed and the enemy aliens were transferred to it.

Before long, four enemy aliens resident in Newfoundland were also interned. This internment had become necessary for various reasons, e.g., the loss of their means of livelihood, public suspicion, and even public hostility.

After Italy’s entry into the war, nine Italian seamen were interned at different dates, and they brought the total of interned enemy aliens up to thirty-seven.

In January 1941, arrangements were made with the Canadian government to receive all enemy aliens who had been interned in Newfoundland, and they were accordingly, together with their property and effects, transferred to internment in Canada.

St. John’s Harbour Net

Immediately upon the declaration of war, the Newfoundland government decided that, since St. John’s harbour is an exposed anchorage, prompt measures must be taken to protect the entrance through the Narrows by means of a net.

The advice of the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Naval Squadron, was obtained. In accordance with his suggestion, a three-inch jackstay carrying a one-inch wire net, two hundred and forty feet long, eighteen feet deep, and with a mesh ten feet by six feet was manufactured with all possible despatch. The net was placed in position at the beginning of November 1939. The centre of the jackstay of the net is eight feet below the surface of the water, and the net itself can be raised and lowered by means of winches. The time for lowering is from three to five minutes, and, for raising, from five to ten minutes. Owing to the shallowness of the water, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for a submarine to enter the Narrows submerged, and the object of the net is to foul the propellers of a submarine as she surfaces. In conditions of low visibility, the net is lowered to the bottom. Otherwise, when the net is raised, day and night signals are exhibited for the guidance of friendly craft.

The signals are exhibited at a height of eighty feet above high water from a white flagstaff erected at Anchor Point on the south side of St. John’s harbour. The day signal is a white ball six feet in diameter, having a black band 1½ feet wide round the center of the ball. The night signal consists of three electric lights in a vertical line, one above the other, each six feet above the other, the upper and lower of which is red and the middle white. Both day and night signals have a visibility of two miles. A net operation crew is stationed close to the winch on the south side of the harbour and keeps permanent watch so as to lower the net for the entry of incoming vessels. They are in telephonic communication with the naval, customs, and harbour authorities.

On 21 October 1939, these arrangements were approved by the Commander-in-Chief, America and the West Indies.

On 3 November 1939, a notice was exhibited for the information of mariners, acquainting them with the regulations regarding the placing and removing of the net, officially described as the Obstruction, regulations which were to come into effect from 6 December 1939. Unfortunately, the net was fouled by the SS Castlemore on 22 November 1939, and consequently, this system of defence did not begin operation until 1 May 1940. It was inspected and officially approved by the Harbour and Pilotage Commission on 14 June 1940.

**Control of Shipping**

On 8 July 1940, further measures were taken for the control of shipping entering the port of St. John’s. An examination area was established inside a line drawn north-west from Cape Spear, latitude 47º, 31′, 11″ N/ longitude 52º, 36′, 59º W, to Cape St. Francis, latitude 47º, 48′, 30″ N/ longitude 52º, 46′, 5″ W. All shipping entering St. John’s were required to anchor in this area to await examination by the chief preventive officer of the Newfoundland customs before being permitted to enter the port.

The enforcement of these regulations was at first carried out by the Board of Customs. In 1941 and 1942 they were assisted by the Canadian naval authorities in Newfoundland. Control of the port is vested in the Commissioner for Public Utilities.

**Censorship**
On the outbreak of war, a complete censorship was established and has been continuously maintained on all telegraph and cable communications, both terminal and transit in Newfoundland. Requests were acceded to from the censorship authorities in the United Kingdom for the full scrutiny of all telegrams passing between the United States of America and Europe over the Horta cable at Bay Roberts, and for the re-transmission to London of certain messages for and from European destinations which could not otherwise be seen in the United Kingdom.

Censor officers are on duty throughout twenty-four hours every day at all cable company offices in St. John’s. All telegrams passing through the offices of the cable and wireless company (Imperial) at Harbour Grace must pass through the post office telegraph systems at St. John’s, where censorship is imposed on them at the same time that it is exercised on inland telegraph traffic.

The use of wireless by ships in Newfoundland waters is prohibited, and the transmitting apparatus on board ship is sealed as soon as the ship enters any Newfoundland port.

Censorship on practically all postal communications between neutral countries and Newfoundland has been maintained ever since the declaration of hostilities. Postal censorship is carried out at St. John’s and also on the mail cars of the Newfoundland Railway and on the steamship ferry plying the Cabot Strait. Because of the increased postings at St. John’s and at points along the railway line, a censor officer is also stationed at North Sydney in the Newfoundland post office there.

Considerable latitude is allowed to the Newfoundland press on condition that it exercises due care in publication, but all press telegrams are carefully scrutinized. Frequent excisions and even suppressions have been found necessary by the telegraph censors who maintain liaison with the officer engaged on press and radio censorship.

All matter received by telegraph, post, or wireless for broadcasting purposes and all script for vocal radio transmissions is subject to scrutiny.

All censorship regulations are under the direction of the Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs.

Control of Navigational Airs in Wartime

On 8 September 1939, the British vice-consul at St. Pierre requested that the Newfoundland government make the necessary arrangements with the St. Pierre authorities for the proper identification of coast guardsmen in order
to avoid confusion. He also asked that the navigation light on Green Island be extinguished, and that radio telephone communication be installed there and at Fortune Bay to report anything abnormal in sight. The Newfoundland government, (on the advice of Captain Schwerdt), replied that the Naval Commander-in-Chief, American and West Indies, had requested that navigational aids should not be extinguished or removed on ordinary commercial routes or in commercial harbours, except as specially ordered in an emergency, and that therefore it had been decided not to install radio telephony at Green Island at present, as the matter was part of the larger question of local communications which was under consideration with the naval authorities.

On 20 November 1939, the Department of External Affairs at Ottawa informed the Newfoundland government that a new scheme for the control of navigational lights in wartime had recently been put into operation by the Canadian government on the east coast of Canada. Under this system, these lights could be extinguished and fog signals and radio beacons discontinued on all or any sections of the coast at short notice for any length of time required. This system had been extended to all the navigational lights maintained by Canada on the west and south coasts of Newfoundland. The Canadian defence authorities wished the scheme to be completed by the Newfoundland government making similar arrangements for the control of the lights maintained by it, particularly those on the south and east coasts of Newfoundland. They pointed out that the control of the lights on Canada’s eastern seaboard was exercised by the Officer Commanding, Atlantic Coast, and suggested that this control could be extended to Newfoundland through the Naval Service Officer at St. John’s.

On 4 December, the Newfoundland government consulted the Naval Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, on the matter, explaining that it might not always be possible to extinguish the lights at short notice. There were thirty-four navigational lights on headlands, which could be reached quickly by telegraph, but fifteen were located on islands which were at times inaccessible. In reply, the Commander-in-Chief emphasized the desirability, for defence purposes, of establishing co-ordination of control of the navigational lights in Newfoundland and on the east coast of Canada. He concurred in the Canadian proposal that the emergency discontinuance of the main navigational aids of Newfoundland be controlled by the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, “subject to your local control in an emergency affecting Newfoundland.”

On 27 December 1939, the Newfoundland government agreed to the Canadian proposal but stated that “this consent is given on the understanding that the discontinuance of the lights in question will be requested only in the event of an emergency, and that due regard will be paid to the dangers to Newfoundland shipping that may result.” A complete list of 101 main navigational lights and other aids on the coasts of Newfoundland, together with
details of available methods of communication, was furnished to Canada. The Newfoundland government requested from Canada a list of the navigational aids which would be brought within the proposed scheme, so that the necessary preparations might be completed, and expressed the hope that the number of such aids would “be kept to the absolute minimum essential for defence purposes.” The Newfoundland government also suggested that all requests for the extinguishing of lights should be communicated to the Newfoundland Department of Public Words by the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, through the Naval Control Officer at St. John’s

On 16 January 1940, the Canadian government accepted the Newfoundland offer and enclosed a confidential memorandum outlining the organization to be set up for the naval control of navigational lights, fog signals, and radio beacons maintained and operated by the Newfoundland government.

The memorandum recommended that the coasts of Newfoundland be divided into three areas for the purpose of this control, as follows: Area 9—West Coast of Newfoundland; Area 10—South Coast of Newfoundland; Area 11—East Coast of Newfoundland. This division would have two important advantages: (1) it would fit in with the Canadian scheme already in operation; [and] (2) it would permit of lights being extinguished in one area in an emergency without affecting other areas. The memorandum suggested that consideration be given to the controlling of attended lights located on islands or in other inaccessible places, by means of radio communication as was being done in the Canadian scheme. The Newfoundland government was also informed that, while requests could be sent in from Halifax for the extinguishing of lights in Areas 9 and 10 in an emergency, this could hardly be done in Area 11, which should therefore remain the sole responsibility of the Newfoundland authorities.

On 28 March 1940, the Newfoundland government informed Canada that the stations comprising Areas 9 and 10 would be brought within the scope of the measures proposed by the Canadian government. Keepers of these stations would be supplied with radio receiving sets and with official instructions to enable them to listed in to the routine broadcasts of instructions every four hours from Radio Station CB, Sackville, NB. Keys to the code would be furnished for this purpose.

Newfoundland also accepted the suggestion that it should retain responsibility for the control of lights in Area 11. “For the present, we propose to rely on our existing methods of communication with the lights and fog alarms in this area, but the situation will be closely watched, and if there should be developments in the war situation which indicate the need for revising this decision, the matter will be considered further.” The Newfoundland government suggested that, in the event of certain instructions
being broadcast in Areas 9 and 10, prior notification by telegraph be sent to the naval officer in charge at St. John’s, “stating the intention to extinguish the lights with the reasons for doing so, in order to enable the authorities here to take the appropriate steps should the dangers pass out of Areas 9 and 10.” It was pointed out by the Newfoundland government that in certain circumstances, e.g., if a ship were in process of entering port, it might be necessary to delay for a short period the extinguishment of a light or the silencing of a fog alarm.” At the same time, however, the keepers in Areas 9 and 10 would be instructed to exercise this discretion “only if they are completely satisfied that it is absolutely unavoidable to do so.”

On 15 April 1940, the Canadian government expressed its approval of the measures proposed by Newfoundland, and stated that “they will greatly increase the whole efficiency of this control on the Atlantic seaboard.” However, it informed the Newfoundland government that the Canadian Department of National Defence had advised that “as navigational aids will only be discontinued in an emergency, it is not probable that it will normally be possible to give prior notification to the Naval Officer in Charge at St. John’s by telegraph.” The same department had also advised against allowing individual light-keepers any latitude in conforming to instructions broadcast, since “the efficiency of a scheme such as this is directly proportioned to the speed with which aids to navigation can be discontinued after the report of the presence of an enemy in any particular area.” Nevertheless, the Canadian government was “entirely willing to leave this matter to the discretion of the Newfoundland Government.”

On 13 May 1940, the Newfoundland government informed Canada that the keepers of all stations in Areas 9 and 10 would be supplied with receiving sets and appropriate instructions for their use by 15 June 1940, and that Newfoundland’s participation in the Canadian system of control would begin as from that date. The Newfoundland government agreed to adopt the advice of the Canadian Department of National Defence, but requested that “the Department of Public Utilities may be notified, through the Naval Officer in Charge at St. John’s, as soon as possible after the issue of instructions for the discontinuance of operation of the aids to navigation, and may be informed of the reasons therefore, in order that the competent authorities here may take appropriate steps should it be necessary that the dangers will pass into other areas on the Newfoundland coastline.”

On 31 May 1940, the Canadian government replied that the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, had been instructed to comply with this request of the Newfoundland government. The Canadian government expressed its satisfaction that the operation of the system of control would begin in Newfoundland on 15 June, but stated that Areas 9 and 10 would be immediately included in emergency broadcasts “so that these stations which
have obtained their receiving sets and instructions may be brought into
operation at the earliest opportunity."

The system introduced on 15 June 1940, remained in effect until the
summer of 1942 when further measures of control were put into operation on
the east and north-east coasts.

On 12 January 1942, the Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, wrote to
the Commissioner for Public Utilities, suggesting that the decision of 28 March
1940 to rely on existing methods of communication with the navigational aids
on these coasts should be revised because of developments in the war situation.
He pointed out that, in the interval, St. John’s had become a defended port, that
an area between Bell Island and the mainland was now covered by guns, that
steps were now being taken to install local defences in Botwood, and that the
organization to “black out” St. John’s had been practically completed but
would be partially ineffective unless the navigational lights in the approach to
St. John’s could also be extinguished. Consequently, the ability to extinguish
navigational lights in the area of the coast north and east, between Cape Race
in the south and Cape Bauld in the north, had become a necessity. He advised
that early consideration be given to arrangements for the control of the
following lights: Area 11—east coast—from Ferryland Head to Cape
Bonavista. Area 12—north-east coast—from Little Denier Island to Gull
Island, Cape John. All stations should be supplied with radio receiving sets, the
personnel should receive instructions based on those issued to Areas 9 and 10
on 16 January 1940, and immediate control should be effected wherever
possible.

On 23 March 1942, the matter was discussed at a meeting of the
Commission of Government, and the Commissioner for Justice and Defence
reported that the following recommendations had been made by the Committee
for the Co-ordination of the Defence of Newfoundland:

(1) St. John’s. The leading lights and Chain light should be normally
extinguished and lit only when required and upon instructions.

(2) The Naval Services, will, if possible, substitute electric lights for the
present gas lights on the baffle so that they can be extinguished when
necessary; otherwise they will have to remain on.

(3) The lights at Fort Amherst, Cape Spear, and Cape St. Francis should also
be normally extinguished and lit only when required and upon instructions.

(4) Bull Head. This light should be reduced to about one-third of its present
lighting capacity.
(5) Bay Bulls. The leading lights should be extinguished and lit only when required and upon instruction.

(6) Lights on ships in St. John’s harbour should be reduced to a minimum. The Assistant Harbour Master should be consulted as to the best method of effecting this object.

(7) As the opening and closing of the harbour of St. John’s at night depends upon instructions of the Naval Services, it would seem appropriate that instructions to put on any of the above mentioned lights should be given by the Examination Service.

(8) The Naval Service will be responsible for giving instructions concerning the re-lighting, when necessary, of beacons outside St. John’s, e.g., Cape St. Francis, Cape Spear, and Bay Bulls.

These recommendations were approved by the government and a notice to mariners was accordingly published on 6 April 1942. Two days later it was communicated to all postal telegraph offices in Newfoundland with instructions to post it in a conspicuous place in their offices for the benefit of mariners. On 21 August 1942, instructions were issued to all light keepers in Areas 11 and 12 to listen in to Radio Station VONF for routine announcements 9 times every twenty-four hours. The following code is employed in these announcements:

Instruction “N.A.”—Navigational lights are to be exhibited, and fog signals and radio beacons operated normally;

Instruction “N.B.” (1)—Extinguish navigational lights, but continue to operate fog signals and radio beacons until further orders;

Instruction “N.B.” (2)—Extinguish navigational lights and radio beacons but continue to operate fog signals;

Instruction “N.B.” (3)—Extinguish navigational lights, and cease operating fog signals, but continue to operate radio beacons;

Instruction “N.B.’ (4)—Extinguish navigational Lights, and cease operating fog signals and radio beacons until further orders;

Instruction “N.C.”—Cancel Instructions “N.B.” Lights to be exhibited and fog signals and radio beacons operated normally.
Civil Defence

Following the German invasion of Norway which gave Hitler control of ports on the Atlantic coast, the Newfoundland government decided that an organization must be created for civil defence in the St. John’s area. On 29 April 1940, C.H. Hutchings, CMG, CBE, JP, formerly Inspector General of Police, was appointed as Director of Air Raid Precautions. On 25 May, two days after advance units of the German army had reached Boulogne, an order was issued for the partial blackout of St. John’s. On 16 July 1940, three weeks after the surrender of France, regulations were issued prohibiting lights in three points of great strategic importance: the Newfoundland Airport, Mount Pearl Radio Station, and Signal Hill, commanding the entrance St. John’s harbour. On 1 August, St. John’s was constituted a Defence Alarm Area under the Defence (Alarm) Regulations, published on 26 July. The enforcement of these regulations was entrusted to the Director of Air Raid Precautions and the air raid wardens appointed by him. On 18 March 1941, a Defence Alarm Area was established in the Exploits Valley, comprising Grand Falls, Windsor, Bishop’s Falls, and Botwood. The district magistrate of Grand Falls and Windsor was authorized to give defence alarms and all clear signals in the Exploits Valley area and to appoint civil defence officers for the enforcement of the Defence (Alarm) Regulations. On 24 March 1942, Corner Brook was also declared to be a Defence (Alarm) Area.

St. John’s Area

On 5 January 1942, Mr. C.H. Hutchings retired as Director of Air Raid Precautions, and Lieutenant-Colonel L.C. Outerbridge, CBE, DSO. was appointed as Director of Civil Defence. In view of the greatly increased importance of St. John’s as a defended port and as a convoy assembly base, it was decided to reorganize the entire system of civil defence in the St. John’s area and impose a total blackout. The salient features of the civil defence system in the St. John’s area at the close of 1942 are as follows.

Area

The area covered by the civil defence scheme of St. John’s and neighbourhood includes: (1) [t]he City of St. John’s; (2) [t]he north-east triangular portion of the Peninsula of Avalon, the base of which includes Holyrood at its south-west extremity and Bay Bulls at its south-east extremity, in each case a distance of about 25 miles from the city; (3) Bell Island (including Little Bell Island and Kelly’s Island).

Organization
(1) Director of Civil Defence, Lt. Colonel Outerbridge, CBE, DSO; Assistant Director of Civil Defence, Captain C.C. Duley, M.B.E; (2) headquarters in Bishop Field College, St. John’s, is continually manned. If rendered untenable, headquarters moves to the premises of the Imperial Tobacco Company, St. John’s; (3) the City of St. John’s is divided into: (a) 4 divisions; (b) 12 Zones; [and] (c) 36 sections—with an aggregate personnel of 1600 volunteers comprising officials, wardens, fire squads and messengers; (4) the remainder of the civil defence area of the peninsula is divided into sections, manned by volunteer wardens; (5) Bell Island forms a separate division under a chief civil defence officer, who is, however, subject to the control of the Director of Civil Defence.

Alarm

Air Raid Message Yellow is received by headquarters civil defence and passed on to: (1) headquarters staff; (2) chief of police and fire department; (3) certain docks and engineering plants where lights are permitted under control during darkness; (4) divisional and zone commanders; (5) liaison officers of first-aid posts; (6) Secretary for Defence and secretary to His Excellency the Governor; (7) cinemas when open.

On receipt of the Air Raid Message Purple, the civil defence alarm is sounded on 11 sirens by the pressing of a button in the headquarters of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

The alarm signal is three blasts, each of 2½ minutes duration, with intervals of ½ minute.

A practice alarm is sounded at 10 am every Thursday.

The “All Clear” is similarly sounded on the sirens but with only one blast of 2½ minutes.

Precautions

(1) Blackout is strictly enforced throughout the civil defence area; blackout applies to: (a) houses—to have no visible lights; (b) motor vehicles—have reduced lighting with a new system of headlight marks; (c) flashlights—to be not more than one candle power. The director may permit lights for essential services. The director may also permit lights for ships working cargo, and for wharves and waterfront sheds. All these lights have to be extinguished on receipt of Air Raid Message Yellow; and on the alarm being sounded, flashlights and smoking in the open are also forbidden.

(2) Fire fighting—the city, being mostly of wood is particularly liable to fire damage. The protection service consists of: (a) the city fire department of 41
men, divided among three fire halls; (b) reinforced by 25 trained volunteers at each fire hall; (c) 2,300 stirrup pumps have been distributed throughout the city (a further 2,000 have been ordered and are expected shortly); (d) 32 fire pumps have been ordered, of which 16 have arrived, which are to be placed at zone headquarters, etc., and the balance of 16 along the waterfront so as to safeguard the large supplies of goods in the sheds and on the wharves; (e) there are two fully-equipped fire tugs stationed in the harbour, specially for the protection of ships; (f) hose reels with 250 feet of hose have also been requisitioned for placing at 17 tactical points in the city; (g) sand and sand bags have been distributed throughout the city; (h) there are throughout the city, approximately 200 large buildings, such as churches, schools, theatres, factories, and stores which are arranging for their own fire-watching and bomb-quenching. For these purposes they will be assisted in the purchase of stirrup pumps by the remission of customs duty.

It is hoped by these means to extinguish most fires at the start, i.e., in the bomb stage, and that the remainder will be controlled by the ARP pumps and fire squads, with the assistance, as required, of the fire department, the chief of which has absolute command of any ARP fire unit in action.

**Communications**

All communication will be made by telephone as long as possible. If and when telephonic communication breaks down, it will be maintained by the messengers (on motor or pedal cycles) who are attached to each ARP and first aid post.

It is expected that radio sets will soon be available to maintain contact between civil defence headquarters and various important points.

**Auxiliary Water Supply**

Owing to the danger to the city water supply from Windsor Lake being cut off by damage to the pipeline through hostile action or sabotage, and the fire-fighting equipment being thereby rendered useless, twenty-one tanks, each of about 8,000 gallons capacity, have been erected at various points on the higher levels of the city, while at lower levels, the water can be obtained from the harbour.

**Casualties and Hospitalization**

(1) Fourteen first aid posts and one mobile unit have been established in the city, each with a doctor, nurses, and stretcher bearers, and with covered trucks for use as ambulances.
(2) It is estimated that about 50 beds will be available at the hospitals. Further accommodation is being arranged at the Memorial University College, and from the Sanitorium 100 beds will be cleared by removing the patients to the Yacht Club at Long Pond. It is expected that altogether 240 cases can be hospitalized.

Evacuation

Should one or more sections of the city be destroyed many people will be rendered homeless. Most of them will get temporary shelter with friends and relatives in the districts that have escaped. The remainder, estimated at possibly 5,000, will be directed by ARP wardens to places outside the city, where supplies of food and blankets have been stored, and where shelter will be available.

A further evacuation of these people to the outports on Conception Bay has been arranged. The government has stored reserves of food outside the danger area.

Arrangements have been made for the temporary supply of food by hostels for men working in the city whose homes have been burnt out and whose families have been evacuated.

Harbour and Shipping

The local lighthouses and the leading lights of St. John’s harbour are extinguished except when required by shipping.

To reduce the amount of light shown in the harbor, special anchor lights have been manufactured, and are lent to shipmasters for use while at St. John’s.

Rescue, Repair and Demolition

The St. John’s Municipal Council, the Electric Light and Power Company, and the railway dock will supply squads for repair and rescue.

The United States of America Base Command will hold parties of volunteers in readiness to assist, and will also provide machinery necessary for demolition.

Air Raid Shelters

This matter has not yet been taken in hand, as the necessity does not appear to be urgent.
Gas and Recontamination

A committee has reported on this question, but this also does not appear to be urgent.

Anti-Sabotage

After consultation with the commander, St. John’s defences, various public utilities were requested to safeguard themselves from sabotage, but four cases had to be passed on to other authorities for their consideration. On the alarm being sounded, parties of the American base volunteers will guard American stores and supplies in the city.

Air Craft Detection Corps

During the summer of 1940, an observation corps was organized for the purpose of detecting the approach of enemy aircraft to Newfoundland. This organization is an integral part of the defence system of Newfoundland and Canada.

Enrolment in the corps is not, however, an enlistment, and is based on voluntary unremunerated service. At first, the corps utilized the services only of persons holding official positions, e.g., Rangers, but it is the intention to expand the organization to include persons outside the government service, who desire to perform a national service by assisting in the work of reporting the presence of hostile aircraft.

The Air Craft Detection Corps have been furnished with special maps of Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador. These were prepared by the Crown Lands and Surveys Branch of the Department of Natural Resources. Superimposed on the maps is an air grid composed of rectangles, each being assigned a literal and numerical symbol to facilitate the disposition of observers. In addition, a catalogue of place names in the island has been compiled, and silhouettes of Canadian and other friendly aircraft have been prepared for the purpose of assisting observers in their task of aircraft recognition.

The duties of an official observer consist only of reporting to the central authority in St. John’s, the time, approximate height, and the direction of flight of any planes seen or heard over his neighbourhood which are not identifiable as friendly aircraft. This information is then transmitted to the Eastern Air Command at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

In 1941, the scope of the corps was enlarged to embrace marine detection also, and its official name was changed accordingly to the
Newfoundland Marine and Air Craft Detection Corps. The corps is now under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland, to whose jurisdiction it was transferred in 1941.
III
BASES
The Newfoundland Airport, Gander

One of the most valuable contributions made by Newfoundland to the war effort of the United Nations consisted of the facilities which her government granted to Canada and the United States for the use of strategic areas of her territory for military, naval, and air services.

One of the most important of these facilities was the use of the Newfoundland Airport at Gander and of the flying boat base at Botwood, both of which were fully equipped and in first-class operating order when they were made available to the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1940.

As the result of discussions held at Washington in December 1935, between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State, it was decided to establish a regular transatlantic air service via the Newfoundland route. The necessary airport, radio, and meteorological services in Newfoundland were to be provided by Imperial Airways Limited and a joint operating company to be incorporated at the instance of three companies to be nominated, respectively, by the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State. Landing facilities in Newfoundland were to be granted to the United States company, Pan-American Airways, for a term of 15 years in exchange for reciprocal facilities to be granted by the latter in the United States to Imperial Airways Limited, for the same period.

As an integral part of this plan for a regular transatlantic air service, it was necessary to establish two bases in Newfoundland, one for ground aircraft, and the other for flying boats.

By virtue of a subsequent agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland, it was arranged that Great Britain should contribute $\frac{5}{6}$ of the total cost of the construction of the Newfoundland bases and their facilities, while Newfoundland should contribute $\frac{1}{6}$ of the total cost. On completion, the bases were to become the property of the Newfoundland government. Thereafter, Great Britain and Newfoundland would contribute each one half of the annual operating and maintenance costs. Great Britain was to pay the entire cost of the installation of the wireless organizations and to bear the full operating costs of the weaker organizations.

Accordingly, construction work began at Gander and Botwood in May 1936, and on 5 July 1937 the first flight was accomplished from Botwood by the Pan-American Clipper, simultaneously with the westward crossing of Imperial Airway’s Caledonia from Foynes. By 1939, transatlantic flights were proceeding by flying-boat to and from Botwood as a more or less regular schedule. Meanwhile, construction work was completed at Gander by 1939, and in May of that year the first wheeled aircraft landed there. In November of
the previous year, radio operation, which had hitherto been conducted at Botwood, had been transferred to Gander.

The Newfoundland government was fully alive to the strategic importance of the Gander and Botwood airports. As early as March 1939, Squadron Leader [Harold A.L.] Pattison, the Air Ministry’s representative at Gander, had prepared a detailed plan for the local defence of the area in the event of hostile action. The plan was submitted by the Newfoundland government to the Dominions Office on 3 April 1939. Moreover, in September 1939, immediately after the outbreak of war, proposals were drafted for the use of aircraft as part of the defence scheme of Newfoundland, and both Gander and Botwood were cast to play important roles in this scheme of defence.

At the same time, however, the Newfoundland government realized that its limited resources would prevent it from exploiting the military potentialities of these bases to the full. Accordingly, on 15 September 1939, it suggested to the United Kingdom government that, in view of Canada’s publicly proclaimed interest in the defence of Newfoundland, the Canadian government should be invited to take over for the duration of the war the Newfoundland Airport and the Botwood seaplane base for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force. The Newfoundland proposals were that Canada should assume entire responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the bases and for all expenditure on meteorological and wireless services and for any other expenditure attributable to military as distinct from civil requirements. The Newfoundland government also offered to place at the disposal of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Fairchild and Fox Moth aeroplanes which were the property of the Newfoundland government. Further, the Newfoundland government proposed that the existing arrangement with the Imperial Airways should be immediately terminated, as it was not only expensive but also incompatible with the use of these planes for military purposes. Finally, the Newfoundland government pointed out that the total cost of maintaining and operating the bases ($150,000 per annum, exclusive of the expense of the wireless and meteorological staff) was unjustifiable in the existing circumstances, unless the airports could be put to military use.

To this offer, the United Kingdom government replied on 6 November 1939, that “whilst there can be no reason why the Royal Canadian Air Force should not have the fullest use of the facilities available in Newfoundland on suitable terms for the duration of the war, if any request to the effect should be put forward by the Canadian Government there are strong reasons against handing over the airports to the Royal Canadian Air Force.” In the first place, Newfoundland was destined to play an important part in transatlantic air services. Consequently, these airports formed an important factor in the United Kingdom’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Pan-American Airways and the United States, and it would therefore be undesirable to permit them to pass out of limited United Kingdom control, even temporarily. Secondly, although,
because of the war, Imperial Airways would be unable to establish a regular transatlantic service with land aircraft, the airport would probably be required in connection with the flights contemplated by Pan-American Airways in 1940 and 1941. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Air Ministry wished to conduct experiments during the forthcoming winter with regard to the packing or removal of snow from the runways and proposed to use its two Harrow planes at Gander in test flights connected with this experimental work. Finally, Imperial Airways intended to resume a weekly transatlantic flying-boat service from Botwood in the summer of 1940, and there was every indication that Pan-American Airways would renew a regular flying-boat service from the United States to Newfoundland. Therefore, it appeared probable that the airbase facilities in Newfoundland would be in considerable demand for civil aviation in the near future. As to the financial consideration, the United Kingdom government, while appreciating the saving in maintenance costs that would result from the adoption of the Newfoundland proposals, considered nevertheless that “the disadvantages of the relinquishment of control far outweighs the advantage of this saving.” For all these reasons, the British government considered that Newfoundland should not take the initiative by raising the matter with the Canadian government. If, however, Canada should make any request for the use of the airports, the British government would be willing to consider the question of how far the Newfoundland airbase facilities could be used directly or indirectly in connection with the Empire Training Scheme. Nothing, however, materialized in this regard.

The decided opposition of Great Britain to any transfer of control led to the abandonment of the Newfoundland proposals, but only for a time. On 19 April 1940, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada, informed the Newfoundland government that “should the necessity arise and the situation in Canada permit, the Canadian Government are prepared to undertake the despatch of an Air Force Detachment to Botwood for temporary duty.” He also pointed out that Newfoundland would be asked to provide quarters and messing for 12 officers and 50 men, an explosives building for the storage of bombs and ammunition, and the free use of the airport facilities. This offer placed the Newfoundland government in a dilemma, because, on the one hand, it could not undertake the expense indicated simply as a matter of speculation, but, on the other hand, if the Newfoundland government postponed the provision of accommodation until the necessity arose, then, obviously, it would not be ready in time for the Canadians when they wanted to arrive. Clearly, the most satisfactory solution, from every point of view, would be for the United Kingdom government to consent to the transfer of control to Canada. Accordingly, on 29 April 1940, by which time the course of the Norwegian campaign was giving rise to serious anxiety, the Commissioner for Finance urged the Commissioner for Public Utilities to renew the original proposals to the British government. The Commissioner for Finance stated that, on 18 April 1940, the Canadian Minister of Transport had informed him in a private conversation that “he would like Canada to take over the use and responsibility
of the Airport for the duration of the war.” The Commissioner also presented various financial arguments in favour of transfer, and pointed out that Great Britain might by then be experiencing greater difficulty in finding dollar exchange than in the previous autumn.

Accordingly, on 30 April, the Newfoundland government asked the United Kingdom to consider the proposals for a temporary transfer. A despatch was telegraphed to the Dominions Office which recapitulated the arguments advanced by the Commissioner for Finance, and added that “if [the] Canadians had full use of and responsibility for our Airports during [the] war they would take much more interest in maintaining [the] aerial reconnaissance of [the] whole coast of Newfoundland which we regard as of great importance from [the] defence point of view.” The Canadian government intended to send officers to St. John’s shortly to discuss possible Royal Canadian Air Force operations in Newfoundland.

On 10 May 1940, the very day on which Germany launched her attack on the Low Countries, the British government returned the vague reply that “if the Newfoundland Government desires to discuss with the Canadian representatives the suggestion that the proposed base at Red Bay should be located further south at Botwood or Harbour Grace, the Air Ministry would prefer such an arrangement provided that the expenditure to be incurred by the Government is not thereby increased.” The Newfoundland government evidently considered this reply unsatisfactory, for, on 14 May, they informed the Dominions Office that “the decision regarding the Newfoundland Airport will materially affect the nature and scope of the discussions with the Canadian Representatives” and that “these discussions will be deferred until the suggestion of 30th April has been considered.”

Meanwhile, the victorious German offensive in the Low Countries and Northern France convinced Newfoundlanders that the time had come for the strategic advantages of their great airport to be used on behalf of the Allied cause. This feeling was strengthened by the fact that, on 10 May, British forces had landed in Iceland to defend it against possible German invasion, and by the fact that, on 23 May, the prime minister had announced in the House of Commons that German advanced units had reached Boulogne. As no reply had been received from London, the Newfoundland government, on 26 May, made strong representations to the British government that there should be no further delay in gearing Newfoundland’s greatest potential military asset to the Allied war machine. “The defenceless condition of this country,” ran the despatch, “causes public alarm in view of the occurrences of recent days. The Prime Minister of Canada is reported to have stated in Parliament on 20th May, that Canadian troops are assisting in the guardianship of Newfoundland, but we have received no information along these lines or any other. The Newfoundland Airport if it is to be used by the Canadians as part of the defence of Newfoundland, will probably require to plan substantial erections
and installations to be completed at the earliest moment after negotiations have been finalized.” The despatch concluded: “We venture to suggest that at this stage, postwar problems should not be a decisive factor.” A week later, the Newfoundland government informed the Dominions Office that Air Vice-Marshall Croil of the Royal Canadian Air Force, who was then touring the Maritime Provinces of Canada, had expressed a wish to visit Newfoundland. In view of his impending arrival, they urged the need for an early reply from London.

The United Kingdom government replied, on 5 June, that “from the point of view of the defence of Newfoundland, it would be desirable that Canadian Air Units should be able to operate from bases in Newfoundland” and agreed in principle to an arrangement being reached with Canada concerning the airport, and to the discussion of such an arrangement at the proposed meeting between Newfoundland and Canadian representatives. At the same time, however, the British government while laying down no precise or absolute conditions at that stage, expressed the hope that Newfoundland would be able to secure an agreement under which Canada would pay for the cost of maintenance and of the wireless facilities. Nevertheless, they recognized the need for prompt action, and urged that no delay be caused by the discussion of financial details. They pointed out, however, that the United Kingdom Air Ministry stipulated that no alterations should be made to the existing layout, and that any damage must be repaired, and that the airport should be handed back at a definite date. The British government also asked that no final action be taken by Newfoundland until they had had an opportunity to comment on any proposed arrangement.

On the following day, the Newfoundland government reported to London on the discussions they had held at St. John’s with Air Vice Marshall Croil and Air Commodore Anderson, both of the Royal Canadian Air Force, who had visited the capital after their inspection at Gander. The two officers had not been empowered to negotiate or to commit their government in any way, and the object of their mission was “solely to ascertain the facts of the situation at the Newfoundland airbases and report back to Canada.” Air Vice Marshall Croil had given it as his personal opinion that the Newfoundland Airport might become “a positive menace” since it might possibly be captured by an enemy landing party or by planes operating from a raider. He also believed that it would be unsafe to use the Newfoundland Airport for defence operations by aircraft until adequate arrangements had been made for its land defences. In his view, the general situation called for the operation of military planes from existing bases in Newfoundland, and, in addition, from one or more new seaplane bases, e.g., in the vicinity of the Strait of Belle Isle and in the neighbourhood of St. John’s. Nevertheless, the Newfoundland government judged from Croil’s attitude that, in all probability, Canada would be reluctant to assume extensive obligations simply because she doubted her own ability to discharge them. For instance, even when the Newfoundland representatives
gave Croil an opening to suggest that Canada might take over the Newfoundland airbases for the duration, he did not avail of it.

On the basis of Croil’s report, the Canadian government informed Newfoundland in June that it was now of the opinion that additional defence forces should be stationed in the island for the protection of the airport and Botwood seaplane base. These additional forces should consist of one flight of bomber reconnaissance aircraft to be stationed at the airport, to be augmented by one flight of fighter aircraft when available, and, for ground protection, one infantry battalion with personnel or other arms attached as required. Accordingly, Canada asked Newfoundland’s acceptance of a share of the responsibility involved in these measures and her permission for a reconnaissance party to visit the island by air as soon as possible. The Newfoundland government replied that they must seek the views of the Dominions Office on their assumption of a share of responsibility, and that, “in the existing circumstances, the financial share which we can assume, must necessarily be small.” Permission was, however, given for the visit of the reconnaissance party, and, on 17 June, five Digby aircraft from Dartmouth, a detachment from No. 10 (BR) Squadron, RCAF landed at Gander. Permission was also granted the Canadian government to embark immediately a battalion for the defence of the airport, and on 22 June the SS *Antonia* docked at Botwood and disembarked 900 men of the 1st Battalion, Black Watch of Canada, under the command of Lt.-Colonel K. Blackadder. As there were no permanent buildings to accommodate them at Gander, the men lived in tents, but the officers were quartered in the administration building along with the officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Since then, a battalion of Canadian troops has been continuously stationed at Gander for ground defence. It may be convenient at this point, to list the Canadian units that have performed defence duties at the airport. They are as follows, with the dates of their arrival, down to the end of 1942: 22 June 1940-10 August 1940—Black Watch of Canada, 1st Battalion, Lt.-Colonel Blackadder, OC; 10 August-6 December 1940—Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, 1st Battalion, Lt.-Col. McKendrick, OC (on 1st October, this unit moved into hutsmens the construction of which had been completed); 6 December 1940-28 April 1941—Royal Rifles of Canada, 1st Battalion, Lt. Col. W.J. Howe, OC; 28 April 1941-4 August 1941—Victoria Rifles of Canada, 1st Battalion, Lt.-Col. Eakin, OC; 4 August 1941-17 March 1942—Lincoln and Welland Regiment, 1st Battalion, Lt.-Col. Muir, OC; March 1942. Prince Edward Highlanders, Lt.-Col. Thompson, OC.

On 20 June 1940, the British government informed the governments of Canada, Eire, and Newfoundland that, in view of the war situation, it was considered undesirable at present to proceed with the formation of the joint operating company contemplated in the Ottawa Conference of November – December 1935.
On 23 June 1940, the Dominions Office informed the Newfoundland government that “the defence of Newfoundland depends primarily upon protection afforded by the Royal Navy rather than upon local defence measures.” As the risk of an attack by a naval raider or submarine appeared to the British government to be remote, “the provision of guns for St. John’s or the placing of mines could not be justified,” and it was impracticable for Great Britain to allot special naval or air forces for patrol purposes. Canadian experts evidently took a different view of the risk of attack, for, on 6 August 1940, Newfoundland was informed that the revised plan for the defence of Canada involved the provision of facilities at the Newfoundland Airport for one fighter squadron and two bomber reconnaissance squadrons, which would necessitate the erection of new buildings and the installation of additional services at a total cost of $1,370,000. Canada asked assurances from the Newfoundland government that it would grant land and rights of way free of cost and consent to the required erections and installations. The Newfoundland government immediately agreed to these requests.

As yet there had been no suggestion from Canada that the control of the airport should be transferred to her. On 7 September, however, the Canadian Minister of Defence (Air) suggested in a telephone conversation with the Newfoundland Commissioner for Defence that Canada should assume control. This proposal was followed up on 13 September by a communication from the Canadian Department of External Affairs suggesting several points for discussion between the governments of Newfoundland and Canada. The Canadian proposals were as follows: (1) [t]he Royal Canadian Air Force should take over control of the Newfoundland Airport, including all buildings and equipment; (2) [t]he Royal Canadian Air Force should absorb the present staff of the airport, either in a civilian or in a service capacity; (3) [t]he respective financial responsibilities of the airport for the duration of the war should be determined; [and] (4) [t]he control of the airport by the Royal Canadian Air Force should in no way interfere with the use of the local air facilities by British and Allied aircraft.

Although unaware of the reasons for the Dominion’s sudden change of policy, the Newfoundland government informed Ottawa on 30 September that it was prepared to enter into the discussion of details provided agreement could first be reached on seven points which it considered fundamental: (1) [n]o part of any of the airbases was to be handed over to the control of a third party without the prior consent of the Newfoundland Government; (2) [n]o alteration was to be made to the existing layout of the bases without similar consent; (3) [a]ny damage done to any of the bases was to be repaired by Canada; (4) [t]he control of the bases was to be restored on the transition of hostilities; (5) [t]he control over the area of the Newfoundland Airport vested in the Commissioner for Public Utilities by Act. No. 19 of 1938, in regard to such municipal matters as permits for the erection of new buildings and the prevention of squatting,
was to continue unimpaired; (6) Newfoundland personnel was to be employed as far as practicable; [and] (7) [p]reference was to be given to materials manufactured or produced in Newfoundland and sold at competitive prices.

The Newfoundland government stated that it assumed that the Canadian government would take over the responsibility for the whole cost of maintenance and operation of the three bases, i.e., the Newfoundland Airport, Botwood, and the Gleneagles seaplane anchorage, including the cost of wireless facilities as from the date of the transfer of control. The Newfoundland government considered it inexpedient and impracticable to effect the changeover before the onset of winter when flying operations would be curtailed, since, at present, the entire airport staff were working under more pressure and could not possibly direct their attention to the problems arising out of the transfer. It was therefore suggested that the discussions might begin in December, at St. John’s.

On 17 October, the Dominions Office informed the Newfoundland government of the United Kingdom Air Ministry’s views on the transfer. They were as follows: “(a) Facilities at the Airport and Seaplane Bases for British civil aircraft operating across [the] North Atlantic or undertaking local flights to continue to be made available as required. (b) There will be no interference with [the] plan for delivery by air of military aircraft across the Atlantic. This involves accommodation for aircraft and personnel at [the] Newfoundland Airport, proposals for which will be submitted to [the] Newfoundland and Canadian Governments as soon as possible. It involves also work by W.T [wireless telegraph] Station in connection with delivery flights. (c) Only such foreign undertakings as are at present authorized should be permitted to use [the] Airport and seaplane bases and only to [the] extent permitted by [the] existing authorizations. (d) [The] Royal Canadian Air Force should have regard to the fact that the Air Port has been constructed at [a] capital cost of over 900,000 pounds sterling, primarily for North Atlantic commercial air transport. Consequently no construction should be undertaken which would prejudice [the] suitability of [the] Airport for this purpose. (e) In view of its major financial interest in the Airport, H.M. Government in the United Kingdom will wish to be consulted as to [the] basis on which [the] division of [the] financial responsibility will be determined. Financial discussions should take account of [the] capital expenditure already incurred by H.M. Government in the United Kingdom on port installation. (f) Arrangement shall be limited to [the] period of hostilities.” There was no objection to the Canadian proposal to absorb the existing staff of the airport, “either in [a] civilian or in [a] service capacity, subject to [the] consent of [the] individuals concerned and [the] consideration of [the] position under existing contracts.”

Replying on 6 December, the Newfoundland government, which had meanwhile held discussions at St. John’s with the Canadian Minister of National Revenue, stated that the Air Ministry’s stipulations would probably
be acceptable to Canada, except no. 6. The Canadian government feared internal criticism if it were to admit having spent $1,300,000 of Canadian funds on hutments for personnel and hangers for aircraft without acquiring security of tenure of the sites of these erections after the war. Therefore, the Newfoundland government expressed the opinion that “in view of the expenditure from Canadian funds and the extreme probability that these airports will have to be defended even after hostilities cease, we think we must give the Canadian Government an assurance that we will leave them undisturbed in their occupation of these sites for a substantial period.” The British government replied on 1 January 1941, agreeing that Canada be given the assurance of a lease after the termination of hostilities for a period related to the life of the buildings but warning that “care should be taken to avoid any general commitment by the Newfoundland Government concerning the post-war period” in view not only of the “general situation as left by the War but also possible constitutional developments in Newfoundland thereafter.”

Meanwhile, in reply to a Canadian request for clarification of point 2 in the Newfoundland statement of 30 September, the Newfoundland government made it clear on 27 December 1940 that the existing layout of the bases had been designed for transatlantic services and that Newfoundland must retain the right to veto any proposal which would be prejudicial to these services. At the same time, of course, the Newfoundland government declared that its attitude would “continue to be co-operative with regard to the defence of the Airport in which Newfoundland and Canada are both interested.” On 20 January 1941, Canada accepted this condition. She also agreed to abandon her request for a fee simple grant of the lands on which the Royal Canadian Air Force buildings were being erected, and to accept instead a lease “provided the term of such lease corresponds to the life of the buildings built thereon, and subject to the concurrence of the United Kingdom, and subject to the other details of the proposed transfer of the control of the Airport being arranged to the satisfaction of the Governments concerned.”

On 25 January 1941, the Canadian government informed Newfoundland that, in conformity with a recommendation of the Permanent Joint Defence Board of the United States and Canada, and following urgent representations from the United States authorities as to the necessity of their forces having training and experience in the Newfoundland area, it had agreed, subject to the Newfoundland government’s consent, to erect additional buildings at the Newfoundland Airport adequate for the accommodation and training of a United States composite group of approximately 300 officers, 1,050 men and 73 aircraft. The cost of these erections would be borne by the Canadian government and this new development would not in any way affect the proposal that operational control of the airport be assumed by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Canada now asked the Newfoundland government for its general concurrence in this project. On 31 January, the Newfoundland government informed the Dominions Office that it would accept the United
States training proposal subject to the “indispensable condition” that “the adoption of the proposal shall not involve any additional rights or privileges to the United States at Newfoundland airbases in regard to civil aviation over and above those which they already possess.”

Later, however, the Newfoundland government learned that the United States personnel and aircraft were being sent to the Newfoundland Airport, not solely for training purposes, but also to implement the defence scheme of the United States-Canada Joint Defence Board. They learned, moreover, that the board had practically completed the preparation of a scheme for establishing seaplane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles to be used by three United States flying boat squadrons. In forwarding this information to London on 10 March 1941, the Newfoundland government complained that neither the Canadian nor the United States governments had submitted this proposal to them, and that they had “the feeling that plans are being made as between the United States and Canadian Governments involving the use and development of our air bases without consultation with us during the formulation of such plans.” Accordingly, the British Government instructed its High Commissioner in Canada to take up with the Canadian authorities the important matter of making suitable arrangements to enable the Newfoundland government to be kept in touch with all future deliberations of the board affecting Newfoundland. It was pointed out that, although two members of the Newfoundland government had attended meetings of the board in the previous October, no copy of the report of these meetings had been sent to the Newfoundland government, despite the fact that “in the Protocol [see below] to the Agreement leasing bases to the United States, it has been agreed, that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland, involving defence considerations, the Canadian Government as well as the Newfoundland Government would have the right to participate.”

Meanwhile, on 12 March, Canada informed Newfoundland that accommodation would be required for 3,420 United States officers and men, not 1,350 as stated earlier. The Canadian government also declared that it agreed to all the fundamental points concerning Botwood, Gleneagles and Torbay. It then submitted a plan setting forth Royal Canadian Air Force requirements in Newfoundland. They were as follows:

(a) The expansion of the Newfoundland Airport to accommodate Royal Canadian Air Force station headquarters and one squadron; and United States Army Air Corps composite groups comprising headquarters and six squadrons.

(b) The development of Botwood seaplane base using present facilities to accommodate one United States flying boat squadron as soon as possible, and possibly an additional United States flying boat squadron later.
(c) The development of a seaplane base on Gander Lake at Gleneagles to accommodate one United States flying boat squadron, and possibly an additional flying boat squadron.

(d) The development of the aerodrome at Torbay to accommodate Royal Canadian Air Force headquarters and one squadron.

(e) The establishment of re-fuelling bases in northern Newfoundland and the Labrador coast at or near Canada Bay, Cartwright, Hopedale, North River, and Port Burwell.

In its reply on 25 March 1941, the Newfoundland government stated that it would have liked to have received much more information concerning the development of Botwood and Gleneagles seaplane bases for the use of the United States before agreeing to the proposal, even in principle. However, the Newfoundland government declared itself prepared to acquiesce in this proposal “on the understanding that we shall be given an opportunity to examine details of developments before land is acquired or work of any kind is commenced.” The Newfoundland government expressed itself willing to proceed at once with negotiations with Canadian officials to dispose at once of details and to fix a definite date for the handing over of the three bases for the duration of the war. It proposed that the conference should be held at the Newfoundland Airport, a suggestion which was accepted by Canada.

The conference began at the Newfoundland Airport on 7 April and lasted until 10 April, when the discussions were continued at St. John’s. The Newfoundland representative was the Commissioner for Public Utilities, accompanied by the Secretary for Justice, and the United Kingdom Air Ministry representative at Gander, who, following the agreement, was to remain as officer in charge of the Air Ministry wireless organization in Newfoundland, and as liaison officer between the Air Ministry, the Newfoundland government, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, with particular reference to transatlantic flights. Canada was represented by Hon. C.G. Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, accompanied by Captain H.A. Dyde, MC (Secretary of the Defence Council), Major Hugh Lumsden, and Wing Commander Bryan, RCAF.

It is clear from the memorandum presented to the Newfoundland government by the Commissioner for Public Utilities that the discussions were dominated by Canada’s preoccupation with the possibility that the United States would try to obtain a dominating position in Newfoundland, more especially in regard to problems involved in the use of land and air forces. On this question, the Newfoundland representatives steadfastly adhered to the position that they must refuse “to contemplate anything but the existence of a sovereign Government of Newfoundland forming part of the British Empire.”
As a result of the discussions at the Newfoundland Airport and at St. John’s, an agreement was finally reached on 17 April by the Newfoundland and Canadian governments.

The salient terms of the agreement were as follows:

(1) The control of the airport and the responsibility for its operation are transferred to Canada for the duration of the war. Canada will also exercise certain rights of a military character in the airport area, but these were regarded as deriving not from the agreement nor from the transfer of the airbases, but from the ordinary law of the land according certain rights in time of war to any of the forces of the Crown stationed in Newfoundland. These rights Canada already had prior to the agreement.

(2) The United Kingdom Air Ministry retains control of the wireless organization at the airport; Canada is to provide the wireless organization with electric light, power, and accommodation and meals for its staff, on payment of cost up to a maximum sum of $25,000 per annum.

(3) Canada is granted fifty years’ tenure of the sites of the Royal Canadian Air Force buildings.

(4) The maintenance of the Newfoundland government buildings is transferred to Canada for the duration of hostilities.

(5) The governments of the United Kingdom and of Newfoundland agreed to contribute $25,000 per annum each “towards the cost and the maintenance and operations of the facilities of the air bases.”

The agreement was approved by the United Kingdom government on 3 June 1941, but the Canadian government regarded 17 April 1941, as the date on which it assumed control of the Newfoundland Airport.

On 30 April 1941, the first United States aeroplane arrived at the airport by arrangements with the Joint Defence Board. Since then United States air and ground forces have been stationed at the airport as part of the air defence system of the Western Hemisphere.

In August 1942, the United States Army Transport Command (the United States equivalent of the RAF Ferry Command) was established at the airport for communication flights and delivery flights of United States aircraft to Great Britain. They have always used the facilities of the RAF Ferry Command.

Use of Gander in connection with Transatlantic Ferry Service
The Newfoundland government was alive, from the outset, to the possibility that the Newfoundland Airport might be used in the delivery of military aircraft from the United States to the United Kingdom. In fact, one military aircraft had been delivered via Gander before the outbreak of war. This was a PBY flying boat, which was delivered from San Diego, California, to the Royal Air Force at Felixstowe on 13 July 1939. It had used Botwood as the intermediate base and it had been supplied with all the civil aviation facilities normally provided.

It was with a view to making use of Gander for this purpose that experiments were conducted in 1939 as to the use of the runways under snow conditions. These snow experiments demonstrated that the Newfoundland Airport could be used for a considerable portion, if not all, of the winter season. At the conclusion of these experiments, the aerodrome control officer visited England in the late spring of 1940, and plans for the deliver of military aircraft by air were formulated by the United Kingdom Air Ministry soon afterwards. It was expected that flights would commence in August 1940.

In July 1940, the Royal Air Force began to set up the necessary wireless organization at a location in the United Kingdom. This new wireless organization was essential in order to dispense with the use of the existing organization which was established at Foynes in neutral Eire. As the Newfoundland Airport-Foynes wireless organization had proved very efficient, the new organization was modelled on it. Thenceforward, both the original communications with Foynes and the new communications with the United Kingdom organization operated on the same frequencies with Foynes being more or less a “sleeping partner.” In 1942, however, after the Ferry Command had taken control of wireless communications, duplicate channels were established as follows: (1) For service operations: Newfoundland Airport-United Kingdom; [and] (2) For original civil operations: Newfoundland Airport-Foynes.

In order to undertake the delivery of the military aircraft, the United Kingdom Air Ministry sent to Montreal, in August, 1940, a number of British Airways officials who had experience of operations in the Atlantic. They established an organization in Montreal which enjoyed the co-operation of the Canadian Pacific Railway. At this stage, the most serious difficulty as far as the Newfoundland Airport was concerned, was the provision of suitable accommodation for the aircraft crews. Arrangements were made for the erection of tents, but as the flights were delayed until the late autumn, another alternative had to be found. Three Newfoundland Railway sleeping cars, and one dining car were provided in time for the first flights. The accommodation and messing arrangements were provided entirely by the Newfoundland Railway.
The first planes delivered were of the Lockheed Hudson type. The original contract called for fifty of them to go by air. The first arrived at the Newfoundland Airport on 29 October 1940. The seventh arrived on 9 November, and, on the following day, the seven planes left together for the United Kingdom. The first group was led by Captain D.C.T. Bennett and every member of the crews had a Flanders poppy, which they wore on arrival in England. They all reached their destination safely on 11 November 1940. This practice of despatching the aircraft in groups continued until the pilots and navigators were trained for individual flights, after which aircraft went as and when ready.

During the winter of 1940-1941, only two runways were kept in use. A full-length narrow strip on one of them was kept clear in order to overcome the difficulties of wet snow in the early winter. Otherwise the snow compaction scheme decided upon as a result of the 1939-1940 experiments was carried out as originally contemplated. The Royal Canadian Air Force assumed responsibility for the runways during the 1940-1941 season, but there was little increase in the original equipment and only a small number of men were available for the work. Nevertheless, there were very few flight cancellations due to the condition of the runways. The delivery of the PBY flying boat Cuba from Botwood, on 25 October 1940, confirmed earlier opinions that it would be advisable to have Gander Lake developed as a flying boat base, so that the organization for the delivery of planes could be centralized. During the spring of 1941, the organization hitherto operated by the Canadian Pacific Railway merged into an organization of the Ministry of Aircraft Production which came to be known as the Atlantic Ferry Organization (Atfero). In the early spring of 1941 Atfero developed the Gander Lake flying boat base at the exact location previously selected by the Newfoundland government in 1936 with a view to possible development at that time.

Atfero was eventually absorbed into the Ferry Command of the Royal Air Force, with considerable reorganization on military lines, in June 1941. In fact, the original Air Ministry wireless organization, complete with staff, was formally taken over by the Royal Air Force Ferry Command on 17 October 1941. This finally severed the Newfoundland government’s connection with the actual flying operations, as the Air Ministry wireless station had previously been under the direction of the Newfoundland government air representative.

The following list of “first flights” may be of interest as illustrating the various types of aircraft flown by the ferry service: 1st Liberator, March 1941; 1st Fortress, April 1941; 1st Curtis-Wright, November 1941; 1st Ventura, April 1942; 1st B.25 (Mitchell), May 1942; 1st B.26 (Marauder), September 1942; 1st Boston, October 1942.

The following additional information is interesting as giving some indication of the part played by Newfoundlanders in the ferry service.
The first Newfoundlander to take part in the actual air part of the transatlantic delivery of aircraft was F. Coughlan. He was one of the original radio operators at the airport before the outbreak of war. He volunteered to transfer to the delivery organization as soon as it commenced operations. His first transatlantic flight was on 17 December 1940, as radio operator in a Hudson aircraft.

Another radio operator at the airport who transferred to the ferry organization was Cyril Small. As far as is known, he is the first Newfoundlander to give his life on this service. He was killed in a transatlantic flight which left the Newfoundland Airport on 26 December 1941.

The first Newfoundlander to take a plane across the Atlantic as captain of the aircraft was Pilot Officer Goodyear.

Torbay Airport

In the course of the negotiations conducted at St. John’s in April 1941, the Canadian representatives enquired whether the Canadian government would be permitted to acquire land for the construction of a military airbase at Torbay, in the neighbourhood of St. John’s. The need for aircraft protection for the capital and for naval and other vessels operating from its harbour was clearly realised by the Newfoundland government, and it therefore accorded its full and immediate co-operation to the Canadian government.

Thus, on 17 April 1941, the Commissioner for Public Utilities informed the Canadian Minister of National Revenue, who had represented Canada at the conference at Gander and St. John’s, that the Newfoundland government agreed that Canada might acquire lands for a military aerodrome at Torbay and might establish radio teletype, telephone, and telegraphic communications between that aerodrome and her other airbases. The Commissioner pointed out that “in so far as Crown Lands are concerned, these will be placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada free of charge, either as an outright grant, or on a lease commensurate with the capital investment of the Canadian Government, as may be agreed in due course.”

The Commissioner also stated that the Newfoundland government granted this permission for the acquisition of land subject to three conditions: (1) that the expenses of the proposed development be borne exclusively by the Canadian government; (2) that the proposed aerodrome be not used as a civil airport except with the consent of the Newfoundland government; [and] (3) that the necessary details as to acquisition and installations be satisfactorily settled with the appropriate departments of the Newfoundland government.
On 20 May 1941, the Newfoundland government was officially notified by the Canadian Department of External Affairs that the Canadian Department of Transport intended to construct an airfield at Torbay in connection with the operation of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Within a week, the Commissioner for Public Utilities issued an order requisitioning land at Torbay under the Defence (Requisitioning of Land) Regulations made under the Emergency Powers Defence Act, 1940. At the same time, the Commissioner wrote to each of the property owners in the area, informing them that it might be necessary to enter upon and acquire property owned by them, and asking them to submit to him a claim for any damages that would be caused by such expropriation.

Having taken these measures, the Commissioner informed Colonel F.F. Clarke, DSO, the representative of the Canadian Department of Transport, that there was no objection to his (i.e., Colonel Clarke) negotiating direct with the landowners concerned for the outright purchase of the necessary lands subject to two conditions: (1) that, in default of an amiable agreement in any case or cases, the matter be submitted to the Compensation Board which had been set up to deal with such matters; and (2) that the rights to be acquired by the Canadian government by purchase be the same as those of a private individual.

On 27 October 1941, a conference was held in St. John’s at which were present on behalf of Newfoundland the Commissioner for Public Utilities, the Commissioner for Justice and Defence, the Secretary for Justice, the Secretary for Public Works, and the liaison officer at the Newfoundland Airport. Canada was represented by the High Commissioner in Newfoundland; Capt. H.A. Dyde, MC; Group Captain McEwen, RCAF; Group Captain Guthrie, RCAF; and Colonel Clarke. The Canadian High Commissioner spoke of the difficulty experienced by the Canadian government in obtaining good title to private lands acquired in connection with the Torbay aerodrome. The Commissioner for Public Utilities replied that a special act of the Commission would be required to confirm the title. On the question of Crown Lands, he gave it as his opinion that the Canadian government would be accorded the same title over Crown Lands as over private lands. The Canadian High Commissioner pointed out that additional lands would be required and that his government proposed to install a radio range near the aerodrome. He promised to inform the Commissioner for Public Utilities of the Canadian government’s requirements in that connection.

On 30 March 1942, the High Commissioner provided the Commissioner for Public Utilities with copies of the site plan for the radio range and copies of the description of the lands required for the site. At the same time, he promised to forward site plans for the aerodrome itself as soon as he received them from Canada. He suggested that the matter of the actual grant of Crown Lands required for both sites might be held over until then, so that could be included in the one grant. In reply, the Commissioner for Public
Utilities stated that the required lands were Crown Lands, but that a grant of the radio site could not be issued until arrangements as to the radio frequency had been made by Canada with the Newfoundland Department of Posts and Telegraphs. On 21 April, he was informed by the High Commissioner that the necessary arrangements had been concluded between that department and the Canadian Department of Transport. Meanwhile, on 17 April, the site plan for the Torbay airport, as approved by the Canadian Departments of National Defence for Air, and Transport, had been submitted to the Newfoundland government which gave its approval to them on 28 April 1942.

**Goose Bay Airport**

During the summer of 1941, both the United States and Canada began to display considerable interest in the possibility of establishing an airport in Newfoundland Labrador.

On 26 June 1941, the Newfoundland government was informed by the United States consul-general in St. John’s that the United States War Department, in co-operation with the Canadian authorities, was planning to carry out, at an early date, surveys of the east coast of Labrador for the purpose of locating suitable sites for landing fields. This notification was given in accordance with Article X of the base lease agreement [see below] which granted the United States the right to make such surveys after appropriate notification.

On the following day, the Canadian government informed the Newfoundland government that it had asked the United States whether the United States air forces then stationed in Newfoundland would be prepared, subject to the Newfoundland government’s approval, to undertake a photographic survey of the Labrador coast, since the Royal Canadian Air Force was unable to do so owing to the new commitments of the Royal Canadian Navy.

On 3 August, Canada requested Newfoundland’s permission to make an immediate survey at a point south of Goose Bay on Terrington Basin with the object of locating a suitable site for an airbase in the North West River area of Labrador. Canada pointed out that the possibility of establishing such a base had been discussed at a meeting in Montreal of the United States-Canada joint defence board, which had been attended by the Newfoundland Commissioner for Justice and Defence. Permission was granted, and on 26 August, Canada informed Newfoundland that the survey of this area had demonstrated that an aerodrome could be constructed there, and that the Department of Transport had been authorised, subject to Newfoundland’s consent, to undertake the necessary development. Canada promised to submit the details of the location, which were being prepared by the Department of Transport, and suggested that the representatives of that department discuss with the Newfoundland
government “the steps to be taken with a view to acquiring the necessary land.” Newfoundland’s approval was urgently requested, as it was desirable that the construction should commence as soon as possible. On 24 August, the Newfoundland government expressed its agreement in principle but informed Canada that it expected, before the work started, to be given “information as to the exact location,” “and the question of the control and operation during and after the war, especially in regard to its use for commercial purposes, will have to be settled in good time.” The next day, Canada informed Newfoundland that she was assuming Newfoundland’s approval of the construction and was proceeding with the necessary arrangements “in view of the imperative necessity that materials reach their destination before the close of navigation.” Canada also expressed the hope that Newfoundland would waive customs duties on the material and would agree to admit the necessary labour. Newfoundland immediately agreed but expected that “common labour would be recruited from Newfoundland and Labrador.”

On 2 September, the United Kingdom government asked the Newfoundland government to cooperate in any way possible, if approached by Canada or the United States on the subject of granting facilities for an aerodrome in Labrador. Therefore, the Newfoundland government informed the United Kingdom of the negotiations that had taken place up to that date.

On 16 September, Canada informed Newfoundland of the approximate location of the site selected, viz. latitude 53° 20’ N, and 60° 23’ W, i.e., the south shore of Terrington Basin. Canada suggested that the same type of control and regulation should be adopted for the proposed airport as had already been established for the Royal Canadian Air Force stations in Newfoundland. With regard to the commercial use of the airport after the war, Canada believed that this could not be forecast until experience had been gained. However, Canada set forth the immediate objectives in view, viz., “to provide facilities for ferrying medium and long range aircraft across the Atlantic to alleviate congestion at the Newfoundland Airport and to provide greater security for crews and equipment, also to enhance the effectiveness of the plans for Hemisphere Defence.”

The views of the United Kingdom government on these Canadian proposals were communicated to the Newfoundland Government on 27 September, 1941. They were as follows:

(1) As far as its military use was concerned, the aerodrome should be open without restriction to both the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force, and also, because of its importance as a stage on the route from the United States to Greenland and Iceland, to the United States Army Air Forces. Nevertheless, it must be made clear that the provision of all such military facilities should be limited to the duration of the war.
(2) All arrangements for wireless control will be interdependent with similar arrangements being made by agreement between the United States and Canada for the wireless and meteorological stations and emergency landing grounds at Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay, and Cumberland Peninsula. Consequently, the wireless arrangements for Goose Bay ought to be discussed in the first place between the Newfoundland government, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Air Force (represented by AOC in C, Ferry Command, Montreal) and the United States Army Air Forces. All such arrangements however, must be subject to the reservation that they are to continue only for the duration of the war.

(3) It is to be assumed that the Royal Canadian Air Force will provide the necessary ground organization and will also be responsible for manning and running the aerodrome.

(4) There was no objection to Canada exercising general control of the aerodrome, subject to the two essential conditions: that (a) the period of such control be confined to the duration of the war; and (b) that transfer to general control to a third party be forbidden. The United Kingdom government emphasized that “Post-war control should be left for consideration in the light of circumstances at the time.”

(5) To safeguard the postwar position of the aerodrome, its use for commercial purposes should be prohibited. This prohibition was not to be construed, however, as applying to “any British Commonwealth civil aircraft engaged in ferrying or other operations directly concerned with the war effort.”

(6) Finally, any leases of land or buildings, whether for military or civil purposes should be limited to the duration of the war. Evidently, the United Kingdom government anticipated certain difficulties in enforcing this stipulation, for they added that some concession on this point might prove to be necessary, especially in view of the arrangements made in connection with the airbases in Newfoundland proper. They accordingly advised that this question be left in abeyance until representations were made by Canada for a lease extending beyond the duration of the war.

On 2 October, the Newfoundland Commissioners for Public Utilities and Justice and Defence held a conference with the Canadian High Commissioner and presented to him the six points raised by the United Kingdom government. He accepted the first point with two important exceptions, viz.:

(a) the phrase “without restriction,” which he considered required qualification so as to permit normal restrictions, e.g., for security and safety purposes, since the Canadian government would be responsible for the operation of the aerodrome; and
(b) the condition as to limitation of the use of the aerodrome for the duration of the war. This he could not accept as far as the Royal Canadian Air Force was concerned.

He agreed to the second point, but suggested that the best course would be to leave the wireless and meteorological arrangements to be made by normal inter-service conferences. The third point he accepted on its entirety. On the fourth point, he agreed to the prohibition of the transfer of the aerodrome, but disagreed with the stipulation that general control be limited to the duration of the war. He agreed that, at the end of the war, “there may be strong reasons why Canada should be allowed to continue military use and control of the airport.” Accordingly, he suggested that “the whole question of post-war control should be left for consideration in the light of circumstances at the end of the War, without any presumption against the possibility of continued control by Canada.” On the fifth point, he agreed that facilities should be made available to British Commonwealth civil aircraft engaged in any war operation. On the other hand, he considered that “an absolute prohibition at this stage, against commercial use would be mistaken.” He stated that he could see no objection “to a stipulation parallel with that made in regard to the Torbay Airport, viz., that the aerodrome should not be used as a civil airport without the consent of the Newfoundland Government either during or after the War.”

He disagreed entirely with the last proposal, viz. the limitation of leases to the duration of the war, on the ground that it was inequitable “in view of the large investment for works on construction which will be made by Canada.” He considered “that in the case of lands the Canadian Government should be given an outright grant of any Crown lands involved and should be permitted to acquire the fee simple of any privately owned lands.”

Confronted by this wide divergence of views between the Canadian and United Kingdom governments, the Newfoundland government communicated the Canadian High Commissioner’s counter-proposals to London on 6 October. They added their own comments on the two fundamental questions of the limitation of Canadian rights to the duration of the war, and of the prohibition of the commercial use of the aerodrome. With regard to the former, they expressed the opinion that “it is not practicable to expect the Canadian Government to incur the large expenditure which will be required to create an aerodrome near Northwest River and at the same time to allow themselves to be put in a position in which all their rights in the aerodrome would automatically come to an end when hostilities ceased.” They pointed out that the position at North West River and at Torbay was not identical with that at Gander and Botwood “because in the case of the two first mentioned aerodromes the whole cost of construction is to be borne by Canada.” Accordingly, they considered that it would be “necessary to leave entirely open until the end of the war the whole question of post-war control and operation for military purposes of the Labrador aerodrome and that we shall have to
grant the Canadians at least a 99 year lease of any Crown Lands which may be required for the proposed aerodrome.” With regard to the latter question, the Newfoundland government believed that they could not expect “much more than an undertaking that the aerodrome will not be used for commercial purposes” without their own consent and that of the United Kingdom government. They asked the approval of the United Kingdom government along these lines.

Replying on 23 October, the United Kingdom government declared that it was opposed to the outright grant of Crown Land and also to the grant of permission to acquire fee simple of any privately owned land, but agreed that there appeared to be no alternative to the 99 year lease proposed by the Newfoundland government. It also approved Newfoundland’s suggestion that the whole question of postwar control be left entirely open until the end of the war, and concluded by requesting to be kept informed of the progress of the negotiation.

These two propositions were submitted to the Canadian High Commissioner by representatives of the Newfoundland government at a further conference held on 27 October. In the course of this interview the High Commissioner made three new requests, viz., to acquire an additional area at Goose Bay, to be granted the right of way for a road from the aerodrome at North West River, and to obtain the right to use timber, rock, and sand from the area.

On 4 December, the High Commissioner submitted a plan for the Goose Bay aerodrome, and on the next day he furnished the following description of the property required by the Canadian government as shown on the plan: “Commencing at the most northerly point of Terrington Basin, thence due north to latitude 53º 25′; thence due west to longitude 60º 40′; thence due south to the northerly boundary of Block A containing 197 square miles, located on Hamilton River; thence due east and south-east following the northerly and easterly boundary of the said Block A to the northerly bank of Hamilton River; thence north-easterly along the northerly bank of Hamilton River and westerly along the shore of Goose Bay and Terrington Basin to the point of commencement, containing approximately 160 square miles.”

On 8 December, the Newfoundland government was informed by the officer commanding the Royal Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland that the Goose Bay aerodrome was ready for operation, as three runways were serviceable for heavy aircraft wheels and complete general serving facilities had been arranged, while accommodation and messing for ten personnel could be supplied comfortably.

However, it was not until 28 September 1942, that the Canadian draft lease was ready for submission to the Newfoundland government. It had been
prepared by the military secretary of the Canadian Department of National Defence and had been approved by the war committee of the Canadian government. In presenting it to the Newfoundland government the Canadian High Commissioner requested an early reply as he was to leave for Ottawa in a few days and wished to take that opportunity of discussing with the war cabinet personally the views of the Newfoundland government on the draft lease. On 10 October, the Newfoundland government decided to refer it to a committee of the Commission consisting of the Commissioners for Public Utilities, Justice and Defence, Finance, and Natural Resources.

Chronology of Goose Bay Negotiations

2 October 1941: Conference in St. John’s between Burchell, Woods, and Emerson re the acquisition by Canada of the Gosse Bay Airport.

21 October 1941: Conference in St. John’s between Burchell and Woods. Woods states that Newfoundland government prepared to grant a lease of the Crown lands involved for a period of ninety-nine years. Burchell subsequently agreed on behalf of the Canadian government to this proposal.

No suggestion of the postwar use of the airport by UK military aircraft was put forward at either of these conferences. Only point of disagreement concerned postwar use of the airport for civil aviation. Canadian government felt that, in view of the fact that it was proposing to make a large expenditure in the construction of the airport, some provision should be made to permit the Canadian government the use of the airport for civil aviation after the war.

Several months later, the Canadian government finally acceded to the request of the Newfoundland government that the postwar use of Goose Bay airport for civil or commercial operations would form the subject of a discussion between the governments of Newfoundland and Canada which would take place not later than twelve months after the war.

28 September 1942: Burchell submits to Woods a draft of a lease—prepared by Colonel Dyde, Military Secretary of the Canadian Department of National Defence, who had attended all conferences between Burchell and Woods on the subject of the Goose Bay airbase. Some of the minor details of the draft lease were unsatisfactory to the Newfoundland government.

26 January 1943: Burchell and Dyde have a conference with Commission of Government in St. John’s. Emerson proposed the insertion of a clause in the lease to provide that civil and military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland government should have the right to use the airport on terms not less favourable than those of the government of Canada. The Canadian government agreed to this suggestion.
At the 26 January conference, the terms of the agreement were all finalized. Emerson and Dyde prepared a final draft of the agreement, subject to the approval of the Dominions Office and the Canadian Government. The Canadian government subsequently approved this draft.

19 July 1943: Woods informs J.C. Britton, Acting High Commissioner for Canada, that Commission of Government, with the concurrence of the United Kingdom government, was ready to proceed with the negotiations, with a view to the final settlement of a lease on the lines set forth in the Emerson-Dyde draft.

Woods stated that the area to be leased and the general tenor of the terms of the lease could now be regarded as having been settled between the two governments. He added, however, that the Dominions Office had raised several drafting points.

30 July 1943: Woods sent Britton 3 copies of a new draft lease containing several alterations based on the points raised by the Dominions Office. The Canadian government accepted all these alterations except the proposed alteration of Clause 5—“All British civil and military aircraft shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.”

The Canadian government claimed that this proposed change introduced an entirely new principle into the lease, which would have the effect of committing Canada and Newfoundland to making Goose Bay airport available on equal terms to United Kingdom aircraft without any assurance of reciprocal rights in the United Kingdom.

25 August 1943: This was pointed out by Burchell in a letter to Woods. Burchell also stated that the Canadian government had avoided granting any rights for postwar civil use of any airbase on Canadian soil or under Canadian control until the end of the war or such time as suitable arrangements might be made as a result of general international discussions. He claimed that the United Kingdom proposal would create a difficult situation with regard to the postwar use of airbases constructed wholly or in part by the United States government in Canadian territory and indeed in other parts of the British Commonwealth. He pointed out that, since it was the intention of the Canadian government to give full publicity to the terms of the lease, it would be impossible to prevent extreme pressure from the United States for the grant of similar or equivalent rights to the United States at Goose Bay and other bases. He added that the proposed alternative was particularly inappropriate at the moment since the whole question of postwar air transport was to be discussed shortly by the interested governments. Burchell concluded by expressing Canada’s desire that the previous wording of Clause 5 be retained, as follows: “Civil and Military Aircraft owned by the Newfoundland Government shall
have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.”

Similar representations were made to the United Kingdom government on 23 August by the High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom.

15 September 1943: He informed the Canadian government that the United Kingdom government was willing to amend the new wording of Clause 5 to read: “The United Kingdom and Newfoundland” for the word “British.”

22 September 1943: He was instructed to inform the United Kingdom government that Canada was not prepared to accept this amendment and to urge the retention of the original draft of Clause 5.

29 September 1943: United Kingdom government proposed the modification of Clause 5 to provide that military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland and United Kingdom governments should have the right to use the airbase on terms not less favourable than those of the government of Canada, and the addition of clause to make the same condition applicable to Newfoundland commercial aircraft.

1 October 1943: Canadian government rejected this proposed modification.

20 October 1943: Lord Cranborne wrote a letter to Howe, Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, who was on a visit to England at that time, repeating the proposals of 29 September. Following Howe’s return to Canada, these proposals were reconsidered by the Canadian government and were again rejected.

30 December 1943: Burchell presents Woods with a resumé of the Canadian government’s reasons for its refusal. They were as follows:

1. [t]he United Kingdom had recognized by the protocol annexed to the bases agreement of 1941 with the United States that the “defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government”;

2. Goose Bay airbase was vital to the Canadian scheme of defence as it had developed during the war;

3. Clause 2 of the Goose Bay draft agreement, which Canada was prepared to accept, assured the United Kingdom government of the use of Goose Bay airbase “For the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence”;
4. [t]he Draft agreement also guaranteed the Newfoundland government equal rights with the Canadian government in the use of the base for civil and military purposes for the duration of the lease;

5. Canada has made large expenditures elsewhere in Newfoundland, notably at Gander, Botwood, and St. John’s without insisting on advance commitments from Newfoundland and the United Kingdom guaranteeing to Canada the postwar use of these bases;

6. [t]he leases to the bases in Newfoundland granted to the United States contained no provisions assuring either Newfoundland or the United Kingdom any rights to use these bases either during or after the war;

7. [a]ny formal agreement, guaranteeing to the United Kingdom the military use of the Goose airbase on the same terms as Canada, might expose Newfoundland and Canada to heavy pressure from the United States for similar concessions at Goose. This possibility was all the more likely in view of the fact that about one-third of the total expenditure at Goose Bay had been made for purposes of the United States whereas no expenditure had been made by or on account of the United Kingdom. Moreover, the Goose airbase was a very convenient intermediate landing field between United States bases in Newfoundland and New England and United States bases in Greenland, the retention of which might be desired after the war by the United States government for military purposes. The Canadian High Commissioner pointed out that the Canadian government had expended approximately $20,500,000 on the construction of the Goose airbase and had plans for the expenditure of an additional amount of approximately $2,000,000. He stated that it would come as a great shock to the Canadian people if they were informed that the only reason why the agreement had not been signed was the demand of the United Kingdom for the use of the airport for the full term of the lease.

He warned that the delay in execution of the agreement was regarded by the Canadian government as prejudicial to the maintenance of good relations with the United Kingdom.

He concluded by urging that the agreement should be immediately signed as drafted in January 1943, and as approved by the Commission of Government, with the amendments suggested in Sir Wilfrid Woods’ letter to him of 30 July with the exception of the amendment of Clause 5, which should be allowed to stand as in the original draft.

7 March 1944: The Dominions Office informed Sir Wilfrid Woods that the United Kingdom government, through its High Commissioner at Ottawa, had suggested to the Canadian government that, “having regard to the course which recent exchanges of views have taken, the best plan might be to defer completion of formal agreement until after the war when the long term
prospects in relation to both civil aviation and the requirements of common
defence should be much clearer.”

11 July 1944: Hon. J.S. Macdonald, the Canadian High Commissioner in
Newfoundland, forwarded to the Newfoundland government a copy of a
confidential memorandum given to Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, the High
Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, in reply to the Dominions
Office proposal of 7 March.

In this memorandum, the Canadian government declared its inability to
accept the suggestion of the United Kingdom government that the completion
of the agreement be left over until after the war. The Canadian memorandum
made the following points:

1. Almost a year and a half had elapsed since the lease agreement had been
worked out between representatives of the governments of Canada and
Newfoundland and provisionally agreed to. The long delay and the necessary
secrecy about the agreement had given rise to widespread and unfounded
suspicion among the people of Newfoundland as to Canada’s motives in the
matter. Consequently, continued delay might be further prejudicial to good
relations between the people of Canada and the people of Newfoundland.

2. It would be difficult to justify to the Canadian parliament the heavy
expenditures made at Goose Bay for permanent defence installations without
title or agreement as to the postwar position.

3. The base was developed at the urgent request of the United Kingdom
government and Canada began construction at the earliest possible date and
with all possible speed without waiting for the completion of a formal
agreement as to the future status of the base.

4. Uncertainty as to Canada’s postwar rights at Goose seriously affected
Canada’s postwar defence situation.

5. While it was true that the United Kingdom had assured Canada that it did
not wish to go back on the promise of a lease made in 1941, it was Canada’s
understanding of the constitutional position that a lease would require
legislation by the legislature of Newfoundland. It was true that the
Newfoundland Commission of Government had provisionally accepted the
terms of the agreement almost a year and a half ago and would presumably be
prepared to pass the appropriate legislation. But, on the other hand, the future
status of Newfoundland was uncertain and it was at least possible that
conditions might so change in Newfoundland that the local authorities there
might later be disinclined to carry out the promise of the United Kingdom.
6. An immediate reason for the early completion of the lease agreement was the fact that the Commission of Government was considering the enactment of a single confirming act dealing with the titles to Canadian defence properties in Newfoundland. The Canadian government pointed out that the omission of Goose Bay from the confirming act might prejudice future negotiations since any government in Newfoundland might be very reluctant to reopen a question which had already proved disturbing to Newfoundland opinion.

For all these reasons the Canadian government expressed the opinion that the negotiations concerning the lease should be brought forthwith to a definite conclusion. Accordingly, it made two proposals:

(1) the insertion in the existing draft of the lease of the following new Article 5: “The right of the United Kingdom to use the base for military aircraft shall be the subject of consultation and agreement between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland after the war, and in the meantime the rights of the United Kingdom under Article 3 of this Agreement shall continue unimpaired”; [and]

(2) with a view to clarifying the question of civil use, the text of Article 10, last sentence, to read as follows: “The question of its use for civil and commercial operations after the war, and all matters incidental thereto, will form the subject of discussion between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the war.”

The Canadian memorandum explained that the effect of these proposals would be that the question of postwar use, both civil and military, by the United Kingdom would be expressly reserved for discussion after the war, “it being understood that the completion of the lease agreement should not prejudice any claims or rights which the United Kingdom may have in the matter.” The memorandum added that the Canadian government had no doubt that, if the agreement as to title could be completed at once, mutually satisfactory arrangements as to the use of the airport could be worked out after the war in the light of the conditions then obtaining.

23 August 1944: The Dominions Office informed the Newfoundland government that, in its opinion, the new amendments proposed by the Canadian government constituted a marked advance on the position previously taken by Canada. This despatch pointed out that, as regards the question of military use, the Canadian proposal went a long way towards meeting the United Kingdom’s point of view since the general effect was that the United Kingdom’s rights of postwar military user would be the subject of consultation and agreement among the three governments after the war, and that, pending such consultation and agreement, its wartime rights would continue unimpaired. This provided the United Kingdom with a reasonable safeguard.
that there would be no modification after the war of its existing wartime rights except with its own consent.

As regards the question of postwar civil use, the Dominions Office stated that the Canadian proposal corresponded very closely with the suggestion made by Lord Cranborne to Mr. Howe in October 1943 and met the United Kingdom position fully.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom government stated its intention to inform the Canadian government that its suggestions had been accepted by the United Kingdom and Newfoundland governments and that the way would thus be clear for the signature of the agreement. However, before communicating acceptance to Ottawa, the United Kingdom government wished to know from the Newfoundland government whether any further safeguards were required from the point of view of Newfoundland.

5 September 1944: The Newfoundland government informed the Dominions Office that it was satisfied from the Newfoundland standpoint to grant a lease embodying the terms agreed between the governments of Canada and the United Kingdom. The Newfoundland government asked the United Kingdom government to confirm by telegram that the Newfoundland government was free to arrange accordingly with the High Commissioner for Canada.

7 September 1944: This confirmation was furnished to the Newfoundland government.

11 September 1944: Sir Wilfrid Woods informed Hon. Mr. Macdonald that the Commission of Government was now ready to complete the document in which the terms of the lease would be embodied, and that these terms would be in accordance with the confidential memorandum given to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, except for the inclusion of two small drafting amendments not previously discussed with the Canadian government, These were as follows: 1. The words “Royal Air Force in Article 3 (b) should be deleted and the words “United Kingdom Military aircraft” should be substituted in order to cover aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm; [and] 2. The words “Ferry Command” in Article 3 (d) should be deleted.

13 September 1944: The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada reported that the Canadian authorities had expressed satisfaction at the settlement and that the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland was being notified of the drafting amendments and was being instructed to sign the agreement.

10 October 1944: The memorandum of agreement between Canada and Newfoundland relating to the establishment of an airbase at Goose Bay,
Labrador, was signed at St. John’s by Hon. J.S. Macdonald on behalf of Canada and by Sir Wilfrid Woods on behalf of Newfoundland.

20 October 1944: A bill entitled “An Act to Confirm an Agreement made between the Government of Newfoundland and the Government of Canada relating to the establishment of an Air Base in Labrador and to authorize the execution of the Lease under the said Agreement” was read a first and second time in Commission, and was published together with a statement of objects and reasons. This statement read as follows:

“In the summer of 1941, the Commission of Government was informed that the Government of Canada were considering plans which had originated with the United Kingdom Air Representatives in Washington for the immediate commencement of construction of an airport near North West River in Labrador, and the co-operation of Newfoundland in this project was requested by His Majesty’s Government in Canada and by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.

The objects of this difficult construction operation, the cost of which is estimated at approximately $25,000,000, were as follows:

(a) To increase the chances of favourable weather conditions for the reception and despatch of military aircraft for Britain and to relieve what then appeared to be the imminent congestion of such aircraft at Gander;

(b) to permit military aircraft having insufficient range to be flown with safety from Gander to Britain to be flown from Labrador by stages, i.e. by way of airbases in Greenland and Iceland;

(c) to improve air protection for transatlantic ship convoys and

(d) to enhance the effectiveness of plans for the defence of the Western Hemisphere which at that time was a pressing strategical problem.

In view of what was then the overriding importance of the delivery of aircraft to Britain for use on all fronts (the United States being then a Neutral State) it was not possible to wait for the settlement of the details of the terms on which Newfoundland could agree to the project before work was started. Accordingly the Canadian Government, with the approval of the Newfoundland Government, began construction on the strength of a general assurance that the Newfoundland Government agreed to the project in principle. The first plane arrived at Goose Bay in December, 1941.

The terms and conditions governing Canada’s construction of the base at her own cost were necessarily discussed in secret. It would have been impossible to consult public opinion without revealing information which
might have been of the greatest value to the enemy at that time. The main principles agreed with Canada were:

(a) that Canada should be given a lease of Crown land, and should be permitted to acquire a lease of any private land required for the air base, for a period (99 years) commensurate with the life of the structures etc., erected or placed on such land at the cost of Canadian funds;

(b) that such lease or leases should not involve the transfer from Newfoundland to Canada of sovereignty in the area and that the laws of Newfoundland should run in the base area as well as outside it:

(c) that Canada should have the right during the period of the lease to construct and operate the air base for the purposes of operations in the Atlantic area and for the defence of Canada and Newfoundland within the general scheme of hemisphere defence; and

(d) that the question of use of the base for civil or commercial operations after the war should be reserved for discussion after the war.

The size of the area which was to be the subject of the lease was discussed entirely from the point of view of the present and future requirements of the defence of the air base itself and of the Western Hemisphere. Having regard to the rapidly increasing range of aircraft and to other recent developments affecting aerial warfare it was agreed that a necessary area of approximately 120 square miles should be set aside to meet the requirements of defence.

The Agreement which the Bill now published for general information will validate has already been signed by representatives of the two Governments. It is in accord with the principles set out above. Further it restricts the use of water powers in the leased areas to purposes of the air base and to such water powers as may be agreed on with the Government of Newfoundland. It confers no rights to exploit timber on the area, but a general assurance has been given to Canada that her agents will be permitted to take from the area an adequate supply of timber, rock and sand for purposes of the construction and maintenance of the base. Mineral rights are excluded.

The Lease which will be issued after the Bill has become law will reproduce the terms of the Agreement.”


United States Bases in Newfoundland
The victories of the German armies in Western Europe during the spring and early summer of 1940 gave Hitler control of Europe’s Atlantic coastline from Narvik to the Spanish frontier. From the seaports and airbases of that coastline the U-boats and the Luftwaffe waged unremitting and increasingly effective warfare against British shipping. The Battle of the Atlantic developed into a grim struggle for Great Britain’s survival, in which the resources of the Royal Navy were hard pressed to keep open the vital sea lanes between the “Arsenal of Democracy” in the United States and the sallyport of freedom in the British Isles. The strengthening of the British fleet, particularly in destroyers, became an imperative and urgent need. Fortunately, the United States was able to supply Great Britain’s need for destroyers and proved willing to do so. Under the impact of German victories, American isolationism was slowly but surely yielding to the realization that the defeat of Britain would imperil the security of the United States. Early in July, the British Admiralty announced the mining of the waters between the Orkney Islands and Iceland, and between Ireland and Greenland. The fact that Greenland had been brought into the war zone drove home to the United States the imminence of her danger, and helped to hasten the steady change in American opinion. The United States realized that, although she was not a belligerent, her safety and that of the entire Western Hemisphere were menaced by Germany’s drive to the west. Accordingly, on 18 August, the United States government agreed with the Canadian government to establish a permanent joint defence board to “consider in a broad sense the defence of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.” The first essential in an effective scheme of hemisphere defence was the construction of an outer ring of airbases to protect the eastern approaches to the North American continent, particularly in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. For this, however, the cooperation of the British Empire was indispensable as these defence bases could be built only on British territory, e.g., in British Guiana, in the British West Indies and in Newfoundland. Thus Great Britain possessed just what the United States needed, strategic sites for defence bases to safeguard the North American continent, while the United States possessed just what Great Britain needed, destroyers to combat the submarine threat. Out of this happy coincidence there came the famous destroyer-bases exchange—an exchange which truly blessed both him who gave and him who received. Late in August, the British prime minister stated that Great Britain was prepared to lease naval bases to the United States. Early in September, the United States president announced the forthcoming transfer to Great Britain of 50 over age destroyers. On 5 November Mr. Roosevelt was elected president of the United States a third time. Five weeks later, it was officially announced that an arrangement had been reached for the leasing of bases to the United States in return for the transfer of destroyers to Britain.

The arrangement had been accomplished by an exchange of notes on 2 September between the British ambassador at Washington [the Marquess of Lothian and the United States secretary of state [Cordell Hull]. The British
ambassador’s note stated that the government of the United Kingdom “will secure the grant to the Government of the United States, freely and without consideration, of the lease for immediate establishment and use of Naval and Air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof on the Avalon Peninsula and on the Southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.” The reasons for the grant of these leases were set forth in the ambassador’s note. They were, first, “the friendly and sympathetic interest of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States; and, second, “their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to co-operate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.”

Lord Lothian’s note also promised the grant of similar leases in British Guiana and in the following islands of the British West Indies—the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, and Trinidad. These additional leases, however, were made “in exchange for Naval and Military equipment and material which the United States Government will transfer to His Majesty’s Government.” This “Naval and Military equipment” was defined in Mr. Cordell Hull’s note in reply as “fifty United States Destroyers generally referred to as the twelve-hundred ton type.” It is therefore clear that the leases granted in Newfoundland and in Bermuda were explicitly excluded from this exchange and consequently did not form an integral part of the destroyers-bases deal, although they were of course closely associated with it. They were really free gifts of the United Kingdom government to the United States government.

The British ambassador’s note further provided that leases of all the bases and facilities referred to, including those in Newfoundland and Bermuda, were to extend, “for a period of ninety-nine years” and were to be granted “free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question.” Moreover, the grant of the leases was to carry with it all the “rights, power and authority…necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases and appropriate provisions for their control,” and these “rights, power, and authority” were to be exercisable by the United States not merely “within the bases leased,” but also “within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases.” The “adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which these areas are situated” were to be “determined by common agreement,” but [w]ithout prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States.”

Finally, it was agreed that “[t]he exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the necessary seaward, coast and anti-aircraft defences, the
location of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary facilities, shall be determined by common agreement.”

The general arrangement embodied in this exchange of notes was confirmed by the definite agreement signed on 27 March 1941 at London by and on behalf of the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. While this agreement was still in draft, the Newfoundland government was informed of its terms in so far as they related to Newfoundland. The Commissioner for Justice and Defence and the Commissioner for Finance were invited to London to consult with the British cabinet prior to the signing of the agreement. In the course of an interview with the British prime minister on 18 March, the Commissioners expressed to him the apprehension they felt as to the reactions of the Newfoundland people to some of the provisions of the proposed agreement. They emphasized the great importance attached by Newfoundland to the matters dealt with in the agreement, and they pointed out that Newfoundland was being asked to give up much that she held to be of great value.

Following this interview, Mr. Churchill addressed a letter to the Commissioner for Justice and Defence, on 22 March, in which he expressed his deep appreciation of the “considerable sacrifice” that Newfoundland was being asked to make, and he regretted its necessity. He recalled, however, that the original exchange of notes had been “hailed and rightly so, not only as an act of highest significance in itself but also as a symbol of co-operation between the great democracies in defence of liberty and all that they hold dear.” He added that “[t]he fruits of that Agreement in this wide sphere are already being made manifest ever more and more as each day passes” and that “[w]ithout this Agreement it is impossible to say what would be the effect on the prosecution of the war and the whole future of the world.” Furthermore, he expressed “every confidence that all those who have to administer the provisions of the instrument in practice will do so with regard not so much to the letter of the documents as to the spirit animating the Governments who have put their signature to them.” It was, he said, “with these considerations in our minds that, recognising to the full the considerable sacrifice made by Newfoundland to the cause that we all have at heart and her splendid contribution to the war effort, that we ask her to accept the Agreement.” He appealed to the people of Newfoundland “of whose loyalty we have in this tested time as throughout her long and eventful history had ample proof, to bear in mind the wide issues which hang upon this Agreement.” It would, he concluded, “be yet one more example of what she [Newfoundland] is ready to do for the sake of the Empire, of liberty and of the welfare of all mankind.”

In his reply, on 24 March, the Commissioner for Justice and Defence promised to “take the earliest opportunity of making known your views to our people and feel confident that the personal commendation of acceptance of the Agreement by the Empire’s leaders in this crisis will not fail to impress them
with the importance of the part they are playing in strengthening co-operation between the two great Democracies in the struggle for the freedom of mankind.”

In this expectation the Commissioner was fully justified, for the agreement was voluntarily accepted and loyally observed by the people of Newfoundland.

The principal provisions of the agreement, in so far as it related to Newfoundland, fall into six chief groups. The first group of provisions refers to the rights and powers of the United States in the leased areas, and are covered by the first three articles of the agreement. Thus Article One declared that the “rights, power and authority” of the United States in the leased areas, were to include (a) the construction (including dredging and filling), maintenance, operation, use, occupation and control of the bases; (b) the improvement and deepening of the harbours, channels, entrances, and anchorages, and generally the fitting of the premises for use as naval and air bases; (c) the control, “so far as may be required for the efficient operation of the Bases, and within the limits of military necessity.” of “anchorages, moorings and movements of ships and water-borne craft and the anchorages, moorings, landings, take-offs, movements and operations of aircraft”; (d) the regulation and control “within the Leased Areas of all communications within, to, and from the areas leased”; (e) the installation, maintenance, use, and operation of “under-sea and other defences, defence devices and controls, including detecting and other similar facilities.”

The United States was also granted “all the rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Leased Areas, which are necessary to provide access to and defence of the Leased Areas, or appropriate for control thereof.” However, in the exercise of these rights, the United States agreed that the powers granted to it outside the leased areas would “not be used unreasonably or, unless required by military necessity, so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation or communication to or from, or within the Territories” but in a spirit of good neighbourliness, and after consultation between the governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom.

By Article Two the United States was authorized also to exercise all such special emergency powers in Newfoundland and its surrounding waters or air spaces as might be necessary for the conduct of military operations, provided that these powers were used in the spirit of good neighbourliness.

Article Three stipulated that in the event of non-user by the United States, the governments of the United States and Newfoundland might “take such steps” in the leased areas “as shall be agreed with the United States to be
desirable for the maintenance of public health, safety, law and order, and, if necessary, for defence.”

The second group of provisions defined the respective jurisdiction of the United States authorities and of the Newfoundland government, and were contained in Articles Four to Eight inclusive. Article Four distinguished between two types of offence, viz., (a) offences “of a military nature, punishable under the law of the United States, including, but not restricted to, treason, an offence relating to sabotage or espionage, or any other offence relating to the security and protection of United States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment or other property or to operations of the Government of the United States” in Newfoundland; and (b) offences of any other nature. In the case of any offence of this latter type the United States was to “have the absolute right in the first instance to assume and exercise jurisdiction,” provided, first, that the person charged was not a British subject, [and], second, that he was charged with having committed the offence within a leased area. In cases of the former type, the United States was to have the same right of absolute jurisdiction but with wider scope. Thus, if the person charged were not a British subject, the case was to come under United States jurisdiction even if the offence was alleged to have been committed outside a leased area. Moreover, if the accused were a British subject, the United States was to have the same right of absolute jurisdiction, subject, however, to two conditions: first, that the accused was charged with having committed the offence within a leased area; and, second, that he was apprehended within a leased area. A British subject charged with having committed an offence of a military nature “within a leased area, but apprehended outside a leased area was to be tried by a Newfoundland court unless the offence was not punishable under Newfoundland law, in which case, he was, on the request of the United States authorities, to be apprehended and surrendered to the United States authorities who would then “have the right to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the alleged offence.” In the event of the United States exercising jurisdiction in the case of a British subject, he was to be “tried by a United States court sitting in the Leased Area” in Newfoundland. Should the United States choose not to assume and exercise jurisdiction in the case of an alleged offender, it was laid down that “the United States Authorities shall, where such offence is punishable in virtue of legislation enacted pursuant to Article V [see below] or otherwise under the law of the Territory [Newfoundland], so inform the Government of the Territory and shall, if it shall be agreed between the Government of the Territory and the United States Authorities that the alleged offender should be brought to trial, surrender him to the appropriate authority in the Territory for that purpose.” Finally, Article Four stated that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect, prejudice or restrict the full exercise at all times of jurisdiction and control of the United States in matters of discipline and internal administration over members of the United States forces, as conferred by the law of the United States and any regulations made thereunder.”
By Article V, the Newfoundland government undertook to enact “legislation to ensure the adequate security and protection of the United States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment and other property, and the operations of the United States under the Leases and this Agreement and the punishment of persons who may contravene any laws or regulations made for that purpose.” The Newfoundland Government also agreed “from time to time” to “consult with the United States Authorities in order that the laws and regulations of the United States and the Territory [Newfoundland] in relation to such matters, may, so far as circumstances permit, be similar in character.”

Article VI described the procedure to be followed by the government of Newfoundland and the United State authorities in the provision of reciprocal facilities for the service of process upon, and the arrest and surrender of, alleged offenders.

Article VII provided for the right of audience for United States counsel (before any Newfoundland court) “[i]n cases in which a member of the United States forces shall be a party to civil or criminal proceedings in any court of the Territory [Newfoundland] by reason of some alleged act or omission arising out of or in the course of his official duty.”

The third group of provisions related to rights of the United States authorities to use the public services of Newfoundland, and were covered by Article IX-XII inclusive. Thus Article IX accorded to the United States “the right to employ and use all utilities, services and facilities, roads, highways, bridges, viaducts, canals and similar channels of transportation belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Government of the Territory [Newfoundland] or the Government of the United Kingdom, under conditions comparable to and no less favourable than those applicable from time to time to the Government of the United Kingdom.” Under Article X the United States was granted the right, after appropriate notification to the Newfoundland government, of making “topographic and hydrographic surveys outside the Leased Areas in any part of the Territory [Newfoundland] and waters adjacent thereto.” It was also agreed that there should be a reciprocal exchange of information derived from all surveys made outside the leased areas by the United States authorities and the United Kingdom or Newfoundland governments. Article XI referred to shipping and aviation. It laid down five principles, as follows: (1) Lights and other navigational aids to vessels and aircraft located in the leased areas and the adjacent territorial waters must conform to the system in use in Newfoundland. Their position, characteristics, and any alteration of position or characteristics must be notified in advance to the appropriate department of the Newfoundland government. (2) “United States public vessels operated by the War or Navy Departments, by the Coastguard or by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, bound to or departing from a Leased Area shall not on entering or leaving the Leased Area or the territorial waters in the vicinity thereof be
subject to compulsory pilotage or to light or harbour dues in the Territory [Newfoundland]. If a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.” (3) “British commercial vessels may use the Leased Areas on the same terms and conditions as United States commercial vessels.” (4) British vessels may trade between the United States and the leased areas. (5) “Commercial aircraft will not be authorised to operate from any of the Bases (save in case of emergency or for strictly military purposes under supervision of the War or Navy Departments) except by agreement between the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom; provided that in the case of Newfoundland such agreement shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland.” Article XII concerned motor traffic, and stated that “[s]tandard and test types of motor vehicles as determined by the United States shall not be prevented from using roads in a Territory [Newfoundland] by reason of non-compliance with any law relating to construction of motor vehicles.” United States government motor vehicles were also exempted from Newfoundland registration and licensing types of fees.

The fourth group of provisions referred to immigration, taxation, postal facilities, etc., and was contained in Articles XIII-XVIII inclusive. Article XIII declared that “any member of the United States Forces posted to a Leased Area or any person (not being a national of a Power at war with His Majesty the King) employed by, or under a contract with, the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases” in Newfoundland, was to be exempted from the immigration laws of Newfoundland. It was agreed, however, that “suitable arrangements will be made by the United States to enable such persons to be readily identified and their status to be established.” Moreover, if their status were altered in such a way that they would no longer be entitled to such exemption, the United States authorities would notify the Newfoundland government to that effect, and, if necessary, provide them with passage from Newfoundland and prevent them “becoming a public responsibility” of Newfoundland.

Article XIV stipulated that no Newfoundland “import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost” was to be charged on:

“(a) material, equipment, supplies or goods for use in the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States Authorities or a contractor;

(b) goods for use or consumption aboard United States public vessels or the Army, Navy, Coast Guard or Coast and Geodetic Surveys;

(c) goods consigned to the United States authorities for the use of institutions under Government control known as Post Exchange, Ships’ Service Stores, Commissary Stores or Service Clubs, or for sale thereat to members of the
United States forces, or civilian employees of the United States being nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the Bases, or members of their families resident with them and not engaged in any business or occupation in the Territory [Newfoundland]."

(d) the personal belongings or household effects of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (c), and of contractors and their employees being nationals of the United States employed in the construction, maintenance or operation of the Bases and present in the Territory [Newfoundland] by reason only of such employment."

No export tax was to be charged on any of the above mentioned materials, etc., in the event of their re-shipment from Newfoundland. The exemption from taxation was to apply even if the material, etc., "pass through other parts of the Territory [Newfoundland] en route to or from a Leased Area.” In return for these concessions, the United States authorities agreed to take administrative measures “to prevent abuses of the customs privileges granted,” and to cooperate with the Newfoundland government to that end.

Article XV stated that no wireless station was to be established and no submarine cable landed in a leased area otherwise than for military purposes, without the consent of the Newfoundland government. “All questions relating to frequencies, power and like matters, used by apparatus designed to emit electric radiation” were to be settled “by mutual arrangement.” Article XVI granted to the United States “the right to establish United States Post Offices in the Leased Areas for the exclusive use of the United States forces, and civilian personnel (including contractors and their employees) who are nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between United States Post Offices in Leased Areas and between such Post Offices and other United States Post Offices in the Panama Canal Zone and the Philippine Islands.” In connection with this article, it was agreed by an exchange of letters on 27 March 1941 between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Winant that mails passing between United States post offices would not be subject to censorship except by the United States, and that the United States and British authorities would “collaborate to prevent their respective mails, in the Leased Areas or in the Territories in which they are located, being used prejudicially to the security of the other.”

By Article XVII, members of the United States forces and civilian personnel, being nationals of the United States serving or employed at the bases, were granted exemption from income tax, poll tax, “or any tax on ownership or use of property which is inside a Leased Area, or situated outside the Territory [Newfoundland].” Moreover, “[n]o person ordinarily resident in the United States” was to be “liable to pay income tax in the Territory [Newfoundland] in respect of any profits derived under a contract made in the
United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, or any tax in the nature of a licence in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases.”

Article XVIII declared that, unless with the consent of the Newfoundland government, no business, except “the institutions referred to in Article XIV (1), (c),” and operating under the limitations of that article, could lawfully be established in the leased areas; and no person was “habitually to render any professional services in a Leased Area, except to, or for, the Government of the United States or the persons mentioned in Article XIV (1), (c),” without the consent of the Newfoundland government.

Articles XIX and XX contains the fifth group of provisions, which relate to certain rights to be enjoyed by the United States in parts of Newfoundland outside the leased areas. Article XIX stated that, although the United States was not to be bound to maintain forces outside the leased areas, yet any such forces stationed in or operating outside these areas under separate agreement with the government of the United Kingdom or the Newfoundland government were to be entitled to the same rights and to enjoy the same status as United States forces stationed within the leased areas. Under Article XX, the United States was to have the right, in collaboration with the Newfoundland government, “and, where necessary, with the Local Authority concerned, to exercise, without other consideration than just compensation to private owners, if any, such powers as such Government and Local Authority and the Government of the United Kingdom may possess of entering upon any property in the vicinity of the Leased Areas for the purpose of inspection, and of taking any necessary measures to improve sanitation and protect health.”

The sixth and last group of provisions are contained in Articles XXI to XX inclusive. They deal with such matters as the abandonment of the leased areas, the removal of improvements, the reservations of certain rights to the government and people of Newfoundland, and acquisition by the United States of supplementary leases, and the modification of the agreement. Thus Article XXI states that “[t]he United States may at any time abandon any Leased Area or any part thereof, without thereby incurring any obligation, but shall give to the United Kingdom as long notice as possible and in any case not less than one year, of its intention to do so.” Moreover, “[a]t the expiration of such notice the area abandoned shall revert to the Lessor.” However, “[a]bandonment shall not be deemed to have occurred in the absence of such notice.” Article XXII provided that “[t]he United States may at any time before the termination of a lease, or within reasonable time thereafter, take away all or any removable improvements placed by or on behalf of the United States in the Leased Areas or territorial waters.” By Article XXIII the United States undertook not to “assign or underlet or part with the possession of the whole or
any part of any Leased Area, or of any right, power or authority granted by the Leases or this Agreement.” Article XXIV stated that, on the signing of the agreement, leases of the leased areas should be forthwith executed, and, thereupon, the transfer of all rights, power, authority and possession under the leases and the Agreement would become effective immediately. However, pending the execution of the leases, these rights, etc., were to be exercised “ad interim,” and possession of the leased area would be given as rapidly as possible, and in any case immediately the location of such areas had been ascertained. The rights of occupiers of building in the leased areas were, however, protected to the extent that they were not “to be removed from such buildings until reasonable notice to vacate has been given and expired, due regard being made to the necessity of obtaining alternative accommodation.” By Article XXV “[a]ll minerals (including oil) and antiquities and all rights thereto and to treasure trove, under, upon or connected with the land and water comprised in the Leased Areas or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this Agreement” were reserved to the government and people of Newfoundland, on condition, however, that “no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the Leased Areas, without the consent of the United States.” Of particular importance to Newfoundland was the second section of this article which stated that “[t]he United States will permit the exercise of fishing privileges within the Leased Areas in so far as they may be found compatible with military requirements, and in the exercise of its rights will use its best endavour to avoid damage to fisheries” in Newfoundland. Article XXVII provided that “[t]he United States may, by common agreement, acquire by supplementary lease for the unexpired period of the Lease granted in a Territory [Newfoundland], such additional areas, sites and locations as may be found necessary for the use and protection of the Bases upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed, which shall, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, be on the basis of those contained in this Agreement.” Article XXVIII declared that “sympathetic consideration” would be given by the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to representations made by either for the modification of the agreement after it had been in force “a reasonable time,” and that any such modifications were to be “by mutual consent.” Finally, Article XXIX stated that the United States and the government of Newfoundland, respectively, would “do all in their power to assist each other in giving full effect to the provisions of this Agreement according to its tenor and will take all appropriate steps to that end.” Moreover, it was laid down that “[d]uring the continuation of any Lease, no laws of the Territory [Newfoundland] which would derogate from or prejudice any of the rights conferred on the United States by the Lease or by this Agreement shall be applicable within the Leased Area, save with the concurrence of the United States”.

The leases granted to the United States in Newfoundland were described in the first part of Annex II to the agreement. This annex is in the form of an indenture of lease. It witnessed that, in consideration of the
undertaking of the government of the United Kingdom in the agreement of 27 March 1941, “the Newfoundland Government hath demised and leased and by these presents doth demise and lease unto the United States of America all those six several pieces or parcels of land (hereinafter referred to as the Leased Areas) described in the Schedule to these presents and delineated on the plans hereto annexed: TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same for the full end and term of ninety-nine years to begin and to be computed from the date of these presents free from the payment of all rent and charges other than compensation as aforesaid. AND the United States of America agrees that it will not during the term hereby granted use the Leased Areas nor permit the use thereof except for the purposes specified and on the terms and conditions contained in the aforesaid Notes and Agreement, which are incorporated in and form part of these presents except such parts thereof as refer specifically to territory other than Newfoundland.”

The six parcels of land granted as leased areas were set forth in detail in the schedule to the Annex were as follows:

“(1) Beginning at the intersection of the shoreline northwest of Placentia with latitude 47° 16′ N., thence due east approximately 7,300 feet to longitude 53° 58′ 18″ W.; thence in a northeasterly direction approximately 8,200 feet to latitude 47° 17′ 12″ N., longitude 53° 57′ 25″ W.; thence in a northwesterly direction approximately 4,200 feet to the intersection of the shoreline with longitude 53° 57′ 58″ W.; thence along the shoreline to the point of beginning, including therein the Peninsula of Argentia lying between Little Placentia Harbour and Placentia Bay, the entire site containing approximately 2,610 acres; there is reserved from the foregoing all those areas, contained within a right-of-way of the Newfoundland Railway, its wharf, property and station at Argentia, as may be mutually determined to be essential to the operation of the said Railway.

(2) Beginning at the intersection of The Boulevarde, along the northwest short of Quidi Vidi Lake, with the road approximately perpendicular thereto at the Rose residence known as Grove Farm Road; thence approximately 600 yards northwest along the road and its extension; thence generally north on an irregular line along, but not including, the southeast edge of the golf course; thence generally north to the junction of the White Hills Roads; thence southeast along the northernmost of these roads to The Boulevarde; thence generally southeast to point of beginning.

(3) An area about 300 feet wide on the eastern boundary of the municipal park between The Boulevarde and the shoreline of Quidi Vidi Lake, the two last above described areas containing approximately 160 acres.
(4) An area of approximately 700 feet by 1,400 feet on the crest of the White Hills about ½ mile east of the White Hills Road with a connecting strip about 60 feet wide across the property of Arthur Cooke.

(5) Beginning at a point on the shoreline of St. George’s Bay eastward of the town of Stephenville and about 1,350 feet southeast of the small natural outlet of Blanche Brook, which outlet is about 16,000 feet northeast of Indian Head Light at the entrance of St. George’s Harbour; thence north 50º 30′ east a distance of about 1,285 feet to a point on the west shoreline of Stephenville Pond at its northwest outlet; thence following the general westerly shoreline of Stephenville Pond northwesterly to a point on said shoreline which bears north 25º 15′ east and is approximately 3,700 feet from the last described point; thence north 7º 45′ east a distance of 1,970 feet to a point; thence north 47º west a distance of 4,220 feet to a point; thence south 43º west a distance of about 6,850 feet to the shoreline of St. George’s Bay (this course touches the shoreline of Blanche Brook at a point about 900 feet northwest from St. George’s Bay); thence southwesterly following the general shoreline of St. George’s Bay for a distance of about 5,000 feet to the point of beginning.

(6) From a point at the intersection of the centre lines of Signal Hill Road and Middle Battery Road; thence south 44º 17′ 41.3″ east along Middle Battery Road for a distance of 286.11 feet; thence south 54º 9′ 41.3″ east along Middle Battery Road for a distance of 95.36 feet to the point which is the point of commencement; thence from the point of commencement south 18º 39′ 3″ and west for a distance of 201.44 feet; thence south 12º 4′ 2″ and west for a distance of 12 feet; thence along the north shoreline of St. John’s Harbour southward and eastward for a distance of 1,025 feet; thence north 26º 26′ 47.57″ east for a distance of 50 feet to the center line of Middle Battery Road; thence along Middle Battery Road north 57º 5′ 32.43″ west for a distance of 246.17 feet; thence north 85º 57′ 28.49″ west for a distance of 182.86 feet; thence north 73º 16′ 50.1″ west for a distance of 165.95 feet; thence north 55º 29′ 29.31″ west for a distance of 243.87 feet; thence north 54º 9′ 41.3″ west for a distance of 199.67 feet, to the point of commencement.”

In a letter to Mr. Winant [US Ambassador John G. Winant] on 27 March 1941, Mr. Churchill declared that it was “the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that, upon the resumption by Newfoundland of the constitutional status held by it prior to the 16th February, 1934, the words ‘the Government of the United Kingdom,’ wherever they occur in a provision applicable to Newfoundland in the said Agreement, shall be taken to mean, so far as Newfoundland is concerned, the Government of Newfoundland, and the Agreement shall then be construed accordingly.” In his reply the United States ambassador placed it on record that his government accepted that interpretation as “the understanding between the two Contracting Governments in this matter.”
A protocol, signed on 27 March 1941, by the plenipotentiaries of the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, was attached to the agreement. Its purpose was “to clarify certain matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland arising out of the Agreement,” so as to safeguard Canadian interests in Newfoundland’s defence. The Protocol consisted of four articles, as follows:

1. It is recognised that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence, and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government, which has already assumed certain responsibilities for this defence.

2. It is agreed therefore that, in all powers which may be exercised and in such actions as may be taken under the Agreement for the use and operation of the United States bases dated the 27th March, 1941, in respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected.

3. Nothing in the Agreement shall affect arrangements relative to the defence of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to those Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence—United States and Canada.

4. It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles I (4), II and XI (5) of the Agreement, or of any other Articles involving considerations of defence, the Canadian as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.”
IV
FINANCIAL MEASURES
At the beginning of July 1939, two months before the war began, the Newfoundland government had in contemplation an extensive programme of public expenditure on reconstruction. As had been announced in the budget speech of 3 July of that year, this programme was based on the expectation that a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom would provide $5,737,000 in aid of Newfoundland revenues in the current financial year. The outbreak of war led to changes in financial policy in almost all the countries of the Empire. Newfoundland was no exception and, from the early days of the war, consideration was given to large-scale modifications in the government’s financial plans.

A provisional arrangement was accordingly announced in a supplementary budget of 21 November 1939. The new principle adopted was that the amount of the grant-in-aid of Newfoundland from the United Kingdom should not be such as to impose any exchange burden on the mother country; in other words no grant-in-aid should be asked for in excess of Newfoundland’s own sterling expenditure in Great Britain, the amount of which was estimated at £950,000 or the equivalent of approximately $4,250,000. This decision involved the reduction of the grant-in-aid by approximately $1,500,000. This was met by reductions in expenditure during the financial year 1939-1940 of $750,000 and by increases of taxation to yield a similar sum during the same year.

The increased taxation took the form of a surtax on or addition to the income tax of from 20% to 25% of the tax as previously existing, the basic rates remaining unchanged; a surtax of 10% on estate duties; an increase of 3 cents a gallon on the import duty on gasoline, and an increase in the duty on matches. These increases, together with $250,000 to be derived from the improved yield of taxation previously existing, was estimated to produce the additional revenue required in the year ending 30 June 1940.

Actually, the out-turn for the year was rather better than the estimates had forecast. The deficit to be covered by the grant-in-aid would have been just under $4,000,000 instead of $4,250,000 estimated. The undertaking to reduce the deficit to within the amount of the Newfoundland government’s sterling expenditure was fulfilled.

As the year 1940 advanced, however, the course of events on the European continent again transformed the financial outlook. The German conquest of France and the Low Countries brought the war to the shores of Great Britain herself. The Battle of Britain, on which the fate of the British Commonwealth and Empire depended, had begun. In these critical circumstances it seemed the plain duty of Newfoundland to provide all the financial assistance within its power. Accordingly, a loan act was passed on 17 June 1940, authorising the government to launch the Newfoundland War Loan of 1940. The objective of the loan was to raise $1,500,000, this sum being
approximately the amount required to provide the balance of interest and sinking fund of the public debt due in London on 30 June 1940. The bonds were of 25 year maturity, bearing interest of 3 3/4% and were issued at par plus accrued interest for any sales made after 1 July 1940. The loan was oversubscribed by $131,600 and the required sum was raised in five and a half working days. This amount, together with $500,000 drawn from the Newfoundland exchequer balance, was transferred to London before the end of June. By this means the actual amount of the grant-in-aid paid from United Kingdom funds during the financial year 1939-1940 was reduced to less than two million dollars ($1,970,000).

On 3 July 1940, the budget for the financial year 1940-1941 was published. Its outstanding feature was the enunciation of the new principle that “Newfoundland, if at all possible, will not ask the United Kingdom for financial assistance to balance the Budget for the remainder of the war.”

To give effect to this pledge, estimated expenditure was cut to $15,450,000, notwithstanding the inclusion of a new vote for war services amounting to $732,771. This involved a reduction in total expenditure of nearly $1,000,000 as compared with the estimates for the preceding year as revised after the outbreak of the war, and a reduction of over $1,500,000 as compared with the original programme for 1939-1940. Correspondingly, the revenue estimate was increased by $1,000,000 over the revised estimate for 1939-1940, and by over $2,000,000 as compared with the original estimates for that year. Thus, as compared with these original estimates, the deficit was reduced from $5,750,000 by over $3,750,000, somewhat to under $2,000,000. As the Commissioner for Finance stated in his budget speech, “both sides [of the budget] are to some extent inflated by this special load of War expenditure. The Budget for the new year is thus in a very real measure a War Budget.”

To secure the increased revenue for the year a number of additional war taxes were imposed. They were as follows:

(a) Income Tax

(1) The basic rate of the tax on corporation profits was increased from 12% to 15%—an increase that was estimated to yield an additional $155,000.

(2) The basic rate of super tax was raised from 6% to 8% on incomes from $10,000 to $20,000, and thereafter by 5% on each gradation of income. This increase was estimated to yield an additional $15,000, making a total additional estimated revenue of $170,000 from income tax.

(b) Customs and Excise
(1) The duty on sugar was increased by 1¢ a lb.
(2) On cigarettes, the customs duty was increased by 45¢ a lb., and the excise duty by $1.00 a thousand.
(3) On cigarettes and pipe tobacco the customs and excise duties were increased by 40¢ a lb., on pipe tobacco only by 16¢ a lb., and on plug tobacco by 1¢ per 2 oz. plug.
(4) The customs duty on cinematograph films for public exhibition was increased from $2.60 per 1,000 feet to $6.60 per 1,000 feet.
(5) The distinction in the rates of customs duty in the case of perfumery and toilet preparations as between articles containing alcohol and those not containing alcohol was abolished. All those preparations except toilet soaps were in future to bear a customs duty of 65% ad valorem. Non alcoholic toilet preparations of British manufacture were, however, granted a preference of 10%.

c) Alcoholic Liquors

The special war tax on alcoholic liquors was raised from 10¢ a bottle and 5¢ a flask to the following rates: (1) 20¢ per bottle the selling price of which does not exceed $2.00; (2) 25¢ per bottle the selling price of which does not exceed $3.00; (3) 30¢ per bottle the selling price of which does not exceed $3.00; (4) 10¢ per pint flask; (5) 5¢ per small bottle of less than a reputed pint.

d) Licence fees

The annual licence fees charged in respect of breweries, tourist hotels, restaurants, clubs, etc., were raised by 50%. Moreover, a charge of $1.00 per hour was introduced in respect of permits issued for extensions of hours during which alcoholic liquors may be sold.

e) Postal and Telegraphic Rates

(1) The 1¢ postal rate was increased to 2¢.
(2) The 2¢ postal rate was increased to 3¢.
(3) The telegraphic rate was raised from 25¢ to 30¢ for the first ten words and from 2¢ to 3¢ for each extra word.
The Commissioner emphasized that “these taxes are intended for the war period only, and are imposed on this basis.” The total estimated yield of these various tax increases, including the income tax increases, amounted to $675,000 for 1940-1941.

The government was, however, still confronted by an estimated deficit of nearly $2,000,000 for the year. The government decided to have further recourse to internal borrowing. It was realized that the war loan of 1940 which had been issued in denominations of $100, $500, $1,000, $5,000 and $10,000 bonds did not meet the requirements of the smaller investors. Accordingly, an appeal for subscriptions to Newfoundland war savings certificates had been made just prior to the budget speech, and the Savings Certificates Act had been passed on 27 June 1940. These certificates were of $3.00 denominations and multiples thereof at an issue cost price of $2.50. They were to reach their full maturity value in six years from date of issue giving an interest yield at maturity equivalent to 3% compound. Interest earned on certificates was exempted from income tax but a limit of $500 (purchase price) was placed on the sales to any one person within any one calendar year.

In order to provide a means whereby individuals could buy war savings certificates by instalments, an act was passed on 30 August 1940 authorizing the issue of war savings stamps with a value of 10¢ denomination. War savings stamp cards for this purpose were made available. These provided for the affixation of twenty-five 10¢ war savings stamps. Upon completion of a war savings card, a war savings certificate was to be issued in exchange. The proceeds of the sales of these war savings certificates were expected to render substantial help in bridging the budget deficit. Furthermore, the budget speech promised that a further scrutiny of the estimates of expenditure would be made later in the year with a view to effecting additional economies. The results of this scrutiny of expenditure were announced in the supplementary budget of 30 November 1940. The further reductions of expenditure amounted to $575,000 after allowing for a higher war outlay. The returns of war savings certificates for the twelve month period were estimated at $500,000, and it was decided that no other loans would be raised for the purpose of balancing the budget. It was announced that the anticipated deficit would be met by further increases in taxation. These were effected by the following measures:

(1) The Income Tax and Death Duties Surtax Act was amended on 31 December 1940, by Act No. 40 of 1940 so as to increase the rate of surtax to 30% in the case of individuals and to 50% in the case of corporations. These provisions applied to 1940 incomes;

(2) The Revenue War Tax Act, 1940, imposed a new war revenue tax of 7½% on all dutiable imports except those from British countries which were on a sterling basis. This latter tax had the dual purpose of diverting import trade in favour of the sterling area, and of raising additional revenue. The estimated yield of these additional taxes was $850,000. Allowing for a small anticipated
increase in the returns from previously existing taxation and including the $500,000 expected from the sale of war savings certificates, it was estimated that the year 1940-1941 would show a surplus of approximately $250,000.

Actually, the out-turn for the financial year 1940-1941 exceeded these expectations. Thus, the revenue yielded $16,187,500 as against original estimate of $13,525,000, an excess of over $2,500,000. Expenditure was also higher than had been anticipated, but only slightly so—$15,491,000 as compared with the original estimate of $15,450,000. Thus while the supplementary budget of November 1940 had envisaged a surplus of $250,000 to be attained with the help of the sales of $500,000 worth of war savings certificates, the actual outcome was a surplus of $695,500, entirely apart from the proceeds of the sale of war saving certificates.

In his budget speech of 3 July 1941, the Commissioner for Finance announced that the war savings campaign would continue, because, although it was not required for the purpose of balancing the budget, it was “no less urgently needed for War purposes.” In making this announcement, he promised, on behalf of the Newfoundland government, that “for the period of the War, the proceeds of the sale of War Savings Certificates will be devoted solely to War purposes.” Moreover, he stated that the government had allocated $100,000 out of the 1940-1941 budget surplus as a reserve for their retirement, as “the beginning of a fund which I hope may be augmented in the future out of which repayments of certificates will be made. Any certificates which after the initial six months have to be repaid at the request of the owners will be repaid out of the fund.” He declared that “in 1940-1941 a new resource in this country has been mobilized, the savings of the people.” The Commissioner also paid high tribute to the public spirit shown by the members of the voluntary savings committees throughout the island. “In addition to giving time and advice to this work, members of these voluntary Committees have donated posters, borne the cost of advertisements, organized meetings and incurred travelling expenses. No local Committee has ever been paid a cent for the services of its members. They have all been give free. This is a war service to which those of us who must stay at home can apply ourselves in the firm knowledge that what we are doing has a direct bearing upon the Empire’s effort.” Another important factor in the success of the war savings campaign was the cooperation of the major industries of the island. They conducted intensive sales campaigns and instituted a system of voluntary deductions from payroll to facilitate the purchase of certificates by their employees. In appealing for continued subscriptions to war savings certificates, the Commissioner declared that for 1941-1942, $500,000 should be “the minimum of our aim, with the hope that it will in fact be substantially exceeded.”

These sales of war savings certificates had somewhat exceeded expectations, amounting to $534,000 as against an anticipated $500,000. As the proceeds of war savings certificates sales were not required to balance the
budget, the Newfoundland government decided to use the proceeds of the first $500,000 worth of war certificates presented as a free gift to the United Kingdom from the government of Newfoundland and was known as the 125th (Newfoundland) Squadron, Royal Air Force. It was to be manned by Newfoundlanders.

With regard to the disposition of the 1940-1941 budget surplus, $100,000, as pointed out above, was sent aside as a reserve for the redemption of war savings certificates; $250,000 was allocated to the reduction of the bank syndicate loan of $625,000 advanced in 1933 by four Canadian banks operating in Newfoundland—a loan guaranteed by the Canadian government; $300,000 was transferred to the United Kingdom as an interest-free loan to be repaid after the war. The balance of rather less than $50,000 was retained in the Newfoundland exchequer. Thus, the year 1941 was marked by the adoption of a new principle, viz., that Newfoundland should make her budget surplus available to the war effort in the form of interest-free loans to Great Britain. This policy was continued on an increasing scale in 1942 and 1943 as Newfoundland’s revenues soared and as her surplus grew ever larger.

Accordingly, in announcing the budget programme for 1941-1942, the Commissioners for Finance declared that “[f]or the new year we have felt it necessary to make our plans with a view to the paramount objective of giving the maximum help possible towards winning the war…Thus we have not shrunk from budgeting this year for a very substantial surplus.” Expenditure was accordingly cut down to an estimated $14,865,500. This was the lowest estimated total of expenditure since the financial year 1937-1938, notwithstanding the fact the 1941-1942 estimates included $600,000 for war purposes. Of this sum, $500,000 was voted for the Department of Defence and $100,000 was appropriated to miscellaneous war services under the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, Home Affairs, and Public Works, inclusive of the payment of $25,000 being Newfoundland’s contribution to the operation of the airport under the scheme for transatlantic air services. A considerable increase of revenue was estimated, the total yield being forecast at $17,463,000. Thus a surplus of $2,597,500 was anticipated.

In normal circumstances the government would probably have taken advantage of the opportunity to reduce taxation, but in view of the wartime financial needs of the Empire, it decided instead to devote its surplus to furthering the war effort. As the Commissioner for Finance put it in his budget speech, “Can we look to balancing of our own Budget or to the prospect of a surplus as a factor to be regarded in itself, isolated from the conditions governing the whole Empire?…I do not think we are justified in making a substantial reduction in the general level of taxation.”

Nevertheless, although there was no reduction in the general level of taxation, the government introduced a change of fiscal policy by shifting some
of the burden of taxation from indirect to direct taxes, thus transferring a considerable proportion of the tax load to the wealthier classes which were better able to carry it. Accordingly, the following tariff reductions were instituted:

(1) The war revenue tax of November 1940, was removed from wheat meal and flour, rolled oats, and cornmeal, and the duty on salt needed in the fisheries was abolished.

(2) The customs duty of 10¢ per 100 lbs. upon cattle and poultry feeds was abolished, leaving these items subject only to the revenue tax. Moreover, as a further assistance to dairy farmers, the duty on certain classes of dairy farming equipment was abolished altogether, and the duty on metal barn equipment was reduced by 35%.

(3) The duty on cocoa imported in bulk was reduced from 9½¢ to 7¢ per lb., and a similar reduction was made in the case of cocoa-milk powders imported in bulk.

(4) Reductions of varying amounts from 10% to 20% were made in the duties on twenty-five articles, mainly of domestic use or building materials on the ground that the war revenue tax had subjected them to an unusually high rate of duty.

(5) A number of administrative adjustments were made mainly in the case of importations of manufacturers in order to facilitate the industrial processes concerned.

The total net loss of revenue from these changes were estimated not to exceed $230,000.

To offset anticipated loss, the government introduced an excess profits tax of 25%. This tax was authorized by the Excess Profits Tax Act of November, 1941, which imposed a tax of 25% on all profits of corporations and joint stock companies in excess of either the average profits for the years 1938-1940 or the profits for the year 1940 whichever was more favourable to the corporation. A proviso limited tax payable under the Income Tax Act and the Excess Profits Act to 32½% of the net income of the year of taxation. This excess profits tax was to be payable on 1941 income. The budget speech pointed out that, as the rate of income tax applicable to corporation profits, together with the war surtax thereon, was previously 22½%, the maximum effect which the excess profit tax could have would be to increase the aggregate tax from 22½% to 32½%. In justifying this new tax, the Commissioner for Finance declared that if excess profits were made, “the State in present circumstances is entitled to take a part of them for urgent national and imperial needs.” He estimated the yield of the excess profit tax at
$240,000, approximately the equivalent of the net loss of revenue anticipated from the tariff reductions.

Pointing out that the estimated revenue of $17,463,000 amounted to approximately 31% of Newfoundland’s national income, the Commissioner for Finance described it as “a very high figure when it is remembered that the majority of our population are still living at low income levels, and that Newfoundland has not yet developed the large industrial and financial Corporations which are such a feature of economic life in the larger countries.”

Dealing with the disposition of the estimated surplus, the budget speech declared that of the total surplus of approximately $2,600,000, $500,000 would be retained in Newfoundland as a reserve against unforeseeable contingencies, $100,000 would be allocated to the fund established in the previous year for the redemption of war savings certificates, and $2,000,000 would be lent to Great Britain free of interest. Stressing Newfoundland’s eagerness to make the maximum contribution to the winning of the war, the Commissioner for Finance stated: “The people of Newfoundland have gone a long way already along this path of imperial co-operation for victory. Eighteen months ago we were saying that we in Newfoundland would not call upon Great Britain for dollars while the War lasted[;] twelve months ago we gave the further undertaking that we would not ask for any further assistance to balance the budget for the period of the War; today we are able to make an outright contribution on the financial side to the cost of victory. Whether still further sacrifices will be needed in the future or whether still further contributions must be made, who can say? I am sure of this, that Newfoundland will go on until victory is won.”

The actual out-turn for the financial year 1941-1942 far exceeded expectations. Revenue yielded $23,294,300, an excess of almost $6,000,000 over the estimate. This record revenue was derived principally from customs and excise duties and from income tax. The former yielded $16,803,000, of which just over $2,000,000 was obtained from the special war revenue tax. Income tax, including the excess profits tax and also the non-residents tax (a tax, introduced in January 1942 of 15% on non-residents in respect of dividends and interest from Newfoundland debitors and income from Newfoundland estates and trusts) yielded $3,306,000. These figures reflected an unprecedented prosperity in which the greatest factor was unquestionably the extension of work on defence projects which provided remunerative employment for thousands of workers.

Expenditure was also in excess of the estimate but only to the extent of a little more than $1,000,000. Part of this increase in expenditure was directly attributed to the war. Thus, the decision to increase the strength of the Newfoundland Militia “in order to make the Force a more complete and effective unit and to enable it to carry out the duties especially assigned to it,”
and the additional provisions made for civil defence, including the purchase of fire-fighting equipment, raised the expenditure of the Department of Defence by $141,000. Then again, the expenditure of the Department of Public Works exceeded the estimate by over $450,000, part of this excess being due to special war services, including the provision of mooring equipment in the harbour of St. John’s.

The surplus for the financial year 1941-1942 amounted to $7,211,000, more than four and a half million dollars greater than had been estimated. Of this surplus, $800,000 had up to 30 June 1942 been lent free of interest to the United Kingdom. A further $1,000,000 was lent on similar terms to the United Kingdom in the first week of July 1942 and was announced by the Commissioner for Finance in his budget speech of 14 July 1942. He pointed out on that occasion that all these temporary interest-free advances to the United Kingdom were repayable in Canadian dollars and had been “offered and accepted on the distinct understanding that they are subject to repayment on short notice; they will be repaid during the War if we need them to meet an emergency.” They thus served a double purpose: on the one hand they provided Great Britain with the dollar exchange that she needed for the successful prosecution of the war; and on the other hand they constituted a reserve fund for postwar reconstruction in Newfoundland. Up to 14 July 1942, the aggregate of these interest free loans financed by Newfoundland’s budget surplus amounted to $4,100,000. The Commissioner pointed out that additional sums totalling $1,997,000 had been advanced temporarily out of Newfoundland’s exchequer balance to finance accounts which the Newfoundland government was operating on a recoverable basis on behalf of the United Kingdom government. “These accounts,” he said, “relate to such transactions as the payment of allotments to the families of our men in the Army and Navy, and expenditure on recruiting for the Imperial Forces, but the main one, to which we have advanced over $1,460,000…represents sums paid in compensation to former property owners in the areas leased to the United States.” He explained that detailed statements of the awards thus made were being submitted to the United States government for direct repayment to the Newfoundland government. He added that “so far as Newfoundland is concerned the Government of the United Kingdom has undertaken ultimate responsibility for the settlement of these awards.”

The proceeds from the sales of war savings certificates during the financial year 1941-1942 amounted to $809,900, an increase of $275,000 over the previous year. In announcing this sum the Commissioner expressed his particular gratitude to the school teachers “who have so successfully encouraged their children and evoked a patriotic fervour and a desire to save which will, I hope, prove an inspiration to the parents.” At the date of the budget speech, 14 July 1942, $700,000 of this amount had been transferred to the United Kingdom government as a non-interest bearing temporary loan to be devoted to war purposes.
The Commissioner announced that the balance of $144,800 would in due course be similarly transferred to the United Kingdom with other amounts received from investors.

On 7 November 1942, the Loan Act, 1942, was passed authorizing a second war loan. This was known as the Victory Loan, and was to be applied to the redemption of the outstanding balance (£377,890) of the 5% sterling loan authorised under the Railway Settlement Act, 1923, and maturing in 1943. The amount of the Victory Loan was $1,500,000. The bonds were of 15 years maturity, bearing interest at 3¼% per annum, and were issued at par. Under the terms of the Loan Act, 1942, a sterling fund for the redemption of the bonds was to be built up at the rate of 2% per annum. The public appreciated the advantage of converting an external obligation into an internal debt at a lower rate of interest. They also realised the importance of making dollar exchange immediately available to the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war. Consequently, there was an enthusiastic response to the Victory Loan. The lists were opened on 16 November 1942 and were closed on 21 November, the amount of the loan having been oversubscribed by $384,000.

Finance: 1942-1943

During the nine months period from 1 July 1942 to 31 March 1943, the total revenue of the Newfoundland government amounted to $19,514,000 and its total expenditure to $15,832,800, resulting in a surplus of $3,681,200.

The expenditure of the Department of Defence increased from $637,265 for the full twelve month period ending 30 June 1942 to $1,625,701 for the nine months ending 31 March 1943. This figure exceeded the estimate of $717,900 by $907,801. The principal reasons for the increase were as follows:

(1) An additional $56,700 was spent on the pay and allowances of the Newfoundland Regiment, previously known as the Militia. This sum included an increase in the rates of family allowances paid to married members of the regiment and provided for the augmented strength of the force which was then being used as a training pool for the two artillery regiments serving overseas.

(2) Largely because of the expansion of the numbers of the force, an additional $86,700 was expended on its clothing, provisions, and other supplies.

(3) A further amount of $90,200 was spent to replace buildings which had been destroyed by fire.
(4) The supplementary allowances which it was decided to pay to the families of men serving overseas in the British navy, army, and air forces cost an additional $27,700.

(5) By far the greatest part of the increase was spent on deferred pay of the men themselves. The sum due under this head from 1 January 1942 to 31 March 1943 amounted to $655,000.

Under the head of the Department of Public Utilities, substantial additional expenditure was incurred for war services.

$131,000 was spent on the provision of an anchorage system for another harbour, similar to the system previously installed at St. John’s.

The unloading facilities at St. John’s harbour were improved by the purchase of a derrick scow which cost $66,900.

$53,500 was furnished by the Newfoundland government towards the cost of a hospital at St. John’s for the merchant navy. A further $40,000 was advanced towards the purchase of a hostel and recreational centre for the men of this service. The total expense in both these cases was shared with the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport.

Advances totalling $925,000 for the financial period were made to the Newfoundland Railway. These advances were made necessary because of the railway’s greatly increased activities which were due in large measure to the demands of the war effort, e.g., the haulage of supplies and equipment for the military bases. Furthermore, in addition to these advances, the Newfoundland Railway, up to 31 March 1943, received rolling stock and equipment to the value of $671,000 under the loan agreement made in 1941 with the United States Defence Supplies Corporation, the terms of which provided for a maximum loan of $2,100,000 (US).

By 31 March 1943, the total accumulated surplus of the Newfoundland government amounted to an aggregate of $11,263,000. Out of that sum, the Newfoundland government advanced temporary loans free of interest to the United Kingdom government totaling $6,500,000.

The Newfoundland government also made advances to finance accounts which it operated, on a recoverable basis, on behalf of the government of the United Kingdom. These accounts related to such transactions as the payment of allotments to the families of Newfoundlanders serving in the army and navy, and the payment of compensation to the former owners of property in the areas of Newfoundland leased to the government of the United States. By 31 March 1943, the amount advanced in payment of these compensation awards was $1,803,000. The government of the United Kingdom assumed responsibility
for the repayment to Newfoundland of these advances. The total balance of all advances outstanding on 31 March 1943 amounted to $2,407,900.

In November 1942, a Victory Loan of $1,500,000 was quickly raised by public subscription. The purpose of this loan was twofold. In the first place, it served to assist in the redemption of a 5% Sterling Loan, amounting to £377,890, the balance of $181,600 being provided from the Newfoundland exchequer. In the second place, it helped to provide the dollars so urgently needed by the United Kingdom for the purchase of war materials in the United States.

The continued sale of war savings certificates also contributed to this objective besides helping to combat price inflation. The total amount of war savings certificates sold in Newfoundland up to 31 March 1943 was $1,893,000. Of this sum, the Newfoundland government transferred $1,300,000 to the government of the United Kingdom as temporary interest-free loans to be used for war purposes. This sum was, of course, in addition to the interest-free loans totalling $6,500,000 advanced out of the accumulated surplus exchequer balances. The first $500,000 obtained from the sale of war savings certificates was transferred to the government of the United Kingdom for the purchase of aircraft required to equip the Newfoundland squadron.

**Finance: 1943-1944**

During the financial year from 1 April 1943 to 31 March 1944, the revenue of the Newfoundland government amounted to $28,552,363. This was in excess of the estimated revenue of $22,179,400 by $6,372,963.

The ordinary expenditure for the year was $21,656,723 and exceeded the estimate of $19,051,500 by $2,605,233. The reconstruction expenditure amounted to $1,260,969, which fell short of the estimate of $1,461,700 by $200,731. The total combined ordinary and reconstruction expenditure was $22,917,692, which exceeded the estimate by $2,404,492.

Thus the surplus of revenue over expenditure was $5,634,671. This sum exceeded the estimated surplus of $1,666,200 by $3,968,471.

The expenditure of the Department of Defence, which had been estimated at $1,706,200, actually reached $1,777,167. In his budget speech on 5 April 1944 the Honourable the Commissioner for Finance stated that provision had to be made for a number of increases in the Department of Defence totalling $177,000. These increases included the following:

1. $87,000 for deferred pay credited to the accounts of men of the Newfoundland Regiment on the same scale as that previously credited to the accounts of Newfoundlanders serving in the Imperial forces overseas.
(2) An additional sum of $39,000 was spent on civil defence, partly to cover the cost of trucks for the haulage of auxiliary fire pumping units.

(3) A further amount of $25,000 was spent to meet increased expenditure on uniforms for the Newfoundland Regiment. In this connection, the Honourable Commissioner explained that, since the Newfoundland Regiment had become the recruiting and training establishment for the artillery regiments overseas, there had been a considerable increase in the number of men provided with uniforms and outfitted in Newfoundland at the expense of the Newfoundland government.

(4) An addition of $20,000 was made to the amount originally allocated for the transportation in Newfoundland of Newfoundlanders in the Imperial forces coming home on leave.

The expenditure of the Department of Natural Resources included a sum of $75,800 provided by the Newfoundland government to purchase 7,500 quintals of heavy salted fish from Newfoundland exporters at cost price and without profit to the latter. This fish was sent as a free gift to the United Kingdom from the people of Newfoundland.

In the expenditure of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, an additional $18,000 was provided for supplementary assistance to members of the fighting services, and $30,000 for the pensions of disabled men and dependents of the mercantile marine serving on ships of the Newfoundland register who suffered injury or death as a result of enemy action.

By 31 March 1944, the total accumulated surplus of the Newfoundland government, after allowing for a deduction of $1,250,000 on account of the proportion of debt service charges accrued to that date but not payable until 30 July, amounted to $15,680,000. Out of that sum, the Newfoundland government had, by 31 March 1944, made temporary interest-free loans to the United Kingdom totalling $8,500,000. This represented an increase of $2,000,000 over the corresponding figure at the end of March 1943.

In the course of the financial year 1943-44, the outstanding balance of the special exchequer advances made by the Newfoundland government to the government of the United Kingdom on a recoverable basis was reduced from $2,407,900 to $670,000. This reduction was due to the fact that, during 1943-44, the government of the United Kingdom refunded to the Newfoundland government all the amounts advanced by the latter in respect of the United States leased areas up to 31 December 1942.

In November 1943, a second victory loan, this time for $2,000,000, was issued and met with an enthusiastic response from the people of
Newfoundland. It was quickly oversubscribed, and its proceeds provided sorely needed dollars for the United Kingdom and at the same time helped to reduce the external indebtedness of the Newfoundland government. This second victory loan was, of course, in addition to the interest-free loan of $2,000,000 made to the United Kingdom government in 1943-44 by the Newfoundland government out of its accumulated surplus.

Further financial assistance was rendered to the United Kingdom by the continued sale of war savings certificates. During 1943-44, the people of Newfoundland purchased $723,000 worth of war savings certificates. The response of the Newfoundlanders of the Overseas Forestry Unit and the school children of Newfoundland to the war savings campaign was particularly gratifying. Since the inception of that campaign in June 1940, the total sales of war savings certificates amounted to more than $2,600,000 and the total number of investors to over 55,000. The proceeds of these sales continued to be lent to the government of the United Kingdom as interest free loans, the Newfoundland government assuming liability for the payment of interest to the holders of the war savings certificates, and making regular provision each year for the payment of this interest as it accrued.

Finance: 1944-1945

During the financial year from 1 April to 31 March 1945, the total new revenue of the Newfoundland government amounted to $33,310,000. This exceeded the estimated revenue of $24,424,600 by $8,875,400. It also exceeded the total net revenue of 1943-44 by $4,709,000, although the revenue for 1943-44 had itself constituted a record up to that time.

The ordinary expenditure for 1944-45 was $21,817,059 and exceeded the estimate of $21,199,800 by only $617,259. The reconstruction expenditure amounted to $4,501,188, which was in excess of the estimate of $3,056,000 by $1,445,188. The total combined ordinary and reconstruction expenditure amounted to $26,318,247. This exceeded the estimate of $24,255,800 by $2,062,447.

Thus, the surplus of total net revenue over total expenditure was $6,991,753.

The expenditure of the Department of Defence which had been estimated at $1,673,500 actually turned out to be only $1,514,635, a decrease of $262,532 as compared with the actual expenditure for 1943-44.

Under the head of the expenditure for the Department of Public Works on war services, $143,000 was spent on the installation of water and sewerage services for the naval hospital erected on government land near St. John’s. An arrangement was made whereby the hospital would revert to the Newfoundland
government for its use when it was no longer required by the naval authorities after the war.

By 31 March 1945, the total accumulated surplus of the Newfoundland government amounted to $22,676,000, after allowing for a deduction of $1,250,000 on account of the annual adjustment in respect of liabilities for interest and sinking fund charges accrued but unpaid at 31 March.

In the early part of the year, the Newfoundland government made a further temporary interest free loan of $2,000,000 to the government of the United Kingdom. This brought the total of such loans made out of the revenue surplus to $10,500,000.

During the financial year 1944-45, the outstanding balance of the special exchequer advances made by the Newfoundland government to the government of the United Kingdom on a recoverable basis increased by $1,530,000, from $670,000 to $2,200,000. By far the greatest part of that sum was incurred by the payment of allotments to the wives and relatives of Newfoundlanders serving in the British armed forces. It also included an amount of approximately $425,000 in respect of compensation paid by the Newfoundland government on behalf of the government of the United Kingdom to former owners of property in the areas of Newfoundland leased to the United States.

At the end of 1944, it was decided to discontinue the issue of war savings certificates except to members of the Newfoundland Forestry Unit serving in the United Kingdom. The sales of war savings certificates in 1944-45 amounted to $457,000. The total sales of war savings certificates, from the inception of the war savings campaign in June 1940 to the end of March 1945 were $3,073,500. Of that total, $1,500,000 was advanced to the government of the United Kingdom in the form of interest-free loans. As already stated, the first $500,000 obtained from the sales of war savings certificates was transferred to the government of the United Kingdom for the purchase of aircraft required to equip the Newfoundland squadron. That amount was subsequently made good out of the general revenue of Newfoundland, an equivalent sum having been appropriated by the Newfoundland government for the purpose of meeting the redemption of war savings certificates. In addition, the unexpended balance of $773,500 from the proceeds of the sale of war savings certificates was paid into a fund for their eventual redemption.

Apart from the issue of war savings certificates, the Newfoundland government made no borrowings during the year 1944-45. On the other hand, a sum of £266,464 was set aside in that year, out of the proceeds of the second victory loan of $2,000,000 raised in November 1943, for the redemption in June 1945 of a 3½% Sterling Loan borrowed in 1905.
Finance: 1945-1946

During the financial year 1945-46, the revenue of the Newfoundland government reached the record figure of $33,427,693. This exceeded the estimate of $29,087,300 by $4,340,393.

The ordinary expenditure amounted to $24,564,194, which exceeded the estimate of $22,778,200 by $1,785,994. The reconstruction expenditure amounted to $4,523,522, which showed a decrease of $1,102,578 as compared with the estimate of $5,626,100. The total ordinary and reconstruction expenditure amounted to $29,087,716—an excess of $683,416 over the estimate of $28,404,300.

Thus the surplus of revenue over expenditure in 1945-46 was $4,339,977.

As was to be expected, the greatest savings resulting from the termination of hostilities occurred in the Department of Defence. The expenditure of that department in 1945-46 was $1,149,415. This represented a decrease of $365,220 as compared with the expenditure of $1,514,635 in the previous year. The two chief reasons for the decrease were as follows: (1) the strength of the Newfoundland Regiment was reduced to a very small number; and (2) because of the demobilization of Newfoundlanders serving with the Imperial forces, the whole of the amount provided for defence pay was not required.

On the other hand, however, provision had to be made for the payment of gratuities and clothing allowances payable on discharge to the members of the Newfoundland Regiment.

As at 31 March 1946, the total accumulated surplus of the Newfoundland Government amounted to $28,669,000. Of that amount $10,500,000 had been advanced in the form of temporary interest-free loans to the government of the United Kingdom to assist in the prosecution of the war. The last of these advances was made in May 1944.

In his budget speech of 18 April 1946, the Honourable the Commissioner for Finance stated that the question of the repayment of these loans was under consideration. At the same time, he expressed his conviction that “it would not be the wish of the people of Newfoundland to mar their generous gesture of goodwill, which had been so greatly appreciated, by demanding immediate repayment on the spot.”

Foreign Exchange Control
On 16 September 1939, the Newfoundland government passed regulations under the authority of the Newfoundland Defence Act establishing a Foreign Exchange Control Board. This action was based on similar measures taken by Canada, and was designed to regulate the control of Canadian dollars which are the current medium of exchange in Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Foreign Exchange Control Regulations came into force on midnight 15 September, simultaneously with the regulations authorised by the Canadian order-in-council. The Newfoundland board was given wide powers over dealing in foreign exchange, payments of Canadian dollars to non-residents, and the licensing of exports and imports.

The following summarises the immediate effects which these regulations had on the general public in Newfoundland:

(a) Residents of Newfoundland possessing foreign currency or exchange, or foreign securities to a value of $1,000 or more, were required to submit a written declaration of their holdings.

(b) All residents buying or selling or otherwise dealing in foreign exchange were required to do so through the Foreign Exchange Control Board or its authorised agents.

(c) No Newfoundland resident was permitted to transfer any Canadian dollars to a person resident outside of Canada or Newfoundland in excess of $100 per annum without the prior approval of the board.

(d) No exports or imports of any kind, including merchandise of any kind or shipments of currency or securities, etc., were permitted without first obtaining a licence from the Foreign Exchange Control Board or its authorised agents.

To eliminate any temporary inconvenience to traders, the board issued, as an interim measure, a general licence for exports and imports of any kind except currency, securities, and foreign exchange.

On 1 May 1940, the Foreign Exchange Control Board promulgated further regulations known as the Foreign Exchange Acquisition Regulations of 1940. These regulations were issued in conjunction with similar regulations published by Canada on the same date. They were made in the interest of the conservation of foreign exchange for war purposes, an object which the board considered to be of the greatest importance. Under the new regulations, the board was empowered to buy all foreign currencies and all currency deposits of Newfoundland residents, wherever held, as from 1 May 1940. Newfoundland residents who had in their possession any foreign currency or deposits in foreign currency were obliged to sell the same forthwith to an authorised agent of the board, i.e., a bank, on or before 31 May 1940. They were to receive in
return Newfoundland currency, i.e., Canadian dollars at the official rate of exchange ruling on 30 April 1940.

In October 1941, the Newfoundland Foreign Exchange Control Board issued an improved Licence to Import, Form E (Revised), in order to provide a more adequate and more accurate method of matching import licences with the Exchange Permit Form F necessary to purchase foreign exchange. In January 1942 it was decided that no import licence was to be required for goods imported into Newfoundland from Canada or from countries in the “Sterling area.”

Under section 18 of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, a resident of Newfoundland was classed as and was to receive the same treatment as a resident of Canada. In 1941, in order to exercise a stricter control over the travelling of residents of Newfoundland to the United States of America and Canada, it was agreed between the Canadian and Newfoundland authorities that Newfoundland residents travelling in that way should be in possession of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Board’s Travel Permit, Form H. Under that arrangement, residents of Newfoundland travelling in that way were considered to be in the same category as residents of Canada travelling to the United States of America, and were subject to Canadian rules and regulations governing such permits.

The Commissioner for Finance acts as chairman of the Newfoundland Foreign Exchange Control Board, and the day-to-day business of the board is conducted in the Department of Finance. The board acts in close harmony and almost daily consultation with the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board in Ottawa. The Newfoundland board is, of course, not subject to the Canadian board in any way, and the rules adopted are not necessarily identical in every case. Nevertheless, the work of the two boards is closely parallel, and any variations of procedure are agreed upon between them by semi-official discussion.

The accounts of the board show that Newfoundland has become a fruitful source of United States dollar exchange. This is clear from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.A Dollar Receipts (i.e., purchase by the board from the residents of Newfoundland)</th>
<th>U.S.A Dollar Disbursements (i.e., sales by the board to residents of Newfoundland)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1940 to Jan 1941</td>
<td>$10,214,200</td>
<td>$9,430,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1941 to Jan 1942</td>
<td>$28,460,300</td>
<td>$1,915,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It has been the policy of the Newfoundland government to make this United States dollar surplus available to the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war effort.
V
ECONOMIC MEASURES
The impact of the war on Newfoundland inevitably introduced abnormal and disturbing factors into its economic life. To cope with the problems thus created, the Newfoundland government established administrative machinery to exercise economic controls of various kinds. The measures taken were necessary for the stabilization of the island’s economy, for the preservation of its foreign trade, for the maintenance of its essential services and supplies, for the efficient functioning of its major industries, for the prevention of social injustice, and for the mobilization of its industrial manpower. These vital measures fall principally under the heads of price and rent control, industrial conciliation and the settlement of labour disputes, import regulations, and national registration.

**Price and Rent Control**

There has been a marked increase in the cost of living in Newfoundland since the outbreak of the war. The rise in the price-level was at first gradual, but it mounted to an alarming rate and in an increasingly steep curve during 1941 and 1942. Taking the cost of living index figure on 1 October 1938 as 100, the figure had risen to 104.4 by 1 October 1939. By December 1941, it had reached 131.6, and it continued to rise steadily until it reached a peak of 150.2 in December 1942. Three chief factors combined to cause this relentless rise:

1. increases in commodity prices in the countries, e.g., the United States of America and Canada, from which Newfoundland bought her imports. In this connection it should be noted that Newfoundland imports by far the larger proportion of her food requirements;

2. increased freight, insurance, and handling charges;

3. increased spending and purchasing power within Newfoundland consequent upon war conditions, especially the increased volume and regularity of employment provided by the defence base construction programme carried out by Canadian and United States authorities in Newfoundland.

There was also a substantial rise in house rentals, especially in St. John’s, caused by the influx into the capital of base construction personnel both from abroad and from all parts of Newfoundland itself.

As early as 12 September 1939, the government had set up machinery for the control of food prices. The Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare was appointed Food Controller and an advisory board composed of businessmen was constituted to assist him. On 29 November 1941, however, this advisory board was dissolved and was replaced by a committee of the
Commission of Government, consisting of the Commissioners for Finance, Natural Resources, and Home Affairs and Education. In December 1941, the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare was empowered to carry out the duties usually associated with the terms “Price Controller” and “Rent Controller.”

The legal basis of the controls imposed was the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940. By the Defence (Price of Goods) Regulations, 1941, and the Defence (Rent Restrictions) Regulations, 1941, made under the act cited, the Price Controller was authorized to fix, by order, the maximum prices to be charged for any goods. Moreover, increases in the rents of unfurnished dwelling houses, effective as at 30 June 1941, were prohibited without the prior approval of the Rent Controller.

Because of the island’s dependence on imports and because of the limited means, financial and administrative, at its disposal, the Newfoundland government did not attempt to fix an overall “ceiling” based on prices current on any particular date or during any prescribed period. To do so would have involved either frequent adjustments to meet the upward trend in the landed cost of imported goods or, alternatively, the payment of subsidies on a very large scale. Private control was therefore confined to certain imported commodities in constant and almost universal demand.

The Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941, which imposed control over prices, was published simultaneously with the above-mentioned regulations of December 1941. The above-mentioned order prescribed that any “specified food” should not be sold at a price in excess of that prevailing on 15 December 1941. The only commodity specified in that particular order was liquid cow’s milk. However, rising costs, principally in the case of imported feeding stuffs, made it impossible for farmers and other milk suppliers to operate under the restrictive ceiling price. Consequently, in September 1942, revised maximum prices for both pasteurised and raw cow’s milk were published.

A similar order was issued in May 1942 restricting the prices of various foodstuffs to those in force on 2 May of that year. The list of foodstuffs comprise meats of all kinds including bologna; sausages and tinned meats (excluding meats preserved by salt or pickle); bacon, and ham; milk (tinned condensed, evaporated or dried); butter, butterine, and oleomargarine; cheese; dried fruits, raisins, currants and prunes; canned and bottled fruits; tinned soups and vegetables; dried beans, rice, rolled oats, oatmeal; onions; [and] sugar, tea, cocoa.

In June 1942 the wholesale and retail prices of white (granulated) sugar were fixed, but were subsequently modified from time to time.
By the autumn of 1942, it became clear that the landed costs of many of the foodstuffs, subject to the order of May 1942, had risen so steeply that the ceiling prices placed on them could not be maintained. The position was corrected by imposing as a new ceiling, the prices ruling on the date set out below:

Tea, cocoa, coffee, chicory, coffee extracts—14 December 1942

Salted beef and pork, tinned meats—22 December 1942

Experience has shown that, because of a lack of inspectors and because of the absence of vigilance on the part of the consuming public, the method of limiting prices to those prevailing at a given date was unsatisfactory and, indeed, virtually incapable of enforcement. The policy was accordingly adopted of fixing the wholesale and retail prices of specified goods by retail and/or trade units. Maximum prices on that basis were, at the close of 1942, in operation in respect of the following foodstuffs: sugar, molasses, corned beef, salted beef in barrels, cooked corned beef in tins, tea, bread (white, brown, raisin), eggs (imported and locally produced), butterine, [and] margarine.

In the case of the majority of the commodities referred to in the order of May, 1942, the Food Controller fixed the maximum additions that might be made to landed costs whether by a percentage markup or on a unitary basis. A similar arrangement was also applied to imported fresh meats.

In the case of molasses, the attempt to fix prices encountered a number of peculiar difficulties. In accordance with long-established custom, prices had been charged by the trade varying with the quality (fancy, choice, grocery) of the molasses and the size of the container (tierce, puncheon, barrel). If this practice had been followed in price-fixing, it would have been virtually impossible for the ordinary consumer to know the retail price that he should pay. Consequently, the whole season’s importations were handled as one unit, the importers acting as a single trade group; differences due to quality and size were ignored, and flat, basic wholesale and retail prices were fixed. To these basic prices reasonable additions were permitted to defray insurance and freight charges to distributive centres in the outports.

It was estimated that at the close of 1942, approximately 60% of all foodstuffs had been brought under some form of price control.

Motor vehicle tires and tubes were subjected to rationing as well as to price control. Prospective purchasers must first obtain a permit from the Supplies Division of the government. Retail prices of tires are fixed by the Price Controller and are communicated to the trade and to the Supplies Division. The maximum price that may be charged for any tires or tubes is endorsed on the relevant permit issued by the Supplies Division.
In order to control the price of coal, regulations were published in August 1942 prohibiting imports except under licence, and the Price Controller was authorised to fix retail prices. Great uncertainty prevailed in St. John’s as to the prices properly payable by consumers. One shipment of coal might become subject to heavy demurrage charges owing to discharging difficulties or delays due to heavy weather or the assembly of a convoy, while another cargo might escape these hazards. Resentment was felt by householders and other coal consumers because of the divergence in prices charged by one merchant compared with another, and this disparity was not always easy to explain. It was decided, therefore, that the difficulty could best be met by the establishment of a pooling system, and in St. John’s a company limited by guarantee was formed to operate the pool. Only members of the pool were granted licence to import, and all expenses of operation, e.g., in chartering and discharging vessels were borne by the pool. The profit per ton and the chargeable expenses were agreed upon, and a flat maximum retail price per ton was prescribed for a specified period, subject to revisions from time to time in the light of experience.

In June 1942, fisherman’s motor fuel was placed under price control. Base wholesale and retail prices at St. John’s were agreed upon with the principal importers, additional charges being allowed them in respect of freight, etc., to their tankage or barrel points around the coast. Maximum additions to these prices to cover freight and insurance to retail points were fixed.

The price of petrol was regulated for St. John’s in 1941 by a gentleman’s agreement between the Price Controller, the importers, the distributors, and the retailers. Certain commodities in short supply e.g., axes, agricultural implements, tinned beef, have been imported under government purchase, and the wholesale and retail prices have been fixed after consultation with the trade.

Freight tonnage rates payable to schooners registered in Newfoundland for the carriage of foods between ports in the island and Labrador and to and from ports in Canada have been fixed by the Commissioner for Public Utilities on the advice of the Transportation Control Board.

The influx of population to certain areas, notably St. John’s, led to serious overcrowding. In these areas the practice became general of purchasing houses, ostensibly for occupation by a new owner, but actually to take advantage of the opportunity to sublet or to lease to new tenants at higher rental. This led to numerous evictions both by new and old owners and landlords, since the Rent Restrictions Regulations, 1941, did not prohibit a landlord from dispossessing his tenant by simple notice to terminate the tenancy. Accordingly, in November 1942, the Rent Restrictions Regulations
were revised so as to make it impossible for the landlord to obtain possession of houses, etc., unless he can prove failure to pay rent, nuisance, or the need of the premises for occupation by himself or his family, and in the last case once only if reasonable alternative accommodation is available for the tenant. The number of instances in which the Rent Controller has granted permission either to increase rent or to evict have been almost negligible. While a certain amount of hardship has doubtless been suffered by those landlords whose rental income has not increased to meet the increase in cost of living and in the cost of repairs, it is incontestible that the revised regulations have been of inestimable benefit to the community as a whole.

**Import Control and Priorities**

Early in 1941, Newfoundland began to experience difficulty in obtaining imports of certain materials which were in short supply in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain because there was a heavy demand for them for war purposes. This, on 26 April 1941, the Newfoundland Railway was obliged to ask the Newfoundland government to assist in obtaining a priority on an outstanding order for steel which it had placed in the United States. At the government’s request, the American consul general in St. John’s took the matter up with the State Department at Washington which referred it on to the British Priorities Committee of the British Supply Council of North America. This committee took the necessary action on the particular case referred to it, but arranged that in future all cases of the kind would be dealt with by the British Purchasing Commission, a body which, like the British Priorities Committee, was a committee of the British Supply Council.

In June 1941, the British Purchasing Commission informed the Newfoundland government that when submitting application for priority, it should supply the commission with the following specified information in each case: (a) the full name and address of the United States contractor; (b) the contract order number and date; (c) a description of the material required; (d) the quantity and value of material, and its delivery date; [and] (e) a statement of the ultimate use of the material from a military standpoint. This was the most important item of all, because the degree of priority rating would depend upon it.

On 4 July 1941, the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission suggested that the Supplies Division of the Newfoundland government act as a clearing-house for applications for priority assistance so that such applications for priority assistance would be filed with the United States government only if they had the support of the Newfoundland government. He asked that Newfoundland manufacturers be notified to that effect. The Newfoundland government agreed to act on this suggestion but pointed out, that, in order to advise importers on applications, it would require “detailed information regarding the degrees of priority and the factors which
govern them.” Accordingly, it requested the British Purchasing Commission to transmit this necessary information as soon as possible. The commission’s reply proved to be “not very helpful” and appeared to assume that the Newfoundland government “had more knowledge and experience on the subject of priorities than was actually the case.” Consequently, the head of the Supplies Division of the Newfoundland government wrote to the commission asking two definite questions, viz.: (1) were the United States authorities prepared to consider applications from Newfoundland only if they were submitted through the British Purchasing Commission? (2) to what extent would the commission expect advice from the Newfoundland government as to applications to the commission? As no reply was forthcoming from the commission, the head of the Supplies Division was instructed by the Commissioner for Public Utilities to proceed to Ottawa and, if necessary, to Washington, for the purpose of finding the quickest route between the Newfoundland importer and the priorities division of the United States government.

While in Ottawa, the head of the Supplies Division learned that the Priorities Division of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply was not, in fact, in direct touch with the United States government, but that the Canadian government had a liaison office in Washington through which the Canadian Priorities Division routed all its priority applications. Both the Priorities Division and the liaison office were agreeable that Newfoundland applications for priority be dealt with by the latter. During his stay in Washington, the head of the Supplies Division made a thorough study of the United States priorities system. In his report to the Newfoundland government he described it as a “method of putting first things first, a technique of making sure that machinery and all equipment needed for national defence are produced promptly, on schedule and without delay. When a manufacturer has an order which has been given a preference rating, he is required to make every effort to fill this order on the stipulated delivery date. If this means delaying other orders, with lower preference rating or no preference ratings at all, then the delay must be made.” These preferences or priority ratings were graded in a ladder-like structure ranging from high to low. The contracts had to be handled by the manufacturers in the order of their importance. It was not enough that orders be fulfilled quickly; they had to be done in their proper sequence. This called for great skill in scheduling and in synchronization. Two important instruments had been devised to implement the objectives of the priority system. These were the Priorities Critical List and the Official Directive. There were two forms in common use—the Preference Rating Certificate, known as P.D. 5, and the Application for Preference Rating, known as P.D. 1. The former was used in the case of materials appearing on the Critical List and needed for military purposes, while the latter was used in the case of other materials. The two channels by means of which the Newfoundland government could communicate with the United States government on priority matters
were the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission and the Canadian liaison office in Washington.

In submitting his recommendations to the Newfoundland government, the head of the Supplies Division advised that Newfoundland should, for the time being, continue to place priority applications in the United States through the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission. He considered that the establishment of a Newfoundland mission at Washington was unnecessary because of Newfoundland’s geographical proximity to the United States. On the other hand, he believed that the appointment of a Newfoundland liaison officer at Washington would be a distinct advantage. The duties of this official would be as follows: (1) to work under the supervision of the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission; (2) to deal with the clerical routine work in connection with Newfoundland applications for priority assistance; [and] (3) to gain experience in other aspects of the work. His appointment would thus serve a dual purpose as he could gain an insight into the priorities system of the United States and at the same time give personal attention to Newfoundland priority applications, thereby fulfilling the function performed for other governments by their missions at Washington. He should be appointed on a temporary basis for a two-months experimental period, at the end of which the Newfoundland government could decide, in the light of circumstances then existing, whether it would be advisable to make arrangements for permanent representation at Washington. This advice was accepted by the Newfoundland government and on 12 October 1941, a Grade II Clerk selected from the Newfoundland civil service left for Washington to assume his duties as temporary officer.

On 31 October 1941, the Newfoundland government established a Priorities Committee to pass on priority applications at the Newfoundland end. The personnel of the Newfoundland Priorities Committee consisted of the Secretary for Public Works as chairman, the Secretary for Customs, and two representatives appointed by the Newfoundland Board of Trade. The head of the Supplies Division, now known as the Supplies Officer, acted as secretary of the committee.

Early in January 1942, the Newfoundland government decided, on the advice of the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission, to set up a permanent supply liaison in Washington. The duties of the Supply Liaison Officer were as follows: (1) to be on the spot to watch applications submitted with the approval of the Newfoundland Priorities Committee; (2) to supplement, by his own knowledge of trade conditions in Newfoundland, the information supplied in support of individual applications; (3) to keep in touch with priorities’ developments in Washington and to keep the Newfoundland government advised of them; [and] (4) to take over gradually from the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission the bulk of the clerical work involved in Newfoundland priorities, preparing applications supported by
the Priorities Committee in St. John’s for submission to the British Supply Council and the United States Office of Production Management. A Grade I Clerk from the Newfoundland civil service was appointed to take charge of the Supply Liaison Office and left for Washington on 4 January 1942.

He was accompanied by the Newfoundland Supplies Officer who proceeded to Ottawa and Washington to discuss a number of acute supply questions which demanded immediate attention because of the recent entry of the United States into the war. On 12 February 1942, the Supplies Officer submitted to the Newfoundland government a report on supply conditions in the United States and Canada. He was still of the opinion that Newfoundland did not require to be represented at Ottawa. He stated that the ratings accorded to Newfoundland in the United States from time to time had been generally most satisfactory and reflected the sympathetic attention that had been given to Newfoundland applications by the Chief Priorities Officer of the British Purchasing Commission. The number of applications that had been referred back to Newfoundland had been proportionately very low. He reported that a system of allocations had recently been substituted for the system of priorities in the case of tin-plate, rubber, cast-iron, and steel. He described this allocation system as follows. Each government is allotted a definite quantity of a commodity for a specified period. The government [then] applies for the quantity it considers necessary to meet the country’s requirements. This quota is based upon returns called for by the government from the trade which must in all cases state precisely for what purpose the materials are to be used. These returns are checked by the government, whose function it is not only to satisfy itself and certify that the total quantity applied for is necessary for the specified purposes, but also to ensure that when the material arrives it will be used only for that purpose. Newfoundland’s schedule of requirements was to be forwarded by the Newfoundland government to the Newfoundland Supply Liaison Officer, who, at the time of its receipt, was to ascertain from the secretary of the Raw Materials Commission whether the British Purchasing Commission, the Canadian liaison officer, or the Raw Materials Commission itself would include the Newfoundland quota in its own allocations.

The Supply Officer’s report also stated that, in his opinion, it would be inadvisable for Newfoundland firms to apply for blanket ratings. His reasons were, first, that such blanket ratings were lower than the ratings accorded under the normal priorities system, and, second, that blanket ratings were “intended purely for maintenance and were not high enough to ensure a delivery appropriate to cases of emergency and break-down of plant.” At the same time, he advised that the government should notify importers to that effect and leave them free to decide for themselves which form of application they would use.

He also pointed out that the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Canada did not think that deliveries to Newfoundland would be expedited under lend-lease arrangements. Moreover, goods obtained under the lend-lease
system could be used only for specific defence purposes. Finally, it would be difficult for Newfoundland to qualify for lend-lease assistance on financial grounds since she had a dollar budget surplus. Accordingly, the Supply Officer recommended that Newfoundland importers “continue to obtain all our requirements by cash-purchase and that lend-lease should be considered only if the time should come when we are informed most definitely that a required delivery of essential defence supplies can be obtained only by this method.”

With regard to the securing of priorities in Canada, he recommended the continuation of the existing procedure which had proved satisfactory, namely, that of writing letters in individual cases as they arose to the Priorities Division of the Department of Munitions and Supply which in turn submitted Newfoundland applications to the controllers of the various groups of materials.

With reference to priorities in the United Kingdom, he stated that certain goods could be obtained only by securing Essentiality Certificates, but the number of these needed was, he thought, likely to be small.

The Supply Officer’s report also described the systems of export control that had recently been set up in the United States and Canada. In the case of the United States, it was necessary, quite apart from the priorities system, to obtain an export licence before certain classes of goods could be shipped. The mere fact that a priority rating had been granted did not in itself permit shipment. The Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Export Control, Washington, issued from time to time a Comprehensive Export Control Schedule. This listed all the materials for which an export licence was required and stated the restrictions imposed on such exports to each different country. A general licence had been issued to Newfoundland (No. G 47) placing it, together with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, and the Philippine Islands in Group G of the Comprehensive Export Schedule, i.e., in a more favoured position than any country not in the group. In principle, the export control system was similar to the priorities system and, generally speaking, the materials requiring an export permit have to be classified under one of the following categories: (1) material consigned to a British Empire government at any agency thereof, and urgently required; (2) material required in connection with a British Empire government contract or by a company engaged in defence work; (3) material required for the maintenance of essential services in the country of destination; [and] (4) material required for commercial purposes approved by the government of the importing country.

The procedure suggested by the Supplies Officer to be used in Newfoundland to meet the requirements of the United States export control was as follows: The Newfoundland Government would issue an import licence in duplicate to the Newfoundland firm at the time the goods were to be ordered from the United States supplier. The Newfoundland firm would then send one
copy of the import licence to its United States supplier. The United States supplier would then attach his copy to his application for an export permit. At the time of issue of the Newfoundland import licence, a copy would be sent to the Newfoundland Supply Liaison Office in Washington, since the export permit branch had emphasized the importance of keeping that office fully advised.

In Canada as in the United States, export control was dealt with separately from priority matters. Newfoundland had been granted a blanket exemption from Canadian export control on all orders under $100 value. In the case of orders over that value, Canadian manufacturers had to obtain, in respect of a considerable number of items, an export permit before shipping goods to Newfoundland. The Canadian government would not issue any export licence for such goods to be exported to Newfoundland unless the application was supported by the Newfoundland government. The procedure recommended by the Supplies Officer was very similar to that which he suggested to meet the United States requirements. It was as follows: The Newfoundland government would issue an Essentiality Certificate and send the original to the Export Permit Branch of the Department of Trade and Commerce at Ottawa. The Newfoundland government would give a duplicate of the certificate to the Newfoundland purchaser, who would send it to the Canadian supplier. The latter would in turn present it to the Export Permit Branch when applying for his export permit.

In view of the introduction of export control in the United States and Canada, the Supplies Officer recommended the transfer of the power of issuing import licences to the Priorities Committee which would, in conjunction with the Foreign Exchange Control Board, consider the final details of any necessary amendments to the existing form of import licence.

He also recommended that all the matters referred to in his report should in future be dealt with by a single body, a Department of Supply (with three divisions—purchasing, priorities, and import licences) which should maintain liaison with the Division of Price Control.

On 20 March 1942, a public notice was issued to Newfoundland importers informing them on methods of applying for priority assistance on goods manufactured in the United States. It ran as follows:

(a) The War Production Board of the United States of America has substituted Form P.D. 1 A for Form P.D.1.

(b) Form P.D. 1A must be completed by the purchaser in Newfoundland who should observe the following procedure:
“(a) instruct his prospective supplier in the United States to prepare Form P.D. I A and forward it, with two carbon copies, direct to the Newfoundland Supply Liaison, 1801 K Street, Washington, D.C.

(b) The Newfoundland purchaser should, at the same time, submit a copy of his order in duplicate to the Secretary, Nfld. Priorities Committee, P.O. Box 908, St. John’s, with a statement as to the ultimate use of the material…

When a priority rating is awarded the appropriate certificate will be sent direct to the U.S. Supplier.”

On 26 April 1942, the Newfoundland Supply Liaison Officer in Washington informed the Priorities Committee in St. John’s that there were indications of further restrictive measures being taken with regard to a further list of commodities. He therefore felt the imperative need of consultation, especially since an application of allocation and allotment methods involving distribution control by purchasing countries in a form agreeable to the United States appeared to be imminent. The Liaison Officer stated that he had discussed the matter with the Chief of the Export Permit Branch of the British Purchasing Commission who had strongly supported his view. On the receipt of this information, the Commissioner of Public Utilities had instructed the secretary of the Priorities Committee to proceed to Washington immediately. On arrival there he found an increasing difficulty in procuring supplies, a difficulty which, it was subsequently revealed, was due to the United States preparations for the North African campaign.

Newfoundland importers of good from the United Kingdom first experienced difficulties in August 1941, when they were informed by their United Kingdom suppliers that export orders now required a certificate from the government of the importing country testifying that the goods ordered were essential to the Empire’s war effort. The matter was taken up by the Newfoundland government with the Crown Agents for the Colonies in London who referred it to the Dominions Office. On 31 December 1941, the United Kingdom system of export control was described to the Newfoundland government by the Dominions Office which requested it to issue a public announcement explaining the position of the trade in Newfoundland. This was done on 13 January 1942, when the Newfoundland public was notified that the export of plant, machinery, and semi-manufactured iron and steel products from the United Kingdom was subject to government control, and that goods in these categories could therefore be imported from the United Kingdom only if the following conditions were complied with:

“1 A Certificate of Essentiality should be obtained [from the Newfoundland Priorities Committee] before an order is placed with a United Kingdom supplier for any goods included in the above category."
2 A Certificate will be issued only for goods which are not obtainable in North America, and this fact should be stated. A Certificate is not appropriate for consumer’s goods or other goods supplied for stock.

3 Only materials that contribute to the prosecution of the war effort or are necessary to the maintenance of indispensable Public Services are eligible for the granting of a Certificate, and importers should give detail of [the] purpose for which goods are required.

(4) Repair parts for machinery originally supplied by the United Kingdom are excepted from the above arrangements and supplies of such parts will be continued as far as possible.”

Condition (2) above was laid down in order to conform with the requirements of paragraph (4) (1) (a) of the lend-lease white paper. Questions relating to the unobtainability of goods in North America subsequently came up for consideration in the course of the discussions held in June 1942 between the Board of Trade of the United Kingdom and the War Production Board of the United States concerning the particular cases or programmes of United Kingdom exports to Newfoundland during the interim period until definite programmes coordinating United Kingdom and United States exports to all destinations, involving the use of materials in short supply, should be finally determined by the Combined Raw Materials Board. Consequently, on 27 June 1942, the Dominions Office, at the instance of the United Kingdom Board of Trade, recommended that the Newfoundland government, before issuing a Certificate of Essentiality in any case where there was doubt as to the unobtainability of the commodity in North America, should make all necessary enquiries in Washington “with the knowledge and perhaps the co-operation of the Office of the Lend-Lease Administration.” The Newfoundland government agreed to this suggestion, and, accordingly, on 30 July 1942, the Newfoundland Supply Liaison Officer in Washington commenced the practice of consulting with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, through the medium of the British Embassy, in all cases of doubt as to obtainability before the Newfoundland Priorities Committee issued Certificates of Essentiality in these cases.

Newfoundland’s priority procedure with Canada passed through three successive stages. During the first phase, cases arising in connection with any manufactures in Canada were originally taken up with the chief of the commodity [branch], Department of Trade and Commerce. During the second stage they were taken up with the chief of the metal and chemical exports division. During the third stage, the procedure was systematized and regularised, and Newfoundland priority matters were dealt with from 30 October 1941 onwards by the Deputy Priority Officer, Department of Munitions and Supply, The difficulties encountered in devising a practicable
system were finally overcome by 24 April 1942. The following procedure was then established and announced in Newfoundland by a public notice on 27 May 1942:

“[T]he Priorities Division of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Ottawa, will consider applications for priority assistance from firms in Newfoundland submitted through, and with the support of the Newfoundland Priorities Committee.

The Newfoundland purchaser must submit to the [Newfoundland Priorities] Committee, the following particulars, in duplicate:—

Name of applicant
Address
Name of supplier
Address
Copy of order showing order number, date and approximate value.
Statement as to the ultimate use of the material particularly from a military or defence point of view.”

The notice also stated that if any part of the order required priority assistance from the United States, separate application was to be made on a P.D. 1A Form to the Newfoundland Priorities Committee.

The notice also emphasized that no request for priority assistance should be made to the Department of Munitions and Supply unless the Canadian manufacturer had definitely indicated that the manufacture could not be proceeded with without that assistance. Newfoundland firms were in all cases advised to confirm the position from their supplier if there was any doubt on the matter and to ask him to specify as far as possible what difficulties were involved and to state in particular whether what was required was priority assistance in manufacture or the release of an export licence.

It remains only to mention certain subsequent changes in the original Canadian export control regulations as they applied to Newfoundland. On 15 December 1941, sugar was excepted from the blanket exemption from Canadian export control granted to Newfoundland on all orders under $100 value. On 16 June 1942, tea, coffee, rubber and rubber products were similarly excepted. By 24 October 1942, the list of excepted articles comprised tea, coffee, cocoanut, rubber and rubber products, sugar and glucose, “other edible products,” and tin alloys. On 8 December 1942 the United Kingdom Senior Trade Commissioner in Canada informed the secretary of the Newfoundland Priorities Committee that Certificates of Essentiality were desirable on the following list of goods imported into Newfoundland from Canada: motor
vehicles; motor car accessories over $100 in value; steel products over $100 in value, or on request; all rubber products; [and] canned goods.

**Settlement of Trade Disputes**

Newfoundland is far from being a highly industrialised country, trade union organization is only in its infancy, and, before the war, industrial disputes were very rare occurrences. However, the rapid increase in the cost of living after the outbreak of war together with the disturbance of the labour market caused by the construction of defence projects created a situation in which serious industrial discord was likely to develop. It was feared that disputes might occur in strategic and essential industries to the detriment of the island’s war effort. Accordingly, on 27 June 1941, the Newfoundland government, under the authority of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, issued its regulations for the avoidance of strikes and lockouts. By these regulations, it was laid down that “[i]f by any reason of an actual or apprehended lockout or strike it appears that there may be an interruption of any work which will interfere with the efficient prosecution of the war or the maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community the Commissioner for Public Utilities may from time to time by order make provision—

(a) for establishing a tribunal or tribunals for the settlement of any trade dispute or trade disputes;

(b) for prohibiting, subject to the provisions of the order, a strike or lockout in connection with any trade dispute;

(c) for requiring employers to observe such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined, in accordance with the order to be, or to be not less favourable than, the recognized terms and conditions;

(d) for recording departures from any rule, practice or customs in respect of the employment, non-employment, conditions of employment, hours of work or working conditions of any persons; and

(e) for any incidental and supplementary matters for which the Commissioner thinks it expedient for the purpose of the order to provide.”

**Buchans Dispute**

It was not very long before these regulations had to be invoked. On 1 August 1941, a strike broke out at the important lead, copper, and zinc mining centre of Buchans. On 4 August, the government was officially informed of the strike, and the Buchans Workmen’s Protective Union demanded the appointment of a tribunal to settle the dispute. On 7 August, the government
decided that “the importance of maintaining an uninterrupted supply of zinc to Great Britain for her wartime requirements” justified the invocation of the regulations for the avoidance of strikes and lockouts. Two orders were published under these regulations, the first appointing a tribunal and the second prohibiting the strike. A detachment of police was sent to Buchans to enforce the orders and to maintain the peace. The strikers were notified of the issue of the orders and were informed that the government had rejected their demand that the tribunal be in Buchans by a certain time.

Meanwhile, government representatives at Buchans had persuaded the union to continue the loading of concentrates ready for shipment until midnight, 6 August. The union executive subsequently agreed to extend the loading operations until midnight, 8 August, on condition that the government would guarantee the arrival of the tribunal at Buchans on that day. This the government refused to do, and, on 19 August, the Commissioner for Public Utilities proceeded to Buchans to confer with the union and the officials of the Buchans Mining Company. He was accompanied by the Assistant Secretary for Justice who was to represent the Crown in the event of court action proving necessary for the enforcement of the regulations. On 11 August, the Commissioner conferred with the union executive and later addressed a full meeting of the union, urging them to return to work pending the arrival of the tribunal. The union informed him an hour later that they had unanimously decided not to resume work until the tribunal had been set up in Buchans.

On 13 August, the Commissioner reported to the government on his visit at Buchans. The government decided to issue immediately and arrange for the service of summonses on the members of the union executive returnable on 15 August. The Commissioner for Public Utilities and the Commissioner for Justice and Defence held a meeting with the members of the tribunal and acquainted them with the latest developments in the situation. The members of the tribunal, on being asked what their intention was, stated that they regarded it to be their duty to proceed to Buchans regardless of the government’s decision and commence their enquiry.

On the following day, the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport authorised its representative in Newfoundland to reallocate shipping from Botwood (the shipping point for Buchans) to Wabana. The Lerwick, which had arrived at Botwood on 13 August to take on board a cargo of zinc concentrates, was accordingly ordered to Wabana.

On 14 August, the tribunal sent a conciliatory telegram of advice to the union, which read as follows: “Tribunal has decided to leave for Buchans by express tonight Thursday. Will sit as soon as practicable after arrival and will lose no time. We understand Union has promised Government to return to work as soon as we arrive. We understand also that strike, besides delaying supply of zinc which is essential war material, has probably rendered useless
certain steamer movements ordered in advance by British authorities. Any waste of ship movements gravely hinders the winning of the vital battle of the Atlantic. In these circumstances, Tribunal feels that characteristic Newfoundland patriotism and common sense would be displayed by Union if it returned to work now and got concentrates on the way without waiting our arrival, thus saving valuable time. This is a friendly suggestion from Tribunal, not order, and is our own idea without reference to Government. Sincerely hope it will be acted upon. Copy of this message has been sent to Magistrate Hollett, Manager of Company and Government for their information.” On receipt of this request, the union decided to resume work immediately.

On 15 August, twenty members of the union appeared in court. In view of the fact that the men had returned to work, the Crown asked that the summonses be withdrawn. The magistrate assented, but, before doing so, addressed the accused and pointed out to them the extreme gravity of their action. The detachment of police returned to St. John’s.

On the same day, the tribunal arrived in Buchans. It commenced its session on 16 August and concluded its hearings at Buchans on 22 August.

On 9 September, the tribunal presented its report. The report began by reciting the tribunal’s terms of reference which were as follows: “The said Tribunal is hereby authorised to enquire into the said trade dispute and settle the said dispute by determining whether any, and, if so, what increased wage should be paid…and whether the claims of the said Union to be recognised as a collective bargaining agency and for a closed shop should be accepted by the said Company, and to determine the manner of settlement of any differences between the Company and its workmen which may be related to the said strike.” The report then went on to state the main points at issue. The major demands of the Union included an increase in wages of 10¢ per hour to meet the increased cost of living. The Company offered a wage increase of 45¢ per day, equivalent to an increase of 5¢ per hour. The Union also demanded overtime wages at the rate of time and one half for all work in excess of a regular shift of 9 hours. The Company agreed to institute regular 9 hour shifts, but offered only time and one-quarter overtime wages. The Union further demanded that all Sunday work be regarded as overtime, except in the case of men whose normal duties called for a seven-day week. The Company refused to recognise Sunday work as overtime. The Company agreed that the prices of all cost of living factors under its control, e.g. rents, electric light, should not be raised. It also agreed that there would be no arbitrary changes in shift-hours. The Union demanded recognition as the bargaining agency, of the application of the “closed shop” principle, and of the employment of none but Union members—all of which were refused by the Company. In addition to investigating these major issues, the Tribunal heard and discussed with representatives of the Company and the Union, forty-one other grievances.
presented by the Union. The great majority of those minor matters were amicably settled.

The conclusions reached by the Tribunal were as follows:
(1) It recommended the payment by the company of a lump allowance in cash to cover the increase in the cost of living to take the form of a cost-of-living bonus of 67½¢ per working day of 8 or 9 hours, and suggested the appointment of a representative local committee to review the cost of living quarterly for the purpose of adjusting the cost-of-living bonus to further changes in the cost of living.

(2) It recommended that overtime wages for work in excess of a nine-hour shift should be time and one-half.

(3) It recommended that steps be taken to provide each Saturday sufficient ore to be milled on the following Sunday and that all emergency work on Sunday be paid at the overtime rate.

(4) It recommended that the company recognise the union. On the advice of the tribunal, the union withdrew its demand for a “closed shop.”

The tribunal’s report also contained a great deal of information concerning living conditions, local stores, and the medical services provided by the company. It strongly urged that no mine be permitted to operate without regular government inspection. Finally, it recommended to the government that a national system of price control be established as soon as possible.

On 16 September 1941, the government decided that the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply be authorised to discuss with a representative of the Exploits Valley Royal Stores, Ltd., the policy of that company concerning the retail prices of goods in its stores at Buchans and Grand Falls. On 22 September, the Commissioner reported that he was satisfied with the reply which he had received from the company concerning its price policy.

At the first quarterly review of the cost of living, the company and the union were unable to agree as to the amount of the increase in the cost of living as at 1 December, 1941. Accordingly, the Acting Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply held conferences at St. John’s with representatives of the company and the union. Following these interviews he issued the following recommendations on 12 February 1942, to be effective from 1 January 1942 to 31 December 1942:

1. The cost-of-living bonus to be increased by 5.5%;

2. As soon as the output reached 35,750 tons per month, the bonus was to be increased to 6% for each month during which that tonnage was produced.
Sunday production was to be omitted from this quota, and each one-month period was to represent twenty-six working days;

3. A bonus system was to be introduced under which the workers were to receive an additional sum for every ton by which 35,750 tons were exceeded in any one month;

4. The company was to be entitled to charge during the period of the agreement an additional sum of 12¢ per day per man for board and lodging in the company’s lunch-houses.

These recommendations were rejected by the union at a meeting held on 15 February, largely because the union mistakenly supposed that the effect of the wage recommendation would be to replace the cost-of-living bonus by a production bonus.

On 1 March 1942, the union accepted an offer by the company to increase the cost of living bonus by 28½¢ per working day. i.e., from 67½¢ to 96¢ per working day. Subsequently, the company increased the cost-of-living bonus as from 1 September, 1942, by a further 24¢ per working day, bringing the cost-of-living bonus to $1.20 per working day. At the same time, the company raised the rate charged for board and lodging in its lunch-houses by 12¢ per day. This increase was accepted by the union.

Six weeks after the Buchans tribunal had submitted its report, the government issued a new set of regulations concerning the settlement of trade disputes. These regulations, published on 23 October 1941, under and by virtue of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, were known as the Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement Regulations.

By these regulations, it was laid down, in the first place, that “[f]or the purpose of securing the public safety, the defence of Newfoundland, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community,” the Commissioner for Public Utilities might “direct any person in Newfoundland to perform such services in Newfoundland as may be specified by the direction being services which that person is in the opinion of the Commissioner capable of performing.” The Commissioner was also authorised to decide the terms upon which such services were to be performed, provided that in the determination of these terms he was to “have regard to any rates of salary, fees or wages for the performance of those services which appear to the Commissioner to be usual.” “[I]n particular in the case of services usually rendered under a contract of service” he was to “have regard to any determination relating to the remuneration and conditions of service of persons employed in the locality in the capacity and in the trade in which the person to whom the direction relates is to serve, being a determination contained in an
agreement between organizations representative of employers and workers or in a decision of a conciliation board, arbitration tribunal or other similar body, or, in the absence of any such determination, [he] shall have regard to the remuneration and conditions of service in practice prevailing among good employers in that trade in the district.” In order to give effect to such directions and also for the purpose of “regulating the engagement of workers by employers and the duration of their employment” the Commissioner was empowered to require, by order, persons to register all necessary particulars about themselves, to require “persons carrying on any undertaking to keep such books, accounts, and records relating to the undertaking as may be prescribed by or under the order,” to produce these documents on demand, and “to furnish such estimates returns or information relating thereto as may be prescribed by or under the order.” Furthermore, the Commissioner was authorised to require “the entry and inspection of premises with a view to securing compliance with directions given under this Regulation.”

In the second place, the regulations provided for the constitution of trade disputes boards as follows: “For the purpose of settling trade disputes which cannot otherwise be determined in cases where it appears to be necessary so to do in the interests of the defence of Newfoundland or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community there may be appointed by the Commissioner from time to time one or more Boards to be called Trade Dispute Boards.” The following procedure was laid down for the appointment of such Boards:— “(1) If any trade dispute exists or is apprehended, that dispute, if not otherwise determined, may be reported to the Commissioner by or on behalf of either party to the dispute and the decision of the Commissioner as to whether a dispute has been so reported to him or not and as to the time at which a dispute has been so reported shall be conclusive for all purposes. (2) The Commissioner shall consider any dispute so reported to him as aforesaid and if it is his opinion that the dispute is not one which can appropriately be dealt with under these Regulations or that it is not in the public interest that it should be so dealt with, he shall inform the parties who have reported the dispute accordingly. Provided however that the Commissioner may on further information alter such decision if he shall see fit. (3) If the Commissioner determines that the dispute can appropriately be dealt with under these Regulations and if in his opinion suitable means for settling the dispute already exist by virtue of the provisions of any agreement to which the parties are organizations representative of employers and workers respectively, he shall refer the matter for settlement in accordance with those provisions; so, however, that where a matter has been referred for settlement in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and there is a failure to reach a settlement, or, in the opinion of the Commissioner a settlement is unduly delayed, the Commissioner may cancel the reference and substitute therefor a reference to a Trade Dispute Board. (4) Where, in his opinion, no such suitable means of settlement exist…the Commissioner shall take any steps which seem to him expedient to promote a settlement of the
dispute, and may, if he thinks fit, refer the matter for settlement to a Trade Dispute Board.” The Regulations also declared that “Any agreement, decision or award made by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this Regulation shall be binding on the employers and workers to whom the agreement, decision or award relates and, as from the date of such agreement, decision or award or as from such date as may be specified therein, not being earlier than the date on which the dispute to which the agreement, decision or award relates first arose it shall be an implied term of the contract between the employers and workers to whom the agreement, decision or award relates that the rate of wages to be paid and the conditions of employment to be observed under the contract shall be in accordance with such agreement, decision or award until varied by a subsequent agreement, decision or award.” Finally the regulations forbade recourse to strikes or lockouts, “unless the dispute has been reported to the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 4 of these Regulations and twenty-one days have elapsed since the date of the report and the dispute has not during that time been referred by the Commissioner for settlement in accordance with the provisions of that Regulation or unless in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 4 (2) the Commissioner has informed the parties who reported the dispute that the dispute will not be dealt with under these Regulations and such decision has not been altered.”

These new and more explicit regulations were first invoked in December 1941, when a trade dispute board was appointed to settle a dispute between the Employers’ Association and the Longshoremen’s Protective Union of St. John’s. The relations between the association and the union had been governed by their agreement of 29 December 1939. Clause 7 of that agreement provided that “[d]uring the currency of this Agreement due regard shall be had to substantial changes in the cost of living and a revision of the scale of wages corresponding as far as possible to such changes shall from time to time take place.” In January 1940, negotiations took place under clause 3 of the agreement, and, as a result, the rates of pay set forth in Part II of the schedule to the agreement were increased as follows: steamship labour by 5¢ per hour; [and] fish wharf and cold storage labour by 3¢ per hour. These increases became effective as from the date of the agreement in accordance with clause 5.

On 28 April 1941, the union requested the association to agree to the appointment of a joint committee to confer on the question of a further increase in wages. On 23 June 1941, the association offered the union an increase of 5¢ per hour in steamship labour rates, an increase of 3¢ in fish wharf rates, and proportionately high increases in night rates, after-midnight rates, and meal-hour rates. This offer was conditional upon the union’s acceptance of the modification of five of its rules. On 11 July, the union declared these proposals to be unacceptable and invited further discussion. A week later, the union presented certain definite demands, the most important of which was for an increase of 10¢ per hour on day and night rates for all types of work. Subsequently, the union offered in return for the grant of these demands that it
would sanction (a) the immediate commencement of work on ships arriving
after 6 p.m., and (b) the changing of gangs after twenty hours continuous work.
On 22 July, the association replied that its offer of 23 June was a maximum.
On 16 August, the union gave one month’s notice of its cancellation of the
agreement and warned that night-work, Sunday-work, and holiday-work would
be discontinued unless the demand for an all-round increase of 10¢ per hour
was granted. Confronted by this ultimatum, the association, on 16 September,
submitted to the union a draft agreement providing for a 10¢ increase in
steamship labour rates and a 7¢ increase in fish wharf rates, but stipulating
“substantial alterations in the existing conditions of employment.” As a result
of further discussions, the association submitted a new draft with the rates
unchanged but still requiring alterations of the working conditions in material
particulars. The proposed agreement was to continue for one year and was to
contain an arbitration clause but made no provision for a revision of the rates
on the basis of an increase in the cost of living. The union objected to certain
clauses of the draft and insisted that the 10¢ increase be extended to fish wharf
labour. Thereupon, on 27 September, the association stated its willingness to
insert a clause providing for a re-examination of the wage rates with reference
partly to variations in the cost of living, and also to alter, in a minor particular,
one other clause. It steadfastly refused, however, to meet the demand for a 10¢
increase for fish wharf labour. Accordingly, at a joint meeting held on 3
October the union delegate rejected the draft agreement.

Meanwhile, the union slowed down operations on the waterfront in
accordance with its notice given on 16 August. In these circumstances, the
Commissioner for Public Utilities was notified and decided to intervene. He
requested the association to pay the rates demanded by the union subject to a
government guarantee. He also undertook to set up a body to investigate the
whole dispute. The association agreed conditionally to pay the demanded rates
and to accept arbitration. The union refused to accept arbitration, but agreed to
resume night and holiday work. On 27 December 1941, a trade dispute board
was appointed to settle the dispute under the Defence (Control and Conditions
of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941, made under the
provisions of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940. The board presented
its report on 19 March 1942.

The principal findings of the Board were as follows:

(1) Wages

The wages demands of the union were granted, and, in the case of fish
wharf labour, exceeded, this class of labour being awarded an increase of 12¢
per hour. The board’s settlement also provided for the periodical adjustment of
the wage scale to conform with variations in the cost of living. The weekly cost
of living, as at the end of September 1941, was ascertained to have been
$24.03. This figure was taken as a base and a revision and adjustment of wages
were to be carried out every six months provided that the total net cost of the items of the specially prepared longshoreman’s family budget could be shown to be at least 5% above the basic figure. The percentage increase in the rate of day-wages only was to be ascertained and that amount was to be added to the wage rates. In the event of the cost of living falling below the basic figure, no deduction was to be made from wages for steamship and seal labour as set forth in the first schedule to the report. In the case of fish wharf and cold storage labour, a fall below the basic cost of living figure was to be followed by a deduction from the wage rates, but this deduction was not to exceed 5¢ per hour except in the case of wage rates for meal hours, Saturday nights, Sundays, and specified holidays, where a maximum deduction of 10¢ per hour was permitted.

(2) Conditions of employment for the different classes of work

Winter work was to commence at 8 am from 1 November to 31 March, provided that the men were notified before 6 pm the previous day. Meal-hour work was to be paid at the rate of a half-hour’s pay for 15 minutes or less and a full hour’s pay for more than 15 minutes. Men who worked through the meal hour were to continue to be paid at the meal-hour rate until they were retired or until the work had been finished.

Drinking and smoking were prohibited during working hours. The union delegate was to be notified of the dismissal of any workman. The provision of adequate drinking water and toilet facilities was made compulsory. The basis of waiting-time was left unaltered. Non-union men might be employed when an insufficient number of union men are available. If so employed, non-union men were to receive the same rates of pay and be subject to the same conditions as members of the union. The rates of wage for a broken hour were set as follows: for ½ hour or less, ½ hour pay; for more than ½ hour, full hour pay.

(3) The Settlement of Disputes

The board recommended the establishment of the following machinery for the settlement of future disputes. A joint committee of three representatives of the association and three representatives of the union should be appointed to discuss any such dispute with a view to settlement. A labour officer should be appointed by the government, and in the event of disagreement on the part of the joint committee, the matter should be reported to him. “Any dispute referred to such Officer should be considered by him, with the assistance of the Joint Committee, of which he will then become Chairman. His decision whether concurred in by other members of the Committee or not will, during the continuance of the war, be final and binding upon all the parties to the dispute.” Finally, there was to be no suspension of work pending the settlement of a dispute.
(4) Special conditions applying to longshore work

The stevedore may transfer a gang working on one hatch to another hatch, or he may reduce a double gang working on a hatch to a single gang. Any workman quitting work before its completion was to be subject to dismissal by the stevedore or foreman at the request of either the union delegate or the Employers’ Association. Foremen were to be paid at 10¢ per hour, and assistant foremen at 5¢ per hour, above the ordinary workmen’s rate. Double shifts were to be permitted in the case of work extending over a period exceeding twenty-four hours, “provided that before work commences sufficient men are selected to form two gangs for each hatch to work the ship continuously in shifts of twenty-four hours.” A minimum rest period of eight hours was to be introduced following twenty-four hours of continuous work. Cargoes were to be delivered direct to road vehicles from the slings. Maximum sling loads of 800 lbs for a single gang and 1,200 for as double gang were laid down in the case of general cargo, but exceptions to this rule were permitted in the case of certain specified classes of cargo. Employers were to be permitted to double up gangs after the commencement of work provided that the men are selected at the beginning of the operation and are told when to report to work, and provided that their pay shall start from the hour fixed for them to begin work.

(5) Variations of conditions of employment

If an employer received a certified emergency request from a competent officer of the naval, military, or air forces or from the representative of the Ministry of War Transport, or from the chairman of the Board of Customs to commence or to continue work before the regular starting hour on the next working day, he was to give at least two hour’s notice to the union of the time when the work would begin and the delegate of the union was then to furnish a sufficient number of men for the work, and the conditions concerning notice of night, Sunday, or holiday work were not to apply. The workmen, except in the case of illness, were to report for such work when called upon by the union delegate. The board pointed out that the conditions laid down by it were to be construed with reference to the equipment then in use. It was careful to add that “[u]pon introduction of mechanical appliances necessary modifications in any of the foregoing conditions, if not agreed to between the Employers’ Association and the Union, shall be made in accordance with the procedure laid down for Settlement of Disputes.”

The settlement was intended by the board to come into effect on 16 March 1942, but at the request of the union and with the consent of the association, this date was postponed to 15 April 1942. At the latter date, the settlement became part of the contract of service between the members of the association and such of their employees who were members of the union.
The union expressed dissatisfaction with some of the findings of the board, particularly the 8 am starting rule in winter, but the union executive nevertheless did its utmost to ensure the observance of the settlement by the rank and file of the union. There were, at first, cases of individual longshoremen quitting work without notice in order to draw attention to what they considered just grievances, but, by 11 July 1942, the vice-chairman of the Commission of Government was able to report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that “during the last two or three months the Union has been working generally in accordance with the terms of the Settlement.” The Labour Relations Officer recommended by the board had been appointed on 1 June 1942, both the union and the association had selected representatives to sit on the joint committee for the settlement of disputes, and the two or three disputes that had come before the joint committee under the chairmanship of the Labour Relations Officer had been satisfactorily settled.

Among the general observations and recommendations made by the board in its report was the advisability of harbour front improvements including the construction of a deep-water quay. As practically the whole of the premises requiring improvement were private property, the government decided not to implement this recommendation as “there would be no point at this time in incurring the enormous expenditure which would be involved in taking over private premises for such a purpose.” Another of the board’s recommendations, viz., the erection of a customs warehouse situated outside the danger zone at some distance from the docks received long and careful consideration. A report compiled by the chairman of the Board of Customs and endorsed by the Commissioner of Finance pointed out that dock congestion which had been at its peak when the board presented its report had been considerably relieved since then by the completion of the navy dockyard and by the erection of a wharf on the southside of St. John’s harbour. Consequently, in the opinion of the Commissioner for Finance and the chairman of the Board of Customs, the construction of a customs warehouse was unnecessary. This view was adopted by the government, and communicated by it to the Dominions Office on 12 September and accepted by the latter and by the Ministry of War Transport. A third recommendation of the board was that “the Harbour Master be given the sole authority to berth ships at the wharves and that application must be made to him before a ship is accepted alongside, and that it shall be within his discretion to order a ship to discharge or load at any wharf and make full use of the premises if, in his opinion, the wharf or shed along-side which the ship would normally be berthed is not available or in a fit state to receive cargo.” This suggestion was implemented by regulations published on 11 August 1942, arming the Commissioner for Public Utilities with ample powers—which were intended, in practice, to be exercised by the Harbour Master—of control over the berthing and discharge of ships and the storage of a cargo in St. John’s harbour.
The more economical use of transportation facilities in general was achieved by the operation of the Newfoundland Transportation Control Board, which was established very soon after the publication of the dispute board’s report. The Transportation Control Board was set up by the government under the chairmanship of the general manager of the Newfoundland Railway with a separate office at railway headquarters and with a whole-time secretary and staff, the secretary acting as the board’s executive officer. The board was directly responsible to the Commissioner for Public Utilities and consisted of the following members: the general manager of the railway (chairman); the chairman of the Board of Customs; the Secretary for Public Health and Welfare (representing the Food Controller); the Secretary for Natural Resources; a representative of the St. John’s Harbour and Pilotage Commission; a representative of the Priorities Division of the Department of Public Works; [and] two representatives of the Newfoundland Board of Trade.

The duties of the board were defined as follows: “to exercise such control over transportation facilities as it is practicable for the Newfoundland Government to impose so that these facilities may be put to the best possible use in the National interest and also to assist the Trade and Public Departments in obtaining transportation for goods and passengers by rail or sea where such assistance is in the public interest.” “It will also be the duty of the Transportation Control Board to collect and furnish to parties interested information as to transportation requirements in respect of different commodities and information as to transportation facilities which are available at any time.” Moreover, “it will be the duty of the Transportation Control Board, through the General Manager of the Railway, to seek shipping space whether by chartering ships or otherwise in order to make up as far as possible a shortage of transportation facilities for any purpose decided by the Board to be of national importance.”

The success of the trade dispute board’s settlement and the loyal spirit in which it was accepted by the Employers’ Association and the Longshoremen’s Union alike may best be judged by the message sent on 22 December by the United Kingdom Minister of Transport to the Ministry’s representative in Newfoundland. The message stated the Minister desired “to express his great personal appreciation of the work that has been done in co-operation with the Ministry of War Transport to minimize delay to Merchant Shipping and to expedite despatch often under most difficult conditions, during the year which is drawing to a close.”

It remains only to note that at a general meeting of the Employers’ Association held on 22 December 1942, it was decided to accede to the request made by the Longshoremen’s Union that work on the waterfront commence at 9 am instead of 8 am until 1 April 1943. In notifying the Labour Relations Officer to that effect, the association stated that it reserved the right to commence work at 8 am in case of emergency, and asked the president of the
union for his cooperation in obtaining compliance on the part of his men in starting work promptly at 8 am should the necessity arise.

On 17 March 1941, a dispute began at the fluorspar mining town of St. Lawrence between the St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, Ltd., and the St. Lawrence Workers’ Protective Union. Five strikes occurred between March and December of that year. The chief issues raised were wages and the "closed shop." Various unsuccessful attempts at mediation were made, and, as fluorspar is a strategically important mineral used in the manufacture of aluminum, the Newfoundland government decided to have recourse to the power conferred by Regulation No. 3 of the Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941, made under and by virtue of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940. Accordingly, on 6 December 1941, an order was made appointing a trade dispute board.

The board’s terms of reference were as follows: “to inquire into the said trade dispute and to settle the said trade dispute by determining:—

(a) whether the St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, Ltd., should comply with the demand of the St. Lawrence Workers Protective Union that the said Union should be recognized as the sole bargaining agent in relation to labour employment and working conditions.

(b) whether the St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, Ltd., should be required to discontinue from its employment any person already employed by the Corporation on the 1st December, 1941, solely on the grounds that such person is not a member of the St. Lawrence Workers Protective Union.

(c) whether the scale of wages in force prior to the 1st December, 1941, should be revised to meet the increased cost of living, and, if so, to what extent and subject to what conditions such revision should be effected.

(d) whether there has been failure on the part of the St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, Ltd., to make prompt payment of wages on the due dates, and what steps, if any, should be taken by the St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, Ltd., to secure that prompt payment will be made in all cases hereafter.”

The board arrived at St. Lawrence on 17 January 1942 and concluded its session there on 27 January. It presented its settlement on 6 March 1942. The board’s findings on the points at issue were as follows: first, on the question of the “closed shop,” the board recommended that the corporation and the union enter forthwith into the following agreement: “The St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland Limited shall recognize the St. Lawrence Workers Protective Union as ‘the sole bargaining agent in relation to labour employment and working conditions’ subject to the following conditions:— (a)
members of the office staff and general foremen, whether employed now or hired in the future, shall not, in any circumstances, be required to join the Union, (b) any other employee of the Corporation who was on the payroll at 1st December, 1941, and who does not desire to join the Union, shall not, in any circumstances, be required to do so, (c) the Union shall give the Corporation an absolute guarantee that it will not, in any circumstances, call a strike of its members. All disputes which may arise between the Corporation and the Union shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the procedure to be agreed upon by the parties, (d) the Union shall continue to show a fully paid-up membership, which includes not less than two-thirds of the workmen of all grades in the employ of the Corporation who are eligible to join the Union. (e) its Officers and Executive be annually elected by secret ballot, at a General Meeting of the Union, called for that purpose, and with due notice given, (f) failure on the part of the Union to observe any or all of these conditions will, automatically, terminate the life of the conditional ‘closed shop,’ (g) otherwise the Agreement, in its entirety, shall be equally binding on the Union and the Corporation for the duration of the war.”

On the second question, the board laid down that the union’s demand that the Corporation “discontinue from its employment any person already employed by the Corporation on the 1st December, 1941, solely on the grounds that such person is not a member of the St. Lawrence Workers’ Protective Union” be not granted.

On the question of wage rates, the board’s main recommendations were as follows:

(1) that the Corporation cease to pay, as from 15 March 1942, the rates of wages it had been paying under-rated pending the board’s award;

(2) that, instead, the Corporation pay “each employee the wage he was being paid as at 1st December 1941, (i.e. prior to the ‘protested rate’), plus a cost of living bonus of 13c. per hour, being 40% of the average wage rate paid by the Corporation at that date”;

(3) that, thereafter, there was to be “a quarterly revision of the cost of living in St. Lawrence, and a corresponding revision of the cost of living bonus.” These quarterly adjustments were to be subject to the limitation that the corporation was not to be required to increase the cost of living bonus of any employee by more than $50 in any one year. For the purpose of this proviso each year was deemed to start on 15 March;

(4) All the above recommendations concerning wages were “to apply for the duration of the War,” subject, however, to the condition that “at any time, subsequent to March 15, 1943, the Corporation shall
have the right of appeal to a Trade Dispute Board, to have the cost of living bonus either reduced or discontinued, on the ground that increased costs of production, and/or diminished sales, and/or a fall in the price of fluorspar, have reduced the capacity to pay.”

On the question of delayed payment of wages, the board found that the corporation had been guilty of delays in the payment of wages, but that, during the last two years, these delays had been neither frequent nor prolonged. The corporation had recently ceased to pay its wages in cash and was paying by cheques instead. The board recommended the continuation of this practice, as it believed that payment by cheque would obviate delays as it avoided the difficulty of transportation of cash from the nearest bank which is at Burin.

The Newfoundland Fluorspar Company, Ltd., the other fluorspar company operating at St. Lawrence, was not a party to the dispute, but had previously undertaken to pay the wage rates decided upon by the board retroactive to 6 December 1941. Immediately upon the publication of the board’s settlement, the company implemented this undertaking. On 25 November 1942, the company entered into a voluntary agreement with the union, covering not only the main points dealt with in the board’s settlement, but also all other connected matters outstanding between the company and the union.

In the autumn of 1941, a dispute developed between the shop and office employees in St. John’s and their employees. On 18 November 1941, the employees union—the Newfoundland Protective Association of Shop and Office Employees—applied to the Commissioner for Public Utilities for the appointment of a board to settle the dispute under the Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941.

The chief claims advanced by the union were that the minimum wage scale, which had been in force since May 1940, was too low, and that the war bonus granted by the employers was insufficient to meet the increased cost of living.

On 20 November, the Commissioner referred the dispute not to a board, but to the Importers and Employers Association and the union for settlement in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of 20 May between the two parties. Under clause 6 of that agreement, there was provision for the reference of disputes to a settlement committee in the first instance, and, failing settlement in that way, to an arbitration committee. A special committee was appointed consisting of three representatives of each of the parties with an independent chairman. This committee, however, came to the conclusion that, under the wording of the agreement, it did not possess the necessary jurisdiction to make an effective ruling between the parties.
Consequently, the Commissioner for Public Utilities decided to submit the dispute for settlement by a trade dispute board which was appointed on 18 May 1942. One of the difficulties of the position arose from the fact that not all the employees nor all the employers in the trades affected were parties to the dispute. Consequently, under the existing regulations, these employees and employers would not be bound by the board’s settlement. Accordingly, on 19 May, the regulations were amended in the following manner: “If it appears to the Commissioner that a trade dispute or trade disputes exist between a number of employers engaged in the same or similar or allied trades or industries and the workmen of such employers and that all employers in such trades or industries and their workmen are not parties to the said dispute or disputes and if the Commissioner deems it expedient or desirable that any agreement, decision or award made by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this Regulation should extend to all employers and workmen in all or any of such trades or industries he may when constituting a Trade Dispute Board declare that a trade dispute exists between all employers in all such trades or industries or in such of them as he may specify and the workmen of such employers and such employers and workmen shall thereupon become and be deemed to be parties to the said dispute and the provisions of the paragraph next following shall apply to all such employers and workmen.”

The board began its session on 27 May, and submitted its settlement on 22 July. In its report, the board expressed the view that the existing wage rates paid to shop and office employees in St. John’s were inadequate. Accordingly, it drew up a new minimum wage scales, which were to have effect as from 1 July 1942, and which were built up for male and for female employees. Both scales were graduated to age; in the case of male employees, the scale ran from 16 to age 29 both inclusive, and in the case of female employees, the age extended from 16 to 25 both inclusive. The minimum basic wage scale for males commenced at $5.00 per week at age 16, ran by yearly investments to $24.40 per week at age 29, which the board regarded as the central point at which the scale must provide a reasonable living standard for a family unit of five persons. The minimum basic wage scale for females began at $5.00 per week at age 16, rose to $5.50 per week at age 19, and continued to rise by annual increments to $12.00 per week at age 25. Both these minimum basic wage scales were calculated on the cost of living in 1939. The board estimated that the cost of living had risen by 30% as between 1939 and June 1942. Accordingly, it added a cost of living bonus of 30% to the basic scales throughout their entire age range in order to establish the minimum wage scales as at June 1942. The board also laid it down that the cost of living supplement was to move with the cost of living whenever that cost—as indicated by the monthly published index of the Department of Public Health and Welfare—moved 5% in either direction. The increase or decrease in the cost of living allowance was to operate “in the next pay-week after the day in respect of which the Public Health and Welfare Department announces the monthly rate which passes the point of change.”
Certain special classes of employees were not included in this general scale but were dealt with separately. Utility men, including express-men, packers, porters, van and truck drivers, storemen, teamsters, boilermen, firemen, and watchmen were awarded a weekly flat rate of $22.00. Shippers were awarded a weekly flat rate of $25.00. To window-dressers and showcard writers with 15 or more years of shop experience, the board awarded a flat rate of $5.00 per week over and above their ordinary age rates as shop hands. The board likewise awarded to advertising and showcard writers with fifteen or more years shop experience a flat rate of $8.00 per week over and above their ordinary age rates as shop hands.

The board recommended that any dispute arising out of the scale be referred in the first instance to the Labour Relations Officer who was to give his decision after consultation with a committee consisting of two representatives from the Importers and Employers Association and the Newfoundland Protective Association of Shop and Office Employees, respectively. The board also authorised the Labour Relations Officer to deal finally, after consultation with the parties, with the two special cases of late entrance and sub-normal employers.

In introducing the cost of living principle as the basis of the new wage system, the board expressed the view that it would be “quite reasonable and indeed, desirable that the new system should be regarded as experimental for a period of twelve months, and that at the end of that time either or both of the organizations concerned should come back to this Board, or to some other Board appointed for the purpose, to discuss any adjustments which may appear to be necessary in the application of the cost-of-living principle.” In fact, however, neither the association not the union, have, as yet, availed of this opportunity for revision.

On 19 November 1942, the board was reconstituted “to deal with certain subsidiary and consequential matters” of which the most important was the question as to whether and in what way the principle of the cost-of-living bonus should apply to utility men and shippers. In its supplementary report, which was presented on 30 January 1943, the board recommended that the cost-of-living arrangement be applied to both these classes on basic wages of $17.00 and $19.00 per week, respectively, which were to be treated as the 1939 rate. This settlement was to have retroactive effect to 1 July 1942.

National Registration

On 1 August 1942, a committee of the Commission consisting of the Commissioners for Public Health and Welfare, Public Utilities, and Natural Resources, decided to recommend to the Governor-in-Commission that the national registration of all persons between the ages of 16 and 60 years should
be brought into effect at the earliest possible date. The Department of Justice
advised that special legislation would not be necessary as the registration could
be affected under the authority of regulations made under the Emergency
Powers (Defence) Act, 1940.

The Committee made the following general recommendations:

1. That the regulations make provision for the appointment of a registrar who
would have the general direction and supervision of the registration under the
Commissioner for Public Utilities and who would have custody of the records.
Newfoundland, including Labrador, would be divided by the commissioner
into registration districts and a number of deputy registrars would be appointed
for each district. Each person between the ages of 16 and 60, both inclusive,
should be registered at the place where he or she ordinarily resides. The duty to
register would be placed upon the person required to register and in case of any
person being absent from his ordinary place of residence, the deputy registrar
might require a competent person in the absentee’s household to give the
necessary information concerning him and to sign his card. To avoid
duplication, a person absent from his ordinary place of residence should not be
required to register in another district. Registration of this kind would involve
considerable difficulty in large construction jobs.

2. That provision be made for the establishment of a registration period, and
persons attaining their 16th birthday after that period might register with a
constable or ranger, who, for such purposes, would be deemed to be a deputy
registrar.

3. Upon registration, the deputy registrar would issue to the registrant a
certificate of registration. No person would be employed or kept in
employment after 15 October 1942 unless he could produce a certificate of
registration.

4. Provision would be made respecting the maintenance of secrecy on the part
of officials, and penalties would be provided for refusal to register, for false
registration, for tampering with certificates on cards, etc.

At a meeting of the Commission of Government on 14 August, the
recommendation of the committee that registration of all males and females in
Newfoundland and Labrador between the ages of 16 and 60 be undertaken and
that the work be carried out by the Labour Relations Officer, for the time
being, acting under the direction of the Commissioner for Public Utilities, was
approved. The Commissioner for Public Utilities was authorised to consider
proposed amendments to the draft regulations, and a press communiqué on the
subject of the acceptance by the Commission of the principle of national
registration was to be issued immediately.
On 21 August, it was decided to amend the draft regulations so as to extend the age of registration from 60 to 65 years. On 24 August, the Defence (National Registration) Regulations, 1942, were passed by the Governor-in-Commission and were gazetted on 25 August.

On 27 August, the Labour Relations Officer held a meeting with the chairman of the Board of Customs and the secretaries of the government departments in the course of which he explained that the main object of registration was to determine the manpower available for labour and military purposes. He pointed out that the scheme possessed certain additional advantages such as identification to provide a means of detecting suspicious characters, and the collection of information that might possible be used for rationing purposes.

On 7 October, the date of registration was postponed from 15 October 1942 to 31 December 1942 and the date of report by employers to registrars or police officers or rangers of unregistered persons in their employment was postponed from 20 October 1942 to 10 January 1943. On 30 October, on the advice of the magistrates in convention, regulation 7 was amended so as to permit deputy registrars residing more than 3 miles from a justice of the peace to subscribe a declaration which would have the same force and effect as an oath. The object of this amendment was to avoid delay and save expense.

On 30 December 1942, the government decided to extend the registration period for all districts to 20 January 1943, and to postpone the date for the production of certificates by employees to their employers to 31 January 1943.

In carrying out the task of registration, school teachers were appointed competent officers. The work of the deputy registrars terminated at the end of the registration period on 20 January 1943, but the duties of the competent officers still continued, and, after 20 January 1943, some school teachers were appointed competent officers. Special arrangements were made to enable police officers and rangers to register at Canadian and United States bases during the registration period in order to register all foreign workmen residing at these bases.

The following is a list of the districts in which registration was effected, showing the number of settlements in each case:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>White Bay</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Green Bay</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Grand Falls</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Twillingate</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Fogo</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Bonavista North</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Bonavista South</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Trinity North</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Trinity South</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Carbonear-Bay de Verde</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Harbour Grace</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Port De Grace</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>St. John’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Harbour Main-Bell Island</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Ferryland</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Placentia-St. Mary’s</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Placentia West</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Burin</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Fortune Bay-Hermitage</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Burgeo-LaPoile</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>St. George’s-Port au Port</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Humber</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>St. Barbe</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Labrador</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labrador was divided into ten districts corresponding to the 6 ranger detachments.
VI
ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON
With the collapse of France in 1940, the future of the French colonies became a matter of lively concern to the British Empire. The interest of Newfoundland was particularly focused on the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, situated within ten miles distance of our shores.

Early in July 1940, a representative of the government of Newfoundland was sent to St. Pierre. He held discussions with the Administrator, and, in addition, acquired information from other sources. He reported to the government on his return and raised several questions of major importance to the war effort and to the economic life of Newfoundland.

An exchange of despatches took place with London and Ottawa, culminating in another visit by Newfoundland representatives to St. Pierre in September 1940. On that occasion, the representatives were authorised to make an offer to purchase about 200,000 quintals of fish held at St. Pierre in French fishing vessels. These vessels were unable to sail for France, and a state of anxiety and unrest prevailed in St. Pierre because of their prolonged and profitless stay there. The purchase of the fish was made conditional by the Newfoundland representatives on the sale or charter to the Admiralty of the trawlers, in which most of the fish was held. Indeed, the offer to buy the fish was ancillary to, and as an inducement for, the acquisition by Newfoundland of the trawlers. The negotiations were not successful, due mainly to the fear of reprisals against the families of any parties taking any part in the sale or charter. Other things, including the economic conditions of the islands, the political views of the administration, the merchant class, and the people generally, were reported on. In particular, the de Gaullist leanings of the large majority, contrasting with the attitude of the administration and merchant class, was under review, and a broadcast from General de Gaulle to the inhabitants was arranged. Further visits of representatives and reports thereon were made later. These subjects are all matters of record.

A natural concern was manifested in Newfoundland over the effects on Newfoundland and on the war effort of St. Pierre and Miquelon under Vichy influence. This was somewhat allayed by the results of the de Gaullist coup and of the subsequent plebiscite held in the islands, affirming unmistakably the loyalty of the inhabitants to the Allied and the Free French cause. Another matter of vital interest to Newfoundland, and one which cannot be too strongly stressed, is the future of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the event of any change in sovereignty of the islands. The possibilities are four-fold: (1) that the islands would come under the jurisdiction of Newfoundland; (2) that they would come under the jurisdiction of Canada; (3) that they would come
under the jurisdiction of the United States of America; (4) that they would revert to France.

It is realized in Newfoundland that in the event of a change of allegiance, the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants would be for United States domination (and that Newfoundland would come third on the list). The reasons are mainly economic, and need not be elaborated here. It must be recognized, however, that, if any considerations of change in sovereignty arise, Newfoundland’s interests would be seriously prejudiced by either Canadian or American jurisdiction over the islands. It has long been felt in Newfoundland that the union of St. Pierre and Miquelon to France was a serious error, and one which has cost Newfoundland dearly over the past century. It has been stated that through smuggling and loss of fishing time to Newfoundland crews, they have cost Newfoundland a million dollars a year for the past hundred years. These figures could, of course, not be proved, but the general truth of the assertion of loss to this country is indisputable. St. Pierre and Miquelon have been a thorn in the flesh and their reversion to Newfoundland is desirable and would solve many problems.

On the other hand, if Canada or the United States acquire the islands, the blow to Newfoundland would be severe. The territory would have a privileged position over Newfoundland in marketing its products, and, beyond this, since large sums of money would have to be spent by the “parent” country, this would inevitably be done in the direction of improving or assisting the fisheries. Apart from the injury which would occur to its salt fishery, Newfoundland is just beginning to get into its stride in the production of fresh and frozen fish. The islands could be used, under either Canadian or American control, to prejudice Newfoundland’s interests irretrievably in this regard. The opportunities for smuggling would be increased, rather than lessened. St. Pierre and Miquelon are geographically a part of Newfoundland; while they remain under any other jurisdiction, the situation is fraught with annoyance and danger.
VII
NEWFOUNDLAND'S FIGHTING FORCES
The 166th (Newfoundland) Army Field Regiment, Royal Artillery

The first draft which went to form the 166th Field Regiment, RA (at that time the 57th Heavy Regiment, RA) arrived in the United Kingdom from Newfoundland in April 1940. Four hundred men set to and by the time the second draft of a further 200 arrived in May, a good start had been made towards the formation of the regiment. Six weeks later the third draft of 200 arrived.

After manning heavy coast defences in Norfolk, the unit was converted into a field regiment.

In December 1942, the regiment entrained for its port of embarkation in Scotland and embarked for North Africa on the same day. No enemy action whatever, either submarine or aeroplane, was encountered during the voyage.

In February 1943, the regiment arrived at Algiers. The first reinforcements remained at Algiers while the remainder re-embarked on smaller naval ships and put out to sea immediately. Again, no enemy action was encountered in any form.

The regiment arrived at Bône, disembarked, and marched to the transit camp there.

During the period from 9-23 February, the regiment settled down in the transit camp, awaiting the arrival of its vehicles and guns. The time was spent mostly in small arms training, bathing, labour, and fatigue duties.

On 9 February, the vehicles and guns of “Q” and “R” Batteries arrived in Bône. They were followed on 31 February by the vehicles and guns of RHQ and “P” battery, complete in all respects. On 23 February “Q” and “R” batteries move out of Bône.

On the night of 25-26 February “Q” and “R” batteries went into action in the Djebel Bargou area on the Mathenet (French) Divisional Front of XXX Corps RHQ and “P” Battery left Bône on 28 February and on the night of 1-2 March went into action in the same area. “P” Battery was stationed in support. The whole regiment came under Command Army Group, RA.

Throughout the period from 3-31 March, the regiment remained in the same area with only minor changes in location. During the month the infantry regiments were changed and “P”, “Q”, and “R” batteries supported other units.

Only occasional enemy action was encountered. There was slight enemy shelling in the “Q” battery area, but no damage or casualties occurred. Good liaison was maintained with our Algerian allies. All the
Newfoundlanders were in “extremely good heart” and their adaptability enabled them to make themselves comfortable while living “in the open.” They built ingenious and well-camouflaged bivouacs and even constructed a shower bath in an adjacent stream.

On 1 April the regiment was in support of a French Algerian regiment of the French 19th Corps, which, roughly, held the mountains Djebel Bargou and the foothills in the front. The Goums [North African soldiers in French service] on their right held the Djebel Serdj. This range of mountains overlooked a plain approximately 10 miles wide dominated on the far side by the high mountains Djebel el Belloute and Djebel Hadjar on the right and Djebel bou Guetrane on the left. Between these mountains ran the pass Foum es Gonafel (or “Foum pass” as it was called). These latter mountains, the pass, and the northern portion of the plain were held by the enemy in some strength.

During the period from 1-11 April the following developments occurred:

(1) A French Moroccan regiment moved into the southern part of the Algerian area. This regiment and the Goums were under command of Colonel Carpentier and comprised the striking force for an independent attack.

(2) “Q” and “R” batteries were placed in support of Colonel Carpentier’s force. Consequently it was necessary to move “R” battery further forward. RHQ followed suit. “P” Battery was transferred from support of the northern French to the support of the center.

(3) Intelligence reports disclosed that the enemy was concentrated in very large numbers behind the Foum Pass. Accordingly “R” battery was again moved forward at night into the well-camouflaged positions to cover the pass. They maintained a “silent policy” so as not to reveal their position.

(4) The regiment sustained its first fatal battle casualty as a result of increased enemy artillery activity in the area of “Q” battery and “R” battery OP and “Q” battery gun positions.

(5) The following plan of attack was made. The French Moroccan regiment and Goums, supported by “Q” and “R” batteries were to attack across the southern portion of the plain in an outflanking movement. The Algerian regiment, supported by “P” battery from a position on the plain firing in an almost northerly direction, was to prevent enemy counterattack on the left of the advance.

On 11 April, the Commanding Officer and OC Battery registered a fire plan for 4 o’clock on 12 April which would be the commencement of the attack.
Constant liaison was maintained with Colonel Carpentier, his staff, and subordinate commanders.

The attack began on 12 April and such good progress was made that the regimental fire plan proved to be unnecessary. The regiment provided forward observation officers with the advancing infantry and also furnished one to the Goums who advanced on the extreme right. This forward observation officer supplied the only means of communication between the Goums and the remainder of the forces. He rendered invaluable service by passing back information about their progress.

On the first day of the attack “Q” Battery and RHQ again moved forward. The greatest difficulty they encountered came from enemy mines and booby traps with which the plain abounded. The infantry advancing on foot were not exposed to the same danger as the other forces. The work of the OP parties, which followed up the infantry in vehicles with wireless etc., was extremely hazardous but was carried out in an excellent manner. Two of the OP parties were blown up sustaining two fatal casualties and other less serious.

In the meantime the “P” battery OP area was subject to heavy shelling by enemy artillery. On the second day of the attack the infantry captured the Foum Pass. The infantry met stiff opposition in the mountains on the far side and required the support of the regiment. The only road through the pass and the main approach was very heavily mined and was also under enemy observation.

The batteries had to move forward to give the necessary support at all costs. The advance had to be executed by night if enemy shelling were to be avoided. Every effort was made to have the pass cleared and to reconnoiter an alternative approach road up the pass. This alternative route was narrow and difficult, and digging parties had to go out to improve the track where it crossed the wadis [rocky water course] before it could be used.

Finally the pass was reported clear of mines by 3:30 the next morning. “Q” and “R” batteries first managed to get through before daylight and came into action on the far side.

“P” Battery came through the pass the next night. The mountains on the far side of the pass made the country very difficult for artillery. The Goums on the right pushed forward in order to try to cut the road which supplied the enemy forces still remaining in the northern portion of the plain. Lieutenant R.M.P. Shields (Uplands, Swanage, Dorset) who was acting as liaison officer and forward observation officer with the French, was provided with a horse for himself and a mule for his wireless set. Lieutenant Shields set up his observation post on Djebel Fartoute, engaged and silenced guns, and dispersed
enemy vehicles. On the 15th, armoured fighting vehicles and other mechanical transport were seen to be advancing for the attack. But shell fire from the Newfoundlanders’ guns broke up the impending attack before it could be launched. Lieutenant Shields, an Englishman among Newfoundlanders, was full of praise for the way in which the Newfoundlanders handled their guns. He remained at his post under heavy shell fire until ordered to withdraw.

It was on the 13th too that Captain R.M.P. Child had to make contact with a forward section of the French. Passing through thickly laid mines and over difficult natural obstacles, he and his signaler reached their objective. On the 15th he had to go forward to a prominent feature in order to support forward sections. He brought down effective fire on a vital road. That day the French were undertaking a programme of reliefs. Captain Child remained at his observation post throughout the day, enduring very heavy shell fire. In the evening, he was again ordered to contact forward elements. In pitch darkness, he climbed a cliff face and remained in an exposed position until relieved next day.

Upon Lance Bombardier F.G. Gough, who lives at 20 Morris Avenue, St. John’s, Newfoundland, a great deal depended. Owing to bad weather, shell fire, and difficult terrain, his wireless set was the only channel through which fire orders could be effectively passed for the attack of 13-14 April and the advance the next day. On the 15th, when the situation was somewhat confused, he was ordered to man an observation post and to relay messages and orders from three forward observation officers. At a critical time, he was the only link between two French regiments and corps headquarters. Never once did he allow communication to be interrupted.

In their next positions the batteries came under heavy and accurate enemy shelling. The road between the batteries was in view of the enemy, and any vehicle passing along the road drew at least a round of gunfire from the enemy.

The air OP, which had a landing ground in the regimental area, rendered useful services to the batteries in the engagement of hostile artillery.

Enemy counter battery fire at that period was very heavy indeed, Supply and intercommunication presented grave problems. The roads were under constant fire during the daytime. Supplies of ammunition and food had to come up by night through treacherous minefields and tortuous deviations. On no occasion, however, was the regiment short of rations, water, petrol, or ammunition, and the batteries were never out of touch.

Officers and other ranks did not spare themselves. Gunner G.J. O’Keefe (Corner Brook, Newfoundland), although badly wounded at an observation post on Djebel el Belloute, would not allow himself to be moved
until every other wounded man had been taken to safety. When enemy shell fire was exceptionally heavy on 18 April, Lance Sergeant William Keeling (also of Corner Brook) took two wounded gunners to the regimental air post in the midst of a barrage. On the same day, two St. John’s men, Lance Bombardier A. Thompson and Gunner G. Hutchings, showed great courage when a gun limber filled with ammunition was hit. While shell fire continued, they went out into the open, located the fire and put it out.

Throughout the whole battle, communications remained in working order, and, despite the unusual and difficult circumstances, effective support was given to the infantry, which consequently, on one occasion, prevented a serious enemy counterattack from developing.

On 18 April, the regiment suddenly received orders to move to a new front altogether, as French artillery was to take over the support of the Moroccans and Goums. The move out of action, which would have been fatal in daylight, was successfully accomplished during darkness. It marked the beginning of a long, difficult, and tiring march back over the mountains to the new area, which was not reached until daylight on 19 April.

During the next three days the regiment made ready to go into action under the nose of the enemy on the famous “Longstop Hill” in front of Medjez-el-Bab in support of a new attack. The attack was planned to commence at night. Owing to the openness of the gun area, the guns could only go into action in darkness immediately before the attack was due to commence. The period from 23 April was accordingly spent in reconnaissance and preparation of the position by night and in maintenance and cleaning of equipment by day.

On 22 April, the regiment moved into action as soon as darkness fell. They moved silently and without showing any lights. Then, at the appointed moment, all the guns began firing together on a prearranged fire plan. The attack on “Longstop” had begun.

The infantry encountered stiff opposition and it was not until the middle of 23 April that “Longstop” was captured. This left the batteries in very exposed positions. The enemy shelling was increasingly accurate but not so heavy as might have been expected in the circumstances. There was considerable damage to all minefields, both enemy and allied. In all, five vehicles were disabled. “R” battery moved forward in close support of the division, and was followed later by “P” and “Q” batteries and by RHQ. The regiment was then concentrated in the area as the division artillery. Enemy opposition from the Bou Aoukaz feature held up the advance of the allied troops by repeated tank attacks behind the allies’ forward positions. The enemy used their new 6 barrelled mortars and, in consequence, the FOO’s and OPs came under heavy and unpleasant fire. During the whole period from 22 April to 23 May acts of gallantry were almost commonplace. Gunner E. Perry (254
Hamilton Avenue, St. John’s, Newfoundland) remained at his post after the infantry had withdrawn and, although in great pain from an injured back, he helped to evacuate the wounded. Gunner Kenneth Lane, also of St. John’s, was in an armoured observation post which was hit. It was essential to get a wireless truck forward. In the teeth of a closely fought battle, Gunner Lane took his truck into position and recovered it safely.

Sudden orders placed the regiment under the command of the division. Commencing on the night of 2-3 May, the regiment came out of action, moved into position, and went into action again, this time in the Bou Arada area. The regiment replaced the artillery in that area and took over their positions. However, as the positions were found to be unsuitable and exposed to accurate enemy shelling, the regiment was transferred to more suitable ones. There the regiment acted in support of an infantry brigade.

During the period from 8-12 May, a British armoured division was ordered to advance in a north east direction to the Cap Bon peninsula.

An infantry brigade was left to hold the position, and the regiment (less “R” battery), under the command of the armoured division, was placed in support of a motor brigade for the advance. “R” battery was under the command of the regiment whose task it was to keep pace with the division while protecting the right flank.

Despite some delays caused by enemy shelling, good progress was made by the armour as far as the line of hills extending from the Djebel Ressas to the Djebel bou Kournine. There, in unsuitable terrain for tanks, the enemy’s resistance stiffened and the motor brigade took over the battle from the tanks. The regiment (less “P” battery) went into action at night, south of the Djebel Ressas. The OPs accompanied the infantry battalions. There was no cover from the enemy OP on the Djebel, and the next day “Q” battery was subjected to well-directed fire from an enemy battery in enfilade. One gun received a direct hit but fortunately the casualties to personnel were not heavy thanks to the good cover afforded by a nearby wadi.

As the infantry advanced into the hills, the range lengthened and it became necessary to move the battery the next night to a position west of, and still exposed to, the Djebel Ressas.

At this juncture, the regiment received the welcome news that Tunis and Bizerta were in British hands, that the 7th Armoured Division was making rapid progress along the coast, and that large numbers of German and Italian prisoners were beginning to come in.

On 10 May, “Q” battery was again singled out for accurate shelling and another gun was hit. Again, a friendly wadi protected the gun crews, although
the burning charges and exploding ammunition drew unwelcome attention to the battery’s headquarters. Regimental headquarters in the same wadi came for its share of attention, but fortunately there were no casualties.

At this point there was nothing between the regiment’s guns and the enemy holding the Djebel, but in the afternoon the news was received that the 7th Armoured Division had captured Grombalia and that the armoured cars of another armoured division were well forward along the Creteville-Grombalia road. A reconnaissance was carried out in preparation for a further move to the high ground, and before dark the regiment fired its last round of the campaign.

During this period “R” battery had been fighting a troop commanders’ battle in support of the tanks in true horse artillery style, each troop in support of a squadron continually working round and behind the enemy’s flank. They had targets such as all troop commanders dream of but such as few have the good fortune to encounter.

Hostilities were now at an end and, before the battery left to rejoin the regiment, the commanding officer of the tank regiment expressed to the battery his appreciation of the excellent support which his regiment had received during the whole action.

The regiment’s total casualties for the campaign were as follows: killed—17 other ranks; wounded—1 officer and 17 other ranks.

The regiment took part in the victory March in Tunis, proud of their record and in good heart.

On 21 June the regiment with its RASG platoon started on its long trek to Tripoli. The route to be followed was Setif, Oued Athmenia, Telergma, Ain M’lila, Ain Beida, Tebessa, Gafsa, El Guettar, Gabes, Mareth Medenine, Ben Gardane, Zuara, Sabratha, Tripoli, with a day’s halt at Gabes and another at Sabratha.

All the vehicles were in good running order, and the march proceeded with little incident. The fertile plain of Algeria gave way to the arid stretches of central Tunisia until finally the regiment reached the desert made famous by the Eighth Army. With the Mareth Line crossed and with Gabes left behind, orders from allied forces headquarters halted the regiment on a fly blown patch of soft sand at Ben Gardane, 120 miles short of Tripoli. Evening bathing in the tepid Mediterranean made life bearable for the majority of the regiment. Finally, on 29 June, the regiment was ordered to move to Sabratha, a more salubrious oasis with a hospital, nurses, cemetery, canteen, cinema, and all modern conveniences. But late the same day these orders were cancelled, and instead the regiment was ordered to start on its return journey to Setif.
On the morning of 30 June, a sadder but wiser column set out on the return journey. Once again the vehicles and guns of the regiment were halted on the sand outside Gabes. Once again the tepid Mediterranean provided daily relief to the sun-grilled Newfoundlanders. The sirocco raised the temperatures in the shade to nearly 120º. Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Lambert, the officer commanding the 166th, recorded their unbounded admiration for the Eighth Army, which had fought tank battles in such a temperature.

On 6 July, the regiment left the Gabes area and lost no time in making its escape from the barren and inhospitable desert. After enduring a day’s sirocco on the road, the regiment returned to the cool nights and breezes of the upland plains.

Arriving at Setif on 9 July, after an absence of three weeks, the regiment pitched its camp close to the site it had previously occupied. Its RASC platoon had been left behind, a few of the men had been evacuated to hospital, and a few had recovered. The arrival of more than five tons of mail provided just the kind of recreation that the regiment required. Not a day was lost in removing the stains of travel left by the long march. A first party of eighty officers and other ranks were immediately despatched for a brief holiday at a seaside rest camp to be followed by others. Programmes were prepared, classes were arranged, and a refresher training programme was soon in full swing.

The period from 11 July to 15 September was devoted to rest and training. The regiment embarked on a full retraining programme including refresher courses of instruction for the individual, troop, and battery training periods, followed by a period of regimental training designed to knit together the batteries and sub-units into an efficient fighting machine.

By 25 September the programme had been almost completed. All the men had had short periods at a seaside camp, and almost all the officers had had leave.

On 26 July, Major C.F. Hutt, after only 3 months in command of “Q” battery, left the regiment to become an instructor at the staff college. He was succeeded by Captain W.E. Black who, by obtaining promotion to field rank after only 2½ years’ commissioned service in the Royal Artillery, created almost a record.

Lieutenant C.A. Sheppard was promoted captain on 26 July and took over command of a troop in “Q” Battery, Captain R.M.P. Child replacing Major Black as battery captain in “Q” battery.

After three years of faithful service as adjutant and 3 years with the regiment, Captain J.M. Beecham departed on 27 August to take a staff
appointment as brigade major. His place was taken by Captain E.L. Bowen, who had recently joined the regiment from the Eighth Army after service in Libya and the western desert.

Lieutenant D.S. Ayre, who came with the draft, joined a gun position officer’s course at the School of Artillery and is to join the regiment on the completion of his course, Lieutenant C.E.M. Payton joined “R” battery after a short observation of fire course at the School of Artillery.

Sergeant Baggs and Sergeant Oxford completed a six weeks’ gunnery staff course (NCO’s) at the School of Artillery on 28 August and rejoined the regiment as qualified assistant instructors in gunnery. Sergeant Baggs was quickly promoted battery sergeant major and took over troop sergeant major in “Q” battery.

On 10 August, the corps commander paid a short visit to the regiment. After expressing his appreciation of the regiment’s record in action he displayed great interest in the training activities and questioned many of them about their work.

On 29 September, Brigadier E.M. Taylor, RA, praised the regiment in the following words: “The Regiment has shown all its former keenness and toughness combined with the usual friendly good humour. It has put on an outstanding performance and has shown that it is an extremely well commanded, trained and organized unit which has ever improved on the high standards shown during the Tunisian campaign.”

On 8 October, the regiment moved by road to Philippeville for embarkation to Italy. En route to Philippeville they spent one night at Ain M’lila. On arrival at Philippeville, the regiment’s guns and vehicles were placed aboard ship. The loading commenced on the 11th and was completed by the 14th October, on which day the two ships sailed with 12 officers, including the 2 i/c and 118 other ranks. On reaching the open sea, the vehicle ships joined a large convoy of over 100 ships.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment, with its commanding officer, moved into a transit camp to await the arrival of personnel ships. Before they arrived, news of the following awards for the African campaign was received on 18 October: Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Lambert, RA—D.S.O; Major R.W. Hitchcock, RA—MC; 970464 Sergeant R.F. Miles—BEM; and the following were mentioned in despatches: 970013 Sergeant G.R. Downton (killed in action); 970343 Bombardier A.R. Thompson; 970103 Lance Bombardier E. Perry; 971398 Gunner G. Hutchings; and 970427 Gunner K.C. Lane (killed in action). The award of the DSO and the French decoration of the Croix de Guerre to Lieutenant Colonel Lambert, the commanding officer of
the 166th, was a recognition not only of his own valuable services but also the regiment’s outstanding performance in the North African campaign.

On 20 October 4 United States LCIIs arrived and by midday the embarkation was completed and the voyage to an as yet unknown destination began.

In the meantime, the two vehicle ships had sailed steadily on. They dropped anchor for a few hours off Malta, where rations were taken aboard and the men enjoyed bathing from the ship. The vehicle ships arrived off Taranto on the evening of 21 October and dropped anchor in the outer harbour about 2200 hours. The next morning they moved through the swing bridge into the inner harbour and were tied alongside about midday. Personnel of the dock operating company came aboard before the ships tied up and the unloading commenced immediately. This was completed by the evening of the 23rd and all the vehicles and guns were stored in a cache on the outskirts of Taranto to await the arrival of the remainder of the regiment.

The LCIs on which the rest of the regiment were travelling were rather crowded, but the weather was magnificent and combined with the kindness of the regiment’s American hosts to make the voyage a most enjoyable experience.

The first call on the morning of the 23rd was at a Sicilian port where, whilst awaiting further orders from naval headquarters, batches of troops were disembarked for a short route march through the town. In the afternoon, the small convoy proceeded on its way and arrived without further incident at Tarano on 24 October at 1600 hours. The personnel immediately joined the vehicles, and at 0900 hours on the 26th the regiment moved off to join the Eighth Army. The regiment stayed for the night of the 26th at Barletta and moved on the next day to San Severo where it was ordered to make final preparations for action and to await further instructions.

Up to that time the regiment had seen no sign of the enemy by land, sea, or air since the end of the Tunisian campaign. However, the regiment was interested to observe the effects of the Allied bombing on the Italian navy in Taranto harbour.

On 3 November the regiment was placed under the command of a well known division and was ordered to the Termoli area where it was expected that it would take part in the battle for the Trigno River. It was not, however, until the 5th that the regiment was deployed for action just north of Trigno. No rounds were fired from that position, but that night the regiment was ordered to support a brigade of an Indian division, which was guarding the left flank of the division advancing up the coast to the Sangro River.
Moving before dawn on the 6th the regiment crept forward along the congested roads through San Salvo. At 1000 hours reconnaissance parties were ordered forward. Forward observation officers were sent off with the infantry. The regiment’s guns went into action shortly afterwards in support of the Indian infantry in their attack on Furci and opened fire for the first time in Italy.

Only slight enemy opposition was encountered, and the next day the regiment moved its guns forward into position south-east of Gissi. Beyond the town, however, the enemy’s resistance stiffened; all the bridges were blown up, the roads were blocked, and the heavy rain made deviations difficult to find. The forward observation officers could not get the vehicles forward and it proved necessary to transport the wireless and all equipment by mules. Captain G.C. Eaton (Cookstown Road, St. John’s, Newfoundland) took his wireless set up on a motor cycle. A shell burst blew him off his machine, but he continued on foot. Throughout the following day, he made constant efforts to gain and keep communications. Although he was under continued shell fire all that bitter day, he succeeded in ensuring artillery support for the infantry. Owing to the continuous rain and the difficult terrain, the progress of the advance was very slow. “R” battery was moved up close to Gissi to get more range.

Meanwhile the division on the right had advanced rapidly, and on 10 November a reconnaissance party, consisting of the two i/c, a survey officer, and the signals officer, was ordered to select positions for the regiment on Paglieta ridge in preparation for the Sangro battle. The only approach to the area was in full view of the enemy. Consequently movement was restricted to the hours of darkness. On the 11th, the regiment moved forward to the Casalbordino area and digging parties were sent forward on foot to prepare gun-pits etc. At dusk on the evening of the 13th, the regiment moved forward to occupy the position only to find that the road had been blown up in two places. However, an urgent call to the Royal Engineers to bring up bulldozers was answered promptly, and, after a very harassing night, the regiment was in action position by daybreak.

Orders were received that the guns were to remain silent until the attack on the “Winter Line” had started and that 700 rounds per gun were to be dumped in the gun-pits. Owing to the heavy rain, it became practically impossible for vehicles to pass over the diversions at the road demolition. On four consecutive nights the ammunition trucks failed to get through and only just managed to turn around and get back out of view by dawn. Each night they were subjected to shelling but fortunately suffered only superficial damage. Nevertheless, despite waterlogged roads, tracks thick with mud, and an alert enemy, the dumping programme was completed by 22 November.

The regiment was delighted to receive a visit at this time from Lieutenant Colonel [A.T.] Howell. He visited all the men and answered the
many questions which they put to him. It appeared that the regiment had been successful in its attempt to occupy positions unknown to the enemy, for, although the enemy artillery was very active, nothing dropped in the regiment’s immediate area, another regiment 1,000 yards to the rear of the Newfoundlanders receiving most of the shells.

After several postponements due to bad weather, the regiment joined in the barrage on the night of 27 November, when the Indian division captured the high ground overlooking the Sangro. Forward observation officers operated with the Indian battalion leading the attack, one with the lancers, and one with the tanks. Owing to casualties, one of these tanks was ordered to fight as part of the armoured force. Lance Bombardier Janes (Badger’s Quay, Newfoundland) and Gunner W. Dodd (58 Livingstone Street, St. John’s, Newfoundland) operated a .75 gun and the Browning’s, causing great slaughter among the enemy. In addition, these two Newfoundlanders kept the wireless communication open for artillery support. Men from both sides of the Atlantic fought as one. Captain F. W. McCosh (18 Newington Place, Edinburgh) went out four times in the pitch black night over mined roads, to hurry on observation post parties. He remained calm and unruffled with box mines going up all around him in the midst of the barrage of heavy shells.

During this battle, the 166th suffered its first casualties in Italy. They included Gunner White and Gunner Fisher (killed) and Captain Sheppard (wounded).

On 1 December, Mozzagrogna being by then firmly in Allied hands, the regiment received orders for reconnaissance parties to cross the Sangro and select gun positions south-east of the village which had been reduced to little more than a heap of rubble. The area proved to be heavily mined and was under intermittent shell fire.

Just as the reconnaissance party were returning from their mission, the Bailey bridge over the Sangro received a direct hit which effectively prevented their return to the regiment that night.

On 3 December, the regiment crossed the Sangro without incident except that a mule fell into a hole beside the road and was completely submerged in mud and water. The regiment came into action without further incident but, as the enemy had withdrawn during the night, was not called on to fire. The next day the regiment was ordered to advance into action just north of Lanciano, where, so far as the artillery was concerned, the regiment was “right at the top of the hunt.” On 9 December, the regiment received its first heavy shelling in Italy. Two valuable sergeants—Sergeant Veitch and Lance Sergeant Conway—were killed and Lieutenant D.S. Ayre, RA, was wounded.
The weather conditions continued very bad, and the supplying of ammunition to the guns was a heavy task as ammunition expenditure at that time was very high. OP officers engaged many targets daily in support of the infantry who were engaged in the difficult task of forcing their way across the Moro River. This they succeeded in accomplishing on 12 December and, on the 19th, the regiment moved forward to the Frisa area.

On 18 December, the regiment fired a programme in support of an attack launched by the Canadians near Ortona. Lieutenant Colonel Lambert, the CO of the regiment, was detailed as CCRA’s representative with the Canadians. During the course of this action, owing to a slight error in timing, he found himself in front of the infantry and walked into the enemy lines where, fortunately, he was met by inaccurate machine gun fire. He withdrew unhurt and returned to the regiment on the 20th.

On 20 December, Major W.E. Black returned from an interview with the War Office selection board in connection with an application which he had made for a permanent commission in the regular army. His interview was successful and he was placed on the roll for a regular commission. On 21 December, Lieutenant Colonel Lambert was evacuated to hospital to the deep regret of all ranks. On 22 December, Lieutenant D.S. Ayre was promoted to a captain. On the same day the regiment received authority to wear the African Star.

Meanwhile the infantry continued to advance slowly beyond the Moro towards the River Arielli with the regiment in continuous support, barrages being fired for various planned attacks. The weather grew gradually worse, and, on New Year’s Eve, all operations were brought to a standstill by a blizzard and a heavy fall of snow. It was one of the worst nights in memory. Every bivouac was flooded, all the blankets were saturated, and all the gun-pits were flooded. By daylight most of the guns were standing in 2½ feet of water. In spite of everything, the cooks lived up to their reputation and managed to produce a hot breakfast which cheered up everyone considerably. The cheerfulness shown by all ranks under these terrible conditions afforded convincing proof of the high morale prevailing in the regiment.

News was received that Colonel Lambert’s health was improving but only slowly, and on 10 January 1944 Major R.W. Hitchcock, MC, RA, was appointed to command the regiment with the acting rank of lieutenant colonel. Major K. Scott-Foster, OBE, R.A. was posted to the regiment as second in command.

The fighting at this time was not on a large scale but what there was was close and bitter and was carried on in bad country. The regiment had the
misfortune to lose three more troop commanders wounded, namely Captain Fowler, Captain Miller, and Captain Taylor, the last named only recently promoted.

On 20 January, the regiment moved its OPs to the Arielli area. After two days there the regiment moved again into the Lanciano area, where, for the first time, practically all the men were housed in buildings.

At midday on 31 January, the regiment received orders to come out of action and to start on a long journey at 0300 hours on the morning of 1 February. Thus its connection with the Indian division alongside which it had been fighting for the past three months was severed. Just before the cease fire was ordered a message was received from the divisional commander saying how much he had enjoyed having the Newfoundland regiment in his division and expressing his thanks for the good work that it had done. His message also stated that all the infantry units with which the regiment had been engaged had expressed their gratitude for the wholehearted and excellent support that the regiment had given them.

Up to that time, the regiment had fired more than 81,000 rounds since its arrival in Italy. Captain Fowler and Captain Sheppard, having quickly recovered from their wounds, now rejoined the regiment and thus Captain Ayre and Captain Taylor relinquished their acting rank and reverted to their substantive rank of lieutenant.

After a hurried move across Italy, which was accomplished in three days, the regiment spent three weeks in the maintenance and replacement of its equipment. This period of training and refitting gave the men a welcome opportunity to obtain a well earned rest. This was badly needed as they had not been able to relax since early November.

On 25 February 1944, the first troop went into action in the Cassino area and was quickly followed by the rest of the regiment. While in its position before Cassino, the regiment fought in support of a well known Indian division.

The weather was foul most of the time, but the spirit of the Newfoundlanders was always high. During this period the regiment lent some signalers to other regiments.

On 2 March, it was learned that Captain Eaton had been awarded the Military Cross for gallantry in action. He was the first Newfoundland officer of the regiment to receive an award.

On 4 March, Captain Grabiner, who had been with the regiment for three years, was posted to the bridgehead and Captain G.B. Ayre, who had
been promoted to acting captain when Captain Eaton was admitted to hospital on 22 February, replaced Captain Grabiner when Captain Eaton returned from Hospital on 11 March and was able to resume his duties.

In the later stages of the regiment’s stay in the Cassino area, an experiment in using the 25 pounder as a mortar was successfully carried out. As a result, the regiment was able to harass the enemy in places where he had not hitherto been reached by shell fire.

The regiment had a “grandstand” view of the Allied attack on Cassino. As the famous Monastery Hill was in full view from their gun positions, the Newfoundlanders were able to see the spectacular bombing that was carried out.

One troop of “R” battery was in action quite close to a French anti-aircraft gun. During one period of violent enemy shelling, some of the French gun crews were pounded. While this heavy shelling was going on, several enemy aircraft flew overhead. Sergeant Jessau, Sergeant Sweet, and Gunner Benoit gave first aid to the French wounded, got them away, and manned their anti-aircraft gun against the air raiders. For this feat the three Newfoundlanders were awarded the French decoration of the Croix de Guerre.

The telephone lines across the River Rapido were cut during this battle. They were repaired by Bombardier C. Butler, Topsail, Conception Bay, Newfoundland, who, under heavy shell fire, swam the river and, battling against the snow swollen flood, gained the opposite bank to mend the lines.

On 5 April, the regiment received orders to move, and once again had quite a long march. On arrival in the new area, they went into action immediately eager to play their part in another portion of the battlefield. Soon after the regiment’s arrival in its new positions, three British officers, Captain Child, Captain Fowler, and Lieutenant Houston, who had been with the regiment for some considerable time, left to take a gunnery staff course. Their departure made necessary certain changes in personnel, but these in no way impaired the efficiency of the regiment. Captain McCosh, who had been with the regiment for four years, replaced Captain Child, and Lieutenants Sheaf and Goodridge, A, were promoted acting captains and replaced Captain McCosh and Captain Fowler as troop commanders.

At first, things were fairly quiet in the new area, although there was occasional shelling of the regiment’s gun positions and a few casualties were sustained. However, the regiment suffered a severe blow on the evening of 10 May, when the regimental headquarters office received a direct hit while the commanding officer was away at a conference. A shell hit the top pole of the tent and immediately burst. Captain E.L. Bowen, the adjutant, and Lieutenant J.M. Murray, the assistant adjutant, were killed outright. The two clerks,
Sergeant Childs and Bombardier [W.E.G. Hopkins] were seriously injured and subsequently died of their wounds. The survey officer, Lieutenant J.M. Parkin, lost an arm.

Shortly afterwards, “D” troop, who were stationed some distance from the rest of the regiment, came under heavy shell fire and sustained casualties. One man was killed and four were wounded, while three vehicles were burnt out and one gun was hit.

Major Scott-Fraser, OBE, who was 2 i/c, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and left the 166th to command a field regiment in the 78th Division. Major Chadwyck-Healey, MC, arrived to replaced him. On 31 May, Lieutenant L. Walsh joined the regiment having brought the latest draft from England. He was posted to “R” battery.

On 5 June, along with the corps artillery, the regiment fired air bursts in V formation to celebrate the fall of Rome to the Allies. The Germans emerged from their foxholes to watch the spectacle and the corps guns brought their full weight to bear upon them.

Until 9 June the regiment remained in support of the Indian division but was then put in support of another unit. It was while in support of this unit that the regiment moved forward to Chieti. As the Germans were in full retreat, blowing up bridges and railways, demolishing roads and villages, and mining roads, the chase was very slow. Throughout the period of the advance, the regiment was unable to fire as the enemy were out of range and on the run. In the course of the advance, the regiment had an opportunity of seeing at close quarters some of the damage which its guns had helped to inflict.

On 12 June, the regiment received orders to pull out of action and move to a concentration area at Campobasso. This took place on 16 June and once again the move covered a considerable distance. In this new area the regiment enjoyed a well earned rest. Maintenance and replacement of equipment was attended to. The mornings were spent in training, the afternoons in recreation, while in the evenings ENSA film shows and concerts in a nearby town were available for the men. Leave continued for all ranks, and in a period of three weeks 20 officers and 200 men went on leave. It was hoped that every member of the regiment would be able to go on leave but this was not possible.

About this time the regiment was issued with its own mine detectors and the men showed great keenness in learning how to operate them.

Since its arrival in Italy, the regiment had up to that time fired in the neighbourhood of 200,000 rounds. This made it necessary for the guns to have new barrels. These were supplied during the rest period. The consequent calibration of the guns took place with great success on 10 July.
On 14 July, orders were received that the regiment would once more move into action but full details were not immediately available.

In the meantime, the regiment was selected to carry out a combined demonstration with infantry advancing behind its concentrations. This was carried out successfully on 17 July for the benefit of a senior officers’ training centre.

Soon afterwards the regiment went into action in support of two famous cavalry regiments. The Newfoundlanders were extended over a considerable distance and in fact covered something like one sixth of the entire Italian front. “P” battery was left behind for a short period as a demonstration battery at the training centre where the regiment had previously taken part in the demonstration.

While moving into action at this time, the regiment caught glimpses of country with which it was very familiar as a result either of having fought in these areas or of having carefully followed the progress of the great battles that had taken place there. The most impressive sight for everybody was the condition of Cassino. There were no buildings standing there in an undamaged state. In fact the whole place was a mass of rubble, mines, and complete destruction.

The regiment also caught a glimpse of Rome. The city and its inhabitants appeared to be completely untouched by, and unaware of, the war.

When His Majesty the King visited the Italian front about 25 July, some 35 men of the regiment were on the route that he passed.

Towards the end of July the regiment was in support of an armoured brigade along with other Italian regiments under the command of the CO who acted as local CRA.

During this period the regiment fortunately did not suffer any battle casualties.

About this time the regiment received a letter from the CCRA, 5th Corps. The following is an extract from that letter: “I want to tell you how very sorry we are in the 5th Corps to have lost, even temporarily, your fine Regiment, and I only hope that it may not be so very long before we come together again. The 5th Corps values its Newfoundlanders very much and I would like to thank you for all the ready cooperation you have always shown me and to wish you, and your chaps, every possible good fortune in the business ahead.”
During October the regiment had quite a trying time. Weather conditions were bad and attacks by infantry frequent. The regiment fired 33,000 rounds of ammunition which had to be brought one hundred and fifty miles by the RASC platoon. Thirty miles of this haul was over bad mountain roads and the last five miles over mud strewn roads and tracks. This last stage had to be covered by night as these tracks were in full view of the enemy. It was, perhaps, the hardest and most concentrated period of fighting that the regiment ever experienced. The infantry were most grateful for the support given them by the regiment during this difficult time. The good work of the regiment was enthusiastically praised by the brigadier and the battalion commanders.

At the outset of this period the division received orders to break further into the Gothic Line. The penetration began when one battalion of the Guards Brigade went forward at Castiglione to prepare for an attack on Mount Catarelto, otherwise known as –707. The guns, after a difficult move, went into action by night, some five thousand yards behind the objective and about four thousand yards behind our own troops.

A fire plan was organized and the attack commenced. Captain A. Goodridge and Captain T. M. Sheaf of “Q” battery acted as forward observation officers. Despite difficult conditions of rain, mud, and cold, the attack was pressed home and the infantry gained their objective. Bitter fighting ensued, and the forward observation officers were kept busy shooting at enemy counterattacks, and very often within four hundred yards of our own troops.

In the course of this battle, Captain Goodridge’s wireless set was destroyed, and while he was returning with another set, borrowed from the infantry, he was badly wounded. To get the wireless, he had to cross an area swept by enemy mortar and machine gun fire. This he did fearlessly and with his customary calm. He was ably assisted by L/Sergeant Giles, who was also wounded, and by Gunner Cheeseman, who maintained the communications continuously.

Captain Sheaf continued the battle, but, after thirty six hours, the battalion was forced to withdraw, which it did under continued support from the regiment’s guns.

Another battalion then prepared for the attack. This was supported by “R” battery OP officers, with fire support from two field regiments and two medium regiments, all controlled by the regiment’s OPs. After much fierce fighting, and retaliatory shelling and mortaring from the enemy, the objective was gained and held, and Captain Miller established an OP. Enemy dead were found in great numbers as a result of the effectiveness and accuracy of the regiment’s concentrated shell fire. The regiment’s own losses were not light. The battle was the fiercest of all those in which the regiment had been directly
engaged. The OPs called hurriedly for fire, and the gunners responded promptly and accurately. The ammunition was moved forward as quickly as required, and magnificent work was done from front to rear.

The enemy withdrew as a result of this attack, our flanking battalion moved forward, and plans were laid for the next stage of the battle. This was carried out by the brigade on the regiment’s left. Once again the Newfoundland gunners fired numerous rounds in support of the attack. It was a grim duel, but, by superior determination and weight of artillery, the objectives were finally gained and held.

During the next few days, general consolidation and reorganization took place in readiness for the next phase of the drive through the German strongholds. It was necessary to capture and secure certain minor features as firm bases for the launching of the next attack. This was to be delivered by two brigades, the one immediately following the other. Harassing fire was kept up prior to the beginning of the attack.

The new phase of the attack opened at dawn one morning with a fire programme of somewhat long duration and depended upon the infantry reaching their objective. The brigade which the regiment was directly supporting was to continue the attack on the right. At 1400 hours, the first part of the programme having been successful, the regiment’s part began. Captain Sheaf and Captain D.S. Ayre, the latter recently promoted to replace Captain Goodridge, went forward with the attack as forward observation officers. The going was heavy, and that night the infantry dug in short of their objective, having arranged to advance early next morning under a series of concentrations to be fired by the regiment. At first light it was found that our patrols had edged forward, and only short concentrations had to be used to assist the infantry in reaching its objective. However, there was still no rest for the gunners, who continued to harass the Germans in their retreat.

Many other minor battles were fought, in which the regiment supplied observation officers and furnished considerable fire support. The infantry throughout the entire division attributed most of their success to the tireless work of the gunners. Not only did the guns themselves do good work but the signallers also performed very valuable services by maintaining lines and wireless communications, thus enabling fire to be brought down at the right time and in the right place.

By the end of October, the regiment had penetrated well into the Gothic Line. The regiment’s casualties that month were light, considering the fact that the regiment was in continuous action and considering the heavy engagements in which it took part.
It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Colonel G. Burns, DSO, MC, on the eve of his departure from his command of the “A” battalion of the Coldstream Guards, visited the Newfoundland regiment and fired its 200,000th round in Italy.

During the last two months of 1944, the conditions were very static. The weather was very cold, wet, and muddy. Later on snow fell and lay fairly deep. The bad weather restricted activity and hampered the regiment greatly. Nevertheless the Newfoundlanders played an important part in a major engagement.

Preparations had been going on for a long time for a battle in which artillery was to be a big factor. Plans were made, targets were registered, and intensive patrolling was carried out by our own troops. Very often our night firing patrols penetrated deeply into the enemy’s positions. The regiment was often called upon to fire within two or three hundred yards of our own infantry and mostly at night. The fact that it succeeded in doing so without injury to our own troops speaks volumes for the accuracy of its fire.

When Field Marshall Sir Harold Alexander GCB, CSI, MC, visited the division on 6 November, the regiment was represented by its commanding officer, accompanied by Captain Eaton, Captain Baird, and twenty other ranks. The Field Marshall chatted with several of the men. The Newfoundland party presented a very smart appearance on parade. They were as neat and clean as if they had been living in peacetime barracks instead of in shacks dug into muddy ground.

An interesting innovation introduced during this period was that some of the troop commanders were able to go up in aeroplanes and direct the guns from the air. Unfortunately, however, the bad weather restricted the number of such flights.

The regiment’s observation post parties throughout this period had many difficulties to surmount. In addition to heavy enemy mortaring and shelling, the tracks to and from the observation posts were muddy, then snowed up, and later frozen. The intense cold made it necessary to relieve these parties every twenty-four hours instead of every three or four days. In spite of these difficulties, the men never lost their customary cheerfulness. During this period, the regiment almost completely changed all its guns. The old guns had given good service but, having outlived their usefulness, they had to be returned as worn out, and were replaced by the new ones with lots of life.

During one phase of this period, the 166th became a five battery regiment, as two batteries belonging to the South African artillery were placed under its command. The Newfoundlanders and the South Africans got on extremely well together.
Christmas was celebrated in good style by all ranks at the batteries and regimental headquarters.

On 23 December, the regiment completed its second round of leave since its arrival in Italy. All the men spent a few days in the Florence area and enjoyed a well earned rest.

On 22 December, the regiment’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Hitchcock, RA, was wounded when a shell burst within a few feet of the jeep that was taking him back from brigade headquarters where he had gone to meet the new army commander. He made a rapid recovery and, after ten days in hospital, returned to his regiment. On his return from hospital, he visited all the batteries under his command and found all ranks in good spirits and full of cheer.

During the November-December period several changes took place in the officer position in the regiment. Major F.B. Maclaran, MC, arrived to replace the former second in command, who had received a staff appointment. Major I.D. Forsyth, who had joined the regiment in March 1941, left in November 1944 to attend a staff college course and Captain E.S. Briggs was promoted to his place and to the command of “R” battery. Lieutenant J.A. Baird was promoted to captain to replace Captain Briggs. Lieutenant Hay and Lieutenant Willar, both Newfoundlanders, joined the regiment about this time and thus reinforced the regiment’s Newfoundland officers’ strength.

News was received from England that Captain A. Goodridge was progressing favourably in hospital and that he had been awarded the Military Cross for his bravery in action. It was also learned that the following awards had been conferred on other members of the Regiment: Captain Quartermaster M.M.W. Hatcher was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire; the Military Medal was awarded to Bombardier H.L. Lake, Bombardier C.H. Butler, and Bombardier L.C. Chaffey.

This was a comparatively quiet period except for fairly vigorous patrolling on both sides. Several local raids were made by the allied infantry in order to obtain prisoner identifications. The regiment gave artillery support to these raids. This often necessitated firing very close to the allied infantry, and once again the 166th was commended for the accuracy of its fire.

On 12 February, Lieutenant W.G. McNeilly, RA, and fourteen other ranks attended a ceremonial parade in Florence. At first extreme secrecy was maintained as to the purpose of the parade. It subsequently proved to be an inspection of fighting troops by the United States General George C. Marshall, who was returning from the Yalta Conference.
About the middle of February it was learned that the regiment, together with the rest of the division, was to be pulled out of the line for a rest. This involved the severing of the regiment’s association with the South Africans—a parting which grieved all ranks.

The regiment came out of action between the 16th and 19th of February and moved to the divisional rest area. Later the regiment was to move south to rest, sending one battery to Benevento as demonstration battery at the Central Mediterranean Training Centre and the other two batteries for rest and training 30 odd miles away.

There was to be an interchange of the battery at Benevento periodically.

On 18 February, the regiment received the great news that leave to Newfoundland would begin on 27 February. Two officers and sixty-six other ranks were to be at the post of embarkation on that date. In addition, three other ranks were given leave to England, where they had been married. The agitation for their leave had started as far back as 1 February 1944. The welcome news that it had been granted was the best tonic that could have been given to the regiment’s already high level of spirit and morale.

The end of the period found the regiment at rest after having been in action for 17 months except for a short break of 3 weeks.

During the period (January-February 1945) mention in despatches were awarded to the following members of the regiment for gallantry in Italy: Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Hitchcock, MC, Major J.S. Childs, Gunner W. Dodd and Gunner G. Shute.

The regiment’s casualties for the period were very light. They were as follows: Gunner J.E. Dawe, killed in action on 27 January; Lance Bombardier B.S. Budgell, wounded on 9 January; and Gunner W.G. Laite, wounded on 30 January.

The following are copies of letters received by the Commanding Officer, 166th Newfoundland Regiment, about this time.

(1)

“Main Headquarters,
6th South African Armoured Division,
U.D.F., G.M.F

Dear Hitchcock:

In thanking you for your letter of February 24th, I want to take the opportunity of expressing the thanks of the Commander and all ranks of the
South African Division for the magnificent support which your Regiment has given us.

It was with real regret that we received the order which transferred the Newfoundland Artillery from our command. However, your loyal and cheerful co-operation will always remain as an inspiration and happy memory. We look forward to being associated with you again in the near future.

Please convey to your officers and men our sincere thanks and ‘beste wense vir die toekoms’ [best wishes for the future]

Yours sincerely
(Sgd) J.P. Palmer
Major General
6th South African Division”

(2)

“Headquarters,
Guards Brigade,…

To Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Hitchcock, M.C., and all ranks 166th (Nfld.) Field Regiment, R.A.

It is with very great regret that I have to say goodbye to you on ceasing to be affiliated to the Brigade. We have fought many battles together, and strong ties of mutual trust and friendship have grown up between us. I know that I am speaking on behalf of all ranks in the Brigade when I say that we are extremely sorry to be losing you, I would like to thank you for all the splendid support you have given us and to express the hope that we shall be associated with you again at some time in the future. Meanwhile, the best of luck to you all, wherever you go.

(Signed) [M.D. Erskine] Brigadier
Commander Guards Brigade”

The 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment, RA.

The 59th (Newfoundland) Heavy Regiment, RA, composed of volunteers who signed on at St. John’s, Newfoundland, in March 1940, saw almost continuous action on the western front from the early days of the Normandy campaign to the final victorious invasion of Germany.

The regiment disembarked in France at Courseulles-sur-Mer on 5 July 1944. Within 24 hours of disembarkation, two of its batteries were engaged on their first task, shelling a concentration of German tanks west of Carpiquet in the battle for the neighbouring airport.
From that moment onwards the regiment was engaged in one long continuous battle. It took part in the grim action at Caen, in the fierce fighting for Falaise, in the historic battle for the closing of the gap, at Esquay and Evrecy, and its guns also covered the crossing of the River Odon. After the liquidation of the Falaise pocket, the regiment was moved up to protect the crossing of the River Seine.

During the last week in August, one battery, under the command of Major [Douglas] Stone, was detached from the regiment and was sent speeding forward in pursuit of the retreating Germans. It came to be known as a special task force, and its 155 mm guns wrought havoc among the enemy in the chase across Belgium. The members of this battery were among the first troops to liberate Antwerp. The mayor of this city presented each of them with a bottle of wine and a packet of cigars. At another town the delighted population wished to show their enthusiasm for the Newfoundland gunners by holding a dancer on their gun positions, and brought along mouth organs and accordions for the purpose.

This flying column of heavy guns fought on the Gheel bridgehead where their guns were only 2,000 yards from the front line.

The battery’s roving commission took it forward with a corps to Nijmegen at the time of the airborne landing at Arnhem. It went up to assist in the widening of the corridor and in the relief of the advanced forces. So numerous were the gunners’ targets during this critical period that they turned their guns round three times a day.

The next duty assigned to the battery was to take part in the action that led to the capture of the ancient citadel of Hertogenbosch. There, in support of the Canadians, it did fine work firing over Tilburg at the retreating Germans. Up to that time it had only one or two days’ rest since landing in France. When the battery eventually rejoined the regiment, after its hectic “round trip,” its heavy guns were worn out and new guns had to be issued.

Meanwhile, at the end of October 1944, the regiment gave support to the Canadians in Belgium and south-west Holland in the historic Scheldt pocket, in the battle for the great port of Antwerp. In mud and rain, the guns were in action day and night for a period of five weeks. Only twenty four hours were spent “at rest” near the ancient city of Ghent. Even then, there was no time for sightseeing as the entire twenty-four hour period was devoted to the maintenance of the regiment’s guns and vehicles.

The Newfoundlanders, under very difficult conditions, gave assistance to the assault on South Beveland especially on the Beveland Isthmus, as well as in the attack on Walcheren.
The regiment took parts also in the action at Breskens where the regimental area was four-fifths flooded, and in the fighting over the Leopold Canal. At Breskens, their guns were sited on islands formed by farmyards.

On 31 October the 59th went into action in an area south of the town of Breskens in support of the Canadians and British commandos in their attacks on Flushing and Westkapelle. These attacks were compared in fierceness to the Anzio beachhead fighting and to the assaults on the islands of the Pacific. The conditions under which the regiment lived and fought were by far the worst in its experience. The area had been laid waste and was partly under water, but even in these flooded and desolate conditions the Newfoundlanders managed to build shelters and make themselves comparatively comfortable. In the course of these operations an observation party was ordered to cross the Scheldt to the port of Flushing in an armoured carrier. The party consisted of Major Witherick, Bombardier Bragg, and Bombardier Walsh. On their arrival at the Breskens jetty they were informed that no vehicle was permitted to cross the estuary. Accordingly, they loaded their equipment—a wireless, blankets, and food—into a craft which was continually under enemy fire.

On the conclusion of their operation, the regiment received a letter of appreciation from the Canadian corps commander who emphasized the invaluable assistance that the big guns had given his troops in their arduous task.

On the eve of 6 November, the regiment received instructions to rejoin General Dempsey’s Second Army south-west of Eindhoven. This involved a march of approximately one hundred and fifty miles over roads congested with traffic and war material. The regiment left the Breskens area at dawn on 7 November and arrived at its new positions in the early hours of the following day. The moving of the heavy guns with large vehicles was a triumph of skill and endurance which won praise for the drivers from all ranks.

After a few days, the regiment took up battle positions commanding the approaches to Germany in what may aptly be described as the “Battle of the Canals.” At last, after four and a half years of eager anticipation, the 59th was now firing its guns on to the territory of the Greater Reich. Time and time again, the heavy shells were loaded into the gun-breeches by the enthusiastic Newfoundlanders anxious to fire on the land of the Nazis.

During the next few weeks the regiment moved from position to position nearer and nearer to the German frontier, along roads and tracks so deep in mud that it was a common sight to see officers and gunners digging out the guns and vehicles. Throughout these trying days, the health and morale of the regiment continued at an exceptionally high level, buoyed up by the prospect of crossing the border of Germany on the final stage of the long road to victory and home.
On Sunday, 10 December, Gunner C.J.H. Clarke and Gunner J.T. Dawe received from the corps commander, at a ceremonial parade, the “Commander-in-Chief’s Certificate” for gallantry during a bombing attack on the regiment during July. RSM J.H. Cotton received the same award at the same time for conspicuously good service throughout the campaign. The certificate was also awarded to Lieutenant “Wick” Collins for the excellent part he and the surveyors whom he trained had played. Unfortunately, he was not with the regiment to receive it as he was in England on sick leave.

The beginning of December found the regiment deployed in Holland in support of the British attack on the last remaining bridgehead west of the Meuse, centred around Roermond and Venlo.

The weather had not been good, and the almost perpetual rain turned the tracks and gun areas into muddy swamps. Consequently, the work of “serving” the guns was considerably increased. However, despite these conditions all ranks worked cheerfully and well, and their allotted tasks were completed satisfactorily.

On 9 December, the regiment moved a few miles south, and deployed to cover certain areas east of the Meuse. It was thought that the regiment would be in action in the area for some little time and therefore various welfare activities were started. One of the many excellent Dutch village schools was taken over and patched up with the assistance of eager volunteers from the regiment. Lighting and heating were installed, furniture was borrowed, and a wireless set purchased. The school was opened as a regimental institute for reading and writing and indoor games under the direction of the padre and Sergeant Newman (22 Battery). In addition, education classes and inter-battery sports were organized.

In the middle of December real winter conditions set in, and the ability of the Newfoundlander to make himself comfortable in the most adverse circumstances was shown to great advantage. “Two-men” canvas bivouacs and tarpaulins were issued and these were skillfully converted into warm and comfortable billets. Most of the Newfoundlanders built themselves tents with wooded sides and floorboards which were much superior to mere canvas tents. They also installed excellent stoves and introduced various ingeniously contrived methods of lighting. Altogether, considering the difficult conditions under which the men worked, the health and morale of the regiment remained at a very high level.

During this period information concerning leave to England was received and ballots were held within the regiment with due ceremony. Naturally, enquiries were made as to the possibility of leave to Newfoundland and an official reply on that subject was eagerly awaited.
A few days before Christmas the two 155 mm batteries (20 and 23) were ordered to move south into Belgium as independent batteries. The role assigned to them was to assist in covering the crossing of the Meuse and to prevent the initial German penetration in the Ardennes from developing.

The 155 mm batteries subsequently went into action in support of the various British and American counterattacks on the German salient. This action entailed considerable movement by both batteries during the next ten days of December, moves which were carried out on roads covered with snow or ice. The speed of these moves reflected credit on all concerned. 20 Battery particularly distinguished itself by carrying out a rapid night march on icy roads under conditions which were considered impossible by all except 20 Battery itself.

Meanwhile the 7.2 batteries did not remain idle. 22 Battery moved to a forward gun area on Christmas Eve to carry out counter battery tasks. 21 Battery remained in its original position where it was usefully employed in engaging hostile mortars.

During December it was learned that Gunner M.P. Lawlor and Lance Bombardier R.J. Maloney, both of the 20 Battery, had been awarded the British Empire Medal for gallantry in the course of a bombing attack on the regiment in July. Sergeant C.D. Rendell and Sergeant E.P. Newman, both of 22 Battery, received commendations of gallantry during the same bombing attack.

The opening of the year 1945 found the regiment divided into two parts. RHQ and the two 7.2 inch batteries (21 and 22) were deployed in Holland covering the area east of the Meuse between Roermond and Venlo. The two 155 mm batteries (20 and 23) were grouped under Major Stone (23 Battery) supporting the British and Americans at the “tip” of Von Rundstedt’s salient in Belgium in the area of Marche. But although divided operationally, the entire regiment was as one in its anxiety to cross the German frontier and thus hasten the Nazi downfall. The regiment’s one thought was a “Victorious New Year.”

The period from early January to 3 February 1945 found the regiment in the same position that they had assumed at the New Year. The 155 mm batteries grouped under Major Stone continued to support the troops of the Second Army against the point of the German salient in the Ardennes. This grouping imposed a considerable strain on battery signal resources since the command had to be exercised without the resources of regimental headquarters. Nevertheless the job was well done, and Major Stone gave special praise to Lance Bombardier E. Monahan of St. John’s, Lance Bombardier R. Sullivan of Calvert, and Gunner F. Riggs of Grand Bank.
The batteries were kept fully employed. Their long range fire was used to harass the vital German supply roads as well as to engage hostile batteries and troop concentrations. Many observation parties were sent out and did their share in directing the fire on to the German positions.

By 19 January, the German salient was nearly eliminated and the battle to clear what was called “the Roermond triangle” was staged. To take part in this battle the 155s remained detached and carried out a long and difficult march north into Dutch territory on the Geilenkirchen front. Once again the drivers deserved great credit for their work in bringing their vehicles over the snow and ice bound roads without casualties.

As the battle progressed, both batteries moved forward into German territory, thus fulfilling one of their greatest ambitions. 23 Battery claimed the honour of being one of the first of the regiment’s batteries in Germany as well as in Holland and Belgium areas. The batteries found the German villages devastated by the regiment’s shell fire. They had the satisfaction of knowing that the necessary work of destruction was now being done on German soil and against German property. The Germans had left the countryside thickly strewn with mines and booby traps, but, fortunately, not many casualties were sustained although some vehicles were blown up. The only personnel to suffer were Sergeant Mercer and Gunner Shea, both of whom were wounded as a result of the latter having accidentally trod on a mine.

Meanwhile the rest of the regiment remained in action west of the River Maas near Roermond, The 7.2’s were fully employed in engaging hostile batteries and mortar positions every day. This was an unspectacular task but called for a constant state of readiness on the part of the gunners.

Air photographs, taken after bombardments of enemy positions, testified to the accuracy and effectiveness of the regiment’s fire, which in some cases was very heavy.

The regiment was also engaged in the battle for the Roermond triangle. It supported the infantry making the attack from positions west of the Maas, thus firing at right angles to the advance and enfilading the German positions. At the start of this battle, the 7.2’s were moved some 10 miles to the south and came under the command of a medium regiment for a few days.

As the battle progressed, 22 Battery moved up again to its original position and 21 Battery to a new position nearby. Although the weather was extremely cold and the snow lying thickly, 21 Battery had no buildings for shelter. The Newfoundlanders made full use of their bivouacs and tents and their home-made stoves. They did so with so much success that all were comparatively comfortable and warm. Indeed, when an opportunity arose later
on to obtain accommodation in regular buildings some of the men at all events did not wish to move.

During this time, the 7.2’s continued to be fully engaged. The firing programmes included much night firing with the result that the gunners were serving the guns more or less continuously throughout the night. In fact, men who had been in action since the start of the campaign in France declared that this was the most strenuous period that they had yet experienced.

Captain Ben Wade of 22 Battery left the regiment on 28 January to go to England on an air observation post course. His place as battery captain was taken by Captain H. Bannister who had been on attachment to the regiment.

The regiment moved, on or about 5 February, from the positions it had held south of the Second Army line before Roermond up to the Grave area in order to support an attack by the Canadians. The march, which was very long, was also arduous because all the roads were thick with traffic and were very poorly surfaced. The thaw which had set in, and the continuous flow of traffic, had combined to break up the road surfaces to an incredible degree. It was only through remarkable staff work, traffic control, and driving that it was possible for the big concentration to take place according to plan.

On the evening before departure two men of 20 Battery lost their lives as a result of accidentally treading on mines. They were Gunner Andrew Churchill and Gunner Phillip Coleman. This sad accident might have claimed two more victims, who were also trapped in the minefield, had it not been for gallant work on the part of the reserve party led by Lieutenant Rupert Jackson. Working with mine detectors in pitch darkness and pouring rain, the rescue party cleared a path to the two survivors and brought them and the bodies of the killed men safely back without casualties.

On arrival in the new battle area, regimental headquarters and the two 155 mm batteries were deployed near Mook on [the] south bank of the Maas, while the two 7.2” howitzer batteries crossed the river to come under command of the 52nd Heavy Regiment, just north of Mook. This division of the regiment was necessary in order to make full use of the 7.2” howitzers which would otherwise have been firing at too long a range. Very full use was made of them, and some 200 rounds per gun were fired in 18 hours by each of these batteries.

Lieutenant Colonel Longfield, the commanding officer of the 59th, wrote of this achievement: “No one who is not well acquainted with the 7.2” howitzer and its 200 lbs. shell can fully appreciate the work involved in such a programme especially under the soft ground conditions prevailing.” He added: “It reflects great credit on all concerned that a difficult operation and an arduous programme were both completed according to plan.”
By about 13 February the initial stage of the attack was completed and
the enemy was out of range. Owing to the lack of roads through the battle area,
it was decided that the regiment should move west of the Maas and fire in
enfilade across the enemy line. Accordingly, the 7.2” howitzers returned to
command and the regiment moved south to the area of Boxmeer. The country
in this district was completely waterlogged. Consequently, great difficulty was
experienced in finding any suitable positions. Those eventually found were
extremely difficult to occupy. However, all the batteries were soon in action
and continued to fire in support of the troops on the east side of the river.

During this period, 21 Battery received new 7.2” howitzer equipments,
which were a big improvement on the old. The Newfoundlanders quickly
learned how to handle them and fired 80 rounds per gun during their first night
in action.

On 27 February, to keep up with the general advance, the regiment, this
time as a whole, moved across the Maas and took up a position on the southern
outskirts of Goch. The regiment found that very little remained of that German
town except piles of ruins. Its reduction by bombing and shell fire was
complete, and the only cover that its houses afforded was in their cellars. All
the houses seemed to have excellent cellars, the roofs of which were of
reinforced concrete. Some of them, particularly those in the outskirts, had
obviously been used as strong points.

On 10 March, the regiment left Goch to move into action in a series of
positions to assist the Canadian Army to clear up the German bridgehead in the
Wesel-Xanten area. The final move was to Sonsbeck near Xanten on 13
March. The 59th was therefore well placed in the big concentration which Field
Marshal Montgomery was building up in preparation for his assault on the
Rhine. There was little firing from this position, and extraordinary measures,
including the famous Rhine smokescreen, were taken to mislead the Germans
and to conceal the high commander’s intentions from them.

The terrain in the Rhine basis is very flat and both sides had to use
towers and church spires as observation posts. It was established that seven
such towers were being used as observation posts by the enemy. The regiment
carried out the systematic destruction of all seven by using single guns of 21
Battery. These guns were sited well forward, and the five were directed by
observing the rounds as they fell. The efficiency of the gunners and of the
battery’s new guns was fully demonstrated. On one of these targets, a church
tower, the guns registered no fewer than 26 consecutive direct hits.

Meanwhile, the preparation of the regiment’s forward position for the
big attack continued. Ammunition was dumped and camouflaged. A survey
was completed, and, on the nights of 22 [and] 23 March, the guns were brought
The final preparations were made during the hours of darkness. The guns were camouflaged, slit trenches were dug, and the ammunition was moved on to the actual gun positions. At dawn, all was completed and again camouflaged, the men remaining under cover.

The assault commenced at about 6 pm when an eight-hour bombardment of the enemy’s battery positions was begun. Fire was continued throughout the night and until just before ten o’clock the following morning. At that time all artillery fire was suddenly stopped to allow the tremendous allied airborne armada to pass over. The regimental area was directly below its path, and the greater part of the aircraft passed overhead at about 600 feet. The spectacle of thousands of aircraft and gliders, British and American, passing in perfect formation so close overhead was unforgettable.

The assault and the crossing of the Rhine were completely successful. Very soon it became apparent that the German line was completely broken.

The regiment was selected to go forward with the armour and the breakthrough troops. This was not a usual role for heavy regiments and was the highest compliment yet received by the 59th. The 59th had the unique distinction of being the only heavy artillery to cross the Rhine.

The regiment crossed the Rhine on 27 March and was subsequently engaged in a series of rapid fire and movement actions more usually associated with [the] Royal Horse Artillery Regiment. These deployments were skillfully executed, and although fire was not often required, it was always available. A short concentration of the regiment’s heavy shells was found to have a very salutary effect on stubborn pockets of enemy resistance. One such pocket had held up the tanks for some time when the regiment was asked to assist. A quick response of some 24 200 lb. shells on the enemy positions resulted in large fires and the withdrawal of the Germans, minus two officers and about 200 men who gave themselves up.

The 59th took part in the two last big battles on the British sector of the western front—the capture of Bremen and the crossing of the Elbe at Lauenburg.

The regiment had advanced northwards with the 52nd Division. The advance culminated in the crossing of the Elbe at Verden and in the battle for Bremen. Hard fighting took place on a narrow front along the road from Verden to Bremen. It was a time of quick moves and many for the 59th. It was an exhausting experience, the regiment employing its heavy artillery as though they were twenty-five pounders. But, as usual, the Newfoundlanders did their part without a hitch or a mistake. The fighting finally reached the suburbs of Bremen, and then the city surrendered.
The very day that Bremen fell, the regiment received orders to move, at first light on the following morning, some 130 miles back to the 12th Corps, to take part in the operation against Hamburg. This march was accomplished in good time, the regiment proceeding to a “high area” from which it moved on the next day to go into action in support of the crossing of the Elbe at Lauenburg. This action was the last.

Then came final victory, the surrender of Germany and VE Day.

In his report covering this period of the regiment’s activities the commanding officer of the 59th wrote the following splendid tribute to his Newfoundland gunners: “As their Colonel, let me say as Epilogue: If there is any job requiring courage, determination, and hard work, these men will do it, if it is within the bounds of human endeavour. A really fine lot of men I am proud to command.”

During the period from 15 May to 29 June, the regiment was stationed in the town of Bergedorf, really a residential suburb of Hamburg and situated some seven miles up the river from that great port.

In Bergedorf, the 59th carried out the duties of an occupation regiment. Each of the occupation regiments, at the request of the Allied Military Government, was allotted a particular area to police and control. The area controlled by the 59th centred around Bergedorf and covered a district of some 27 square miles in all. The commanding officer of the regiment was appointed the garrison commander of the area. Among the most important occupation duties of the 59th were the following:

The regiment was responsible for controlling the movements of all personnel in the area including displaced persons (refugees of all nationalities), German prisoners of war, and German civilians. At first there was a rigid control of all movements, but the control was gradually relaxed in accordance with the principle that the Germans must administer themselves under the instructions of the Allied Military Government and that therefore movement must not be hampered except for security reasons. The control was exercised through a system of battery checkpoints in the area which was manned day and night by personnel from the regiment assisted by interpreters. These personnel interrogated all displaced persons, German prisoners of war, and German civilians. Displaced persons without proper passes were handed over to 22 Battery’s collection centre, where they were again interrogated and despatched to the various DP camps. German prisoners of war without proper discharge papers were sent to a prisoner of war cage run by 23 Battery which sorted out the prisoners of war into SS, or non-SS, troops and then sent them to prisoner of war cages in Hamburg for final disposal. German civilian transport was also checked to ensure that they carried the correct Military Government passes. When the regiment first arrived in the Bergedorf area on VE Day there was
considerable confusion and unauthorized movement. But once the system of checkpoints was established all movement was placed under control.

Another very important part of the regiment’s activities was the control and welfare of the DP camps. There were nine such camps in the area when the regiment arrived. The number of occupants varied from 100 to 500 persons according to the size of the camp. Many nationalities—Russians, Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch, Latvians, Estonians, Italians, and Danes—were represented. Most of the displaced persons were formerly forced labour workers.

On the regiment’s arrival, it found that the German administration had broken down and that the conditions in some of the camps were chaotic. The occupants of the camps had to forage for themselves. Bands of displaced persons were busy collecting food, clothing, and fuel wherever they could lay their hands on any. Accordingly, the most urgent task that confronted the regiment was to reorganize the camps and improve the existing conditions.

Each battery was made responsible for a certain number of camps, and, with the aid of German labour, the camps were cleaned and painted. Regular supplies of rations were obtained through the Allied Military Government, and the various nationalities in the camps were sorted out. The displaced persons were naturally exuberant after their years of forced labour, and were very grateful for the improvement in their condition. The natural charm and friendliness of the Newfoundlanders did much to ease the occasional awkward situation which arose. Within a month, all but two of the camps were evacuated, and all the displaced persons, except the Italians, were on the first stage of their journey home.

On 24 May, Lieutenant Colonel Longfield left the regiment following his promotion to brigadier. He was succeeded in command of the regiment by Major R.C.R. Forsyth.

On 2 June, the regiment bade farewell to its guns. This was an important occasion and was marked by fitting ceremonial. The Commander, Brigadier F.C.F. Cleeve, CBE, DSO, MC, attended the farewell parade by special invitation of the commanding officer of the regiment. The guns “marched past” to the strains of the Royal Artillery Slow March, played by the band of the Second Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment, and the 59th saluted guns for the last time as they proceeded on their way to the ordnance department. These guns had served the Newfoundlanders well, first of all during the years of training in England, and afterwards in battles from the Normandy beaches to the Elbe.
The regiment was well cared for during the period of occupation duty. A great variety of entertainments were provided for all ranks both in Bergedorf and in Hamburg.

Nevertheless, the news that the regiment was soon to return to England was received with great enthusiasm, and the whole regiment bustled with preparation for the journey.

In view of the impending return to England on 19 June, the regiment held a farewell parade for the commander, Brigadier Cleeve, and his staff. The whole regiment took part in the parade and once again it had the services of a band, this time that of the Fifth Battalion of the Inniskillin Dragoon Guards. The brigadier inspected the parade and made a farewell speech, after which the regiment marched past the brigadier. In the course of his speech, Brigadier Cleeve complimented the regiment on its excellent appearance and ceremonial drill.

During the period from 15 May to 29 June 1945 the following awards were gained by the regiment: MBE—1068102 WOEL I (ASM) Juggins, G[erald V[ivian], REME (Warrant Officer Juggins was in charge of the regiment’s light aid detachment, and as such put in excellent work in the maintenance of guns and vehicles); Mention in Despatches—970797 Gunner Smith, W.D. (awarded for courage and initiative just before the regiment crossed the Seine. Although wounded he remained at his post and foiled an attempt to steal either rations or petrol); Commander-in-Chief’s Certificate (awarded for continuous good service)—971331 W/Sergeant Head, H.S., 971293 W/Sergeant Harvey, P.J., [and] 971097 L/Bombardier Tapper, G.

The commanding officer of the 59th concluded his report on the regiment’s activities during the period 15 May to 29 June 1945 with the following words: “Finally the Regiment is now ready to return to England, the first stage of the journey home, with the knowledge that they’ve done a really good job of work throughout. The Regiment has gained the admiration and respect of all with whom they served, and there will be many over here who will be sorry to see the Newfoundlanders depart. The Newfoundlander is a very likeable chap and he has undoubtedly made many friends amongst his comrades in arms during this campaign. The really constructive and useful job of work the Newfoundlander has done during the last seven months is just another example of his versatility and ability to settle down in any surroundings, and there will be many D.P.’s of all nationalities who will be forever grateful for his service.”.

The Newfoundland gunners of the 59th, in common with the personnel of the other artillery regiments on the western front, could take legitimate pride in the tribute paid by Field Marshal Montgomery to the men who manned the
guns in the victorious offensive against Germany. The Field Marshal’s words form a fitting epilogue to the epic story of the heroic exploits of Newfoundlanders [in] two artillery regiments.

This is his message: “I would like to pay compliment to all gunners and I would like this to be passed on to every gunner. The gunners have risen to great heights in this war. They have been well commanded and well handled. In my experience the Artillery has never been so efficient as it is today; it is at the top of its form. For all this I offer you my warmest congratulations. The contribution of the Artillery to final victory in the German War has been immense. This will always be so[,] the harder the fighting and the longer the war, the more the Infantry and in fact all the arms, lean on the gunner. The proper use of the Artillery is a great battle-winning factor. I think that all the other arms have done very well too, but the Artillery has been terrific and I want to give due weight to its contribution to the victory in this Campaign.”

Service Statistics

(1) Statement showing the number of Newfoundlanders enlisted in the Royal Navy, Royal Artillery, and Royal Air Force as at 30 September 1945:

**Royal Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted in Newfoundland and sent to the United Kingdom</th>
<th>2,889</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in United Kingdom on termination of engagement with the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in the United Kingdom other than above</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in Newfoundland for Rescue Tug Service, RN</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,419</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Royal Artillery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted in Newfoundland and sent to the United Kingdom</th>
<th>2,255</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers enlisted in Newfoundland and sent to the United Kingdom</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted in Newfoundland but did not proceed overseas</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enlisted in the United Kingdom on termination of engagement with the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit | 47
Enlisted in the United Kingdom other than above | 21
**Total** | **2,343**

**Royal Air Force**

Enlisted in Newfoundland and sent to Canada (BCATP) or to the United Kingdom (Ground Crew) | 429
Enlisted in the United Kingdom on termination of engagement with the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit | 219
Enlisted in the United Kingdom other than above | 65
**Total** | **713**

Several hundred Newfoundlanders have joined the Canadian armed forces. The number is conservatively estimated at 600 men.

Grand total of Newfoundland men enlisted in the armed forces of the United Kingdom and Canada | 7,075

---

(2) Statement showing the number of Newfoundland Girls enlisted in Canadian forces as at 30 September 1945:

| Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service | 74 |
| Canadian Women’s Army Corps | 190 |
| Royal Canadian Air Force (Women’s Division) | 260 |
**Total** | **524**

The above are classed “On Active Service” by the Canadian authorities.

(3) Statement showing the number of Newfoundlanders reported dead, missing, believed dead and missing as at 30 September 1945:

| Royal Navy | 347 |
| Royal Artillery | 72 |
It is known that 22 airmen serving with the Royal Canadian Air Force have died.

(4) Statement showing the number of Newfoundlanders discharged from the service as medically unfit for further service or for other causes as at 30 September 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy (including Rescue Tug Service)</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Air Force crews and ground staff</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,527</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Recapitulation of enlistments, deaths (including missing) and discharges, showing number still serving as at 30 September 1945:

**Royal Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlistments</td>
<td>3,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths (including missing)</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,587</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Royal Artillery**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlistments</td>
<td>2,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths (including missing)</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,317</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Royal Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlistments</th>
<th>713</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths (including missing)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges</td>
<td>88 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>493</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total of Newfoundland men still serving as at September 1945</td>
<td>4,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s enlistments</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prisoners of war as at September 30 1945

| Royal Navy  | 1 |
| Royal Artillery | 0 |
| Royal Air Force | 3 |
| **Total** | **4** |

(6) Statement showing honours and awards awarded to Newfoundlanders serving in the Royal Navy, Royal Artillery, and Royal Air Force as at 30 September 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Honours and Awards</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cross</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Empire Medal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar to Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Medal</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Medal</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention in Despatches</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificate for Gallantry or Good Service</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar to Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Croix de Guerre</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspicuous Gallantry Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commendations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander-in-Chief’s Certificate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of the British Empire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force Cross</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Efficiency Decoration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Bronze Star</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>152</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Statement showing particulars of Newfoundland Regiment (on active service) as at 30 June 30, 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned direct</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned from the ranks</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seconded to Department of Defence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to other units</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placed on reserve of Officers</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present strength</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Ranks

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enlistments</td>
<td>1,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To commissions</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Royal Artillery</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To other units</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medically unfit and other causes</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Merchant Navy

In addition to the Newfoundlanders in the Merchant Navy when War broke out, some 600 were enrolled by special arrangement to assist in manning the many new ships being built. The enrolment was done under the Department of Public Utilities and the actual recruiting and signing on agent was Captain Dalton of the Newfoundland Railway.

Overseas Forestry Unit

It was estimated that about 3,500 Newfoundlanders were sent over at various times to the Overseas Forestry Unit in the United Kingdom. A large number of these joined the fighting services in the United Kingdom at the termination of their engagement with the Forestry Unit. The Newfoundland Department of Natural Resources handled the recruiting and other affairs of the Overseas Forestry Unit.
VIII
NEWFOUNDLAND’S STRATEGIC VALUE
Newfoundland’s geographical location made her a strategic asset of incalculable value to the mainland of North America. This fact was suddenly and vividly revealed in 1940, when the Nazi conquest of Norway, the low countries, and France gave Hitler control of a large a section of Europe’s Atlantic coastline. These disasters drove home to Canada and the United States the primary strategic importance of Newfoundland to the military security of North America.

Shortly after the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Canadian prime minister announced in the House of Commons at Ottawa that the Dominion had assumed responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland and that Canadian troops had already been despatched to guard vital areas in the island. Later, an official statement declared that Newfoundland would form an integral part of the defence area under Canada’s eastern Command and that Newfoundland’s home defence forces would be brigaded with Canadian troops. With the complete consent and approval of the Newfoundland government, Canadian forces undertook the protection of the great Gander airfield, the Botwood seaplane base, the Bell Island iron mines, and the capital city, St. John’s.

Following the establishment of the joint defence board of the United States and Canada in August 1940, Newfoundland was rapidly integrated into the general scheme of hemispheric defence. In that same month the United Kingdom, with the full approval of the Newfoundland government, granted the United States the right to construct bases in Newfoundland and to hold them on a 99-year lease. Construction began early in 1941. Three areas were selected. One was at Quidi Vidi on the outskirts of St. John’s, where the Fort Pepperrell military base was built. The leased area in St. John’s also embraced a frontage on St. John’s harbor, where special port installations were constructed. The second was at Argentia on the western side of the Avalon Peninsula, where the United States government established a vast naval and army base and a great airfield. The third was at Stephenville on the west coast of Newfoundland, where a large and well equipped staging field was built. By the bases agreement of 1941 between the United Kingdom and the United States, the latter was accorded, and continues to exercise, exclusive jurisdiction, civil as well as military, over its own personnel in all the leased areas. The United States was also granted jurisdiction, to a limited extent, over Newfoundland and foreign personnel in all the leased areas. The bases agreement also conferred on the United States the right, in the event of an emergency, to take military action anywhere in Newfoundland after consultation with Newfoundland and Canada. In the protocol annexed to the bases agreement, both the United Kingdom and the United States expressly recognized Canada’s defence interests in Newfoundland.
Meanwhile, Canada had entered into defence arrangements of her own with Newfoundland and the United Kingdom, whereby Canada was given the responsibility of administering and defending Gander and Botwood bases for the duration of hostilities. Canada proceeded to spend large sums on the improvement and enlargement of both these bases. On Gander alone she spent $30,000,000 in the period 1940-1945. In return, Newfoundland gave her a guarantee of security of tenure up to fifty years in the lands within these bases on which her installations were erected. Canada also built a new airbase at Torbay near St. John’s on lands either granted by the Newfoundland government or purchased by the Canadian government from private owners. The title to the Torbay airbase was vested in the Crown in the right of Canada. Canada’s greatest construction project in Newfoundland territory, however, was the immense airbase on the Hamilton Inlet in Labrador, the cost of which was estimated at approximately $25,000,000. Newfoundland granted Canada a 99-year lease of Goose Bay airbase for military purposes. The agreement stipulated that the base was to be available to Newfoundland civil and military aircraft on the same terms as to Canadian government planes. Goose Bay was made available also to the United States and the United Kingdom military aircraft for the duration on the war and for such time thereafter as was mutually agreed to be desirable in the interests of joint defence. The Goose Bay agreement further provided that the right of the United Kingdom to enjoy continued use of the base was to be subject to discussion between the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Newfoundland after the war. With the full approval of the Newfoundland government, Canada also financed and constructed a naval base at St. John’s for the British Admiralty. Moreover, Canada built a subsidiary repair base at Bay Bulls in the vicinity of St. John’s. Finally, with the consent of the Newfoundland government, many facilities of a minor character, but auxiliary to the bases or necessary for military communications, were installed by Canada at various points in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Thus Newfoundland became the Gibraltar of the West, bristling with bases which played a decisive part in winning the vital battle of the Atlantic. Argentia was of major importance in enabling the United States Navy to maintain effective control of the western Atlantic. St. John’s harbour was, unfortunately, too small to be used as an assembly point for convoys, but it proved an excellent convoy escort base for destroyers and frigates. St. John’s also rendered very valuable service as a haven of refuge for ships stricken by enemy submarines and as a port of succour for survivors. Aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force, based on Gander and Torbay, provided an umbrella of air power for convoys over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, to points where effective air coverage could be continued by planes operating from Iceland and the Azores. Thus Newfoundland became as it were an unsinkable aircraft carrier guarding the western convoy routes against the ravenous packs of U-boats.
She also became one of the sallyports of freedom, for many of the bombers which dominated the skies over Germany like an avenging host from out of the west were ferried across the broad Atlantic to the United Kingdom either direct from Gander or by way of Greenland and Iceland from Goose Bay.
HISTORY
OF
NEWFOUNDLAND'S PARTICIPATION
IN
WORLD WAR II.

SECRET